The answer may lie in old fashioned tracking and follow up.
The LRA are only a problem when they actually do something -that is, go near / attack or attempt to influence a node that someone actually acres about. These are not as common as one might think in the large border areas of the DRC. Hence, you do not need to cover off on the whole area, only the things that matter. This reduces your problem considerably.
Next step is to take a leaf out of the South African book vis a vis SW Africa in the early 80s. The SAPOL's 'Koevet' organisation developed considerable expertise in a framework that consisted of positioning reaction forces near or on the known nodes or infil/ exfil points for the PLAN.
When cued to an incident, Koevet could react, and were equipped with trackers and were mobile enough to follow up and pursue the PLAN elements detected (normally small groups -much like the description offered previously of the LRA's current modus operandi). Whilst Helos were used, the key elements of success I assess were:
a. speed of reaction (based on on sound assessment of vital ground and appropriate positioning forces);
b. appropriate tactical mobility and firepower;
c. tracking skills (often using 'turned' terrorists and/or local indigenes); and
d. Aggression - a desire to close with the enemy and destroy him.
I would be keen to hear why such an approach couldn't work against the LRA.
regards,
Mark
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