COIN case: LRA Lords Resistance Army

[M-A Lagrange]

Hello everybody,

Ok, as I said, I'm late on that one but it is interresting to see all the comments.
I agree with Dayuhan: sending a team of trained special ops guys is a good idea.
That said, why it's not a good idea right now or at least let's look under the table what is going on.

LRA: they are out of DRC, most probably in Central Africa, to regroup.
They are around 200 and a group is probably still in DRC or at the border of South Sudan.

UDPS: they are not so much wiling to do the job and they are busy with Sudan and Somalia.

FARDC: US trained a regiment and equiped them. They had a join training for medical evacuation with USAF. AFRICOM came to visit just recently.

MONUSCO: they are naked. They just decided to transfert the Guatemalian special ops to Kinshasa during elections. Jordanians are supposed to take over the spial ops job. (Not much in fact). Result: lost of intel, contacts with population, knowledge of the ground, operationality...

DRC: it's election year. Kabila is in need to show he can bring peace in the country. In the 2 Eastern provinces of Kivu, where he used to be popular, he just lost all of it because he couldn't bring peace.
Kabila, to be reelected needs Province Orientale (where the LRA is active) to vote for him. This is pretty secured but an announce less the 2 month before elections (nov 28) is a good point for him.

Now, why is it not a perfect timing: political opposition is really challenging Kabila. Despite being un united, the opposition parties (mainly UDPS and UNC) have the capacity to be major players in the next National Assembly.
In order to govern, Kabila needs 251 seats at the assembly. In 2006, his party (PPRD) did 111 seats. With a cohalition he came to majority at parliament.
Presidential elections are important but they also have legislative elections the very same day.

US are seen as Kabila supporters. The declarations of Mme Otero in DRC, stating everything is Ok, in line with European Union, make it even more obvious. Since few weeks, there are demonstrations, violently repressed, from opposition in Kinshasa. (At least 4 dead)

US could put a cup of conditionality in their military cooperation. As for example: we help you with LRA but you open the election central server to opposition for checking.
France already issued such comment. The embassador said he found UDPS request legitimate. And France is providing training to the police in Kinshasa.

[Ken White]

Carl:

That is not how humanitarian service is normally viewed but it would be a darn sight more effective than most conventional humanitarian work.

That I can agree with.

A lot of LRA have been scared into submission from what I've read. A number just got tired of being chased all the time and gave up.

No doubt. Situation like that, probably about 75% will typically recant (at least superficially...) but the hard core real killers will not because they know they'll be killed themselves -- they just have to be killed. There have been and can be exceptions and there is no 'norm' but that seems to be the case more often than not.

Bill Moore:

... I still don't mind SF and other SOF elements getting engaged at low levels, relatively low cost, and at relatively low risk to the nation (of becoming a bigger conflict). I'm not cold hearted, but if we lose some SF troops on these mentions, well that is what we all signed up for.

I agree with that. No quarrel at all with deployments like that -- by SF or conventional troops.

I don't think conventional soldiers signed up for anything other than to defend the country for the most part.

I note your caveat of "most part" and acknowledge that may be correct but as one who deployed several times for a lot of things not involving defending the country with a bunch of other 'conventional' guys and to three Continents, you're just flat wrong on that. Way wrong...

I suspect you're also wrong on the capabilities they could and did bring to such operations -- note the past tense -- though possibly not on what they might bring today in many cases. That competence thing is easily fixed. Conventional units are just like SF Teams or Battalions / Groups -- some are better than others; often much better. Parochial prisms are not good viewing devices and if the 'Big Army' is less all round capable than it once was as appears to be the case, then it's a lick on the Army -- but it should also be recalled that SOCOM helped foster that incompetence. Either way, it isn't hard to fix IF the powers that be wish to do so.

I think relying on the through and with approach is stupid and have said so before, and you bring up a great point, "how much pay back do we really owe them?" That is really the rub. If a policy objective is worth pursuing, then it is probably worth pursuing unilaterally or with a coalition of the willing instead of paying for mercenaries out of our pockets. Mercenaries that generally do a pretty poor job.

Policy is the rub -- we do not do that well and DC is partly responsible. The services and forces also contribute because those serving at high levels get more concerned with turf protection and budget enhancement (and concomitant risk reduction) than they do with providing forces that can undertake dicey mission; this ties the hands of the policy folks...

Regardless, we need to pursue necessary and not whim efforts overseas and paying for support is IMO foolish because it really absolves both sides, the payer and the payee, of other responsibilities

However, since this is our policy, I'm my question still stands. Do we simply say no when they ask for help? If we do, will our through and with strategy work?

In reverse order, it works but is not conducive to solid relationships as I said just above. In the case of Uganda, we are where we are and, as I said, I have no particular problem with this mission (aside from the fact we shouldn't be involved in Africa much at all) -- I have a BIG problem with the public announcement of it and suspect the 'why' of that is IPB for future, other and bigger deployments there and, worse, elsewhere on the Continent.

I have no problem with violence and its penalties, I have no problem with deployments in the national interest. I only ask that it be true NATIONAL interest and not service or constituency interests that are the rationale. I do not think, all things considered, this one meets that criteria and I'm quite sure that, if I'm right and it is an opening that will be exploited for US domestic political purposes then I will be able to say 'I told you so' but I darn sure won't enjoy that...

M-A Lagrange:

US could put a cup of conditionality in their military cooperation. As for example: we help you with LRA but you open the election central server to opposition for checking.
France already issued such comment. The embassador said he found UDPS request legitimate. And France is providing training to the police in Kinshasa.

Hopefully we're smart enough to be doing just that...

[Fuchs]

Slightly related video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RKcMfQrqC7I

[ganulv]

[MONUSCO is] naked. They just decided to transfert the Guatemalian special ops to Kinshasa during elections.

When I was living in Guatemala in the early ‘90s an ex-Kaibil did the board half of the room-and-board I was doing with a family. He once told me that the tales of Kaibil recruits having to kill a stray dog with their bare hands, remove its heart, then eat it raw weren’t true. He assured me that they were allowed to use a blade to do the killing and the removal of the heart.

Kaibiles don’t have an Angel of Death aura amongst Guatemalans because of their reputed Spetsnaz-style training or because they are always supposedly GTG for a multi-day manhunt in Indian Country but rather because of the part they played in incidents of the sort we (and I use the exclusive <we> here) tend to use euphemisms such as “tragic mistake” to describe.

I say all of that as a set up for what troubles me about this deployment. The Acholi population has already been resettled—is someone under the illusion that SF can turn a forced resettlement program into something more humane than what it is? An effort to create local militias has apparently been largely unsuccessful—is the idea that Americans are going to be better at it because, well, Americans are better at it? The Kaibiles have been involved in FFF previously—does someone think that SF is that much better than those guys?

I am not saying Obama has any ill intent with this deployment. But for the Acholis stuck between two armies I am sure that matters little. And I am nervous that the only lesson from recent history that has been drawn is, “Oh, they just need someone there who knows how to do this right.”

I never had any so I will gladly defer to one with actual experience.

When you only have one choice for long enough anything starts to taste if not good at least decent. I do, however, recommend millet beer if the opportunity ever presents itself.

[carl]

—does someone think that SF is that much better than those guys?

Yes actually. When those guys got beat up by the LRA I asked a British LTC working for MONUC how that could have happened. All he would tell me was "Well, there are special forces...and then there are...special forces." To my knowledge there was never a detailed report about that action made public (there may be 4 volume report now), from which I gathered the Guats didn't do very well.

But for the Acholis stuck between two armies I am sure that matters little.

I don't understand how this comment pertains to LRA as it is now. They aren't anywhere close to Uganda and haven't been for a long time.

[ganulv]

Yes actually. When those guys got beat up by the LRA I asked a British LTC working for MONUC how that could have happened. All he would tell me was "Well, there are special forces...and then there are...special forces." To my knowledge there was never a detailed report about that action made public (there may be 4 volume report now), from which I gathered the Guats didn't do very well.

Who knows? It’s an inherently dangerous line of work and no amount of skill and training makes one bulletproof, intel is never perfect, etc. I can’t speak to the current status of the Kaibiles but I wouldn’t take one failed raid to be anything more than that. By way of analogy, I don’t think anyone out there would argue that the operation survived by Marcus Luttrell means the SEALs are a bunch of hacks. I mean, the Kaibiles do well enough on the free market.

I don't understand how this comment pertains to LRA as it is now. They aren't anywhere close to Uganda and haven't been for a long time.

Regardless of where the LRA is localized at the moment the campaign against them was and is the justification for the resettlement program whose aftereffects are still being felt in Acholiland. And some Acholis are still stuck in “sanctuaries.” Shouldn’t that give us pause about throwing in with the Ugandan government? I know they are not as bad as the LRA, but this conflict isn’t a forced choice question. And if it were, isn’t there a “none of the above” option?

[Ken White]

... And I am nervous that the only lesson from recent history that has been drawn is, “Oh, they just need someone there who knows how to do this right.”

If our recent history is any guide, your worry is more than justified.

[carl]

Who knows? It’s an inherently dangerous line of work and no amount of skill and training makes one bulletproof, intel is never perfect, etc. I can’t speak to the current status of the Kaibiles but I wouldn’t take one failed raid to be anything more than that.

All I can say is that a professional soldier who was in a position to know, indicated that they weren't so good. And it wasn't all that unusual for MONUC forces to get beat up like that.

Maybe a thought experiment is in order, I couldn't imagine a well trained unit of say, Australian infantry getting into trouble like that anywhere.

[jmm99]

apparently equates professionalism in killing with unrestrained bloodthirstiness ?

From the linked article, Killer Elite Switching Sides in Mexico Drug War (bold added):

...the Kaibiles fought relentlessly [JMM: really ??] to earn a reputation for massacring civilians, epitomized by the December 1982 Dos Erres slaughter. At least 250 men, women and children were methodically killed by 40 of the elite troops at the village of Las Dos Erres.

One rather below average unit in the Americal Division managed much the same feat, didn't they ?

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

Maybe a thought experiment is in order, I couldn't imagine a well trained unit of say, Australian infantry getting into trouble like that anywhere.

I've got a lot of respect for the Strynes, across the board they're better man for man than the US Army by a couple of notches. They're better trained and have more combat discipline -- but anyone can have a bad day...

It should also be recalled that units can excel against some opponents some places and be at a total loss against others in different places. It's all in what and where you train. Plus local terrain knowledge always gives the local folks a several orders of magnitude advantage. Then there's the minor effect of discipline -- that means Soldiers will think before they fire -- local warriors won't bother, they'll just shoot and not worry about who got killed as long as it wasn't themselves. This stuff isn't rocket science but neither is it nearly as easy as many seem to think.

[Ken White]

One rather below average unit in the Americal Division managed much the same feat, didn't they ?

Well done -- and appropriate.

[carl]

Ken:

I am going to go as far out on a limb as a 4 eyed 4F pencil necked geek forever a civilian can go on when talking about this with somebody with your experience, so far out I'll commence sawing it off behind me now.

I think the circumstances of that fight, from the little I know, indicate that the Guats just walked into an ambush in a lightly populated area. I know that units can have bad days, but this was a so called "elite" unit. They should not have had a bad day in what seemed at the time to be a straight up small unit patrol action. Local knowledge, rules of engagement, intel etc didn't seem to have much to do with it. They were hunting the LRA and walked into an ambush shortly after dawn. I just can't see properly trained jungle and forest fighters doing that especially if they were brought in special for the purpose.

[Ken White]

I think the circumstances of that fight, from the little I know, indicate that the Guats just walked into an ambush in a lightly populated area. I know that units can have bad days, but this was a so called "elite" unit.

Like your British Officer said, there are SOF and there are SOF. Not that the SOF label proves much of anything in combat. The average two tour 11B Specialist in the 82d or the 10th Mountain has more combat experience than do most SOF types...

They should not have had a bad day in what seemed at the time to be a straight up small unit patrol action. Local knowledge, rules of engagement, intel etc didn't seem to have much to do with it.

Those things always have something to do with it.

What, exactly, is "a straight up small unit patrol action?"

They were hunting the LRA and walked into an ambush shortly after dawn. I just can't see properly trained jungle and forest fighters doing that especially if they were brought in special for the purpose.

First problem is AFAIK we do not know what the terrain was like; Was it jungle or savannah (rain forest trained folks would have problems in open savannah...); on a trail or not; we do not know how many people each side had; we do not know if the Guatemalans had local 'scouts' or guides who may have been turned; I believe they were on a specified mission to capture Kony's deputy honcho -- that implies some intel (false?) or possibly a set up; we do not know what weapons were involved; we do not know the ranges involved; how much recent rest had each side had; was it really an ambush or was it a meeting engagement. You may know enough to make judgments. I do not.

As I understand it one of the LRA's most important survival factors is their exhaustive knowledge of the terrain. If one is used to looking at terrain from a thousand or more feet or even from moving vehicles, a three foot hump in the ground may be totally invisible or not seem like much -- when you're on foot, 50 meters from that hump, you may or may not notice it for several usually vegetation related reasons and even if you do, you cannot see over it...

You can't see it, I have. I've seen it happen to British, French, Australian, Korean (N and S), Chinese, Thai, Viet Namese (N & S) and US units, several of those units high speed SOF types. War's like that -- it (war, not those in it) doesn't play fair and anyone and everyone involved can have a bad day. IIRC eight Guatemalans were killed and five wounded but they killed 15 of their attackers (sounds like an all round bad day to me...).

Those in it don't play fair either but that's another story. Hollywood, most Fiction Writers and Many Historians have much to answer for...

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Ken,

I note your caveat of "most part" and acknowledge that may be correct but as one who deployed several times for a lot of things not involving defending the country with a bunch of other 'conventional' guys and to three Continents, you're just flat wrong on that. Way wrong...

Ken, I didn't say it didn't happen, I said this isn't what a lot of people signed up for outside of SOF and the Marines (who historically get involved in more smaller scale contingencies than the Army), but you're right I overstated this. My comment was shaped by our transition from the Cold War to MOOTW in the early 90s and the large number of complaints from conventional units who repeatedly said they didn't sign up for Bosnia, Haiti, etc., but that was a relatively short transition period, so I withdraw the statement.

I suspect you're also wrong on the capabilities they could and did bring to such operations -- note the past tense -- though possibly not on what they might bring today in many cases. That competence thing is easily fixed. Conventional units are just like SF Teams or Battalions / Groups -- some are better than others; often much better. Parochial prisms are not good viewing devices and if the 'Big Army' is less all round capable than it once was as appears to be the case, then it's a lick on the Army -- but it should also be recalled that SOCOM helped foster that incompetence. Either way, it isn't hard to fix IF the powers that be wish to do so.

Where did I lead you to believe I was commenting on their capabilities? SOF needs General Purpose Force enablers for almost all operations, so I'm not sure where you think I said we didn't need them. I also don't think I commented on competence in this thread; however, SF is uniquely selected and trained to operate in these politically sensitive environments, so yes I think SF is the best force for this particular type of mission. Earlier comments about behavior of young conventional soldiers/marines still stand. I have seen how many young GPF soldiers/marines behave towards locals, and you're much more likely to have a serious Strategic Corporal incident (the wrong kind) with GPF than SOF. As you know we still have our share of idiots in SOF, but percentage wise it is much lower, and the behavior isn't accepted as the norm. The way GPF minimizes these incidents is micro-management, which degrades mission performance.

I think I know where you're coming from about SOCOM fostering that incompetence, but please clarify? Some blame USSOCOM for taking the best NCOs out of the Army, and of course that may be happening to some degree with MARSOC in the Marines also. Outside of that, how did SOCOM contribute to GPF incompetence?

[carl]

Ken:

To my completely untrained civilian mind, a "straight up small unit patrol action" is a small unit walking through the forest looking for another small unit and they have a fight.

I yield on all your points but shouldn't a good unit, an elite unit, know how to evaluate micro-terrain (I read that term in a book)? I would think that ability, amongst others, is one of the things that makes a good unit a good unit. And from what I was told the Guats weren't very good so maybe they couldn't do those things.

The other thing I was told at the time was this. They figured that 15 LRA were killed because a MONUC helicopter gunship that eventually showed up fired 5 rockets at something or other. MONUC then figured that each rocket should kill 3 people ergo 15 LRAs must have been killed.

[Ken White]

a "straight up small unit patrol action" is a small unit walking through the forest looking for another small unit and they have a fight.

It almost never is and the outcome of the fight depends on many variables -- for this event, almost none of which we seem to know. I know I don't...

And from what I was told the Guats weren't very good so maybe they couldn't do those things.

Maybe they were, maybe they weren't. Good that is. Micro terrain is almost as silly as human terrain. terrain is terrain -- and 'reading' it is fairly straightforward. Reading what it hides is never straightforward.

The other thing I was told at the time was this. They figured that 15 LRA were killed because a MONUC helicopter gunship that eventually showed up fired 5 rockets at something or other. MONUC then figured that each rocket should kill 3 people ergo 15 LRAs must have been killed.

What I recall reading was that the Nepalese came in on the birds and did a mop up and got the count. Also reacall an account that said 8 UN KIA and 15 UN WIA.

You can make your mind up anyway you wish -- I don't have enough information to do more than ask questions -- which I very strongly suspect no one who was not actually there on the ground could answer...

[M-A Lagrange]

First of all, LRA is no more Acholi based group. The heads, as Khony, still are but the troops are kidnapped childsoldiers.
Acholi live in North West Uganda and South/South-East South Sudan. Khony is in CAR or in the Uele in DRC. Basically around 700 km far from Acholi land.
The Acholi fable is long gone, as the North Sudan support fable.

Secondly, let’s be frank: LRA bothers noone. It’s a joke compare to the mess coming in South Sudan and little in comparison with the Great Lakes endless mess.
What is shameful is that it took so much time to realize that AU will do nothing and that local government wont do it neither. After all, LRA just kills people in an area where there is nothing but people…
The only justification for such action from US is they want to put down a former Khartoum proxy for the coming Sudan war or they want to strength the military cooperation between Great Lakes stake holders by having a direct hand in. My personnal feeling goes for the second one but I can be wrong.

About the Guatemalians SF bad day.
I must say that it was poorly prepared (no recent sat images, no reco, no local intel…) and they were trapped in an area where you can find elephant hemp. What that? It’s an herb that grows up to 1.5 to 2.5 m high. It’s easy to ambush someone, even well trained, in such place.
What is the problem with Guatemala SF is not so much their capacities than the frame they are operating in: MONUSCO mandate and will to actually implement the mandate. They are a “reaction” force and do not, far from it, take the lead to gain advantage over any opponent. That said, Guatemala government is not willing to bring back home even 1 single bodybag. This does slow down your operational capacity in the end.

That is why I tried to bring attention to the political timeline of this deployment. The real threat, at the moment, is that DRC government makes LRA an excuse to not go for elections (Unlikely) or to at least not run elections in that part of the country (not likely anymore).
LRA will surely attack but only on opportunistic base: no more defenses. In DRC news papers, that deployment is presented as a already won victory by those who are close to ruling party. Opposition news papers are less enthousiastic.

That said, it's a good news for the populations in the area. Now let see what's gonna happen.

[carl]

Ken:

I've decided to stop making fool of myself. Everything you say makes a lot of sense and, upon re-reading, a lot of what I say doesn't; especially since I think I mixed up the rocket/# of dead thing with another incident. The Kaibiles though, probably wish they had done some things differently on that day. (How's that for a feeble Parthian shot as my horse limps over the hill with her hindquarters shot full of arrows?)

M-A:

Your comments make me very pleased about the progress the DRC may have made. Kabila's actions are based upon how he thinks the voters are going to perceive them. That means he actually cares what they think, at least a little. That is pretty remarkable for that part of the world.

[M-A Lagrange]

Ken:
M-A:

Your comments make me very pleased about the progress the DRC may have made. Kabila's actions are based upon how he thinks the voters are going to perceive them. That means he actually cares what they think, at least a little. That is pretty remarkable for that part of the world.

Carl,

Don't get too exited. Elections will be hold only and only if the international community will be capable to provide logistic.
Insecurity can be a good argument to not have elections. That's why the effort is more than welcomed. But this doesn't mean democracy is on the way. THat's why conditionality is needed.
Kabila cares cause if he did not, then he would be wiped out from power. He has to care cause he is unpopular in most of the country.

[Ken White]

My comment was shaped by our transition from the Cold War to MOOTW in the early 90s and the large number of complaints from conventional units who repeatedly said they didn't sign up for Bosnia, Haiti, etc., but that was a relatively short transition period, so I withdraw the statement.

No need to withdraw it, it was and is accurate for the time -- I deliberately referred back to an earlier time to illustrate two things:

It wasn't always that way. It does not need to stay that way -- and IMO it should not.

...so I'm not sure where you think I said we didn't need them.

Didn't think that.

Earlier comments about behavior of young conventional soldiers/marines still stand. I have seen how many young GPF soldiers/marines behave towards locals, and you're much more likely to have a serious Strategic Corporal incident (the wrong kind) with GPF than SOF. As you know we still have our share of idiots in SOF, but percentage wise it is much lower, and the behavior isn't accepted as the norm. The way GPF minimizes these incidents is micro-management, which degrades mission performance.

I totally agree with all that, saying only that can be -- and should be -- changed. Our poor training designed to be cheap instead of effective is the major cause of that.

I think I know where you're coming from about SOCOM fostering that incompetence, but please clarify? Some blame USSOCOM for taking the best NCOs out of the Army, and of course that may be happening to some degree with MARSOC in the Marines also. Outside of that, how did SOCOM contribute to GPF incompetence?

First, on the NCOs (or Officers...). I do not subscribe to that IMO SOCOM has some of the best and some of the worst of those in the Army -- and almost no one that's in between (which Big Army will tolerate because it believes it must, not due to actual need). There are people who make good shooters; there are others who make good SF types. There are a great many very competent people who do not want to do either of those jobs for a variety of reasons. There are places for all three types and those who both want to be and can pass selection should do the SF / SOF thing and the rest can soldier on in the rest of the Army. I will point out that there are folks in the rest of the Army who are every bit as good, combat wise, as the SF / SOF guys and gals, there are actually more of them in the Big Army but they are not concentrated or specialized so they are not as noticeable. So, no to raping units for the great guys. Not true.

I was specifically referring to the fact that big Army lost its focus in the 70s and severely (and quite wrongly) dumbed down training and thus lessened the competence of units to do their missions. Instead of fixing that, the Army wrongly scaled down mission sets. This gave SOCOM an opportunity to pick some mission sets they could logically claim were 'theirs' and get the missions and concomitant funding. Thus, the Army screwed up and SOCOM merely took advantage of their screwup to enhance their capabilities. The upshot was that SOCOM contributed to continued lessened competence in Army combat -- particularly Infantry -- units.

Aside from the adverse impact on the Army, there were unintended consequences for SOCOM, notably the diversion of SF into CIF and Strat Recon missions (as opposed to LRS which is not a SOF mission at all) -- both of which, IMO are wasteful of SF training and capabilities. People are needed to do those jobs, no question -- but IMO, SF should not be the provider.

Full disclosure, I'm not a SOCOM fan. I tried to tell people when Barb Wire Bob was skulking around Congress lobbying for it that it was not a totally bad idea but the way it would likely end up would not be all that good for the Nation. IMO, that has come to pass. What should have occurred was either creation of a new Service or nothing, the current process is the worst of both worlds.

As an aside, if the rest of the Army had the training money of SOCOM it arguably would be in better shape; you get what you pay for and in SOCOM's favor, they have never scrimped on training dollars whereas the big Army -- wrongly -- has.

All immaterial, The Army proper appears to be trying to improve it's training and capabilities (or, more accurately, restore both), SOCOM is here and on balance it does more good than harm but I, for one, wish they'd learn down in Tampa what SF is really supposed to do and stop trying to force it into other things. The US needs competent conventional forces, it needs highly trained Shooters, Strat Recon and SF -- and those are four very different missions requiring, really, at least four different kinds of folks. The fact that SF can switch hit is a plus, no question -- but is it really desirable?