Warrior Ethos

[William F. Owen]

"I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat." Basically the antithesis of COIN.

Destroying enemies of the U.S. in close combat is not the main objective for U.S. ground forces in the COIN environment.

Actually I beg to differ. This is exactly what's wrong with current "flavour of COIN" some are advocating.

Defeating the enemy either in close combat or by stand-off methods is the essential military contribution to COIN. If this requirement did not exist then COIN could be performed by policeman.

COIN is WARFARE! It's primary mechanism is killing and captureing - in some cases, so as to contribute to the security of the population. It is in no way the antithesis of COIN. If you are not skilled in killing and capturing the enemy, he will merely seek to do the same to you, or the population.

[CPT Foley]

Actually I beg to differ. This is exactly what's wrong with current "flavour of COIN" some are advocating.

Defeating the enemy either in close combat or by stand-off methods is the essential military contribution to COIN. If this requirement did not exist then COIN could be performed by policeman.

COIN is WARFARE! It's primary mechanism is killing and captureing - in some cases, so as to contribute to the security of the population. It is in no way the antithesis of COIN. If you are not skilled in killing and capturing the enemy, he will merely seek to do the same to you, or the population.

COIN is a more subtle kind of warfare, that is primarily political in nature. Galula stresses a xerox machine is more powerful in COIN than a machine gun...a pediatrician more valuable than a mortar expert. GEN Chirelli stressed that there was direct correlation between violence and garbage pick up. It's an environment where Soldiers shooting up the Koran on camera is a more devastating set back than losing a whole Brigade in combat. I'm not pretending we don't need to be trained to inflict violence in the effort to protect the population, and I agree the Police take on a greater role in COIN, but I'm adamant that the 'kill/capture' takes a less prominent role - and wonder if the new paradigm is best characterized by the word Warrior. I was in awe of the bravery and selflessness of guys & gals I served with in Iraq and they did have something special that other Soldiers should emulate. I think we need to strive to build reverence around the word 'Soldier' the way the USMC has created around the word 'Marine,' and respecting other cultures and protecting noncombatants should be part of the new ethos. Not because its nice, but because it's key to winning in COIN.

[William F. Owen]

COIN is a more subtle kind of warfare, that is primarily political in nature.

All warfare is political. Read Clausewitz. Dead civilians are a political problem, not a moral one. There is only one kind of WAR and very few types of warfare.

Galula stresses a xerox machine is more powerful in COIN than a machine gun...a pediatrician more valuable than a mortar expert.

A Paediatrician is only useful if he produces political effect. If he treats kids and everyone still hates you, his work is useless.

It's an environment where Soldiers shooting up the Koran on camera is a more devastating set back than losing a whole Brigade in combat.

So a video on Youtube has greater political effect than 3,000 casualties in 24 hours? Seriously?

I'm adamant that the 'kill/capture' takes a less prominent role - and wonder if the new paradigm is best characterized by the word Warrior.

There is no new Paradigm. FACT. Nothing you are doing in COIN is new or hasn't been done by other armies. Regardless of the frequency you actually do it, Killing and Capturing, or gain advantage from it's threat, is still your primary function. It's what militaries do.

... respecting other cultures and protecting noncombatants should be part of the new ethos. Not because its nice, but because it's key to winning in COIN.

You do not need to respect the culture or protect noncombatants to win in COIN. Your actions should merely not needlessly create enemies, and you only need to protect those civilians relevant to the mission.

I'm not trying to be a hard ass here, but everything you are saying is symptomatic of the "new COIN" that seeks to portray it as something other than what it is. It is not armed social work, or summed up with silly expressions like "hearts and minds." It is a form of warfare.

[slapout9]

I think there is supposed to be a third aspect in COIN..... it's kill,capture or convert to your side.

[William F. Owen]

I think there is supposed to be a third aspect in COIN..... it's kill,capture or convert to your side.

True, but also true in many forms of warfare. Major grouping changing allegiance is usually fixed in the political domain.

[reed11b]

True, but also true in many forms of warfare. Major grouping changing allegiance is usually fixed in the political domain.

Darn beat me too it..I was going to say "if they convert, there no longer your enemy now are they?"
Reed

[slapout9]

True, but also true in many forms of warfare. Major grouping changing allegiance is usually fixed in the political domain.

Me thinks it is true in all warfare,conversion just has a higher ratio of activity compared to the others in COIN.

[William F. Owen]

Me thinks it is true in all warfare,conversion just has a higher ratio of activity compared to the others in COIN.

That might be debatable in an historical context. The Vietnam war was State v State yet over 120,000 defected, and a substantial number of those were NVA. The Korean War also similar - but I take your point!

[CPT Foley]

All warfare is political. Read Clausewitz. Dead civilians are a political problem, not a moral one. There is only one kind of WAR and very few types of warfare.

A Paediatrician is only useful if he produces political effect. If he treats kids and everyone still hates you, his work is useless.

So a video on Youtube has greater political effect than 3,000 casualties in 24 hours? Seriously?

There is no new Paradigm. FACT. Nothing you are doing in COIN is new or hasn't been done by other armies. Regardless of the frequency you actually do it, Killing and Capturing, or gain advantage from it's threat, is still your primary function. It's what militaries do.

You do not need to respect the culture or protect noncombatants to win in COIN. Your actions should merely not needlessly create enemies, and you only need to protect those civilians relevant to the mission.

I'm not trying to be a hard ass here, but everything you are saying is symptomatic of the "new COIN" that seeks to portray it as something other than what it is. It is not armed social work, or summed up with silly expressions like "hearts and minds." It is a form of warfare.

It is armed social work, and that's the paradigm shift. Read Toffler. Warfare is different in the information age. To bemoan, that killing/capturing "is what militaries do" denies the changing nature of warfare - warfare in a 24 hour news cycle where seemingly minor acts of disrespect can be seen by hundreds of millions within hours. An insurgency is a competition between the insurgent and government for the support of the civilian population. Your narrow mission-oriented approach reminds me of a combined exercise rehearsal I was at for a simulation exercise. I was the most junior person in the room, which included two retired Generals. An LTC was reviewing some proposed message traffic about our helicopters scaring the sheik's sheep. He quipped, "I don't think we will be sticking around to help herd them up." The room exploded into laughter. I was incredulous. The LTC and everyone in the room, myself included, has been conditioned to put the mission first and make sure SP's are met. But from just finishing a tour with SF in Iraq, I was dumbfounded, and frankly disgusted, that our senior leadership didn't recognize that pacifying the sheik was exponentially more important to overall mission than meeting an SP. And that even if the helicopters did have something equally urgent awaiting them, pacifying the sheik was certainly worthy of consideration versus laughter. That's the new paradigm.

[Entropy]

Count me as one who doesn't like the "warriorization" of our armed forces one bit. The rewriting of the service creeds is particularly bad - I absolutely cannot stand the new AF creed. I am not a warrior - I'm a citizen airman whose duty lies with my nation and constitution, not some warrior "ethos." There's good reason it's "citizen solidier/airman" and not "solider/airman citizen."

[William F. Owen]

It is armed social work, and that's the paradigm shift. Read Toffler. Warfare is different in the information age. To bemoan, that killing/capturing "is what militaries do" denies the changing nature of warfare - warfare in a 24 hour news cycle where seemingly minor acts of disrespect can be seen by hundreds of millions within hours.

Sorry but that's rubbish. No one in the military, or military thought takes the Toffler seriously. Are you seriously advocating the Tofflers over Clausewitz?
Killing someone is an act of disrespect. Did any of the US beheadings on the internet cause a strategic shift? Of course not.
The only news stories that can create strategic effect are stories about events which have strategic effect. Do not confuse the two.

An insurgency is a competition between the insurgent and government for the support of the civilian population. Your narrow mission-oriented approach reminds me of a combined exercise rehearsal I was at for a simulation exercise.

It is only a competition is that if effects a political end state or outcome. Insurgents sometime do not need the support of the population, they just need to scare them into submission. I witnessed this in Sierra Leone.
My narrow mission oriented approach comes from being trained in "COIN" as a very young soldier and studying and reading about COIN for over 28 years. Since I am not American, COIN is not new to me. It is merely a form of warfare.

I am pretty sure Warfare and war in the next 20 years is going to be like the last 20, with Sierra Leone, Georgia, Gaza, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Darfur, and Machetes, High Explosive and AKs will create more political effect, than 24 hour news channels.

[CPT Foley]

Sorry but that's rubbish. No one in the military, or military thought takes the Toffler seriously. Are you seriously advocating the Tofflers over Clausewitz?
Killing someone is an act of disrespect. Did any of the US beheadings on the internet cause a strategic shift? Of course not.
The only news stories that can create strategic effect are stories about events which have strategic effect. Do not confuse the two.

It is only a competition is that if effects a political end state or outcome. Insurgents sometime do not need the support of the population, they just need to scare them into submission. I witnessed this in Sierra Leone.
My narrow mission oriented approach comes from being trained in "COIN" as a very young soldier and studying and reading about COIN for over 28 years. Since I am not American, COIN is not new to me. It is merely a form of warfare.

I am pretty sure Warfare and war in the next 20 years is going to be like the last 20, with Sierra Leone, Georgia, Gaza, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Darfur, and Machetes, High Explosive and AKs will create more political effect, than 24 hour news channels.

I'm not suggesting Toffler replaces Clausewitz, but they aren't necessarily mutually exclusive. Sorry, but the idea that the military establishment scoffs at Toffler only confirms my sense he's probably on to something. To suggest that the media/internet doesn't have enormous impact on strategic events seems to defy credulity, e.g., Abu Ghraib, Gitmo, etc. By your reasoning these are just military detainment facilities. The mission is to keep prisoners from escaping and extract intelligence information. Why would we interfere with such military police operations with fuzzy public relations concerns? Because COIN is a big PR battle. It impacts support at home, host nation, IGOs, NGOs, coalition, etc.

I genuinely respect your considerable service in the COIN environment, but I find David Galula's views more persuasive, as best illustrated in his work "The Pacification of Algeria."

[Ken White]

with also some SF experience and as one who served as (non SF) advisor to two foreign Armies, I do not disagree with much you say and I do very much agree that Warrior is a bad term for the reasons you state and more, I still have some questions on your comments in this thread.

Given that I disagree with Wilf that the wars of the next 20 years for the US will only be like those of the last 20...

That will be true only if we allow that to happen -- we certainly need to be prepared for COIN support and FID but we should also avoid it if at all possible -- and we can do that if we wish -- one question is why would we not want avoid such warfare if at all possible?

To suggest that the media/internet doesn't have enormous impact on strategic events seems to defy credulity, e.g., Abu Ghraib, Gitmo, etc. By your reasoning these are just military detainment facilities. The mission is to keep prisoners from escaping and extract intelligence information. Why would we interfere with such military police operations with fuzzy public relations concerns? Because COIN is a big PR battle. It impacts support at home, host nation, IGOs, NGOs, coalition, etc.

Impact, yes, I agree -- but have those impacts truly affected anything?

I genuinely respect your considerable service in the COIN environment, but I find David Galula's views more persuasive, as best illustrated in his work "The Pacification of Algeria."

How did that effort in Algeria work out for Brother Galula and the French?

I ask that not to be snide or snarky but as a very serious question. Recall that the French had the same advantages in Algeria that the British had in Malaya; they were the government, there was no host nation to deal with -- we will always in any FID situation have the problem of dealing with the host nation and quite probably, also dealing with a coalition. Thus I question whether either Malaya or Algeria provides and guidelines we'd really want to follow. We did after all follow French guidelines in Viet Nam and we know where that got us.

As an aside, I'll point out that the Algerians were not like the Viet Namese as the French discovered, the Viet Namese were not like the Malays as we discovered -- and hopefully, we will realize that the Afghans are not like the Iraqis.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Warfare is different in the information age. To bemoan, that killing/capturing "is what militaries do" denies the changing nature of warfare - warfare in a 24 hour news cycle where seemingly minor acts of disrespect can be seen by hundreds of millions within hours.

I would posit if you change "warfare" to "politics" then you have a more accurate paradigm shift for the 21st Century. That doesn't obviate the fact that war is always war, and at its root it is all about killing. If they do convert, fine.

That is, of course, as long as the "conversion" doesn't occur while they are holding your vulnerable flank!

It is armed social work, and that's the paradigm shift.

COIN may involve some "armed social work" but that "revelation" is not a paradigm shift, COIN has almost always had an element of soldiers doing non-soldier jobs, when they were not killing the bad people. The FFL did it for nearly 100 years in North Africa.

As to laughing at the sheik's predicament that's just crass insensitivity, nothing more.