Strategy and change over time

[Rob Thornton]

Slap - I think if you have the strategy wrong, then the best you might be able to do is succeed in spite of your best efforts to the contrary - what did that Irish guy say to Wallace in that scene in Braveheart, something about being fooked

[John T. Fishel]

strategy? What is doctrine? How are they related?

Strategy is the relation of ends to means through ways. It addresses 3 questions: What do I want to accomplish? How can I achieve my goal? With what?

Military doctrine is our best guess as to the best practices to conduct engagements and operations. It has been vetted and published as a textbook - we call that textbook a FM. As such, it addresses the how question of strategy.

The huge caveat about doctrine is that it is written by too few people, usually Majors and LTCs (or ex Majors and LTCs - contractors) , in too little time, with too little information and so suffers the same failings as most civilian textbooks do. (Just look at the books your kids use or the ones put out for college courses) Sometimes, of course, they actually say something as does 3-24 and a few others. (I think pretty highly of FM 100-20 of 1990, for instance, but then I had something to do with it. Nothing in 3-24 contradicts anything we said in 100-20, just exapnds on it.)

Doctrine, of course is not strategy but it does tell us how we plan to do the "how" of strategy. If there is a mismatch between doctrine and the strategic ways then the 3 legged strategy stool is off balance and the ways leg must be fixed. That means bringing doctrine in line with the strategic ways - usually by changing the doctrine.

Cheers

JohnT

[Rob Thornton]

Hey John,
I don't disagree. I think what has got my attention is the relationship between the how the end change and what follows. It would appear that sometimes pragmatic change is really just acceptance of popular perspective (yes Marc - I'm hearing your observations about the illusions of society and civility). The idea of the impact of political change amidst a perceived long war (e.g. for us what is long?) and how it affects us and our will (particularly our appetite) is very interesting. Consider the tale of Alcibiades, here was a really good politician ( I also like the fiction work by Steven Pressfield ). I mean when you go from Pericles all the way up through the end you see allot of sway in how the public reacts. I was noticing our own media of late - it appears its not just casualty rates or operational measures of success that influence what is reported. To guys like you and Ken (and again - no age jokes intended), that may seem old hat as having seen it many times - but for me its very interesting to see group domestic agendas and FP objectives twined, un-twined and re-twined. Its caused me to reconsider how the flavor of the sausage is arrived upon.

BTW - I blame you a bit for turning me on to Morgenthau

Best, Rob

[wm]

I think that the first step is to be univocal in what we mean when we talk about strategy. JTF posted a definition. JP 1-02 has a different one, culled from JP 3-0:

A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national and/or multinational objectives.

This is not quite the same as JTF's position and, I submit, may well put the notion of doctrine as pre-eminent, especially if we happen to identify doctrine as, "a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the M in DIME (the instruments of national power)."

I suspect that doctrine often drives strategy. For an example, check out Robert Doughty's work on the French in WWI, Pyrrhic Victory. I submit that he argues that the French doctrine drove how the force was equipped, which in turn drove the techniques and planning the French used to respond to the Germans' invasion.

[William F. Owen]

I think "911" pretty much proved that discussions in Strategy are somewhat pointless.

a.) Strategy is a function of foreign policy.
b.) Foreign policy is a function of party politics.

So views on strategy are actually views born from personal political belief. Doctrine on the other hand is what is taught, which is a product of what is believed, so actually a product of what you think military history teaches you.

[Ken White]

...may well put the notion of doctrine as pre-eminent, especially if we happen to identify doctrine as, "a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the M in DIME (the instruments of national power)."

However, I will note that that the 'M' is only 25% of that equation...

I suspect that doctrine often drives strategy...

No question. There is also no question that doctrine drives equipment puchases which in turn contemporarily impose limits on strategy.

My belief is that doctrine has too often driven US strategy to the exclusion of the other parameters and, further, that doctrine is -- but should not be -- seen as so very important that it becomes an inflexible driver of means.

I also believe that the inflexibility thus induced permeates the defense establishment and effectively -- nowadays -- constrains strategic thought. We have become risk averse and use 'doctrine' as an excuse. A major US advantage in previous wars has been our ability to innovate and improvise. By paying excessive heed to 'doctrine' we have partly eliminated that significant advantage, constrained imaginative and resourceful leaders and encouraged mediocrity.

Anyone concerned about why Captains and Majors (not to mention SGTs and young SSG) are departing in large numbers -- and have been for many years, before 9/11, should take a hard look at that issue

[wm]

My belief is that doctrine has too often driven US strategy to the exclusion of the other parameters and, further, that doctrine is -- but should not be -- seen as so very important that it becomes an inflexible driver of means.

I also believe that the inflexibility thus induced permeates the defense establishment and effectively -- nowadays -- constrains strategic thought. We have become risk averse and use 'doctrine' as an excuse. A major US advantage in previous wars has been our ability to innovate and improvise. By paying excessive heed to 'doctrine' we have partly eliminated that significant advantage, constrained imaginative and resourceful leaders and encouraged mediocrity.

Anyone concerned about why Captains and Majors (not to mention SGTs and young SSG) are departing in large numbers -- and have been for many years, before 9/11, should take a hard look at that issue

I concur wholeheartedly that some seem to view the linkage between doctrine and strategy as a one-way, linear relationship, and one that tends to have a "materiel" step in-betweeen the two (part of my point in mentioning Doughty--the French 75 was poorly suited to the counterfire mission that would be imposed by a static war situation but it was not replaced as it was great for close support and quick displacement in a war of maximum offensive maneuver.)

My position is that doctrine and strategy are interrelated and ought to create a dynamoic that causes a continuous reassessment and revision of on based on what is (or isn't working) in the other. Wilf's last post indicates to me that he will disagree for he holds yet a third position on the definition of strategy

As to doctrine being used as an excuse for risk aversion, I submit that we have a doctrine which has risk aversion at its center rather than the other way around. Working with a doctrine that uses technology to reduce the risk of casualties has been with the US military for a long time--off the top of my head, I'd say since at least the end of the Civil War. (Please don't beat me up on this last point for I have nothing other than gut feel to support it right now.)

During the Cold War, we used to say that besides our technolgical edge, the thing that would allow us to win WWIII was the innovativenss of our junior officers and NCOs, that we, unlike our Soviet counterparts, were not hamstrung by an unthinking attachment to doctrine. I used to fear that this was not the case and think that Ken has similar fears based on his closing lines in the above quotation.

[Ken White]

My position is that doctrine and strategy are interrelated and ought to create a dynamoic that causes a continuous reassessment and revision of on based on what is (or isn't working) in the other.

I agree. My belief however is that such is not now the case...

Wilf's last post indicates to me that he will disagree for he holds yet a third position on the definition of strategy.

I'm not sure that's a third position (with respect to this thread, thus far, though I'm not sure where John T. and Rob might fall...). I agree with Wilf, strategy, to me is political (and is very much based on domestic politics) and that has been true since the Republic was founded. Winfield Scott succeeded as well and as quickly as he did only because he was at the end of a long message chain. Every US Commander since then has more closely followed the dictates of the Administration in power -- as they're supposed to.

That needs a caveat -- the national government determines the strategy and the services execute their portion of that. In the process, they may develop subsidiary and implementing strategies of their own but their task is essentially -- or should be -- purely military and most such 'strategies' are merely aggrandized operational plans. I realize that today for many reasons, the services are involved in other than purely military tasks and that undesirable condition will not soon disappear but their effort is still operational and strategic implementation rather than the development of strategy.

I also realize the services must have input to the strategic process, the 'M' in DIME and I think DIME about hits it -- the service input is or should be about 25% of the total.

Further, your contention on materiel is, as I agreed earlier, spot on -- and doctrine does drive that procurement ergo doctrine does affect strategy. That's okay, it should. What doctrine should not do is effect strategy beyond that parameter -- and even that should be modified if needed.

Let me give an example. I believe 'Strategic' Raids are feasible and for the impatient US, desirable. They are not really part of our doctrine -- indeed the doctrine writers have been told not to go there -- thus we have no 'requirement' for totally covert insertion and egress capability for medium sized combat elements. Therefor, that option is denied strategic planners. I could also have fun with Kosovo but that's another thread...

As to doctrine being used as an excuse for risk aversion, I submit that we have a doctrine which has risk aversion at its center rather than the other way around. Working with a doctrine that uses technology to reduce the risk of casualties has been with the US military for a long time--off the top of my head, I'd say since at least the end of the Civil War. (Please don't beat me up on this last point for I have nothing other than gut feel to support it right now.)

Yes and no, I think. No question that your statement is correct in application -- but IMO, that was over the years simply the desire of good Commanders; to make the other SOB die for his country. In my observation, the stronger emphasis on force protection and minimizing casualties as 'doctrine' (written or not...) occurred only after Viet Nam (and Mogadishu) when many people misread -- and are still misreading IMO -- many things. The American people, broadly are more accepting of casualties (provided some payback is obvious) than are Politicians.

The services today are more politically focused than at any time in my life; though they have been understandably attuned to the political for all my life. Low casualties are a politically desirable as well as militarily desirable thing -- it used to be that the effort to preclude casualties was almost totally militarily driven. I'm not at all sure that is the case today. My sensing is that it is not.

During the Cold War, we used to say that besides our technolgical edge, the thing that would allow us to win WWIII was the innovativenss of our junior officers and NCOs, that we, unlike our Soviet counterparts, were not hamstrung by an unthinking attachment to doctrine. I used to fear that this was not the case and think that Ken has similar fears based on his closing lines in the above quotation.

On attachment to doctrine we have indeed become overly attached and will be hamstrung by that attachment if we do not change. Pogo was right; we have met the enemy and he is us...

I do not have fears, I watched the destruction of innovation and intitiative, inadvertent to be sure but none the less very damaging, take place from 1949 through 1962 in very slight increments as the Army got into the peacetime swing after WW II with only a hiccup for Korea. In the early 60s, McNamara induced stupidity rapidly accelerated that trend, the one year tour in Viet Nam cemented it into place as a way of life and a deeply flawed training regimen has exacerbated the problem since 1975. Recall that the nation and the Army -- the Pentagon -- have not really been at war since 1945; they've sent people off to fight wars to be sure but the peacetime mentality has not been banished. We've simply done what all Armies do in peacetime, allowed ourselves to be buried in minutia...

Uniform changes are a great example of peacetime mentalities in Armies. Did I ever tell you that White Shirts are for Waiters...

Thus from 1949 until 1995 I watched an organization eat its young and move into the shade. It wasn't a pleasant thing to see and I retired several years before I wanted to simply because I didn't want to continue to be a part of the destruction. Fortunately, I've now totally retired and I'd really like to see a reversal of all that before I head south...

Afghanistan and Iraq have helped lift some -- not enough but some -- of the stifling. We'll see where that goes...

[William F. Owen]

My position is that doctrine and strategy are interrelated and ought to create a dynamoic that causes a continuous reassessment and revision of on based on what is (or isn't working) in the other. Wilf's last post indicates to me that he will disagree for he holds yet a third position on the definition of strategy.

I think have to understand that "Strategy" is something different from "the Strategy." "The Strategy" may make, no "Strategic" sense. EG: We are in A'Stan to deny Al Qeda a base, when Al Qeda could plan another 911, from cells living in Canada.

The Military is a tool used to achieve the desired Strategic outcome. How that is done is "the military contribution to strategy" or "military strategy."

I don't really have a definition of Strategy because it is entirely irrelevant, to the "the strategy."

Doctrine is what is taught. Sorry to repeat this, but just in case, Doctrine is what is taught. - so yeas, logically doctrine is a tool, and it can enable the contribution to strategy. So doctrines can be something other than military, and nothing to do with strategy. Basically gardening is not about the tools, yet what tools you have, in some way defines how your garden will look.