New Vision for Joint Concepts

[William F. Owen]

More from General Mattis here

I will take issue with the following though,

Future enemies will avoid U.S. technological strengths in sensing and targeting, which is the whole idea behind hybrid threats: an enemy that will rapidly shift its posture and adapt its operations and tactics to keep U.S. forces off balance. “Hybrid means you’re going to see a mix of conventional and unconventional… it’s not going to be in four quadrants of a DOD chart with disruptive, catastrophic, traditional and non-traditional war,” Mattis said.

OK, Hybrid Threats is a USMC construct, and I am dead set against it, because it is forcing mechanism for getting the USMC to think, just like Manoeuvre Warfare and 4GW. Forcing mechanisms are bad, because they forgive stupidity and dishonesty. IMO, they have no place in an evolved military.

What he says about the four quadrants of a DOD chart is absolutely correct, and always has been, but that does not make Hybrid the answer.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Wilf,

This strongly implies to me that the good General has run out of patience with the "new war" club, and wants to get back to basics. If I am reading this right, then that is to be applauded.

Not so sure that was the intent, but then again I don't think the memo was clarifying as many of you did. I think the memo simply makes a strong argument for vetting ideas before they become mature concepts and doctrine, which I think most serious military professionals would strongly agree with.

He wrote:

We cannot afford to reorganize, initiate multi-million-dollar acquisition programs, or reform education and training curricula based on concepts that are not authoritative or even validated.

I would add that it just isn't the money issue, but the heart of the issue is whether the concept works or not. For example, many have legitimate questions about our new COIN doctrine, just as many questioned the usefulness of EBO. We can frequently recover quicker from misspending a few million dollars on a bad idea, than from the bad idea itself.

Having read a few of GEN Mattis' articles and memo's I'm confident as many have written that he is a big fan of protecting the basics, but I don't think he is making an argument for that in this memo. Instead this memo is focused on concept development and testing, not staying firmly rooted in the past. IMO he clearly makes a strong argument for change when he writes that "States have most commonly revolutionized their own militaries, or even war itself, not by setting out to do so but by trying to solve concrete technical, procedural, and strategic problems they faced."

This compelling challenge can take the form of either a problem or an opportunity.

Our current struggle against transnational terrorism has presented a compelling challenge that some would argue that our doctrine doesn't sufficiently address, thus the rapid development of new ideas and concepts (plus knocking the dust off very sound COIN, FID and LIC doctrine manuals) in hopes of developing worthwhile solutions to significant military problems.

So again I don't see an argument where he is opposed to change, but rather he makes a case that we need a functional process for identifying and implementing the few gems (great ideas/concepts) and ways to disguard ideas that turn out to be unsound such as EBO.

I think the key is first identifying there is a "gap" in our doctrine to begin with. IMO we simply disgarded a lot of our SASO, FID, COIN, doctrine etc., when we started OIF. As such we allowed the problem to morph to a scale where new doctrine may be necessary.

A problem exists if we recognize through experience that doctrine is not working or if the strategic or operational context has changed or is changing fundamentally.

I guess you can make two arguments about OIF, and hopefully OEF-a soon. One is that our doctrine failed us, and out of necessity we developed a new doctrinal approach, or two we simply applied validated COIN doctrine that has existed for years.

An opportunity exists if some conceptual, technological or other advancement could allow us to operate more effectively.

One conceptual idea (out of many) that appears to have some functional merit is social network analysis. There are a number of useful technological innovations that we're incorporating in the conflict also. In most cases it is evolutionary versus revolutionary, but it still needs to be captured in doctrine.

[William F. Owen]

So again I don't see an argument where he is opposed to change, but rather he makes a case that we need a functional process for identifying and implementing the few gems (great ideas/concepts) and ways to disguard ideas that turn out to be unsound such as EBO.

I don't see him being opposed to change either. The sole thrust and intent of my comment was directed towards those who keep thinking up concepts, which the General is clearly sceptical of.

I am actually an advocate for change, but change based on what we know, not the need to have a new concept. I think that would also describe the Generals intent.

[Coldstreamer]

Wilf,

I'm glad I read to the bottom before posting, because you'd already posted all the Mattis wisdom (EBO et al) that I was going to cite.

Indeed refreshing to have command led impatience with horse-poo purveyors. But at the same time, while agreeing with the basis of viewing all military problems on their own terms, based on a close contextual analysis, with solutions based on first principles...there has to be some way to explain in understandable terms the nature of the beast and what we're trying to do. Isn't any 'process' (the estimate, for example) a forcing mechanism to a degree? Or does it only become a forcing mechanism when it becomes a prism that only sees things within its own limited terms? Asking to learn, rather than disagree.

[William F. Owen]

...there has to be some way to explain in understandable terms the nature of the beast and what we're trying to do. Isn't any 'process' (the estimate, for example) a forcing mechanism to a degree? Or does it only become a forcing mechanism when it becomes a prism that only sees things within its own limited terms?

Extremely good point.

The Estimate is indeed a process - and a deeply flawed one, if you mean the 7Qs - but that's another story. The point is that a process like that is actually a structured enquiry, on which to derive information to solve a problem, so truth is pretty much sacred.

Things like Manoeuvre Warfare, Complex War fighting, 4GW and Hybrid Threats, almost always take highly contestable set of facts or even some outright invention, and say "this is the problem" so what you need is my solution and it looks like this. Names get attached and reputations follow.

Because the facts have near enough been invented in the context of the desired problem, there is always tears before bed time, when it is realised that the invented facts are actually the problem, and not the problem folks wanted to solve. See me, for a slightly better explanation or context.

[Coldstreamer]

Yeah, I'd go with that. And the fiction that follows. Such as WW1 was stupid, mindless attrition....in the context of the problems they faced, trench warfare made sense...and only evolved after significant manoeuvre, countermanoeuvre and flanking movements got as far as they could. They deadlock was broken when the integration of the tank, artillery, air and infantry, via detailed timings and use of the wireless enabled real-time combined ops...with resulted in...bugger me...'manoeuvre warfare'.

So what proponents of 'manoeuvre warfare' of the 80-90s were actually espousing, was 'competent warfare'...ie - not runnning spastically at machineguns when a handly covered route for a flanking attack existed. And the 'attritional' alternative to MW or 'stoopid warfare', implied that MW could be achieved at little or not cost - a sad misapprehension.

Yup. A lot of lazy thinking, and conceptual liferafts in lieu of thought.