"Replace Petraeus"-Fred Branfman

[jmm99]

It may not be comfortable, or populer, but given the ambiguous nature of what is and is not a combatant that the entire Warizistan district could reasonably be considered a belligerent party engaged in war against the United States, and it's interests in the Af/Pak area of operations.

Leaving aside any issues of Paki sovereignty over that part of FATA, there is no doubt that AQ-Taliban and associated groups (following the construct of the 2001 AUMF) constitute a "Power" to the armed conflict in the Wari agencies. Where those designated "hostile forces" have control of territory and populace, that territory and populace are belligerent to us - just as Germany and Japan were belligerent nations in WWII. However, as you also point out, they (the general populace) may be more an occupied population than active supporters of the hostile forces (so, are they Germany Proper, Occupied France or something in between ?).

No matter which scenario is fact, the Laws of War still require distinction between combatants and civilians (much more difficult where the combatants melt into the civilians); and consideration of proportionality in targeting (e.g., to eradicate a given group of combatants, how many civilians will be killed ?). Thus, the Wari agencies cannot be a free fire zone.

Through experience and observation I have come to the conclusion that relatives and neighbors of the various terrorist entities as their version Combat Support and Service and Support elements of the vast majority Mujahideen groups. This would make them legitimate military targets would it not?

I'd say that infrastructure - the informal "Combat Support and Service and Support elements" - should be considered combatants; but then I agreed with that aspect of the Phoenix program. To be candid, I think that is a minority position - at least legally.

I am curious about what the folks here think of that - not so much as a legal point (although it can be argued that way); but as a metter of military ethics and military practicality. How do you distinguish these infrastructure folks from the rest of the population - assuming that you can legally target them ? I suppose intelligence, intelligence & intelligence.

The various Gitmo and Bagram detainee cases could impact all of this. These cases are not that important in and of themselves. But, their rules as to the status of "captures" should be the same as for status allowing or not allowing "kills". So far, there seems a tendency to distinguish between armed combatants and unarmed supporters - and to consider the latter as being civilians (not subject to "kill rules"; and subject to detention only if guilty of a crime).

[slapout9]

I'd say that infrastructure - the informal "Combat Support and Service and Support elements" - should be considered combatants; but then I agreed with that aspect of the Phoenix program. To be candid, I think that is a minority position - at least legally.

I am curious about what the folks here think of that - not so much as a legal point (although it can be argued that way); but as a metter of military ethics and military practicality. How do you distinguish these infrastructure folks from the rest of the population - assuming that you can legally target them ? I suppose intelligence, intelligence & intelligence.

That is why I keep talking about the 3F's Family,Friends and Finances criminal/gangs are exactly like that. It is also how you fill out the 5 rings map as opposed to the traditional way if you want to understand the system in an unconventional/covert type situation.

[Blackjack]

I am curious about what the folks here think of that - not so much as a legal point (although it can be argued that way); but as a metter of military ethics and military practicality. How do you distinguish these infrastructure folks from the rest of the population - assuming that you can legally target them ?

That is the question I keep asking myself about these situations. To me, Lawfare is foolish and suicidal in the current small wars that western powers are engaged in. What do you do with the member of a group like HIG who goes out and attacks a convoy with an SVD in the morning, and is sheltered by his family in the evening? What do you do when the village leaders, or tribal leadership are sheltering the man? How do you deal with the four guys in the UK or US who send him $1,000 USD a year to buy ammunition, take care of his family, etc. Al lwhile he is trying to kill ISAF troops, HTT persons and contractors? Do we have to rethink the ethics of warfighting because of these types of enemies and their supporters?

These are soem questions with no easy answer and they bothered me last night. I really need to have a long, hard think on it again.

[jmm99]

but they really go to the core of whatever approach is taken to these violent non-state actors (irregular fighters and their supporters), whether that approach be solely kinetic (direct actions), or totally populace-centric (isolating the bad guys from the population via non-violent means), or a combination of both.

This discussion has been going on in the military law world since the JAG School published its treatise on irregular combatants in the 1959 JAG Treatise, A TREATISE ON THE JURIDICAL BASIS OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN LAWFUL COMBATANT AND UNPRIVILEGED BELLIGERENT (JAG School 1959).

Questions of law and ethics came to the fore in the GVN Pacification Program (1967-1972), which included CORDS and Phoenix. Brigadier General Tran Dinh Tho, author of "The Cambodian Incursion", Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1979, earlier (1977) wrote "Pacification", which can be downloaded in its entirety here. Chapter 4 (4 RVN-US Cooperation and Coordination in Pacification (441 KB pdf) deals with Phoenix and related programs.

Contrary to popular belief, the Phoenix term "neutralize" (used of VC infrastructure) did not exclusively mean "kill". The program was a "kill, capture or convert" program, which during 1967-1972 had very close to a 1/3, 1/3 and 1/3 "kill, capture or convert" ratio.

The greatest problem with Phoenix was positive and reliable identification of who the VC infrastructure were. False IDs in a COIN situation are obviously counter-productive. The negative results in the program were used, of course, to discredit it and the entire CORDS effort.

You might consider reading these old resources, which dealt with very similar questions to those that we see now in Astan.

[slapout9]

is sheltered by his family in the evening? What do you do when the village leaders, or tribal leadership are sheltering the man? How do you deal with the four guys in the UK or US who send him $1,000 USD a year to buy ammunition, take care of his family, etc. Al lwhile he is trying to kill ISAF troops, HTT persons and contractors? Do we have to rethink the ethics of warfighting because of these types of enemies and their supporters?

These are soem questions with no easy answer and they bothered me last night. I really need to have a long, hard think on it again.

You are right about it being a moral question. I would ask who's population are we supposed to protect?....it was supposed to be Americans!!!!!! that is why we started all this to begin with. We may have to set priorities and make hard choices very soon that should have been made before we started all this and we should have made emergency amendments to the legal agreements we are in because of the extreme nature of our enemy.

[jmm99]

the GCs, as accepted by the US, if applied according to the nature of the armed conflicts and the hostile forces involved in those armed conflicts, are not a huge problem.

What has been a problem is adaptation to the situations in which we have been involved. Since 9/11, the US (both Bush II and Obama administrations) has sought to develop a coherent set of rules to deal with the irregular combatants we face. Like any learning process (e.g., consider the development of national policies in the Cold War, from Truman through Reagan), it has had its ups and downs.

We are still very much in the early "lessons learned" stage in development of the Law of War (LOAC) applicable to violent non-state actors and their supporters.

I can't imagine negotiating a common set of "emergency agreements" with the members of the various coalitions since 9/11 - much less with the other High Contracting Parties to the GCs and the various NGOs that would stick in their two cents worth.

[slapout9]

I can't imagine negotiating a common set of "emergency agreements" with the members of the various coalitions since 9/11 - much less with the other High Contracting Parties to the GCs and the various NGOs that would stick in their two cents worth.

jmm, I wouldn't negotiate, I would make a statement saying we will do our best to follow them (laws) but, the enemy has no regard for any laws and is attempting to seek a military advantage by subverting them. If civilians cooperate and shield and support our enemies we will do what we need to do to protect our interest and population not anyone else's. As an example Malaya was never called a "War" it was called the Emergency and any laws and or polices that needed to be changed were changed until things were brought under control.