Strategy and change over time

[Rob Thornton]

I wanted to break these out of their respective threads because I think in the broader context we are talking about why and how change occurs, the advantages and disadvantages to change, and resistance to change. I saw both of these responses today and started thinking about their relationship:

Ken White said in post #33 in the Flawed Doctrine or Flawed Strategy thread

Our doctrine must support the elected strategy and if it does not, then new or altered doctrine should be developed to do that. Conversely, our strategy must not be constrained by current doctrine.

Bayonet Bryant said in Post #8 on the Changing the Army for Future Wars Thread

The first hurdle you need to make sure that you can clear is a justification of why the Army should be involved in nation-building in the first place. I'm not saying they should/shouldn't, just that you need to be very clear in your justification of why they should be. If you can't do that, then rest of it is a bit of a mental exercise, but little more.

In my mind Ken’s quote from a thread that looks hard at establishing a cause and effect relationship, but the really interesting part of this I think is the last sentence “Conversely, our strategy must not be constrained by current doctrine. “ which gets to the first step of determining the objective or the policy end(s). I’m more of mind that History is contingent, and major shifts (aside from the geological type) don’t usually just occur regardless of how they wind up boiled and scripted in a linear historical narrative. They tend to be shaped by events, not all of which are rational, but in fact often appear to be based off of a torrent of information some of which is poorly informed, misinformed, partially informed, maybe even subject to being disinformed – its usually a combination of the good, the bad and the poor. I think getting the objective right is the critical piece because failing to get the objective right probably means starting off in the wrong direction.

Where I think Bayonet Bryant’s post ties in is wrt shaping the ways and means to pursue the objective. In this case the doctrine which would shape the rest of the DOTMLPF-P should follow articulated strategic guidance that in this case should signal a broad and enduring requirement(s), not a flash in the pan, brief episode, but one that recognizes an objective(s) which advances your sustained, long term security. You could argue that losing a war you have invested heavily in has long term effects on your security, or that given broader changes in your interests, or means and will to secure them; your objectives require a different approach. You could also argue the opposite, and in fact we have here on SWJ quite often. Much of this would seem to be subject to how you view the world, e.g. as an idealist or a realist, but even those terms are subject to politics and perspective.

On September 11th 2001 I was still in the field at Fort Lewis, WA. It was the last day of a training exercise for 1/25th Infantry and my BN 1-24th IN had just finished being the BDE’s OPFOR for the rest of the BDE (1-5 IN and 1-33 AR) as the they prepared for a JRTC rotation. During the week long FTX there was virtually no COBs (what was then referred to as civilians on the battlefield) and it was exclusively force on force. I was the BN Asst 3 and had been up all night; I was bagged out down the hill from the TOC. One of the RTOs came screaming down the hill telling me the CDR wanted me to get to the BN HQs as quickly as possible as there had been a radio call that we’d been attacked. What seemed impossible in that moment now looks much different. With a prognosis for “persistent conflict", long wars, etc and going on 8 years its hard to imagine otherwise. How does this affect our strategic outlook? Makes you empathize a bit with the decisions made by the Athenians and Spartans - but we've got a few decades to go to catch them I guess.

Looking forward I just can’t help but wonder about our desire to see things from a single perspective, and to try and make what by nature is uncontrolled into something that we can bend to our will, and build an objective to which it will seemingly self conform. Ken, no age reference inferred, but your comment would have found a good home in CvC’s work. It seems fairly straight forward and at first read, but is packed with complexity. I don’t know if you’ve read any William Carlos Williams, but he did one called “the Red Wheel Barrow” I think which is like that.

Best, Rob

[slapout9]

Rob,what about if both Strategy and Doctrine are Flawed?

[Rob Thornton]

Slap - I think if you have the strategy wrong, then the best you might be able to do is succeed in spite of your best efforts to the contrary - what did that Irish guy say to Wallace in that scene in Braveheart, something about being fooked

[John T. Fishel]

strategy? What is doctrine? How are they related?

Strategy is the relation of ends to means through ways. It addresses 3 questions: What do I want to accomplish? How can I achieve my goal? With what?

Military doctrine is our best guess as to the best practices to conduct engagements and operations. It has been vetted and published as a textbook - we call that textbook a FM. As such, it addresses the how question of strategy.

The huge caveat about doctrine is that it is written by too few people, usually Majors and LTCs (or ex Majors and LTCs - contractors) , in too little time, with too little information and so suffers the same failings as most civilian textbooks do. (Just look at the books your kids use or the ones put out for college courses) Sometimes, of course, they actually say something as does 3-24 and a few others. (I think pretty highly of FM 100-20 of 1990, for instance, but then I had something to do with it. Nothing in 3-24 contradicts anything we said in 100-20, just exapnds on it.)

Doctrine, of course is not strategy but it does tell us how we plan to do the "how" of strategy. If there is a mismatch between doctrine and the strategic ways then the 3 legged strategy stool is off balance and the ways leg must be fixed. That means bringing doctrine in line with the strategic ways - usually by changing the doctrine.

Cheers

JohnT

[Rob Thornton]

Hey John,
I don't disagree. I think what has got my attention is the relationship between the how the end change and what follows. It would appear that sometimes pragmatic change is really just acceptance of popular perspective (yes Marc - I'm hearing your observations about the illusions of society and civility). The idea of the impact of political change amidst a perceived long war (e.g. for us what is long?) and how it affects us and our will (particularly our appetite) is very interesting. Consider the tale of Alcibiades, here was a really good politician ( I also like the fiction work by Steven Pressfield ). I mean when you go from Pericles all the way up through the end you see allot of sway in how the public reacts. I was noticing our own media of late - it appears its not just casualty rates or operational measures of success that influence what is reported. To guys like you and Ken (and again - no age jokes intended), that may seem old hat as having seen it many times - but for me its very interesting to see group domestic agendas and FP objectives twined, un-twined and re-twined. Its caused me to reconsider how the flavor of the sausage is arrived upon.

BTW - I blame you a bit for turning me on to Morgenthau

Best, Rob

[wm]

I think that the first step is to be univocal in what we mean when we talk about strategy. JTF posted a definition. JP 1-02 has a different one, culled from JP 3-0:

A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national and/or multinational objectives.

This is not quite the same as JTF's position and, I submit, may well put the notion of doctrine as pre-eminent, especially if we happen to identify doctrine as, "a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the M in DIME (the instruments of national power)."

I suspect that doctrine often drives strategy. For an example, check out Robert Doughty's work on the French in WWI, Pyrrhic Victory. I submit that he argues that the French doctrine drove how the force was equipped, which in turn drove the techniques and planning the French used to respond to the Germans' invasion.