COIN case: LRA Lords Resistance Army

[Michael F]

Carl, this makes a lot of sense and i guess some US trained UPDF SF could do the job.

Tracking the LRA in small groups could be a very long task...(months) but present indeed the best chances of success.

It also allows for a more discreet Ugandan presence on DRC soil which surely would aleviate some political pressure on President Kabila.

BTW the UPDF SF commander is Lt. Col. Muhoozi Kainerugaba, the First son of President Museveni. Should the SF succeed it would also be good to prepare the kiddo to take over from daddy

About AFRICOM support, this could be minimal in terms of boots on the ground (support to planning, training the SF and intelligence) which would avoid to risk a second failure (the operation Lightning Thunder failed to its aim of killing Kony but is also said to have been plagged by massive corruption).

Actually, Carl, i think that your idea is possibly already applied. In a ENOUGH report (Finishing the Fight Against the LRA), it is stated that " Many Ugandan troops, however, have stayed in Congo and continue to conduct “intelligence operations” against the LRA. Some low-scale fighting between the remaining Ugandan troops and the LRA has been reported, but these largely below-the-radar efforts are likely insufficient to corner the LRA leadership".

[carl]

I hope the Ugandans are doing something like this now. If they were, it would not be something they would publicize until it was all done.

If they aren't, this is the kind of thing Special Forces A Teams (if they are still called that) would be ideal for. I imagine there would be great enthusiasm for a training mission, and maybe a little leading, to assist the UPDF in finally destroying the LRA.

One thing is, whatever is to be done, it can't depend at all on the FARDC and as little as possible on MONUC.

[Tom Odom]

Congressmen and NGOs picking missions is never a good thing. I am fully supportive of taking out the LRA; an active role, however, for AFRICOM at this juncture would be a serious setback to its efforts to calm the continent about its mission.

AFRICOM’s new focus?
Lawmakers push for U.S. to aid hunt for rebel leader
By John Vandiver, Stars and Stripes
Mideast edition, Tuesday, July 14, 2009

The leader of the Lord's Resistance Army, Joseph Kony answers journalists' questions following a meeting with UN humanitarian chief Jan Egeland Sunday Nov 12 , 2006 at Ri-Kwamba in Southern Sudan. Egeland met with Kony, the elusive leader of Uganda's notorious rebel Lord's Resistance Army and one of the world's most-wanted war crimes suspects, seeking to secure the release of women and children enslaved by the group during their 20-year conflict with the Ugandan government. But Kony denied that his forces are holding prisoners. STUTTGART, Germany — It’s not exactly a call to arms, but it doesn’t sound that far off either.

In a little-noticed piece of bipartisan legislation introduced this spring — the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act — a group of U.S. lawmakers is urging the Obama administration to form a strategy for taking out one of the most dangerous rebel leaders roaming the jungles of Africa: Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army.

"Kony’s removal is essential to peace in the region," said Rep. Ed Royce, R-Calif., who was one of many Republican and Democratic politicians issuing statements following the bill’s introduction.

[Michael F]

Honestly, i think Africom was and is already involved in more than "capacity building". Providing weapons to the TFG in Somalia, the support to the anti-LRA ops,Umoja Wetu in the Kivus...should prove enough that Africom, despite a young Command, wants to show "it can get its hands dirty". Is it a bad or good thing ? Should they be more directly involved ? Opinions may differ but mine is quite clear: It should be more involved and more open to other stakeholders.

In the LRA case, a joint AFRICOM, FR, UK, BEL, support (intelligence, logistic,...) to DRC, Ugandan, Southern Sudan and CAR would surely ensure complete international support, increase the quality of the intelligence provided, alleviate fears of "you are stepping into my area of influence"....Politically as well as technically, this would be mostly positive.
Should Africom go alone with the UPDF (meaning without collaboration with FR, BEL, UK and to some extend DRC) like for Lightning Thunder, and should it fail again, it would just help the sceptic in Africa and elsewhere to point the finger to Africom (young, ambitious but inexperienced would be their description of Africom)...

Sharing failure is the best way to ensure there won't be any (or at least support would be maximum) or to limit it a maximum in terms of public image.

[Tom Odom]

Honestly, i think Africom was and is already involved in more than "capacity building". Providing weapons to the TFG in Somalia, the support to the anti-LRA ops,Umoja Wetu in the Kivus...should prove enough that Africom, despite a young Command, wants to show "it can get its hands dirty". Is it a bad or good thing ? Should they be more directly involved ? Opinions may differ but mine is quite clear: It should be more involved and more open to other stakeholders.

In the LRA case, a joint AFRICOM, FR, UK, BEL, support (intelligence, logistic,...) to DRC, Ugandan, Southern Sudan and CAR would surely ensure complete international support, increase the quality of the intelligence provided, alleviate fears of "you are stepping into my area of influence"....Politically as well as technically, this would be mostly positive.
Should Africom go alone with the UPDF (meaning without collaboration with FR, BEL, UK and to some extend DRC) like for Lightning Thunder, and should it fail again, it would just help the sceptic in Africa and elsewhere to point the finger to Africom (young, ambitious but inexperienced would be their description of Africom)...

Sharing failure is the best way to ensure there won't be any (or at least support would be maximum) or to limit it a maximum in terms of public image.

We can agree to disagree. AFRICOM has been under scrutiny since its beginning and this is too early for it to be proving its critics correct.

Tom

[Mark O'Neill]

The LRA are only a problem when they actually do something -that is, go near / attack or attempt to influence a node that someone actually acres about. These are not as common as one might think in the large border areas of the DRC. Hence, you do not need to cover off on the whole area, only the things that matter. This reduces your problem considerably.

Next step is to take a leaf out of the South African book vis a vis SW Africa in the early 80s. The SAPOL's 'Koevet' organisation developed considerable expertise in a framework that consisted of positioning reaction forces near or on the known nodes or infil/ exfil points for the PLAN.

When cued to an incident, Koevet could react, and were equipped with trackers and were mobile enough to follow up and pursue the PLAN elements detected (normally small groups -much like the description offered previously of the LRA's current modus operandi). Whilst Helos were used, the key elements of success I assess were:
a. speed of reaction (based on on sound assessment of vital ground and appropriate positioning forces);
b. appropriate tactical mobility and firepower;
c. tracking skills (often using 'turned' terrorists and/or local indigenes); and
d. Aggression - a desire to close with the enemy and destroy him.

I would be keen to hear why such an approach couldn't work against the LRA.

regards,

Mark

[davidbfpo]

The para-military branch of the South African / South-West African police in what is now Namibia are covered in 'Koevoet' by Jim Hooper: http://www.amazon.com/Koevoet-Jim-Hooper/dp/1868121674

There are two editions, I've got the early one(1988).

Hooper's book is not cited in: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koevoet

davidbfpo