COIN case: LRA Lords Resistance Army

[Bill Moore]

A rather laudatory NYT article on US SOF in Africa, as the writer follows an official tour by the SOF's BG Linder and the LRA is not the main subject. There is a long section on the hunt for the LRA by Uganda troops with SOF directly alongside, which IIRC was way beyond their original ToR, with my emphasis in bold:

Nice to note:

Link:http://mobile.nytimes.com/2014/06/15..._r=0&referrer=

David,

Great article, thanks for sharing. MG Linder is the right leader, at the right place, at the right time. He is employing special operations like they should be employed in an ideal situation. The only comment I disagreed with is MG Linder's comment about state on state conflict being a thing of the past. I only wish that were true. That isn't the issue they're dealing with in Africa at the moment, but Saudi and other Sunni States are waging a proxy war against Iran and vice versa. The risk of state on state conflict in the Asia-Pacific is high and increasing.

I only bring this up, because it confounds our balancing act for ensuring our forces are ready to deal with the most significant and likely threats to our national interests. Both types of warfare, the irregular warfare MG Linder is leading and assisting other with, and conventional warfare require considerable training to be proficient at. Where do you assume risk? How do you align your forces? Does SOF only do irregular warfare, and conventional forces focus on conventional war? I still don't understand our Army's focus on the Regionally Aligned Brigades. Is nation building the right focus for the bulk of our ground combat power?

To further demonstrate the challenge, in my view it is clear that SOF is being effectively employed in Africa. Others think so also, and want SOF in other regions to mimic how SOF is being employed in Africa, which is the wrong answer. It is the right approach in Africa, not in the rest of the world. We have a military that seeks models they can replicate, yet we talk about the necessity of deep understanding and cultural nuances. We still haven't got past the talk to reality in many cases.

[JMA]

... in my view it is clear that SOF is being effectively employed in Africa.

They are?

How so?

I see no evidence of success anywhere so please enlighten me.

[Bill Moore]

They are?

How so?

I see no evidence of success anywhere so please enlighten me.

Fair enough, and I'll attempt a feeble defense. First off, these are not war zones, so the military remains largely subordinate to the Department of State (DOS), and DOS is seldom about winning. They want to maintain control of the military strategy they don't understand. I question if they understand our political objectives, but that is a different argument.

Second, these operations take time, and more importantly they take the support of the supported nation. If your comment about the Ugandan forces not being disappointed is correct, then the FID approach won't work. At that point we need to reconsider what our way forward should be, to include leaving altogether. That would be a short term failure, but could contribute to long term success for more important missions when countries realize we're finally serious about them stepping up to the plate to address their own security problems. In Uganda I think our objectives extend well beyond killing Koni, so things may not be as bad you portray them.

If we're starting to provide support to Nigeria that will be a test case to watch.

To add to your argument I just saw a news flash about a potentially major terrorist attack on a Kenya coastal town. Still waiting for details. Carl has a point, we often have no intention on winning. It seems we prefer to take half steps for ever, which simply prolongs the fighting, prolongs the suffering, and creates a culture over generations that no nothing but war. We accused the Sri Lankan government of "winning" their war against the Tamil separatists the long way. We miss the point they won, and that country is being reconstructed. The level of hate and discrimination there is probably less than we experienced after our Civil War, but we only read history, we don't take lessons from it. We and the UN faulted the S. African mercenary unit who quickly and effectively suppressed the rebels in Sierra Leone. The more I think about we might be allergic to winning? Winning in most situations requires aggressive pursuit of the adversary, but doing so in a way that doesn't undermine our legitimacy at home and internationally like the French did in Algeria. No body said it was easy, but darned if we don't spend millions educating our officers to fight (I think), and instead we now have a movement to develop a military composed of nation builders. That is seen as more relevant because we're not allowed to win by fighting, so we put our hope in economic development.

[JMA]

Bill, my experience in soldiering with Americans has been all good. From my experience there is no problem with the quality of professional soldiers in your country.

That said I would suggest that the weakness in these overseas adventures at short notice is that the soldiers so deployed have none or very little local knowledge of enemy and terrain... but perhaps worse still no understanding of the local troops they are to work with or train.

IIRC it was Norwegians and/or Germans who were called in to train troops for Somalia. Maybe now you can understand my contention that it is a case of the blind leading the blind. What can a Norwegian or a German contribute to the training of Africans for a war in Africa? Zero, zip, nothing (unless in a specific weapon or weapon system).

A few years ago we saw reference to the training of a battalion in the DRC comprising elements from various rebel groups by a US training team. Not good, look it up.

I put my head on a block that the only way to train troops in Africa is through "training the trainers".

OK back to warfare. To avoid coming in blind US forces must be fed into the system over a period of years and not - under any circumstances - on a short tour.

Study is important and I would suggest it starts here:

BUSH WARFARE - The Early Writings of General Sir William C.G. Heneker, KCB KCMG DSO

This is an account of the experiences of a Canadian officer at the end of the 1800s who clearly was capable of understanding warfare in Africa and should be studied by all before deployment to Africa.

etc etc ...

[davidbfpo]

Seleka, a mainly Muslim rebel group in the Central African Republic, said it captured Dominic Ongwen, a leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army militants, on Jan. 3 and handed him to U.S. forces (in CAR) two days later. A U.S. officer offered Seleka a monetary reward, General Antime, a Seleka official, said in a phone interview today

Link:www.bloomberg.com/news/2015-01-08/central-african-republic-s-seleka-says-it-captured-ongwen.html?

Events in France pushed this matter into the background, although on searching others have covered the story - so for a little more detail:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-30705649

[davidbfpo]

Ho-hum, the Seleka haven't had their money or a thank you.

A Seleka commander said he was captured after a 25-minute battle, after which they informed US forces in the area. A US official had said that Mr Ongwen had defected, before being handed over to their forces.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-30743647

[davidbfpo]

the story of the man as I know it, and what his defection might mean to the future of the LRA. More so than Joseph Kony, the founder and leader of the LRA, Ongwen is sadly typical of the LRA rank and file. His example refutes the erroneous but morally and sometimes legally convenient definitions of LRA members as either helpless victims or violent perpetrators. Abducted as a child, indoctrinated and forced into committing unspeakable acts before he had even hit puberty, Ongwen is clearly a victim, but he is also a perpetrator.

Which ends with:

The only thing clear from Ongwen’s surrender is that the LRA crisis is still not over.

Link:http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/...child-soldier/