Do Senior Professional Military Education Schools Produce Strategists?

[zenpundit]

Grand strategy for the US is made (or the responsibility of) the President with the advice of his NSC. It is published as the National Security Strategy of the US supposedly annually according to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Because it is unclassified, it is inherently a partisan political document - some more so, some less. (The best of these was the final one published by the Budh 41 Adminsitration.) The NSC includes the CJCS as a statutory advisor; therefore, the military has appropriately input to US grand strategy. Note that the NSS is, in reality, a bureaucratic product so the Joint Staff and OSD are players. Key players from both as well as the NSC staff often wear military uniforms.

All true but that may or may not really become a grand strategy, which to be operational, has to exist as a shared set of assumptions among the broad elite, not just among a few members of agovernment bureaucracy during a particular administration. Cranking out policy docs will not cut it. The grand strategy has to be accepted deeply by the American people, or at least their broad leadership, or it rests on sand.

Containment was a grand strategy. So was the Atlantic Charter. So was the Open Door and the Monroe Doctrine. They were grand strategies because their core transcended normal partisanship and, in practice, became a frame of reference with which partisans and officials understood, framed and debated policy options and strategic goals. The grand strategy represented a vital consensus.

America lacks a real grand strategy right now because it is deeply divided between Left and Right and between elite and masses and few politicians care to do the hard work of building such a consensus or have the longitudinal perspective to see the need to do so. Short term thinking prevails.

[Steve Blair]

America lacks a real grand strategy right now because it is deeply divided between Left and Right and between elite and masses and few politicians care to do the hard work of building such a consensus or have the longitudinal perspective to see the need to do so. Short term thinking prevails.

I would argue that when the older examples of grand strategy were framed, America was also deeply divided. The difference is that there wasn't a great deal of concern and/or recognition of the masses as such. Decision-making was much more insulated than it is today, making it easier to frame and carry out grand strategies. There's also the matter of overall context for the framing of those strategies. Obviously grand strategy is a flexible thing, but it's dangerous to draw historical comparisons without context.

[Ken White]

Living through the period and being a borderline adult when it began and assisting in small ways with its implementation for 45 years, I can only say that:

- Steve is right, there were divides between policy elites and the mass of the nation; rich and poor, the various armed forces, Congress and the WH, members of the punditocracy and political ideologies that were just as deep as they seem today -- the difference today is simply that we are less restrained in our speech to the point of egregious incivility and significantly improved and easier mass communication lets everyone know that.

We also seem to have not learned much history...

- Containment was not a strategy, it like the Monroe doctrine was a Policy that was generally followed when it suited (and was ignored when it did not) and a series of Strategies -- and stratagems -- were developed by all the eight Presidents who served while the policy was in being. Each mostly different; most, in hindsight, not as useful as many thought. ADDED: After some thought, I'd even say that some if not most of those strategies were really counterproductive.

[John T. Fishel]

but disagree on the latter.

But first, a digression. There is not much agreement on what constitutes Grand Strategy. Steve Metz uses Barry Posen's definition which is not really different from a definition of foreign and security policy. Of course, Steve modifies the definition he has chosen to use toward the end of his book to bring in the "Ways and Means" - especially the latter. Some Grand Strategies are effective, some are not - just like military strategies and theater strategies. I see GS as how a state chooses to organize its resources (both tangible and intangible) and employ them to achieve its objectives in face of the objectives of others (which may or may not be threats). Usually, these are written as documents - the NSS is an attempt, imposed by Congress, to force the Executive to produce and puiblish a GS.

Containment was, indeed, a policy. Kennan's Long Telegram - later published as the X Article - was less than a strategy. It stated a goal in line with an assessment of the threat and argued that if the USSR's expansion were "contained" (a shorthand description of a "way"), the goal would be achieved. NSC 68 turned the policy into strategy and GS at that. It spelled out the ways and the means (resources) and served us well throughout the Cold War with some tweaking. Did it have to be written? Not in theory but in practice writing it out was necessary and functionally so to achieve an effective GS.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

and NSC 68 was one (or an -- or the -- I'm easy ) ) implementing strategy. No quarrel with that. I'll also point out that, per your comment yesterday, the document contained no resource considerations...

However, it did constitute a strategy. BTW, remind me -- who authored that document?

I further agree that it largely guided all elements of the USG from implementation in 1951 for about 20 years -- and that its principles were broadly followed for another 20.

However, I also suggest that a look at History will dispel any notion of great continuity within that 'strategy'. From the 'New Look' (NEC 162/2) to 'Flexible Response' (host of NSC Docs and AR 100-McNamara) to 'Sufficiency' to "Mikhail, I'll outspend you..." That latter policy (again with no resource considerations...) endorsed by my Wife...

Thus my contention that Containment was not a strategy but a policy implemented by numerous strategies. Many of which did as much harm as good...

Our political system is inimical to 'Grand Strategy.' I submit that's why there is argument over whether there is such a thing. Some nations have them and use them; most democracies cannot due to changes of government.

[John T. Fishel]

agreed. George Kennan wrote the Long Telegram and X article which articulated what came to be called the Containment policy. It had no resourcing and only the barest outline of a method or COA ie contain the Sovs and not let them expand.

NSC 68 was an implementing strategy - in my view a GS (but that is not really important) - and did contain very specific resources and COA to put those resources in place for use as needed. You are right about the whole range of policies that were proposed by various administrations and a number of strategic tweaks. IMO, however, the strategic implementations all fell within the rubric of containment - even Reagan's we'll spend you into oblivion.

I guess that I would argue that the strategy first articulated by NSC 68 was GS simply because it was both national in scope and survived with some modifications for over 40 years. American expansionist GS from 1785 until 1890 was encapsulated in a whole bunch of docs from legislation to Indian treaties - kind of like the British "unwritten" constitution - that all involved removing the Indian nations from their land and enclosing them on ever smaller parcels and reservations and killing them if they refused to be enclosed.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

State.

NSC 68 was written by the Policy Planning staff at State -- from whence internationally aimed strategies should appear.

It also short circuited the NSC, BoB and DoD, all of whom had different ideas. I think there's a very strong and good message in that...

The fact that Louis Johnson, far and away the worst and dumbest SecDef (worse than McNamara, Clifford, Aspin and the other two bad ones, Charlie Wilson and Tom Gates combined), was in the Pent-agony probably helped get it by the building...

As an aside of no relevance, I believe if you'll check, NSC 68 did not contain any real resource requirements but only broad estimates -- one reason Truman initially rejected it. Only after North Korea attacked the South did Truman decide to implement the directive -- and his spending on defense future programs immediately exceeded the NSC 68 estimates. That brings up two points -- other players can cause major strategy modifications and resource estimates will generally be low due to that fact.

[Bob's World]

At the Duke Conference on Grand Strategy that I was fortunate enough to attend a comment was made and widely concurred with that:

"Grand Strategy is typically crafted by some speech writer, and then discovered 20 years later by some historian looking back for a way to explain or describe what had transpired" or words to that effect.

Most appear to be built around some threat as a focal point and are more a naming after the fact of what has been done then any cogent scheme going in.

You'd think we be smarter than that. But as mentioned above, if Grand Strategy is some "vital consensus;" that's virtually impossible to get on the front end. Far easier to describe what the majority position actually did post facto.


But here we are today. I am intrigued by FDR's approach to Grand Strategy, and he had one that he was prepared to employ following WWII, but died before he could implement it. I think it makes a great point of departure for looking at what a Grand Strategy might look like today (tailored for the new realities, of course):

1. The "Four Freedoms": Of Speech, of Religion, from fear, from want

2. The "Four Policemen": The United States, Great Britain, Russia, and China

3. The End of Colonialism

4. The promotion of Self Determination


Churchill blanched at any partnership with Russia or China; and was adamantly opposed to ending colonialism.

There must be greater shared responsibility for world order today, though the number may be more than 4, the states have changed, and "policeman" may not be the best role; and certainly the remnants of colonialism are at the heart of so many conflicts; as is the denial of self determination.

So my vote is we put FDR's position on the table and move forward from there. We could do a lot worse.

[George L. Singleton]

Overall I find William F. Owen's comments best synthesize the practical and textbook facts and history of "strategy."

National strategy or goal setting by the President as supported by the NSC is good on paper, but the interpersonal direct influence of the SECDEF and SECSTATE have disproportionate implications. I used to say the same about the Director of the CIA but not too sure about that these days.

As from slamming Senator McCain over a beer discussion I find that tasteless and rude and totally unnecessary, perhaps pandering to political correctness with another as our now new President.

We all owe our allegiance to whoever our President is and if we differ with him or her (future tense thinking) we work our disagreements through our Congressmen and Senators and at the next Presidential election.

My two cents.

[slapout9]

Wilf,Ken as Gomer Pyle would say Thank Ya,Thank Ya,Thank Ya for proving my points! I have to go do stuff but I will respond later and perhaps I can splain stuff mo better better

[Surferbeetle]

...with the understanding that Asia is not my area of expertise, but an interesting place nonetheless.

From David Rothkopf's blog on the FP Website:

Then you arrive at Singapore's Changi Airport and you are powerfully reminded that the excellence of the airline is not a fluke. This is the best airport in the world, spacious, efficient, and attractive. As such, it is the perfect preparation for Singapore itself, almost certainly the best run political entity on the planet. Admittedly, the country, led from the start by the man who is now known as its Minister Mentor Lee Kwan Yew, has practiced what I would characterize as constrained form of democracy but few places have ever so compellingly made the case that what is trade away in terms of the occasional citation for spitting gum on the sidewalk is more than made up for in a society that is prosperous (Asia's second richest), innovative, and safe.

It is a government that has led the way by behaving in many ways like a corporation, taking ideas like competitiveness and strategic planning seriously. (At dinner tonight with a senior business executive who is one of the country's great entrepreneurial success stories, she said, "In the beginning, in Singapore, the state was the entrepreneur." And that was said with a genuine appreciation for all the state achieved in that role.) Even in the midst of a global recession it has been seen as not just responsive, but creatively responsive, promoting retraining of workers and focus on new growth industries.

Part of the credit must go to its unique system of senior government official compensation. Ministers are paid via a formula: two thirds of the average of the eight highest salaries in six key professions (lawyer, accountant, banker, multinational executive, local manufacturer, and engineer). As a result in recent years the president and the prime minister have made in excess of $2 million a year in salary and other ministers in excess of $1 million. The result is that many of the best minds will be found in the government, zero corruption and terrific results. Want an example of the innovation? The president, prime minister, and ministers took an almost one-fifth pay cut this year because of the recession. What? Accountability among public officials? Real incentives? Imagine the loud "gak" you would get out of the U.S. government as they choked on those ideas.

[jmm99]

that is p.89 of Howard & Paret, as appears in full in my post #37, and which I will repeat here (keeping my numbering to designate the three points of the trinity; and keeping your emphasis and mine as well; and including CvC's fourth paragraph):

... composed [1] of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; [2] of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and [3] of [war’s] element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.

The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government.

These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship among them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.

Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.

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Again, I have to make it very clear that the situation I am addressing is the interface between the people, the government and the military in setting national policy, and its impact on national strategy and military strategy (as those terms are defined in joint doctrine), as that interface exists in the US in the first decade of the 21st century.

I am not making or trying to make some generalized argument that applies to the US in other time periods, or to other nations in the same or other time periods. In short, I'm not addressing the application of CvC to Hitler or Hamas, WWII or Vietnam, Native Americans or Texan Mexicans, or the peoples of South Korea, the Lebanon and Somalia.

Scope: US, 1st decade of 21st century - its interface of people, government and military.

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What CvC wrote is clear enough. As to the main tendency of the people: "[1] of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force;" As to the main tendency of the government: "[3] of [war’s] element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone."

My modest suggestion is that the primary characteristics, that CvC applied to the people and government ca. 1831 (a view strongly held by Metternich in Europe and less strongly by Hamilton in the US), are not the primary characteristics of situation I address - US, 1st decade of 21st century - its interface of people, government and military.

Further, I suggest that to take CvC's early 19th century charactistics for the people and government ("tendencies", as he called them, "like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject") and apply them to the 21st century US situation, would be serious error - and without rigor.

In fact, I would suggest that to do so would to violate CvC's statement that "to fix an arbitrary relationship among them" would render that argument "totally useless" (from 3rd CvC paragraph quoted above).

My second modest suggestion is that CvC's early 19th century analysis of the people and government did not (and could not - since CvC did not claim a magic crystal ball) take into account what I call the transitory politicians of the 21st century US situation. Again, to attempt to define them (the transitory politicians) in terms of the 19th and 18th century statesmen would also be an "arbitrary fixation" - and also "totally useless".

So, my two modest suggestions are not contrary to CvC's warning against "arbitrary fixations" - in fact, they heed that warning.

The following is an important concept; that is, the "tendencies" are "... yet variable in their relationship to one another" (as Ken said, "they are inherently unstable"); and that (4th para. above):

Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.

It is impossible to develop a theory and maintain the balance if one gets the composition of the magnets wrong; and attempts to define them for what they are not.

end part 1

[jmm99]

Did CvC have something to say about this, beyond the direct quotation of his "remarkable trinity" ? Indeed, he did.

The following quotes are from J.J. Graham translation, published in London in 1873, from Book 8, Chapter III, subpart B. "Of the Magnitude of the Object of the War, and the Efforts to be Made", which is here - so everyone can quickly find them online and see the context. These quotes are running from start to finish (no cherry picking), starting 6th paragraph from the bottom:

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The first quote sets the context, where the French Revolution and Napoleon were much on CvC's mind - and where he eschewed prediction of the future:

Thus, therefore, the element of war, freed from all conventional restrictions, broke loose, with all its natural force. The cause was the participation of the people in this great affair of State, and this participation arose partly from the effects of the French Revolution on the internal affairs of countries, partly from the threatening attitude of the French towards all nations.

Now, whether this will be the case always in future, whether all wars hereafter in Europe will be carried on with the whole power of the States, and, consequently, will only take place on account of great interests closely affecting the people, or whether a separation of the interests of the Government from those of the people will gradually again arise, would be a difficult point to settle; and, least of all, shall we take upon us to settle it. But every one will agree with us, that bounds, which to a certain extent existed only in an unconsciousness of what is possible, when once thrown down, are not easily built up again; and that, at least, whenever great interests are in dispute, mutual hostility will discharge itself in the same manner as it has done in our times.

This brings in the concept that "great interests closely affecting the people" will result in a different manner of how "mutual hostility will discharge itself".

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The next step in CvC's analyis (of his summary historical sections that precede this part) was to introduce the doctrine that each period has "its own peculiar forms of war", "its own theory of war" and must be judged in terms of the "peculiarities of the time"....

We here bring our historical survey to a close, for it was not our design to give at a gallop some of the principles on which war has been carried on in each age, but only to show how each period has had its own peculiar forms of war, its own restrictive conditions, and its own prejudices. Each period would, therefore, also keep its own theory of war, even if every where, in early times, as well as in later, the task had been undertaken of working out a theory on philosophical principles. The events in each age must, therefore, be judged of in connection with the peculiarities of the time, and only he who, less through an anxious study of minute details than through an accurate glance at the whole, can transfer himself into each particular age, is fit to understand and appreciate its generals.

But this conduct of war, conditioned by the peculiar relations of States, and of the military force employed, must still always contain in itself something more general, or rather something quite general, with which, above everything, theory is concerned.

but that the "conduct of war" has, in each era, some things which are quite general and which imply a more general theory of the conduct of war.

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The last step in CvC's analysis was recognition that all future wars will not be of a "grand character" - and that "external influences" and "manifold diversity of causes" alter the nature of the particular war. While not expressly mentioning the "people" and "government" legs of the trinity, context suggests that they are the source of the "external influences" and "manifold diversity of causes":

The latest period of past time, in which war reached its absolute strength, contains most of what is of general application and necessary. But it is just as improbable that wars henceforth will all have this grand character as that the wide barriers which have been opened to them will ever be completely closed again. Therefore, by a theory which only dwells upon this absolute war, all cases in which external influences alter the nature of war would be excluded or condemned as false. This cannot be the object of theory, which ought to be the science of war, not under ideal but under real circumstances. Theory, therefore, whilst casting a searching, discriminating and classifying glance at objects, should always have in view the manifold diversity of causes from which war may proceed, and should, therefore, so trace out its great features as to leave room for what is required by the exigencies of time and the moment.

Accordingly, we must add that the object which every one who undertakes war proposes to himself, and the means which he calls forth, are determined entirely according to the particular details of his position; and on that very account they will also bear in themselves the character of the time and of the general relations; lastly, that they are always subject to the general conclusions to be deduced from the nature of war.

So, analysis in this strategic context must be situation dependent, though always subject to the "general conclusions" to be deduced from the nature of war as it has been conducted.

[William F. Owen]

1. Further, I suggest that to take CvC's early 19th century charactistics for the people and government ("tendencies", as he called them, "like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject") and apply them to the 21st century US situation, would be serious error - and without rigor.
   
2. My modest suggestion is that the primary characteristics, that CvC applied to the people and government ca. 1831 (a view strongly held by Metternich in Europe and less strongly by Hamilton in the US), are not the primary characteristics of situation I address - US, 1st decade of 21st century - its interface of people, government and military.

a.) OK, so are you saying the the Passion, Reason, Chance trinity does not apply in the 21st Century US?

b.) So would you suggest better ascribing the characteristic of Passion (you can also say Emotion) to the Government or the Army and not the People?

....and I assume we are talking about the same 21st Century Americans who vote more on game shows than they do national elections?
Do Emotions ever effect things at the polls?

Sticking with the Howard Paret translation (because all my CvC commentaries use it) Book 1, Chap 1, Section 3, P76 says that "even the most civilise people can be fired with a passionate hatred for each other." How does that not describe emotions post 911?

Would you expect the primary source of emotion to be Army of the Government? Is the trinity wrong? If so, how?

If you are telling me that CvCs trinity does not accurately describe the system within which you live, then OK, but we'll have to wait and see, because it did, just 9 years ago, and has historically right up until now. Yes the US people may not be emotionally connected with current conflicts, but that does not undermine CvCs basic observations.