The Role of the British Political Officer on the North West Frontier

[tequila]

The first three titles are fonts of knowledge, but none seem to clarify the precise nature of the relationship between the Political Officer and the military in terms of formal C2 relationships. Perhaps it was more along the lines of supported (Political Officer) and supporting (Military).

Ahmed's book provides an interesting perspective on this --- he notes that there really isn't any such relationship. He notes that the PA for S. Waziristan and the commander of the South Waziristan Scouts before him were at odds with regards to their attitude towards the Wazir mullah behind the revolt, and that this greatly assisted the mullah's power grab.

He also relates an anecdote on how the British PAs were often seen by their military counterparts as being too close to the tribes they were supposed to be overseeing. To paraphrase, the PA was accompanying a punitive expedition into the frontier. When the shooting started, the PA disappeared and could not be found. Later on that night, the PA appeared again for dinner. "So how did your side fare? Casualties on our side were half-a-dozen."

So obviously political-military relations during the British political officer days weren't all they could be.

[davidbfpo]

Red Rat's other question was:

Does anyone know what is happening in Pakistan with the current Pak Army offensive and the relationship between the political authorities and the military authorities there? The media gives the impression that all authority has been passed across to the military and report on it in purely military terms.

There has been no first-hand reporting on the South Waziristan campaign, although this week access was allowed (see:http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.co...ing-games.html ) and a flurry of reports followed, notably over documents linked to the 9/11 attack (in the daily SWJ news brief). There is little of substance on the Pakistani Army's offensive, which appears to be under-resourced (BBC cites two divisions -v- 10-20K militants) and that "militants" have evaded capture.

The Long War Journal has a map that shows what the situation is: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archiv...iban_contr.php (The origin is unclear and I suppose it is an amalgam of what is available).

I've seen little on the current civil-military relationship recently; two weeks ago there was this by Ahmed Rashid and given the attacks since relations are unlikely to have changed IMHO: http://watandost.blogspot.com/2009/1...s-hit-new.html

The BBC News reported this today: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8335738.stm by Pakistan's prime minister at news conference that the country's leadership was united in its efforts to wipe out the Taliban.

We are at war. We do not have any other option because their [the militants] intentions are to take over.

[M Payson]

This site has good coverage of day-by-day actions and maps on South Waziristan campaign. http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/...n-october-2009. They’ve also got profiles of Taliban leaders. Here’s Hakimullah Mehsud. http://www.irantracker.org/related-t...akes-power-ttp

Also, here are some resources on FATA and Waziristan. As with Afghanistan, it's humbling to consider history and the weight of our current actions.

“Imperial Frontier: Tribe and State in Waziristan,” by Hugh Beattie, published by Curzon Press in 2002 - a detailed, fascinating work, with extensive notes on sources.

“Waziristan 1936-1937: The Problems of the North-West Frontiers of India and their Solutions,” by Lieut.-Colonel C.E. Bruce, published in 1938. He and his father before him spent years in/near Waziristan, Balochistan, etc. Available in a couple of formats. http://www.archive.org/details/wazir...93619031345mbp. Also available in PDF http://coin.security-review.net/bits...pdf?sequence=1

“The Shape of Frontier Rule: Governance and Transition, from the Raj to the Modern Pakistani Frontier” by Joshua T. White (published in Asian Security, vol. 4, no. 3, 2008) offers some thoughts on governance reform in FATA and transitioning into the future.

And “Understanding FATA: Attitudes Towards Governance, Religion & Society,” a 2008 survey, provides an extensive range of public opinions on everything from political institutions to possession of firearms. http://www.understandingfata.org/home.html

Finally, ICG just put out a new report, Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA” (21 October 2009) that gives a scorching indictment of the current system governance, including and especially political agents http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6356. There's a thoughtful editorial in Pakistan's Dawn newspaper http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/...eforms--szh-01 that points out some important constraints to just solving the problem... There's certainly not agreement in FATA on what reforms should look like.

[davidbfpo]

Catching up on my reading I found a review of a 'Edge of Empire: the British Political Officer and Tribal Administration on the North-West Frontier 1877-1947' by Christian Tripodi (Farnham and Burlington,VT.: Ashgate, pub. 2011):http://ccw.history.ox.ac.uk/2012/09/...y-of-politics/

The review has some startling reminders of how Political Officers worked and died sometimes. The reviewer, Rob Johnson, himself an Afghan "hand", ends with:

He also has some sage words of advice for those who advocate the use of Political Officers in recent or future conflicts. He raises some thought-provoking questions about the purpose of such officers, the context of their tactical viewpoints within a broader strategic purpose, and casts doubts on their appropriateness in a post-colonial world. The fact that the West reached back, rather too late in the day, into its history to find solutions to insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan tells us much about the character of those conflicts and the relationship between the political leaders and their militaries. The key point is that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were characterised by an absence of political progress. Although the Western militaries obeyed the principle of ‘primacy of political purpose’ in countering-insurgency, too often the lack of political direction or political will to find a solution meant the soldiers had to fill the gap.

Not cheap US$100-125 on Amazon:http://www.amazon.com/Edge-Empire-Ch...istian+Tripodi

Or:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Edge-Empire-...1889021&sr=1-1

Just ordered a second-hand copy, so will add a review one day.

[davidbfpo]

It took a long time to get to read all of Christian Tripodi's book, Edge of Empire: the British Political Officer and Tribal Administration on the North-West Frontier 1877-1947' and it was brilliant.

The writing style is easy, fluid even; there are references a plenty - so many it deserves a second read to note them. His views are balanced and every factor is taken into consideration - finance in particular, not just the political agent -v- military aspects.

Earlier in this thread Sandeman's work in Baluchistan, which steadily became an imperial province with little conflict, as he followed a policy of 'heats & minds'. Yes, that is where the phrase originated.

There are a couple of contemporary references, rightly the author does not comment on whether the political agent was a "fix" over the Durand Line.

[davidbfpo]

There are a number of reviews of Tripodi's book available via a Google search. This is a critical one:https://www.academia.edu/1144465/Rev...tier_1877-1947

In looking at these I found an Australian officer's research paper, written when studying at Pakistan's NDU 'An Historical Analysis of the ‘Incessant Disputes in the Tribal Areas’ (of the North-West Frontier) against the British (and the British Indian Army) from 1893 to 1939. Which I might get to read another day:http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/public...go%20paper.pdf

[davidbfpo]

In 2009 Christian Tripodi contributed a paper to a RUSI meeting, it is a commentary on whether the past could guide the present; the actual title is 'British Policy on the North West Frontier 1977-1947: a suitable precedent for the modern day?'.

A taster:

The fundamental point, however, was not necessarily that British methods were possessed of inherent weaknesses. Any system of administration in an environment as testing as the North-West Frontier was and is bound to have its weaknesses exposed, as the contemporary Pakistani experience has illustrated. Rather, the point to be made is that those weaknesses had little effect in real terms because the British were afforded the luxury of being able, over time, to marginalise the tribal areas within their own strategic considerations. They could afford to persevere with a 'hands off' system of control and administration that was fully acknowledged to be faulty and lacking in imagination but which sufficed in the face of institutional conservatism; a state of affairs that one would presumably wish to avoid today.

Link:http://www.rusi.org/analysis/comment...4AB377DACA5CF/