Quote Originally Posted by wm View Post
...may well put the notion of doctrine as pre-eminent, especially if we happen to identify doctrine as, "a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the M in DIME (the instruments of national power)."
However, I will note that that the 'M' is only 25% of that equation...
I suspect that doctrine often drives strategy...
No question. There is also no question that doctrine drives equipment puchases which in turn contemporarily impose limits on strategy.

My belief is that doctrine has too often driven US strategy to the exclusion of the other parameters and, further, that doctrine is -- but should not be -- seen as so very important that it becomes an inflexible driver of means.

I also believe that the inflexibility thus induced permeates the defense establishment and effectively -- nowadays -- constrains strategic thought. We have become risk averse and use 'doctrine' as an excuse. A major US advantage in previous wars has been our ability to innovate and improvise. By paying excessive heed to 'doctrine' we have partly eliminated that significant advantage, constrained imaginative and resourceful leaders and encouraged mediocrity.

Anyone concerned about why Captains and Majors (not to mention SGTs and young SSG) are departing in large numbers -- and have been for many years, before 9/11, should take a hard look at that issue