It is clever. "Quest for Fire" meets "Who Moved My Cheese."Originally Posted by jenniferro10
It is clever. "Quest for Fire" meets "Who Moved My Cheese."
They do. That’s why it’s important for people like us--with our experience and military values--to actively involve ourselves in the political process. If you’re not willing to do that, then you’re conceding control of American defense policy to the people like you’ve described.
That's a good piece. Part of the problem with inflexible leadership is that military leaders are never evaluated by their subordinates. So they’re never accountable to the troops they lead. I think this would help:
To go along with that, Schmedlap also suggested peer reviews. This way, leaders who weren’t responsive to changing conditions would eventually be outed by their subordinates and, hopefully, not promoted into critical positions like the ones we’re talking about.I've never understood why officers are officially evaluated primarily by their superiors, when it's their subordinates who really know whether or not they're effective. I've always wondered why the Army doesn't implement an evaluation program much like those administered in colleges and universities around the country--teacher evaluations. At the end of each semester, the professor leaves the room, the TA passes out the Scantron questionnaire forms with the extra sheet for comments, and the students fill them out anonymously. Then the forms go to the Dean. Why doesn't the military evaluate PLs, COs, and BCs like this? But instead of every soldier filling out the form, it would be answered by, say, only subordinate NCOs and officers.
I typed up my own forms and did this for one of my platoons at the end of my time, and it was the best, most honest feedback I ever received in the Army. If similar questionnaires on the other PLs had been passed up to my commander and the BC, they would've been able to better compare the effectiveness of their PLs.
Surferbeetle,
You provided some good info in that last post. Now my question is, where are those people? Where were they? If we have people tasked for the purpose of standing up a government, are they doing it? Were they trying in 2003? Were they even in theater? Are they now?
Assuming that we have properly identified the skill sets necessary to do this, and tasked the job appropriately (at least on paper), do we have nearly enough of these people to do the task that they have purportedly been given?
Somewhat related point - I think the real crux of the issue regarding whether we need to "train Soldiers for COIN" and also "train Soldiers for high-intensity operations" rather than "training them to operate across the full spectrum" is a debate that completely misses the point. The real crux of the issue is not just one of whether you can pack in a certain amount of knowledge and skills into one brain. Rather, it is a question of whether you can expect the average 19-year-old Soldier to adjust his mental and emotional state on the fly to operate across the full spectrum of operations. The average 19-year-old rifleman is intelligent, resourceful, and creative. He can learn the skills and apply the knowledge. But 19-year-old riflemen are generally not emotionally mature. They have a difficult time transitioning from close-quarters combat, where the interaction is an exchange of deadly force, to face-to-face non-lethal engagements where the interaction is an exchange of information. The real question should be, can we expect most Soldiers to operate effectively in this environment? (I think the answer is yes, but....) If so, for how long? If deployments were 4 to 6 months in length and units maintained a habitual relationship with their AOR (meaning you deploy to location X, redeploy and maintain dialed in to what is occurring in location X, then deploy again to location X, and so on) and we kept Soldiers at their duty stations for 5 or 6 years, rather than 3, then we would see much better results and there would be no more wondering about the counterproductive distraction known as the Nagl-Gentile debate.
Very much the point. This is the danger in the "COIN is not Warfare" approach that suggests that "in COIN" you do X and Y, instead of emphasising WHY things are done give an particular circumstance or condition, and this dependant on judgement. You want to provide a broad set of tools and education that is as widely applicable as possible. This is impossible in a culture that has become emotionally dependant fitting warfare into separate boxes.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I know an almost 80 year old ex-rifleman who isn't emotionally mature...
I also know a few people of diverse ranks and ages who have the same problem. I have a Sister in Law, former schoolteacher who insists 19 year olds today are equal to 16 year olds of 30 years ago. She may be right but if so, no worries; I've seen a lot of then 16 year olds pass for 18, go to war and do okay -- and I mean do okay in shifting gears up and down the spectrum of combat and that to an extent few have seen recently.
Generally, if you tell people they can do something, they'll do it -- tell them you don't think they can and they'll do that; act as if their attempting to do it makes you nervous and that will make them nervous. Treat 19 year olds like children and they'll continue to act like them. You have to force them to grow up quickly; it is not that hard to do.
Everyone has difficulty transitioning from CQB to seemingly friendly interchanges for information; or, more correctly, that transition ability is not age specific -- it's person specific and some do it better than others. Know your people...
All that is idle comment -- point is; Our training is marginal. If we better trained at initial entry, Officer and Enlisted, we could eliminate a lot of this conjecture. It would be nice if in that training, we treated both as if they were more mature than they may be; people tend to rise to expectations. Do that and we will have no problem with full spectrum operations. The US Army trained for it before, successfully IMO, no reason they cannot do so again. That seems particularly so given the increased quality of troops today versus then...
We do need to stop the excessive PCS and we need to scrap up or out. We also should stop running decent kids off for minor disciplinary infractions. Schmedlap's tour idea is good; a year is a long stint and sending units to different AOs in succeeding rotations during operations like Afghanistan and Iraq is just tactically stupid -- the modular effort is great but there's a time and place.
Agreed, I also feel that after intial training, most training should be unit based. That "Ranger" example eluded to earlier has always steamed me a bit. Do it as a unit and you get a unit, with the sense of team spirit and cooperation only improved. Do it as individuals and individuals you will get; and individuals make poor soldiers and TEAM members. Just my sleep deprived 2 cents.
Reed
Posted by Wilf,Excellent post, and you identified the words I have been looking for. Ken also hit the nail on the head in another forum where he discussed the Army's training down fall when it started adapting training methods from industry, which was check the block training on each task. If you put the right hand guard on first you get a no go, if you don't tie a perfect square knot on your pressure dressing you get a no go, and of course both of the requirements were no value added, but everyone had to waste time to learn how to respond like a robot instead of a thinking person. Even Specail Forces adapted this stupid training methodology. Old timers cringed, I wasn't experienced enough at the time to see the danger in the methodology, but I see it clearly now. During that transition period, many of our officers spent more time reading and quoting the latest business books (management fads) than they spent studying war fighting. I can see how we got to the point where we couldn't transition to changing environments well over the years. Hopefully those days are long behind us.Very much the point. This is the danger in the "COIN is not Warfare" approach that suggests that "in COIN" you do X and Y, instead of emphasising WHY things are done give an particular circumstance or condition, and this dependant on judgement. You want to provide a broad set of tools and education that is as widely applicable as possible. This is impossible in a culture that has become emotionally dependant fitting warfare into separate boxes.
Posted by Reed,Good point Reed, although I'm not sure what you do with the 50% of the unit that can't make Ranger school, but we do need more very tough unit level training. I still think JRTC and NTC are excellent training venues for units. The Army did good when they stood up these training centers. I haven't been through a rotation in recent years, so I can't speak to their effectiveness now, but it is an excellent concept.Agreed, I also feel that after intial training, most training should be unit based. That "Ranger" example eluded to earlier has always steamed me a bit. Do it as a unit and you get a unit, with the sense of team spirit and cooperation only improved. Do it as individuals and individuals you will get; and individuals make poor soldiers and TEAM members.
Last edited by Bill Moore; 06-02-2009 at 06:47 AM.
This is spot on. One solution I've kicked around would be to focus unit training on kinetic, force-on-force engagements--as we've always done. At the same time, create a 10-week, stateside, permanent, counterinsurgent course focused on basic language instruction, customs, regional negotiation tactics, etc.
You send all junior combat arms officers through the course after OBC and you send E-4s and above when you can get them there. One of the primary purposes of Ranger School is that you train these guys from across the Army, and then sprinkle them evenly throughout combat units, so that no infantry platoon is without at least one or two Ranger-qualified soldiers. These soldiers, then, are supposed to be the ones who pass on mental toughness, confidence, and expertise (the ability to march while sleeping, I guess?).
By setting up a course like this, you wouldn't have to spend time training every young soldier on the tenets of COIN while he's just trying to learn how to fight and how to use the 240 and the ANCD (if we still use those). Let the leaders in each platoon handle the counterinsurgency. (Because realistically, how often do 19-year-old riflemen need to interact and exchange information? That's a job for NCOs and officers and, fortunately, with the exception of maybe checkpoints, there's usually an E-5 or above present in most situations.) This way, COIN becomes ingrained in combat units, while they focus their unit training on shooting, moving, communicating, and fighting.
This would be expensive and excessively time-consuming, but when nature builds a better mousetrap, you have to become a better mouse. We have to be able to do both.
Okay. Scenario, some time after the year 2015:
What language? Whose customs?
No idea. I mean, it's an important question that would have to be worked out. Fortunately, there's a lot of overlap--as in, Muslim culture has similarities from Indonesia to Morocco. Also, because we don't start new conflicts every year, we could target relevant regions for languages. For instance, we're not leaving Afghanistan or Iraq any time soon, so you could start with Arabic and the Persian languages. But it would likely have to also include a random mix of languages and customs (like Somali, Korean, Urdu, etc.)--that is, unless the Army went along with Schmedlap and started PCS'ing people every five or six years and sending units back to the same places. In that case, you could really target soldiers for regions.
Bottom line, I don't know. It's just an idea. I just think that having half a dozen trained and qualified counterinsurgents in each platoon would alleviate a lot of this debate on "fighting" versus "COIN."
No one else does either, therefor, Congress, correctly will not fund it.
There are also other problems...If you believe the cultures of Indonesia and Morocco have much in common, you need to travel more. Afghanistan and Iraq are far more closely located and they're two totally different cultures. Plus, who says the issues will occur in Muslim areas.Fortunately, there's a lot of overlap--as in, Muslim culture has similarities from Indonesia to Morocco.
I spent 45 years training or helping others to train for a land war in Europe. Never been there but I've eaten a whole lot of rice on many occasions in several nations over a good part of those years...During the Viet Nam unpleasantness, we trained people to speak Viet Namese -- then sent a lot of them to work with Montagnards who did not speak Viet Namese. I have visions of Dari speakers playing with Urdu speakers -- or Arabic speakers.Also, because we don't start new conflicts every year, we could target relevant regions for languages. For instance, we're not leaving Afghanistan or Iraq any time soon, so you could start with Arabic and the Persian languages.That doesn't address the personnel turbulence issue -- US Army units typically rotate about 20-30% of strength annually, thus your Dari speaker goes on PCS to Korea. We may improve on the turbulence and we should but it will still affect your proposal.But it would likely have to also include a random mix of languages and customs (like Somali, Korean, Urdu, etc.)That's the point -- do not target soldiers for regions, that will in any implementation fragment units. Units are very important even though the US Army due to a 1917 derived personnel system consistently refuses to recognize that. Individuals are trained to be a part of a unit; Reed and Schmedlap are right, once you get an individual trained to be a competent soldier, he or she goes to a unit and that unit trains to do its job; COIN or MCO, the differences in what that unit does are relatively minor. How well -- or poorly -- it performs is largely a function of its leadership (the collective)....that is, unless the Army went along with Schmedlap and started PCS'ing people every five or six years and sending units back to the same places. In that case, you could really target soldiers for regions.
You have to train Units for their job; the effort should be toward generic training with occasional forays into specialized training for various environments. For deployment to specific areas, Training Packages, tailored to echelon (Plat/Co; Bn/Bde; Div/TF/JTF) with language and cultural stuff and structured for rapid learning are used. Those package have to offer EXTRA information and guidance for NCO leaders, for Co Officers and for senior commanders (and their vastly oversized staffs). The Packages must contain not only cultural and custom information but also should be very current politically and culturally -- that currency would not be present in a School course; I spent seven years in TRADOC and they do not do current...
Well, not very well, anyway.
Nothing wrong with ideas, the more the better. However, in the end, the Army has to settle on ideas that are effective (not that it always does...); training individuals for specific locations faces the difficulties of which locations and how much training coupled with when and where those individuals are assigned. The bureaucracy doesn't handle those aspects at all well. The probability is that an excessive amount of training will be given on areas an individual never sees -- or that is dated and no longer relevant.Bottom line, I don't know. It's just an idea.I suggest that it would merely move that debate into the Platoon that had a half dozen 'counterinsurgents.' The Platoon should be focused as a unit on its job -- which can be performed in all spectrums of combat.I just think that having half a dozen trained and qualified counterinsurgents in each platoon would alleviate a lot of this debate on "fighting" versus "COIN."
The key to that transition ability is well trained and competent leaders. For a variety of reasons, some valid, some specious, we do not address that fact as well as we should.
You mentioned Ranger School and the 'philosophy' of having Ranger trained folks scattered through out the Army to sort of stiffen everyone. Good theory; in practice it doesn't work. Nor does Ranger School develop superior combat leaders -- it is too short and too intense; too much important stuff has to be left out. What Ranger School does accomplish is teaching future leaders that they're tougher and can do more than they might think. That's a big plus and is applicable in any spectrum of conflict. I can see no pluses in a Counterinsurgency School that would be short, intense and leave too much out.
OTOH, if 'counterinsurgency' techniques which are universal were simply embedded in ALL training as it was at one time...
It ain't that hard.
I see your point, there are hundreds, maybe thousands of languages and cultures to choose from, and it's hard two determine where conflicts will emerge in six years. Very true. I think it's less about turning our Soldiers into cultural/language experts than to giving them enough cultural/lang. info to be more effective. I have been working on Arabic now for 5 years and am convinced I have the linguistic capabilities of a wombat. Doesn't look like I'm on the expert path. It's much easier to recruit experts than develop them. But I do think it's really worth giving our troops the culture/lang. 101 & 102. Most of our troops are very conscientious. If we let them know that learning 50 key phrases in the dominant language in their AO will make them exponentially most effective - and safer - they will embrace it. We do it now to a certain degree, but with a lack of emphasis. It's like another crummy online class we have to complete. Not something vital to our efforts.
Not to make group members pound the table and scare their family at breakfast, but I always felt we missed a big opportunity in Iraq to leverage the huge amount of Iraqi civilian workers (tens of thousands) on our bases. It's not hard to imagine an Iraqi worker at home listening to the extended family members debating how bad Americans are, how we should help with IEDs, etc., and have the worker say, "they seem like very good people. The men at the gate always say "ahlan wa shalan" when I come. The people who work in my building always say "salaam alaikum" and "shloon alahal" when they see me. The man I work for insisted I take some sweets home for the children. When I told him Yasin was sick he gave me aspirin. He insists I take a breaks for salat. They are good people. They are here to help."
Ok, "OIF the Musical" written by Frank Capra IV has gotta hurt your head. Especially for those used to dodging bullets. But I want to be clear. I understand we still need to kill, capture, interrogate, intimidate, use force, etc., etc., - so please don't make it a hard vs soft choice. We can do both. But I think the benefits of having our troops actively trying foster an great PR image would be a force multiplier. We are losing the IO battle to people who cut off peoples heads with dull rusty knives. But we don't have to. I realize most of our IO problems originate from the strategic level, but that doesn't mean we shouldn't maximize our opportunities at the operational level.
Last edited by CPT Foley; 06-02-2009 at 12:02 PM.
I'd suggest Klingon, with smatterings of Romulan. Now before y'all get your backs up and protest.
Isn't the idea to teach principles rather than specifics?
Don't you want soldiers to be able to operate in ANY environment rather than a singular environment?
From my perspective as a "group" military establishments have a tendency to hold to silos of knowledge with the tenacity of drowning children. Some things need behaviorist (lock-step) automaton responses. This oozing social stuff though should be taught as principles and strategies, so says the technologist who doesn't go outside very often.
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
Warrior ethos - the ability of an individual to subjugate his emotional and physical pain to the well being of his unit and the chain of command. We have reached a point in our social evolution that outside of SF units, this is about impossible to achieve because the rights of the individual almost equal the rights of the collective. We compensate by trying to have smart soldiers with lots of technology at their disposal.
Don't forget Borg! - well 7of9 anyway.
...but what you say is exactly correct and the silliness of the Combined Arms boys still using Soviet threat models, speaks to this, but not in a useful way.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Zactly...
That sums it up rather nicely. Full spectrum simply means just that. Soldiers don't pick the environment, politics do.
Good job. You can have Sunday off...
LOL - are you trying to completely change the worldview of TRADOC
Seriously, I do agree with you that it should be taught as principles, although I'm not so sure about "strategies" (I'd need some clarification on what you mean by that in terms of training).
One of the most effective cultural training systems was, oddly enough, the Roman system in the 2nd century and, again, in the 4th century. The vast majority of "principles" were only "taught" to the centurianate and the tribunate, but there was an extensive use of exempla - "stories" - that were used to teach the legionnaires. On the whole, both the 2nd and 4th century systems worked pretty well for their environment (the 3rd and the 5th are another matter
It should be possible to modify the 2nd century version - its weaknesses are not really apropos to today's environment (mainly that it encouraged the local revolt of generals once the imperial inheritance system of the Silver Age went down the tubes). The key to that system was to valorize innovative study of specific situations and inductively derive "lessons learned". This was encouraged by the shear number of exempla, stretching back over 1000 years. The final end product of this system, at least in terms of cultural training / education, can be seen in Maurice's Strategikon.
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
I think this has been what Ken has specifically argued against repeatedly. Part of learning how to use one's weapon and how to move as a member of a fire team, et cetera (all of those "skills" that are trained) is also learning how to apply those skills in different situations. In other words, you shouldn't separate training into COIN and high intensity. And, by extension, there is no need to teach "tenets of COIN" to the rifleman or the platoon leader. Just train them to apply force as a unit, how to increase or decrease as necessary, and why.
Here's an example. When I was a platoon leader in Bosnia, we never got into a firefight. We never expected to, either. Nonetheless, when my Soldiers entered a building/room, they still took up their points of domination or otherwise arrayed themselves in a tactical manner. That way, if a situation arose, they could immediately respond. That does not mean that they did a stack before moving through a door or moved with their weapons at the low ready. Their movement was casual. I suspect that none of the Bosnians had any idea that my Soldiers were actually arrayed in a manner straight out of a CTC handbook on urban fighting. But my Soldiers did remain cognizant of where they should be at all times and what sectors they were responsible for - as opposed to some units that viewed SOSO as something distinct from "warfighting" (rather than two ends of a continuum of operations) and just kind of milled about in a gaggle wherever they went. The same principles of movement as a member of a fire team applied. The form that the movement took differed only in the tempo and level of aggression. No need for two separate sets of training - clearing a building in high intensity and clearing in low intensity. Just teach how to clear, methods of breaching, et cetera, make sure Soldiers know the "why" for all of those considerations and they can operate in Bosnia or Iraq, peacekeeping or invasion, COIN or industrial war.
SWC break...
Schmedlap,
Google Links for On Point
link
…and On Point II
link
These are very large documents and I have only sampled portions of them, however this would be a starting point from an official standpoint.The U.S. Army's Combat Studies Institute describes this report as the "US Army's first historical study of its campaign in Iraq in the decisive eighteen months following the overthrow of the Baathist regime in April 2003." It "examines both the high-level decisions that shaped military operations after May 2003 as well as the effects of those decisions on units and Soldiers who became responsible for conducting those operations".
JFQ has an article on Civil Affairs manning
From a personal standpoint, Civil Affairs needs more troops...
Sapere Aude
You can also get the On Point series from CSI. link
They're both PDF and a heck of a haul on anything other than DSL or something equally fast.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
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