Warrior Ethos

[Surferbeetle]

As to the French Experience in Algeria, I wasn't there, however I find that Alistar Horne has something to say on tactics in his book A Savage War of Peace, Algeria 1954-1962

Of all these measures, the most ambitious-as well as the one that was to leave the most lasting imprint of Soustelle's regime-was the formation of the S.A.S corps. Their aim, essentially, was to take into their protective net populations in the remoter bled that might otherwise become subject to the rebels, or buffeted by the army-or both. Some 400 S.A.S detachments were created, and each under an army lieutenant or captain who was an expert in Arabic and Arab affairs and could deal with every conceivable aspect of administration; from agronomy, teaching and health, to building houses and administrating justice. The kepis bleus, as they were affectionately called, were a selflessly devoted and courageous band of men, who made themselves much loved by the local populace, and for that reason were often the principal targets of the F.L.N., suffering the heaviest casualties of any category of administrator. Foreign journalists who saw them at work in the remoter bled, isolated and in constant danger, never ceased to be impressed. Unfortunately, there were always too few kepis bleus with all numerous qualifications that the job required; and, inevitably, there were the bad ones who transformed the S.A.S into "intelligence centers" where torture was not unknown.

Looking to the US experience I note that after MCO was over in WWII we moved into rebuilding/stabilization/globalization operations with respect to Germany and Japan...a combined operation kinetic/nonkinetic operation from the macro view which resulted in not a few years of peace. GEN Lucian Clay had a couple of thoughts on the necessity of such a strategy.

Moving to B.H. Liddell Hart (a WWI veteran)in his book Strategy:

Strategy not only stops on the frontier, but has for its purpose the reduction of fighting to the slenderest possible proportions.

This statement may be disputed by those who conceive the destruction of the enemy's armed force as the only sound aim in war, who hold that the only goal of strategy is battle, and who are obsessed with the Clausewitzian saying that 'blood is the price of victory'. Yet if one should concede this point and meet its advocates on their own ground, the statement would remain unshaken. For even if a decisive battle be the goal, the aim of strategy must be to bring about this battle under the most advantageous circumstances. And the more advantageous the circumstances, the less, proportionately, will be the fighting.

As an Iraq veteran I am here to tell you that combat operations did not occur 24 hours per day during my year (03-04), and that indeed, indirect/armed social work/non-kinetic operations reduced violence levels. I also lived through the results of reduced indirect/armed social work/non-kinetic operations and the resulting increase in violence. For the datapoint, I worked 7 days a week 'outside the wire' for the first six months and 6 days a week 'outside the wire' for the next six months and traveled fairly extensively during both periods.

Another datapoint to think about...From Wired: North Korea: The Mother of All Stability Ops?

Let’s assume that the U.S. and Republic of Korea forces succeed — with brute force, or without — in smashing North Korea’s no-tech army. Then what? Well, you might have to deal with a few more consequences. Try dealing with millions of starving North Koreans, for starters. Add to that the threat of a few loose nukes. And finally — this is the really hard part — try administering a country that has been under the control of a Stalinist regime for six decades. I wouldn’t expect a swift transition to democracy or a painless reunification.

In a recent conversation I had with strategist and Pentagon consultant Tom Barnett, he made precisely that point. “North Korea is not really a war scenario, let’s be honest,” he said. “It’s a humanitarian scenario; it’s a hunt for the weapons of mass destruction scenario.” And you thought Afghanistan and Iraq sucked.