Strategy and change over time

[wm]

I find myself thinking more and more about Marc's comments about how we form our perception of reality and how we often avoid challenging it, how we defend it, etc.

If we combine this idea with Wilf's point that doctrine is, rather literally, what is taught, then I think we must end up giving the nod to doctrine as driving strategy. This follows from claims that our language shapes our reality (or at least how we communication our perceptions of our reality) and that our language is taught to us--unlike the way Athena was born from Zeus, language does not spring from our heads fully-formed. Since it is taught to us, it is a form of doctrine. Thus, doctrine forces how we undertake our strategic approaches since it constrains what we can speak about and how we can say/express it to others. This view also seems to map quite nicely to BW's staff UW approach--his technique is a way of introducing a new set of meanings into the heads of the Cerberus-like policy wonks past whom he and his fellows must move to get their agendas approved and funded by Hades/Pluto (who just happens to be the god of wealth/the riches of the earth as well as the god of the dead).
(Sorry for the excursus into Greco-Roman mythology. Perhaps Rob's invocation of MarcT pushed me in that direction. )

BTW, if we want to follow Wilf's lead and identify the meaning of doctrine by reflection on its Latin origins (docere--to teach), perhaps we should do the same with strategy, which derives from the ancient Greek strategos. The office was more than just a miltary one, even though the term is usually translated into English as 'general.' Here's a link to consider .

[William F. Owen]

If we combine this idea with Wilf's point that doctrine is, rather literally, what is taught, then I think we must end up giving the nod to doctrine as driving strategy. This follows from claims that our language shapes our reality (or at least how we communication our perceptions of our reality) and that our language is taught to us--unlike the way Athena was born from Zeus, language does not spring from our heads fully-formed.

The idea that doctrine is what is taught, is not mine. It is what the word means.
Additionally, I would say that doctrine should be substantially why something is done, not how. That allows for the role of context. This is useful when applied to military operations. It is very much less useful, when you have something like the Powell/Weinberger Doctrine, which is actually not a doctrine at all, but a check list, based on a selective reading of history

BTW, if we want to follow Wilf's lead and identify the meaning of doctrine by reflection on its Latin origins (docere--to teach), perhaps we should do the same with strategy, which derives from the ancient Greek strategos.

I would strongly caution against anyone following me, but I would suggest having clear and shared understanding of the terms we are using.

Rob Thornton
I find myself thinking more and more about Marc's comments about how we form our perception of reality and how we often avoid challenging it, how we defend it, etc.

Well there is the crux of the matter. Most folk here do not challenge the messages they gain from, and stay clear of those who will challenge them.
It's extremely interesting that most of the well known names who post on Journal, stay clear of the discussions on the board.

[slapout9]

The problem I think is you have to get them all right. On another thread I mentioned the word alignment. The Political Objective has to be achievable and has to link or align with Strategy and Doctrine and Operations and finally Tactics. That is what makes it all so hard and when something goes wrong there is a tendency to blame one part instead of looking at the whole linkage of different processes. If you fail at the highest level it can affect the outcome of everything else at the lower levels no matter how good each piece is by itself.

[John T. Fishel]

Doctrine drives strategy - yes, but strategy also drives doctrine.

"All politics is local." Tip O'Neil, Speaker of the US House. - yes and necessarily so.

Stuff drives doctrine which drives stategy which drives doctrine whch drives stuff - which came first, the chicken or the egg? - yes

Staff UW is HOW "we" can influence strategic development. Writ large, it is the story of the surge (see Woodward's The War Within, Robinson's Tell Me How This Ends, and Ricks' The Gamble).

Back to politics and strategy and for a different definition, see Steve Metz' Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy. This also raises the question of Grand Strategy, National Strategy, Theater Strategy...

On innovation, we go back and forth. But, in the end, my perception (nod to Marct) is that the military does tend to reward it more often than we suspect. I have been amazed at the number of our newly selected general officers who don't fit the expected mold/career pattern.

Cheers

JohnT

[John T. Fishel]

Wm, my definition of strategy is fully compatible with yours

[wm]

Wm, my definition of strategy is fully compatible with yours

Concur John. I think the one I lifted from the JP is actually a wholely contained subset of yours.

[William F. Owen]

OK, Do doctrine writers get a brief from the State Department on the National Strategy? Did State sign off on FM100-5 or FM3? If not, then Strategy does not drive doctrine, or vice versa.

More over what doctrine and what strategy? They are very wide areas of concern. I am aware of tactical and operational doctrine. What is Strategic Doctrine?

[Entropy]

Very interesting thread.

The older I get the more I think that doctrine, as an end product, is much less important that the process of creating new doctrine and challenging existing doctrine. While I agree with Wilf that doctrine is "what is taught," I think it goes beyond that and can become a mindset with a lot of negative effects.

WM mentioned WWII France, which I think is a good example. Doctrine for them became a mindset that prevented the French military, as an institution, from perceiving changes and adapting to them in time. The "Powell doctrine" was similar in that it took a few wars for the institutional military to change. Dogmatic doctrine can suppress the innovation at lower levels that is always required in wartime.

When doctrine is allowed to become dogma, then there's a problem. ISTM that Col. Gentile and others worry that our new FM-24-based COIN doctrine is heading down that road.

On strategy-doctrine, I don't think doctrine "drives" strategy, but it influences what is perceived as possible and desirable - this is particularly true with "dogmatic" doctrine, which becomes, I believe, an unstated and sometimes unperceived assumption for decisionmaking. In WWII France, for example, ISTM that the static-defense oriented French doctrine probably influenced policymaker decisions, narrowed their view, and prevented them from properly assessing and meeting the German threat.


Wilf quoted Askenazi: "Don't ask my opinion. Tell me what you want and I will tell you if it is possible." Dogmatic doctrine will limit what one perceives is possible IMO. In that regard, I see doctrine as something more likely to limit strategic options than expand them. Therefore, I think doctrine (especially, official, published doctrine) should be be more wide-and-shallow than narrow-and-deep.

[William F. Owen]

The older I get the more I think that doctrine, as an end product, is much less important that the process of creating new doctrine and challenging existing doctrine. While I agree with Wilf that doctrine is "what is taught," I think it goes beyond that and can become a mindset with a lot of negative effects.

Anytime the "Doctrine" becomes what is the important, you're stuffed. Doctrine has to be written and it has to have practical expression, but it is merely a tool. It is not something to be protected, but it is also not something to be needlessly and constantly challenged.

Dogmatic doctrine can suppress the innovation at lower levels that is always required in wartime.

When doctrine is allowed to become dogma, then there's a problem. ISTM that Col. Gentile and others worry that our new FM-24-based COIN doctrine is heading down that road.

That would also accurately sum up my concern, as well as the nature of the narrative which has driven recent COIN development.

Wilf quoted Askenazi: "Don't ask my opinion. Tell me what you want and I will tell you if it is possible." Dogmatic doctrine will limit what one perceives is possible IMO. In that regard, I see doctrine as something more likely to limit strategic options than expand them. Therefore, I think doctrine (especially, official, published doctrine) should be be more wide-and-shallow than narrow-and-deep.

I would see that as more practical than dogmatic. The military instrument is pretty blunt, limited, and indescriminate. It works best at full power and that means the military contribution to strategy has to be understood in those terms.