COIN case: LRA Lords Resistance Army

[Michael F]

Sure Tom, terrain seems particularly difficult. The LRA (about 400 fighters) is spread in small groups of 10 men in an area twice the size of Ireland, now unpopulated, and with plenty of natural cover.

To neutralize them you have to find them hence the problem... UAVs (lack of autonomy) or Satelitte Pix (small mobile groups-average speed of a LRA group is 35 Kms a day) can not help finding them.
Even if you spot them, UPDF has a couple of Hinds in Southern Sudan, and even on QRA these would need up to 30 minutes to arrive on site (idem for MONUC's Hip in Dungu DRC).
Surrounding the area is just unthinkable (lack of forces, different countries and sheer size of the area).

One option would have been to leave Kony alone for a moment, let him resettle, rebuid camps and once the LRA is regrouped and fixed...reattack but Kony is too smart for that and knows mobility and terrain offer him a huge advantage.

An other option would be to install UN bases inside this area with a small force in each plus organize a Psyops (leaflets) to convince isolated LRA groups to disarm. I guess this would be too risky in the eyes of the UN.

Arming the locals to allow them to defend is according to me a great idea that could turn to nightmare as locals would also use these weapons to settle local conflicts (confer Ituri, North Katanga and Kivu...everytime self-defense militias were created these turned to ethnic then undiscriminated violence)

Finally, to continue to try to track every group and intervene after every village attack hoping to bag some LRA is not very successfull.

So what ?????

[carl]

One of the complications in dealing with the LRA is that in addition to being very evil, they have on occasion in the past proven to be quite good infantry. The Guatemalans learned this the hard way several years ago.

Maybe this is somewhat akin to chasing the Apaches around; a very mobile opponent, difficult terrain and they fight well. What Crook did on at least on occasion was to get on their trail, and stay on their trail, no matter what. They eventually got tired of being chased around and gave up.

Perhaps a similar thing might work. You would have groups of men get on the trail of big or little LRA groups and stay there, for months if need be. The air support that was available would be used mostly to resupply the tracking groups. The armed helos would be ready to go out when a tracking group fixed a group of LRA.

The hard part would be getting good men for the tracking groups. I don't know if the Ugandans could do it. Judging by Tom's comments in the past the Rwandans could certainly do it. Then you would have to get somebody to pay for it and get the countries the effort would go through to sign off on it.

An advantage would be it would keep constant pressure on the LRA. If good African troops were used in the tracking groups the logistical reqs wouldn't be huge.

Lots of difficulties but doable I think.

[Michael F]

Carl, this makes a lot of sense and i guess some US trained UPDF SF could do the job.

Tracking the LRA in small groups could be a very long task...(months) but present indeed the best chances of success.

It also allows for a more discreet Ugandan presence on DRC soil which surely would aleviate some political pressure on President Kabila.

BTW the UPDF SF commander is Lt. Col. Muhoozi Kainerugaba, the First son of President Museveni. Should the SF succeed it would also be good to prepare the kiddo to take over from daddy

About AFRICOM support, this could be minimal in terms of boots on the ground (support to planning, training the SF and intelligence) which would avoid to risk a second failure (the operation Lightning Thunder failed to its aim of killing Kony but is also said to have been plagged by massive corruption).

Actually, Carl, i think that your idea is possibly already applied. In a ENOUGH report (Finishing the Fight Against the LRA), it is stated that " Many Ugandan troops, however, have stayed in Congo and continue to conduct “intelligence operations” against the LRA. Some low-scale fighting between the remaining Ugandan troops and the LRA has been reported, but these largely below-the-radar efforts are likely insufficient to corner the LRA leadership".

[carl]

I hope the Ugandans are doing something like this now. If they were, it would not be something they would publicize until it was all done.

If they aren't, this is the kind of thing Special Forces A Teams (if they are still called that) would be ideal for. I imagine there would be great enthusiasm for a training mission, and maybe a little leading, to assist the UPDF in finally destroying the LRA.

One thing is, whatever is to be done, it can't depend at all on the FARDC and as little as possible on MONUC.

[Tom Odom]

Congressmen and NGOs picking missions is never a good thing. I am fully supportive of taking out the LRA; an active role, however, for AFRICOM at this juncture would be a serious setback to its efforts to calm the continent about its mission.

AFRICOM’s new focus?
Lawmakers push for U.S. to aid hunt for rebel leader
By John Vandiver, Stars and Stripes
Mideast edition, Tuesday, July 14, 2009

The leader of the Lord's Resistance Army, Joseph Kony answers journalists' questions following a meeting with UN humanitarian chief Jan Egeland Sunday Nov 12 , 2006 at Ri-Kwamba in Southern Sudan. Egeland met with Kony, the elusive leader of Uganda's notorious rebel Lord's Resistance Army and one of the world's most-wanted war crimes suspects, seeking to secure the release of women and children enslaved by the group during their 20-year conflict with the Ugandan government. But Kony denied that his forces are holding prisoners. STUTTGART, Germany — It’s not exactly a call to arms, but it doesn’t sound that far off either.

In a little-noticed piece of bipartisan legislation introduced this spring — the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act — a group of U.S. lawmakers is urging the Obama administration to form a strategy for taking out one of the most dangerous rebel leaders roaming the jungles of Africa: Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army.

"Kony’s removal is essential to peace in the region," said Rep. Ed Royce, R-Calif., who was one of many Republican and Democratic politicians issuing statements following the bill’s introduction.

[Michael F]

Honestly, i think Africom was and is already involved in more than "capacity building". Providing weapons to the TFG in Somalia, the support to the anti-LRA ops,Umoja Wetu in the Kivus...should prove enough that Africom, despite a young Command, wants to show "it can get its hands dirty". Is it a bad or good thing ? Should they be more directly involved ? Opinions may differ but mine is quite clear: It should be more involved and more open to other stakeholders.

In the LRA case, a joint AFRICOM, FR, UK, BEL, support (intelligence, logistic,...) to DRC, Ugandan, Southern Sudan and CAR would surely ensure complete international support, increase the quality of the intelligence provided, alleviate fears of "you are stepping into my area of influence"....Politically as well as technically, this would be mostly positive.
Should Africom go alone with the UPDF (meaning without collaboration with FR, BEL, UK and to some extend DRC) like for Lightning Thunder, and should it fail again, it would just help the sceptic in Africa and elsewhere to point the finger to Africom (young, ambitious but inexperienced would be their description of Africom)...

Sharing failure is the best way to ensure there won't be any (or at least support would be maximum) or to limit it a maximum in terms of public image.

[Tom Odom]

Honestly, i think Africom was and is already involved in more than "capacity building". Providing weapons to the TFG in Somalia, the support to the anti-LRA ops,Umoja Wetu in the Kivus...should prove enough that Africom, despite a young Command, wants to show "it can get its hands dirty". Is it a bad or good thing ? Should they be more directly involved ? Opinions may differ but mine is quite clear: It should be more involved and more open to other stakeholders.

In the LRA case, a joint AFRICOM, FR, UK, BEL, support (intelligence, logistic,...) to DRC, Ugandan, Southern Sudan and CAR would surely ensure complete international support, increase the quality of the intelligence provided, alleviate fears of "you are stepping into my area of influence"....Politically as well as technically, this would be mostly positive.
Should Africom go alone with the UPDF (meaning without collaboration with FR, BEL, UK and to some extend DRC) like for Lightning Thunder, and should it fail again, it would just help the sceptic in Africa and elsewhere to point the finger to Africom (young, ambitious but inexperienced would be their description of Africom)...

Sharing failure is the best way to ensure there won't be any (or at least support would be maximum) or to limit it a maximum in terms of public image.

We can agree to disagree. AFRICOM has been under scrutiny since its beginning and this is too early for it to be proving its critics correct.

Tom