The Role of the British Political Officer on the North West Frontier

[Van]

Red Rat, do a search on Google Books - I've found some period works that have been scanned in there.

Didn't some of these officers get published as ethnographers?

[tequila]

In failed states where any capacity for governance has to be grown (ie Afghanistan and Somalia where there is no functioning police, civil service or education system as we would recognise it, nor the educated middle classes to establish one) and intervention is measured in years, probably decades it occurs to me that the District Officer model could well be a successful model to follow.

Pakistan continued the political officer model in the FATA. As a model of low-cost governance that allowed Pakistan (and the British) to maintain the illusion of control over the Frontier, it worked whenever the tribal system was not in flux. However, it utterly failed to integrate the FATA into Pakistan or convince any of the inhabitants of the FATA that they had any stake in Pakistan at all. When confronted by masses of refugees from across the border, the growth of a violent mass movement, and the collapse of the tribal system, the District Officer model failed utterly. The result is today's FATA, which is under the dominance of al-Qaeda, the TTP, and associated Taliban, criminal, and jihadi networks.

Rather than a discredited colonial system that will simply require repeated combat deployments as it fails over and over again, a more extensive state building model may be appropriate.

[Leo Africanus]

Red Rat,

A good account, although oblique, can be found in Chevenix Trench's book, 'The Frontier Scouts'. Whilst primarily concerned with the development of the various Guides and Scouts regiments that have evolved into the modern, Pakistani, Frontier Corps, there are many references to the roles of the Political Officers.

Another source, although again oblique, are the recollections within the journals of the Indian Army Association (IAA). Now sadly defunct, a quick flick through the pages of that journal (and indeed others such as that of the Sikh Regiment Association) will produce a fund of stories. Some of them are quite wry. I've lost the detailed reference but one account of a major battle which lasted some 24 hours ends with a company commander clearing a ridgeline and just trying to work out how to winkle out the last remaining 'hostiles' from a cave, when along comes the political officer, who had been moving 'one bound' behind the lead troops and talks the opposition out of their bunker. He then led them off downhill without so much as a 'by-your-leave' to the company commander. The latter expressed himself as 'flabbergasted' but his problem had been solved as he reflected it would probably have cost him several men to clear the cave. It would be wonderful to know what the political officer did; I suspect remove them to a tribal shura where a decision would be made on whether they would be punished or more likely 'bound over' to keep the piece, until the next time..........

Lessons learnt? The need for an acceptable mechanism for what I suppose we would now call 'tactical reconciliation' - without the fuss. The need for authorised 'political officers', up close and dirty - perhaps partly met by the successful MSST concept, operating immediately in areas that have been 'cleared' in the SCHB construct. And finally, note the terminology: 'hostiles'. As David Kilcullen has shown, a percentage (the majority?) of those we are fighting are 'accidental guerillas', as Shakespeare puts it, 'Warriors for the Working Day'. In that case gracing them with terms such as Taliban, Anti Government Elements (AGE), Opposing Military Forces (OMF) or even 'insurgents' is to label them incorrectly. Our predecessors called them 'hostiles', because that is what they were at the time but they also knew that tomorrow they would have to deal with them politically. If you 'project' an inaccurate title onto them, then you will be failing in one of the first military principles, 'know your enemy'. May I commend a 'rebranding exercise' therefore - let them be 'hostiles' and thus judged by their behaviour and not by some 'a priori' labelling exercise. We may then learn also to be more discriminating in whom we are dealing with: those that are hardcore and irreconciliable can be dealt with accordingly; those who are willing to accept a political process, even if fighting now, can be approached differently.

Hope this might shed some light???????

[davidbfpo]

Second 'The Frontier Scouts' and I'd suggest looking at journals of imperial history / commenwealth history and maybe de-colonisation. Best of all get 'The Men Who Ruled India' by Philip Mason, pub. 1985; better known as author of 'A Matter of Honour: Indian Army 1746-1947'). District Officer obituaries are a good start, some refer to their own books, I use the daily Telegraph, although The Times can help. Further back 'Soldier Sahibs' by Charles Allen, pre-Mutiny time.

davidbfpo