COIN case: LRA Lords Resistance Army

[Michael F]

In Dec 2008, a joint (DRC, Uganda, Southern Sudan) ops was staged to neutralize the LRA

See this NY times article:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/wo...=uganda&st=cse

The question now is not what went wrong or not (or maybe for lessons learned), who failed or not BUT HOW TO DEAL WITH THE LRA now ?

A new bill in the US Senate (Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act 2009) calls for renewed US/AFRICOM involvement and emphasize the need to protect civilian populations.

HOW CAN THIS BE ACHIEVED ? Any comment, advice, remark or reference to article is welcome.

[davidbfpo]

Just in case background is sought, this is the previous thread on joint action: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ghlight=uganda

davidbfpo

[Tom Odom]

The problem with the LRA is not just the LRA but also the terrain and the countries involved. The LRA uses the flushing quail technique to great effect. That means blocking forces and airlift to shift them where they need to be. None of the countries involved have that level of air support at their disposal. You need the blocking forces to contain then as a sustained kill capture effort runs them to ground. Otherwise we get a repeat of what has happened before.

Tom

[Michael F]

Sure Tom, terrain seems particularly difficult. The LRA (about 400 fighters) is spread in small groups of 10 men in an area twice the size of Ireland, now unpopulated, and with plenty of natural cover.

To neutralize them you have to find them hence the problem... UAVs (lack of autonomy) or Satelitte Pix (small mobile groups-average speed of a LRA group is 35 Kms a day) can not help finding them.
Even if you spot them, UPDF has a couple of Hinds in Southern Sudan, and even on QRA these would need up to 30 minutes to arrive on site (idem for MONUC's Hip in Dungu DRC).
Surrounding the area is just unthinkable (lack of forces, different countries and sheer size of the area).

One option would have been to leave Kony alone for a moment, let him resettle, rebuid camps and once the LRA is regrouped and fixed...reattack but Kony is too smart for that and knows mobility and terrain offer him a huge advantage.

An other option would be to install UN bases inside this area with a small force in each plus organize a Psyops (leaflets) to convince isolated LRA groups to disarm. I guess this would be too risky in the eyes of the UN.

Arming the locals to allow them to defend is according to me a great idea that could turn to nightmare as locals would also use these weapons to settle local conflicts (confer Ituri, North Katanga and Kivu...everytime self-defense militias were created these turned to ethnic then undiscriminated violence)

Finally, to continue to try to track every group and intervene after every village attack hoping to bag some LRA is not very successfull.

So what ?????

[carl]

One of the complications in dealing with the LRA is that in addition to being very evil, they have on occasion in the past proven to be quite good infantry. The Guatemalans learned this the hard way several years ago.

Maybe this is somewhat akin to chasing the Apaches around; a very mobile opponent, difficult terrain and they fight well. What Crook did on at least on occasion was to get on their trail, and stay on their trail, no matter what. They eventually got tired of being chased around and gave up.

Perhaps a similar thing might work. You would have groups of men get on the trail of big or little LRA groups and stay there, for months if need be. The air support that was available would be used mostly to resupply the tracking groups. The armed helos would be ready to go out when a tracking group fixed a group of LRA.

The hard part would be getting good men for the tracking groups. I don't know if the Ugandans could do it. Judging by Tom's comments in the past the Rwandans could certainly do it. Then you would have to get somebody to pay for it and get the countries the effort would go through to sign off on it.

An advantage would be it would keep constant pressure on the LRA. If good African troops were used in the tracking groups the logistical reqs wouldn't be huge.

Lots of difficulties but doable I think.

[Michael F]

Carl, this makes a lot of sense and i guess some US trained UPDF SF could do the job.

Tracking the LRA in small groups could be a very long task...(months) but present indeed the best chances of success.

It also allows for a more discreet Ugandan presence on DRC soil which surely would aleviate some political pressure on President Kabila.

BTW the UPDF SF commander is Lt. Col. Muhoozi Kainerugaba, the First son of President Museveni. Should the SF succeed it would also be good to prepare the kiddo to take over from daddy

About AFRICOM support, this could be minimal in terms of boots on the ground (support to planning, training the SF and intelligence) which would avoid to risk a second failure (the operation Lightning Thunder failed to its aim of killing Kony but is also said to have been plagged by massive corruption).

Actually, Carl, i think that your idea is possibly already applied. In a ENOUGH report (Finishing the Fight Against the LRA), it is stated that " Many Ugandan troops, however, have stayed in Congo and continue to conduct “intelligence operations” against the LRA. Some low-scale fighting between the remaining Ugandan troops and the LRA has been reported, but these largely below-the-radar efforts are likely insufficient to corner the LRA leadership".

[carl]

I hope the Ugandans are doing something like this now. If they were, it would not be something they would publicize until it was all done.

If they aren't, this is the kind of thing Special Forces A Teams (if they are still called that) would be ideal for. I imagine there would be great enthusiasm for a training mission, and maybe a little leading, to assist the UPDF in finally destroying the LRA.

One thing is, whatever is to be done, it can't depend at all on the FARDC and as little as possible on MONUC.

[James Bean]

Rex, as SWJ contemplates, there are inherent sensitivities to discussing certain parts of one's work in too much detail. My own views of LRA are as follows:

1. Coming at armed insurgent groups from an Asian-lens, LRA is difficult to comprehend. I spend a lot of time in Northern Uganda, and find the Acholis and Langis to be compassionate, acutely aware of the conflict (even its westward migration), and hardworking (when they have the opportunity). Yet everything I have learnt about LRA firsthand is that it's a user-pays mercenary group specialising in insurgency; devoid of ideology. It is a maw that sucks in lives and destroys them.
2. As for the glut of commentary that militates against LRA and advocates SF/COIN and 'irregular' approaches to snuffing out the LRA; rather than being malignant, such commentary is simply benign and ignorant. Some of the local players have a second-to-none track record of dealing with insurgencies. On the sharp end of the ledger they know what they are doing. It's just much harder to attain stability than sew instability.
3. I won't deny that eliminating Konyi would have an immediate impact on LRA, but if we're honest about it, there's not a lot of precedent for success in either eliminating terrorist leaders or proving a sustainable result even when elimination has occurred.
4. For too long the focus has been on military solutions to the LRA and very little in the way of addressing security in the North. I like how one of our SWJ colleagues (David Kilkullen - hi if he's around - really like the cut of your jib mate!) refers to 'small is beautiful'. Small recoverable and innovative approaches to information dissemination and providing jobs and catalysing change in Northern Uganda will be just as effective, if not more, than gunships and leaflet drops in D.R. Congo (sorry, but in 2009 when people call this PSOP, I just laugh; it's like a ham radio operator obstinately denying the range/convenience of mobile telephony!).

How's that gentlemen?

Jim

[M-A Lagrange]

To understand LRA, please pay a visit to Conflict Research Group working paper on it.
This document has been compiled by Kasper Thams Olsen, who I would call THE LRA SPECIALIST. He recently briefed UNMIS and MONUC on them.

http://www.psw.ugent.be/crg/publicat...gpaper_LRA.pdf

This paper is a qualitative study on LRA tactics, motivations and use of indiscriminate violence. If that can help... I would be much more than happy.

Please note that there have been alleged LRA attacks in North West South Sudan. It is not confirmed, it is not official, it has to be taken with caution. But still, that may make sense as they are not welcomed in Uganda, in DRC, CAR and in South South Sudan. Also, as Uganda peace negociator resigned, there is still a slight possibility they go back home. That would fit into their strategy.

[Rex Brynen]

James:

Thanks for the thoughtful comments!

On whether eliminating Konyi would transform the situation (à la Savimbi/UNITA), its always hard to predict how internal dynamics play out once a lynchpin leader is removed. Of course, I'm sure none of us would shed a tear if someone were to test the hypothesis

As for information operations and economic initiatives, what would be the dynamic that would undercut the LRA? The Olsen paper that M-A Lagrange has kindly posted above suggests that the LRA's counter would be retaliation and collective punishment. Are you thinking, from a DDR perspective, of either the possibilities for encouraging defections, the dangers of unemployed defectors returning to the bush, or both?

[M-A Lagrange]

Well, I can attest that LRA will retaliate on civilians. After failed action in 2008/2009, LRA killed 900 civilians with machettes as retaliation. I was in DRC at that time.

Please take time to think about it. When LRA does have undiscriminated violence as modus operantis. This is to demonstrate that opposite side is not capable of providing protection. (Weird, but that is their way).

Also there are good reports on former abducted children trained by LRA integrated into LRA hunt.

[Michael F]

Apparently, Kony is still hunted down by up to 200 UPDF troops in DRC (so called intelligence advisors). During the past month, LRA movements have been reported by Open Sources in the Yambio-Doruma-Ezo triangle. Main LRA looting activity happens now in the EZO area (CAR -SUD-DRC triborder area) which could translate into an other group of LRA escaped to CAR.

Kony is supposed to have tried to organize a commander meeting in CAR last month (no confirmation if he succeeded to gather his unit commanders or not).

My gut feeling is (stating the obvious) that Kony is trying to gain time by escaping to CAR. UPDF forces would still be able to track LRA in that most remote zone but less efficiently than in the Garamba area. Kony may want to further reorganize its forces, ensure resupply from allies (Khartum???) via isolated airstrips and proximity to CAR groups supported by Khartum. The aim of the game is to survive untill 2011 and the potentially explosive Southern Sudan referendum. Khartum would surely consider reinforcing arab militias and the LRA ahead of this as these could come handy to influence the referendum or counter a newly independant Southern Sudan.

[M-A Lagrange]

Well 2011 referendum seems a very long term target. 2010 elections could be a more archivable objective as LRA has no logistical support.
Also, despite percistent rumours of guns flying all over the place, there has been light hard evidence of Khartum involvement in it, even of the happening of such thing. The one I know is tanks flying from Kenya to Rumbek for GoSS. But still does not mean it does not exist. Bad people even say that it is GoSS that is arming the place to undermine coming referundum...

Also take in consideration coming DDR schedule in South Sudan. That will ease Kony job to come in and out South Sudan.

Other thing to take in account is that burning the land for food supply works when you have food coming. LRA favorite target always has been humanitarian programs. For the moment, WFP pockets are dry and donors are reluctant to fund, this is a secret for no one. according to FAO, the coming season is hunger...

I do not know about Kony meeting in CAR but in DRC, he was still capable to coordinate multy target attacks while his groups were splited all over the place.

[Michael F]

Well 2011 referendum seems a very long term target. 2010 elections could be a more archivable objective as LRA has no logistical support.
Also, despite percistent rumours of guns flying all over the place, there has been light hard evidence of Khartum involvement in it, even of the happening of such thing. The one I know is tanks flying from Kenya to Rumbek for GoSS. But still does not mean it does not exist. Bad people even say that it is GoSS that is arming the place to undermine coming referundum...

Also take in consideration coming DDR schedule in South Sudan. That will ease Kony job to come in and out South Sudan.

Other thing to take in account is that burning the land for food supply works when you have food coming. LRA favorite target always has been humanitarian programs. For the moment, WFP pockets are dry and donors are reluctant to fund, this is a secret for no one. according to FAO, the coming season is hunger...

I do not know about Kony meeting in CAR but in DRC, he was still capable to coordinate multy target attacks while his groups were splited all over the place.

Some interesting thoughts,indeed.
If i may add mine.

Khartoum has been providing weapons to multiple groups in Southern Sudan across history and according to unconfirmed sources, is currently increasing the weapon flow.
About the areas bordering CAR, there are many strong ethnic and commercial links between local pro-Karthoum Sudanese and CAR groups and so between them and the CAR rebels.

Is Karthoum directly dealing with the LRA in CAR ? still unproven. Is Karthoum arming sudanese and CAR rebells along this border and indirectly the LRA ? It's not proven. Actually, proving it is impossible..... the deniability is too easy.

I've got my own opinion (Katrhoum has the motives, the means and the recklessness to do it so why shouldn't they ???)

[nativebuddha]

Also there are good reports on former abducted children trained by LRA integrated into LRA hunt.

Are you saying that former LRA child soldiers are being used to fight the LRA?

Working for whom? Museveni?

[davidbfpo]

An academic commentary from Perspectives on Terrorism:http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/...=145&Itemid=54

The introduction summary ends with:

It is concluded that the LRA is too ambiguous an organisation to be simply labelled in such a way. It is also suggested that the terrorism label has in fact been an obstacle to attempts to end successfully a confrontation that is now going into its 24th year.

Worth reading just to get this:

Gettleman ties this lack of ideology to the intractability of many of the current conflicts in Africa. Indeed, he uses the LRA as 'probably the most disturbing example’ of these new kinds of conflict, asking:

Even if you could coax them out of their jungle lairs and get them to a negotiating table, there is very little to offer them. They don’t want ministries or tracts of land to govern. Their armies are often traumatized children, with experience and skills (if you can call them that) totally unsuited for civilian life. All they want is cash, guns, and a license to rampage. And they’ve already got all three. How do you negotiate with that?

Citing:J. Gettleman. (2010) ‘Africa’s Forever Wars: Why the continent’s conflict never seem to end,’ Foreign Policy, March/April 2010.

The author concludes:

The case of the LRA should serve as a warning of both the difficulties of establishing whether a group in a conflict zone is truly a terrorist organisation and of the harm that such a label may cause when it comes to conflict resolution.

[carl]

David:

You know more about the 100 Years War than I do. Do you think the LRA can be seen as something akin to the armed bands that wandered about France during that war?

[Rex Brynen]

While I appreciate that motivation is 9 tenths of the matter would an investment into training the TGF troops not provide a better return on investment rather than bring in "foreign Christians" from Uganda to try to do the job?

There are a number of options as to how this training may be approached and I am wondering what if anything along these lines has be attempted?

This has been, and is being tried--as publicly evidenced by the abduction of two French security advisors last year. You're right, however, that security in Somalia--if it ever comes--will have to rest on Somali shoulders.

It doesn't help, of course, that not all of the TFG troops are sure what side they are on, or necessarily care!

As for the Ugandans, they have had some moderate (but limited) successes against the LRA. However, as northern Uganda has become increasingly less hospitable, the LRA have moved between south Sudan, DR Congo, and the CAR--which complicates things immensely.

[carl]

My comment on the Ugandan army is based on their inability in their own country to deal with LRA which apparently comprises a majority of child soldiers.

I was told by Ugandan guy I know who was a recon platoon leader in one of the Ugandan factions during the 80s wars that the LRA should not be taken lightly. Child soldiers or no, stone cold evil or no, he said they know what they are doing.

Also during late 2005 or early 2006, the LRA beat the brains out of a Guatemalan army unit, part of MONUC, that was trying to track them down. That happened in northeast DRC.

[Rex Brynen]

Also during late 2005 or early 2006, the LRA beat the brains out of a Guatemalan army unit, part of MONUC, that was trying to track them down. That happened in northeast DRC.

January 2006--a Guatemalan Special Forces unit. They lost eight dead when they were ambushed by the LRA in Garamba National Park.