Warrior Ethos

[Surferbeetle]

The term "armed social work" is in danger of becoming the next "hearts and minds." By that, I mean that people will assume the common usage of the words and draw meaning of the term from there. What do we mean by "armed social work"?

Here is a definition of social work from the International Federation of Social Workers (I'm guessing they're fairly authoritative on the subject?)...
Perhaps a more accurate term would be "armed community organizer." (I recognize that term might bring with it baggage from politics, particularly the last prez campaign, but it sounds more accurate.)

Schmedlap

You are killing me with this...this..community organizer??!!!! Armed social work is bad enough.

Civil Affairs or Civil Military Operations.

Steve

[Schmedlap]

You are killing me with this...this..community organizer??!!!! Armed social work is bad enough.

Civil Affairs or Civil Military Operations.

To be fair, those definitions don't seem to match what our forces are called on to do. Our forces needed to organize some kind of civil order or governance (preferably the latter), not just cooperation between locals and the US military. CA and CMO seem to be geared towards synchronizing existing civil governance with the military, rather than creating or organizing civil institutions in the first place. It seems to assume that some kind of governing framework is already in place and can be leveraged. Well, what if there isn't?

The definitions from the links that you provided above (with my commentary in brackets)...

Civil Affairs - Civil Affairs units help military commanders by working with civil authorities and civilian populations in the commander’s area of operations to lessen the impact of military operations on them during peace, contingency operations and declared war. [Lessen the impact? That is not what has been needed, lately. What has been needed is the creation/organization of some kind of governance so as to prevent a situation from arising in which lots of people organize themselves into gangs, militias, and kill one another due to fear and competition for resources and power. That is not lessening an impact. That is preventing a new threat from emerging out of a vacuum.]
CA units act as a liaison between the civilian inhabitants of a warzone or disaster area and the military presence, both informing the local commander of the status of the civilian populace as well as effecting assistance to locals by either coordinating military operations with non-governmental organizations (NGOs)and IGO's or distributing directly aid and supplies. [Again, this does not meet the need that we have had lately. What was needed was to stand up some kind of indigenous civilian authority to mediate disputes and prevent the society from devolving into Hobbes' "state of nature"]

...operators provide critical expertise to host-nation governments and are also able to assess need for critical infrastructure projects such as roads, clinics, schools, power plants, water treatment facilities, etc. Once a project has been decided on, a contract is put out at a civil-military operations center for local contractors to come and bid. CA teams will periodically check up on the status of the project to make sure the money is being well-spent. [Nice things to have, but you need some kind of governance. Otherwise, these projects do not have the intended effects. Does CA establish governance?]

CA provides the commander with cultural expertise, assesses the needs of the civilian populace, handles civilians on the battlefield, refugee operations, keeps the commander informed of protected targets such as schools, churches, hospitals, etc., and interfaces with local and international NGOs and private volunteer organizations, which provides the commander with a unique battlefield overlay of all civilian activity, ongoing infrastructure projects, and the presence and mission of NGOs in the area. [situational awareness and intelligence collection - but nothing about organizing the people into some means of governance]

Civil Military Operations - The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces."The part is in bold could be a solution in Iraq or Afghanistan, if there are enough troops to do it. But there are not and were not. So those troops, instead, need to organize the locals to do it themselves. But that is not what the definition is describing.

What was needed, so far as I can tell, is not defined in some existing term, so armed social work enters the vocabulary. It sounds, to me, like armed community organizing. Perhaps that is not the best term, either. Maybe armed social work is better. Maybe both are wrong. Fine. But it's beyond the scope of CA or CMO, imo.

This is funny to me because of an incident on the "rhino" that runs between the GZ and VBC. I was on the bus in full gear, no convoy was running there when I needed to be there and couldn't catch air, so it was the rhino I had to ride.

I always enjoyed my visits to the FOBs. My favorite moments were when NCOs or Officers would point out to me or my Soldiers that our uniforms were filthy - as if we had neglected to bring them to the cleaners or something. 99% of people had the common sense to realize that we did not live on the FOB or, if we did, that we clearly just returned from a patrol. There were always a few less gifted ones who pointed out the obvious because they were oblivious.

[Brandon Friedman]

The part is in bold could be a solution in Iraq or Afghanistan, if there are enough troops to do it. But there are not and were not. So those troops, instead, need to organize the locals to do it themselves. But that is not what the definition is describing.

What was needed, so far as I can tell, is not defined in some existing term, so armed social work enters the vocabulary. It sounds, to me, like armed community organizing. Perhaps that is not the best term, either. Maybe armed social work is better. Maybe both are wrong. Fine. But it's beyond the scope of CA or CMO, imo.

When we were dealing with this in Iraq, it wasn't that CA couldn't do it or that we couldn't handle CMO ourselves, but, like you said, there just weren't enough of them (or us). However, I understand that now most combat arms Army officers being involuntarily mobilized out of the IRR are being re-classed as CA officers. I don't know how they're being utilized down range, but it would seem to me that we should be embedding CA teams at the company level (if not lower). Anyone know if we're doing that now? When I was deployed, we had something like a four-man CA team attached to the battalion. Sometimes.

And then there's also the option of creating a civilian international development expeditionary force through State, but there's a lot of political resistance to that.

[Schmedlap]

When we were dealing with this in Iraq, it wasn't that CA couldn't do it or that we couldn't handle CMO ourselves, but, like you said, there just weren't enough of them (or us).

Agree. I was just pointing out that what we were attempting to do was not, by definition, CA or CMO. It was something else that we're searching for a description for: armed social work, armed community organizing, applying band-aids to amputations, something else...

However, I understand that now most combat arms Army officers being involuntarily mobilized out of the IRR are being re-classed as CA officers.

Yikes. I'm afraid to ask how that's working out.

I don't know how they're being utilized down range, but it would seem to me that we should be embedding CA teams at the company level (if not lower). Anyone know if we're doing that now? When I was deployed, we had something like a four-man CA team attached to the battalion. Sometimes.

In OIF I, we had a CA team at Bn level. My last deployment with a CF unit ended in Jan 06. We had one CA team for the BDE. It worked about as well as you would expect.

[Surferbeetle]

Schmedlap,

Great questions, glad to see that you are back. I will break up a few of your points and address them individually. Lets see if we can better describe the Civil Affairs elephant.

To be fair, those definitions don't seem to match what our forces are called on to do. Our forces needed to organize some kind of civil order or governance (preferably the latter), not just cooperation between locals and the US military. CA and CMO seem to be geared towards synchronizing existing civil governance with the military, rather than creating or organizing civil institutions in the first place. It seems to assume that some kind of governing framework is already in place and can be leveraged. Well, what if there isn't?

Let’s split hairs concerning your assumption that a governing framework does not exist (and as I recall you spent time in Iraq so I will use Iraq as a staring point). Nature abhors a vacuum, and in Iraq my assessment (and apparently yours as well when you describe gangs and militias) was that many different governing frameworks existed even though the GoI framework ranged from weak to non-existent depending upon time and place. None-the-less, a review of US history reveals that we have imposed military governments upon countries whose governments we deemed to have failed. The examples include Mexico, The Confederacy, the Philippines, Germany (WWI and WWII), and Japan. The question of who was legally in charge of Iraq during March 2003 until today, is beyond my technical expertise. Wikipedia, however provides a legal background/timeline on the occupation of Iraq and the status of forces agreement and perhaps you or JMM can shed some additional light as to its adequacy and applicability to this question.

The definitions from the links that you provided above (with my commentary in brackets)...

Civil Affairs - Civil Affairs units help military commanders by working with civil authorities and civilian populations in the commander’s area of operations to lessen the impact of military operations on them during peace, contingency operations and declared war. [Lessen the impact? That is not what has been needed, lately. What has been needed is the creation/organization of some kind of governance so as to prevent a situation from arising in which lots of people organize themselves into gangs, militias, and kill one another due to fear and competition for resources and power. That is not lessening an impact. That is preventing a new threat from emerging out of a vacuum.]

[Again, this does not meet the need that we have had lately. What was needed was to stand up some kind of indigenous civilian authority to mediate disputes and prevent the society from devolving into Hobbes' "state of nature"]

[Nice things to have, but you need some kind of governance. Otherwise, these projects do not have the intended effects. Does CA establish governance?]

[situational awareness and intelligence collection - but nothing about organizing the people into some means of governance]

] "The part is in bold could be a solution in Iraq or Afghanistan, if there are enough troops to do it. But there are not and were not. So those troops, instead, need to organize the locals to do it themselves. But that is not what the definition is describing.

Security and Stability are inseparable, as we both know from Iraq. From a purely military standpoint as a CA-Bubba I can’t work with the locals to bring the local Water Treatment Plant back on line (LOO-Restore Basic Services) or assist with elections (LOO-Conduct Free Election) or work with the local police forces to bring them back on line (LOO-Restore Security) without Infantry-Bubbas doing snap-TCP’s, cordon & knock ops, raids, etc. etc. Simultaneously we need SF-Bubbas training local military forces and Active, Guard, Reserve and CA-Bubbas with professional civilian skills (practiced every day) working with the locals on this problem. This is the essence of Civil Military Operations…CA planners (limited resource) helping GPF forces (larger resource) to work with the local population (largest resource) to stabilize the AO.

As you know well, it’s a tough nut/moving target and this is reflected in the progression of US Doctrine for these situations: Small Wars, Low Intensity Conflict, Operations Other Than War, Military Operations Other Than War, Stability and Support Operations, Security Force Assistance, etc., etc.

For your Saturday night reading pleasure GTA 41-01-001 is one of our easily accessible guides to Civil Affairs which is “Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.” and provides more insight into how our small Civil Affairs forces work the worldwide battlefield.

What was needed, so far as I can tell, is not defined in some existing term, so armed social work enters the vocabulary. It sounds, to me, like armed community organizing. Perhaps that is not the best term, either. Maybe armed social work is better. Maybe both are wrong. Fine. But it's beyond the scope of CA or CMO, imo.

IMHO Germany and Japan are examples of adequately resourced CA/CMO operations and Iraq and Afghanistan are poster children for what happens when we don’t adequately resource CA/CMO operations. Who is the Four Star General Lucian Clay of Afghanistan or Iraq?

Again IMHO we should consider adequately resourcing Civil Affairs Forces across all of the services with respect to people, language training, cultural training, industry training, and technical & advanced degrees (your link to the WSJ article on Korean enlistment rates with respect to highly educated professionals could be a part of the solution). This would be with the understanding that the nation that we are assisting will provide the bulk of the needed human capital to accomplish the mission....which of course will drive how we approach the problem set.

Lastly we need to incorporate CMO training from AIT and BOLC forward.

Ken, however brings out some pithy points that need to be reflected upon as well. If I may paraphrase: Since capabilities/tools are often used in emergencies without respect to long term impacts is this capability something that we as a nation want to invest in?

Steve

[Ken White]

However, ever now and then I do think I need to throw a cautionary wet blanket (with sand) on the beach party...

...As you know well, it’s a tough nut/moving target and this is reflected in the progression of US Doctrine for these situations: Small Wars, Low Intensity Conflict, Operations Other Than War, Military Operations Other Than War, Stability and Support Operations, Security Force Assistance, etc., etc.

I suggest there is not so much a progression of doctrine as a plethora of names which have by themselves fragmented effort to an extent by precluding a consistent doctrine. Everyone wants to make big tracks when they're on watch...

IMHO Germany and Japan are examples of adequately resourced CA/CMO operations and Iraq and Afghanistan are poster children for what happens when we don’t adequately resource CA/CMO operations. Who is the Four Star General Lucian Clay of Afghanistan or Iraq?

You keep using these and I keep pointing out that the circumstances and the people were and are totally different -- that's a bad comparison, the politics of the day, the economics, the troop strength and several other factors make those literally dangerous and misleading comparisons. Such an effort is not going to be made today. Not even close.

Ken, however brings out some pithy points that need to be reflected upon as well. If I may paraphrase: Since capabilities/tools are often used in emergencies without respect to long term impacts is this capability something that we as a nation want to invest in?

We need to invest in it and will -- the real question is to what extent and for what use...

[Surferbeetle]

However, ever now and then I do think I need to throw a cautionary wet blanket (with sand) on the beach party...I suggest there is not so much a progression of doctrine as a plethora of names which have by themselves fragmented effort to an extent by precluding a consistent doctrine. Everyone wants to make big tracks when they're on watch...You keep using these and I keep pointing out that the circumstances and the people were and are totally different -- that's a bad comparison, the politics of the day, the economics, the troop strength and several other factors make those literally dangerous and misleading comparisons. Such an effort is not going to be made today. Not even close.We need to invest in it and will -- the real question is to what extent and for what use...

...and so it's worth the wet blanket (even with the sand).

Ken,

We are in agreement that getting the analysis wrong can have dangerous consequences and that Germany & Japan are not the best fit models for Iraq & Afghanistan for the reasons that you mention...however I am open to suggestions as I dig around and try and find/understand more appropriate models

We certainly have other fish to fry when it comes to dedicating a four-star to head up CA/CMO operations for these two conflicts, but having been spoiled by having worked for some good GO's...

Steve

[Schmedlap]

... as a CA-Bubba I can’t work with the locals to bring the local Water Treatment Plant back on line (LOO-Restore Basic Services) or assist with elections (LOO-Conduct Free Election) or work with the local police forces to bring them back on line (LOO-Restore Security) without Infantry-Bubbas doing snap-TCP’s, cordon & knock ops, raids, etc. etc. Simultaneously we need SF-Bubbas training local military forces and Active, Guard, Reserve and CA-Bubbas with professional civilian skills (practiced every day) working with the locals on this problem. This is the essence of Civil Military Operations…CA planners (limited resource) helping GPF forces (larger resource) to work with the local population (largest resource) to stabilize the AO.

But there is a very important job missing there. Essential services, law enforcement, elections, and defense are important. But what about standing up some shell of a government? If there is no government and no law, then what offices are you filling with your elections and what laws are the police enforcing? Without a local government, who is responsible for maintenance and standards of community property? I don't see any guidance for who is in the lead for standing up a government. State Dept maybe? I don't know. I didn't see any mention of it on this thread or the links provided. It would seem like something related to CMO, but that doesn't answer the question either.

[MikeF]

But there is a very important job missing there. Essential services, law enforcement, elections, and defense are important. But what about standing up some shell of a government? If there is no government and no law, then what offices are you filling with your elections and what laws are the police enforcing? Without a local government, who is responsible for maintenance and standards of community property? I don't see any guidance for who is in the lead for standing up a government. State Dept maybe? I don't know. I didn't see any mention of it on this thread or the links provided. It would seem like something related to CMO, but that doesn't answer the question either.

Schmedlap hits on a very important point- one that I've been studying intensely for nearly the last two years. What do we do when there is no functioning government or the populace rejects the current government? There is no silver bullet answer here, and both Iraq and Afghanistan can arguably placed in this category. Unfortunately, we will probably find that we can either do nothing, or we will have to occupy for several generations in the hopes that an American military presence can provide enough security over time to allow the subtle,slow shift towards stability and acceptance of a national government.

Going back to the earlier discussion on the use of violence and soldier behavior in COIN, I had a Brigade Commander sum up our ethos with the following quote,

"Treat everyone with dignity and respect, but be prepared to kill them."

I would submit that actively pursuing, tracking down irreconciliables and killing them IS mutually exclusive to acting like a jackass and behaving ignorantly and disrespectfully to the populace. It is simply a matter of discipline and professionalism. Personally, I found acting politely and intermingling with the populace can be the best form of intelligence collection even if one is forced to use coercive population control measures to provide intitial security.

Teddy Roosevelt said we should "walk softly and carry a big stick." I think his words are still valid.

Ken would probably sum it up with METT-TC. There is a time to bring the love, and a time to bring the hate. A commander must discern which COA is valid given the particular environment. Regardless, one can still act in a manner of professionalism and discipline.

Ultimately, the true battle is between the host nation and its' people. It has nothing to do with us. We can either assist, arbitrate, or get in the way. When we forget that COIN/IW is warfare, then I would submit that is dangerous. I've observed too many units that drive down the road instead of manuevering/bounding b/c they felt all they were doing was conducting "non-lethal" operations. I could never understand why they did not realize the enemy did not care what their mission was.

CPT Foley- I wrote an essay a while back on the conditions I observed in the DRV back in late 2006 as a small town descended into anarchy. You may want to take a look at it to determine how you would engage this situation in order to stop the violence and provide security. At the time, I determined an indirect or soft approach was not feasible given the total collapse of the government. It speaks more to what Wilf (Mr. Owen) is referring to as to the necessity of the use of violence to secure the populace.

With all of that said, I've gotta get back to my thesis writing. Please feel free to dissect and refute anything I've said.

v/r

Mike

[Surferbeetle]

But there is a very important job missing there. Essential services, law enforcement, elections, and defense are important. But what about standing up some shell of a government? If there is no government and no law, then what offices are you filling with your elections and what laws are the police enforcing? Without a local government, who is responsible for maintenance and standards of community property? I don't see any guidance for who is in the lead for standing up a government. State Dept maybe? I don't know. I didn't see any mention of it on this thread or the links provided. It would seem like something related to CMO, but that doesn't answer the question either.

FM 1-04, Legal Support to the Operational Army (Distribution Unlimited) gives some background on the JAG's role with respect to your question. Civil Affairs Rule of Law and Governance Teams (Appendix E) are staffed by Functional Specialists (including lawyers - although the JAG Corps always brawls for those bodies) in these areas. Many/most of the CAT-A's are staffed by generalists (Army, Marine, & Navy)

With respect to Civilian Functional Specialists FM 3-07 Stability and Support Operations (Distribution Unlimited), Appendix F speaks to PRT's and their role in Governance (Paragraphs F5, F6, & F7).

Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone by Rajiv Chandrasekaran. Haven't read it myself, but it may provide you some more insight on the CPA days...or not.

Gun toting diplomats ? From the US Army's Special Operations Recruiting Battalion Webpage:

The remaining 96 percent of the Army’s Civil Affairs Forces are found in four Civil Affairs Commands, subordinate brigades and battalions in the Army Reserve. They provide a prime source of nation-building skills. These reserve-component Civil Affairs units include Soldiers with training and experience in public administration, public safety, public health, legal systems, labor management, public welfare, public finance, public education, civil defense, public works and utilities, public communications, public transportation, logistics, food and agricultural services, economics, property control, cultural affairs, civil information, and managing dislocated persons.