COIN case: LRA Lords Resistance Army

[M-A Lagrange]

There is one question I never had good answer to concerning LRA. When they were moved from Sudan to DRC, it is said it was without weaponery. The fact that they used mainly machettes in a first time, after failed attack during peace negociations, would go that way.
But now, they seems to have gain fire power again. Where they were in DRC is far from Khartoum roads for smuggling. And building an airstrip is not that easy.
I know FARDC are loose on keeping weapons in their hands but still.
Answering to that question would probably help in responding to the question what is their logistic support.

[Tom Odom]

There is one question I never had good answer to concerning LRA. When they were moved from Sudan to DRC, it is said it was without weaponery. The fact that they used mainly machettes in a first time, after failed attack during peace negociations, would go that way.
But now, they seems to have gain fire power again. Where they were in DRC is far from Khartoum roads for smuggling. And building an airstrip is not that easy.
I know FARDC are loose on keeping weapons in their hands but still.
Answering to that question would probably help in responding to the question what is their logistic support.

It is like the movie field of dreams:

If you have cash, the weapons will come

And someone in the FADRC will bring them...

[Michael F]

The LRA, off course, had weapons when they entered the Garamba in 2005. They just did not launch any attack for a long time.
"From mid-2005, when the LRA began to prepare for the
peace process that was to become the Juba talks, its fighters and high command moved towards the border of the DRC in Western Equatoria. On their way west, some of the fiercest fighting with the SPLA occurred in areas that had previously been untouched by the LRA, such as the road between Yei and Juba (BBC News, 2005). However, the LRA has denied that these attacks were carried out by their troops"

The Karthum supply actually must have stopped (temporarily) for logistical reasons while the LRA was in the Garamba. "While civilian and military interviewees say that Khartoum supplied equipment to the Ugandan rebels well into 2006, the LRA says that such supplies ceased long before then.36 Others have reported that supplies stopped in November 2005, when the LRA crossed into Garamba National Park in DRC."

The surge in firepower actually comes from a different "timing". The LRA, as a tactic, is used to leave arm caches in strategic areas. With the Karthum supplied weapons in the past, it was easy to build multiple caches in Southern Sudan and North Congo and to reuse those weapons as soon as they were hunted down.

I don't think they bought those weapons from the FARDC as the FARDC presence in the area was small during a long time and many other weapon salors were available (Mbororos, Equatorian, GoSS corrupt, Ituri militias,...). The LRA never worked with a lot of cash (they are out of the monetary system) and more by extorsion or support.

Quotes from the very interesting @small arms survey report@ http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files...%208%20LRA.pdf

[M-A Lagrange]

Some interresting developments are happening with our beloved Kony.
Populations in Sudan start to complain that the GoSS and UPDF are unable to protect them...
Seems that Kony has already won the psychological war.
That defenitively serves Khartoum, but looks more like an unattended side effect.

[carl]

Today's BBC story

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8243829.stm

stating that Ugandan troops are in the C.A.R. chasing the LRA and have been for month. Interesting in that the C.A.R. is rather a ways away from Uganda.

[Michael F]

New development:

THE army has captured another senior LRA commander in the on-going military push against the rebels in the DR Congo and the Central African Republic.

Mickman Opuk, who was close to LRA leader Joseph Kony, was captured from the jungles of the Central African Republic a fortnight ago as the joint military offensive pursued a group of rebels.

“We picked him like a grasshopper and he is intact,” said army spokesperson Lt. Col. Felix Kulayigye yesterday. “Our forces had been in hot pursuit of Kony’s group which he was part of.”

Four other LRA junior commanders have been killed and 98 abductees rescued since the army entered the Central Africa Republic to hunt down the rebels, Kulayigye added.

Opuk is one of the most notorious rebel commanders. According to the army, he participated in the 1995 Atiak massacre of over 200 civilians.

Asked when Opuk would be flown to Uganda, Kulayigye said he was being kept in the field to assist the joint forces with information.

“Slowly by slowly we are harvesting them. The fact that we have been allowed in the Central African Republic shows that Kony is not safe anywhere.”

He said the chief of defence forces of Uganda, the Central African Republic and Southern Sudan met in Kampala on Friday to review the progress of the anti-LRA operations.

Officials from the four affected countries met a month ago and agreed to allow Ugandan army units into the Central African Republic, Kulayigye told Reuters earlier.

“(Ugandan army) squads entered Central African Republic under the auspices of the joint security meeting.

“It was agreed that since Kony is a regional problem, he should be pursued into the Central African Republic.”
He, however, suspected that Kony was heading for Sudan's western Darfur region.

The joint military offensive was launched on December 15, 2008 after Kony refused to sign the final peace agreement.

The operation, codenamed Operation Lightning Thunder, involving ground troops and jet-fighters, pounded LRA bases in Garamba forest in eastern Congo, killing some rebels and sending others in disarray.

The UPDF withdrew from Congo at the end of March when the time-frame given by the Khartoum government elapsed.

It, however, maintained intelligence officers to help the Congolese army flush out the remaining rebels. The UPDF returned to the war-front when the rebels sneaked into the Central African Republic.


http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/694012

[Michael F]

Might sound crazy (600 miles from Uganda) but the guy is and :
* It's safe of SPLA, CAR, FARDC, UPDF forces (and US allies),
* The NCP is present in Southern Darfur and can provide a secure environement,
* The LRA forces may stay spread between Western Bahr El Ghazal, CAR and DRC (300 miles) while Kony is safe north in Darfur.
* There is little chance the NCP will hand Kony over to anyone.
* UNAMIS and UNAMID are not present in those regions.


LRA moving north - S. Sudan army official
Friday 18 September 2009 05:00. Printer-Friendly version Comments...

By Manyang Mayom
September 17, 2009 (JUBA) – Southern Sudan Military Intelligence have determined that the Lord’s Resistance Army leader is moving toward Chad, according to the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) Spokesperson Major General Kuol Diem Kuol. He further affirmed that the LRA has now become powerless.

LRA troops march towards an the assembly point in Owiny Ki Bul, 160km (100 miles) south of Juba, Sudan September 20, 2006 (Reuters)
Maj. Gen. Kuol announced this on Wednesday night, claiming that Joseph Kony and his deputy are moving toward Darfur and that an attack is expected in Western Bahr El Ghazal.
Over 80,000 people have fled from their homes in Western Equatoria and Central Equatoria this year, according to a report released this month by the World Health Organization. The LRA guerrillas are implicated in a recent wave of massacres and killings in DRC, Sudan and CAR, with upwards of 1,000 killed since December 2008.
Ugandan army forces are pursuing LRA in the Central African Republic, according to recent media reports.
Kuol noted that particularly in Tumburia County of Western Equatoria on September 11, 2009, SPLA military intelligence found fresh footprints of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) from Central African Republic heading toward Raja County of Western Bahr-El-Ghazal state. "According to the intelligence we have, LRA leader Joseph Kony and his deputy Okot Ozimo, they are heading toward Darfur; some of his forces will remain in DRC and some of the troops’ lives have become difficult for Kony to operate in Southern Sudan."
He went on to insinuate that paramilitary forces aligned with the Government of Sudan would orchestrate a military action or threat that would allow Kony to escape: "For Mr. Kony to move away from South Sudan, the National Congress Party (NCP) in Darfur are now threatening our forces in the North of Raja County in such a places like Timza, Karita, and Kitkit … – there is a big threat that Murahileen militias are threatening our forces of SPLA and the objective of NCP behind this threat is to let Joseph Kony with his deputy move freely to reach Darfur and then to Chad without facing a military offensive."
"All our forces in Raja area… are now put on maximum alert," affirmed Kuol. "I want to make use of your Sudan Tribune media to inform our civilians not to be surprised by this notorious LRA attack," he concluded.