Do Senior Professional Military Education Schools Produce Strategists?

[Ken White]

Living through the period and being a borderline adult when it began and assisting in small ways with its implementation for 45 years, I can only say that:

- Steve is right, there were divides between policy elites and the mass of the nation; rich and poor, the various armed forces, Congress and the WH, members of the punditocracy and political ideologies that were just as deep as they seem today -- the difference today is simply that we are less restrained in our speech to the point of egregious incivility and significantly improved and easier mass communication lets everyone know that.

We also seem to have not learned much history...

- Containment was not a strategy, it like the Monroe doctrine was a Policy that was generally followed when it suited (and was ignored when it did not) and a series of Strategies -- and stratagems -- were developed by all the eight Presidents who served while the policy was in being. Each mostly different; most, in hindsight, not as useful as many thought. ADDED: After some thought, I'd even say that some if not most of those strategies were really counterproductive.

[John T. Fishel]

but disagree on the latter.

But first, a digression. There is not much agreement on what constitutes Grand Strategy. Steve Metz uses Barry Posen's definition which is not really different from a definition of foreign and security policy. Of course, Steve modifies the definition he has chosen to use toward the end of his book to bring in the "Ways and Means" - especially the latter. Some Grand Strategies are effective, some are not - just like military strategies and theater strategies. I see GS as how a state chooses to organize its resources (both tangible and intangible) and employ them to achieve its objectives in face of the objectives of others (which may or may not be threats). Usually, these are written as documents - the NSS is an attempt, imposed by Congress, to force the Executive to produce and puiblish a GS.

Containment was, indeed, a policy. Kennan's Long Telegram - later published as the X Article - was less than a strategy. It stated a goal in line with an assessment of the threat and argued that if the USSR's expansion were "contained" (a shorthand description of a "way"), the goal would be achieved. NSC 68 turned the policy into strategy and GS at that. It spelled out the ways and the means (resources) and served us well throughout the Cold War with some tweaking. Did it have to be written? Not in theory but in practice writing it out was necessary and functionally so to achieve an effective GS.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

and NSC 68 was one (or an -- or the -- I'm easy ) ) implementing strategy. No quarrel with that. I'll also point out that, per your comment yesterday, the document contained no resource considerations...

However, it did constitute a strategy. BTW, remind me -- who authored that document?

I further agree that it largely guided all elements of the USG from implementation in 1951 for about 20 years -- and that its principles were broadly followed for another 20.

However, I also suggest that a look at History will dispel any notion of great continuity within that 'strategy'. From the 'New Look' (NEC 162/2) to 'Flexible Response' (host of NSC Docs and AR 100-McNamara) to 'Sufficiency' to "Mikhail, I'll outspend you..." That latter policy (again with no resource considerations...) endorsed by my Wife...

Thus my contention that Containment was not a strategy but a policy implemented by numerous strategies. Many of which did as much harm as good...

Our political system is inimical to 'Grand Strategy.' I submit that's why there is argument over whether there is such a thing. Some nations have them and use them; most democracies cannot due to changes of government.

[John T. Fishel]

agreed. George Kennan wrote the Long Telegram and X article which articulated what came to be called the Containment policy. It had no resourcing and only the barest outline of a method or COA ie contain the Sovs and not let them expand.

NSC 68 was an implementing strategy - in my view a GS (but that is not really important) - and did contain very specific resources and COA to put those resources in place for use as needed. You are right about the whole range of policies that were proposed by various administrations and a number of strategic tweaks. IMO, however, the strategic implementations all fell within the rubric of containment - even Reagan's we'll spend you into oblivion.

I guess that I would argue that the strategy first articulated by NSC 68 was GS simply because it was both national in scope and survived with some modifications for over 40 years. American expansionist GS from 1785 until 1890 was encapsulated in a whole bunch of docs from legislation to Indian treaties - kind of like the British "unwritten" constitution - that all involved removing the Indian nations from their land and enclosing them on ever smaller parcels and reservations and killing them if they refused to be enclosed.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

State.

NSC 68 was written by the Policy Planning staff at State -- from whence internationally aimed strategies should appear.

It also short circuited the NSC, BoB and DoD, all of whom had different ideas. I think there's a very strong and good message in that...

The fact that Louis Johnson, far and away the worst and dumbest SecDef (worse than McNamara, Clifford, Aspin and the other two bad ones, Charlie Wilson and Tom Gates combined), was in the Pent-agony probably helped get it by the building...

As an aside of no relevance, I believe if you'll check, NSC 68 did not contain any real resource requirements but only broad estimates -- one reason Truman initially rejected it. Only after North Korea attacked the South did Truman decide to implement the directive -- and his spending on defense future programs immediately exceeded the NSC 68 estimates. That brings up two points -- other players can cause major strategy modifications and resource estimates will generally be low due to that fact.

[slapout9]

Here is my version of Grand Strategy and Leadership,,,, 1962 We Choose To Go To The Moon!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g25G1...eature=related

[Ken White]

No question both strategies helped the country out of the economic low...

At the time.

[John T. Fishel]

the Policy Planning Staff, led by Paul Nitze, wrote the thing. (Sorry I missed the essence of your question) Agree about Louis Johnson. But, in the 1948 - 50 period there was no NSC staff to speak of and the concept was that State was the lead agency. The PPS was an innovation of SECSTATE George C. Marshall that, IMO, he created to replicate a planning component of a military staff. Today, that is the J5 staff section at the JS and all GCCs. And the PPS has significantly atrophied.

DOD, in that time was NOT the 800 pound gorilla - it was 3 services trying to become a unified department and fighting it all theway. The JS, such as it was, was very small; OSD was largely non-existent. I could go on.

You are right that Truman intially rejected - rather did not approve - NSC 68 because it was weak on resourcing. But as the document evloved over the course of 1950 the resource components were added - and before the N Kor attack (for the most part). The question of whether Congress would have approved w/o the push from the N Kor is problematic at best.

NDU press has published NSC 68 (in all its interations to include Pres Tuman's public EO) with discussion and commentary icluding an intro by Nitze. It's available online.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

DOD, in that time was NOT the 800 pound gorilla - it was 3 services trying to become a unified department and fighting it all theway. The JS, such as it was, was very small; OSD was largely non-existent. I could go on.

Yep, sure do. Remember it well, didn't read about it. Still, they were a 400 to 500 pound Gorilla even then, resource allocation wise. Scattered all over DC and the suburbs, too. Even in the old Temps on the Mall.

Though I would have said four services trying every way they could to avoid becoming a unified Department. Pity they didn't win. Not only am I not a Goldwater-Nichols believer, I'm not a fan of DoD. The Service bureaucracies were bad enough without adding an upper layer. See DHS and the DNI for current versions...

This, OTOH:

...and before the N Kor attack (for the most part).

Is not as I recall but it's really immaterial, I suppose...

[John T. Fishel]

perhaps, i should defer to your memory.

[Ken White]

Uh, what'd I say...

I'm not even sure why I'm in this room.

[Bob's World]

Well, according to (caution, name drop coming) John Gaddis, there were "grand strategies of containment," probably dovetails in with Ken's comments that each Pres had his own cut on how to operate within that construct, and each had his own unique challenges to deal with as well.

As to where the line lies between grand strategy and policy, I guess my take is: Does it really matter?

One man's grand strategy may be another's policy, but show me a nation with neither and I'll show you the United States over the past 20 years. Responding to Crisis, vs shaping a national destiny.

To me, an effective Grand Strategy does not require concensus, and it also does not need to be rooted in some threat; but it should be holistic enough that it guides decisions as broad as what to do in Pakistan, whether or not to bail our Chrysler, or what to say in my speech in Cairo.

Containment gave us context. It enabled us to take a tie in Korea, a loss in Vietnam and press on to a victory on the main objective. Sadly few things fail like success, so we have been continuing to cling to what worked for so long, even though it really just doesn't fit the globalized, post-cold war world.

We need a new policy, or a new grand strategy. I don't care which, just pick one and lets get moving forward together in a manner that allows us to know how relatively important the daily dramas really are.

[slapout9]

No question both strategies helped the country out of the economic low...

At the time.

Yes, he got it right and wrong. Cuba too. First the Bay of Pigs...oooopps not so good. Cuban missile crisis did it right....then turned right around and continued to support the assassination programs against Castro....which affected our legitimacy as an Honorable country after signing the agreement with the Soviet Union saying we wouldn't do this. Say what you mean and mean what you say.

But from another point of view Cuba was a credible threat, meaning they had the actual capability to strike the Continental United States both conventionally and later with nuclear weapons.....a clear threat that had to be dealt with in some way. Vietnam never was any of those things but look what we did

[Bob's World]

Sometimes we get so fixated on "capability" that we lose sight of "motive."

N. Korea is playing a dangerous game. A crazy guy with a gun in a crowded room is scary enough. A crazy man with a nuke in a crowded world? You can't negotiate with crazy, so here is a case where focusing on capability is probably appropriate.

Iran is another story. Here we need to lean toward policies that target their motive to develop and use such weapons, while at the same time taking positions with them that address their legitimate beliefs that they need such capabilities to achieve a regional influence that is appropriate to Iran's status in the middle east. Both the Israelies and the Saudis lead us to taking positions with Iran that are more in their national interests than ours, and we need to break free from that. It seems that the President understands that and is heading in the right direction.

We don't worry about England, or France, or Israel. Why? Plenty of capability, but no motive. Time to bring Iran into the circle of trust. I don't think that requires them to go nuke, but they will never believe that so long as they are outside the circle.

[slapout9]

BW, some good points. So let me ask you a question. The Mid-east region AO. First we invade one country then we invade two countries now we are talking about fighting in a 3rd country Pakistan. How many countries do you have to be fighting in before you have World War 3?

[Ken White]

Yes, he got it right and wrong. Cuba too. First the Bay of Pigs...oooopps not so good. Cuban missile crisis did it right....

Questionable. I'd say not really. He traded all our many IRBMs that were in Germany, Greece and Turkey for the few that the USSR had placed in Cuba. So, yeah, he got it done but at a net cost to US credibility -- he simply got out traded by Kruschev...

You said:

...Say what you mean and mean what you say.

I agree but most politicians cannot do that for a variety of reasons -- some understandable, some not. As an example

...a clear threat that had to be dealt with in some way. Vietnam never was any of those things but look what we did

We went to Viet Nam because Eisenhower unfortunately got persuaded by his SecState and against the advice of his Army Chief of Staff to sign a Mutual Support treaty with South Viet Nam. -- and then the brothers Kennedy, looking for a way to show how tough they were -- and boost a flagging US economy -- decided to use that treaty to fix both those problem...

That Administration and its idealists did this nation a lot of damage. Nor were they very good at either saying what they meant or doing what they said.

[jmm99]

perhaps a dangerous thing; but it does relate to part of the conversation here - and to any number of similar threads. The basic question presented is whether CvC got his "remarkable triangle" right or wrong in describing the primary characteristics of the people and the government.

This is not to question the concept of a triangle composed of the three elements: people, miltary and government; and that they must interface in deciding matters of peace and war. I'm suggesting that CvC got the primary characteristics of the people and the government ass-backwards - at least in the context of the US, past, present and future (if the future follows US history).

-------------------------------------
Framework

Here is an example of where I am coming from re: CvC's concepts of the people and government. It simply sets the stage and framework for discussion.

MCDP 1-1 Strategy

pp.31-32

THE TRINITY

This chapter has described the nature of the strategic environment. This environment is defined by the nature of politics and the interactions of political entities that participate in the political process. The strategic environment is complex and subject to the interplay of dynamic and often contradictory factors. Some elements of politics and policy are rational, that is, the product of conscious thought and intent. Other aspects are governed by forces that defy rational explanation. We can discern certain factors that are at work in any strategic situation-the constants and norms-and use them as a framework to help understand what is occurring. At the same time, we realize that each strategic situation is unique and that in order to grasp its true nature, we must comprehend how the character and motivations of each of the antagonists will interact in these specific circumstances.

Summarizing the environment within which war and strategy are made, Clausewitz described it as being dominated by a “remarkable trinity” that is-

composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of [war’s] element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.

The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government.

These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.

Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.[17]

Clausewitz concluded that the strategic environment is shaped by the disparate forces of emotion, chance, and rational thought. At any given moment, one of these forces may dominate, but the other two are always at work. The actual course of events is determined by the dynamic interplay among them. The effective strategist must master the meaning and the peculiarities of this environment.[18]

17. Clausewitz, p. 89. > 3. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

18. See Edward J. Villacres and Christopher Bassford, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity,” Parameters (Autumn 1995) pp. 9-19.

For present purposes, I will assume (since I am not an SME there) that his characterization of the military is acceptable.

-------------------------------------------
Discussion

Coming back to the key passage in CvC, with some inserts from his other passages in the same quote above:

... a “remarkable trinity” .... composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force [JMM: the people - emotion]; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam [JMM: the commander and his army - chance]; and of [war’s] element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone [JMM: the government - rational thought].

CvC obviously had a rather dim view of the people ("primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force"), who presumably were saved from barbaric savagery by government (the "instrument of policy ... subject to reason alone"). Perhaps, that was so in Europe of the early 19th century when he wrote - and during the 18th century which informed his view of the people and government. I doubt it; but that is not my primary argument.

I would suggest that the people are a more immutable segment than government; and that collectively over time are much more subject to reason in favor of the national interest than government. I suggest that, in looking at this segment of the "remarkable triangle", we look to what can be termed the National Character (examples in MCDP 1-1 at pp.23-25), and also its Organic Framework or even its Civil Religion. That Character encompasses, but is not limited to, its overall pattern of laws and customs (which I regard as informal law). The point is that, whatever you call it, the People's Character changes very slowly - measuring change in terms of decades or even centuries (e.g., in basic legal principles, for example; while COL Jones and I will differ in how to treat particular principles in the Declaration of Independence and Constitution, as to their interpretation and implementation in specific cases, we both agree that these are key expressions of the American Character).

Government, particularly as we know it in a democracy, is scarcely immutable. It is subject to the election cycles - and a complete change-over can occur in a 6-year period (an effective change-over in less time). While it is true that the people may go off half-cocked (or become quite insane, as in the French Revolution), the charge is invariably led by politicians who become the new government. One should note that, in the later stages of the French Revolution, the people in effect had enough; thereby allowing Napoleon to re-institute the ancien regime with a new facade (more acceptable to the by-then accepted concepts of liberty, fraternity and equality - but not too much of them).

However, beyond the mutable nature of democratic government in time, another feature of politics and politicians interferes with the concept that government acts with reason and rational thought re: the national interests. This feature is as or more important than governmental rate of change. Politicians tend to act with reason and rational thought - re: their own self-interests - there are exceptions, but I believe they prove the rule.

If I am correct in this line of thought, following CvC's view of the people and government is based on his false premises as to the character of them - and will often yield lousy results, since one will be looking in the wrong place for rationality re: the national interest. Populace-centric formation of strategy ?

[Ken White]

I believe CvC was in his time and place correct in his placement but that many years and a different developmental process have caused the very real mutation which you astutely divined.

People who vote -- or an inordinate fear of them -- cause strange ripples to the governmental process in all democracies. Our errors occur when we try to emulate Europe. Nice folks but we aren't Europeans, there is a slightly different mindset here. Not better, not worse -- just a little different on some things.

Germans are also nice people and a lot of Americans are of German extraction -- no insult to any of them when I say that I have long wished and said that the nascent US should have adopted fewer European ideas and more of the Hodenosaunee or Iroquois governmental practices. Even more so than they did -- particularly that bit wherein the Sachems had to consider the effect of their laws and rulings on to the seventh future generation (though the mind boggles at most of the folks we elect to Congress trying to do that)...

And how much better off we might have been had Thayendanega been the senior instructor at Valley Forge rather then Von Steuben.

(Yes, I know the Revolution would have lasted a bit longer -- but it would've ended the same way. Then the US army might not then have adopted most of European Army bad practice and ignored their good practices which is effectively what we have done...)

[Surferbeetle]

Von Steuben from Wikipedia:

Steuben's training technique was to create a "model company", a group of 120 chosen men who in turn successively trained other personnel at Regimental and Brigade levels. Steuben's eclectic personality greatly enhanced his mystique. He trained the soldiers, who at this point were greatly lacking in proper clothing themselves, in full military dress uniform, swearing and yelling at them up and down in German and French. When that was no longer successful, he recruited Captain Benjamin Walker, his French-speaking aide, to curse at them for him in English. Steuben introduced a system of progressive training, beginning with the school of the soldier, with and without arms, and going through the school of the regiment. This corrected the previous policy of simply assigning personnel to regiments. Each company commander was made responsible for the training of new men, but actual instruction was done by selected sergeants, the best obtainable.

Another program developed by Steuben was camp sanitation. He established standards of sanitation and camp layouts that would still be standard a century and a half later. There had previously been no set arrangement of tents and huts. Men relieved themselves where they wished and when an animal died, it was stripped of its meat and the rest was left to rot where it lay. Steuben laid out a plan to have rows for command, officers and enlisted men. Kitchens and latrines were on opposite sides of the camp, with latrines on the downhill side. There was the familiar arrangement of company and regimental streets.

Perhaps Steuben's biggest contribution to the American Revolution was training in the use of the bayonet. Since the Battle of Bunker Hill, Americans had been mainly dependent upon using their ammunition to win battles. Throughout the early course of the war, Americans used the bayonet mostly as a cooking skewer or tool rather than as a fighting instrument. Steuben's introduction of effective bayonet charges became crucial. In the Battle of Stony Point, American soldiers attacked with unloaded rifles and won the battle solely on Steuben's bayonet training.

Again from wikipedia, Thayendanegea

Thayendanegea or Joseph Brant (c. 1743 – 24 November 1807) was a Mohawk leader and British military officer during the American Revolution. Brant was perhaps the most well-known North American Indian of his generation. He met many of the most significant people of the age, including George Washington and King George III. The American folk image emphasized the wartime atrocities his forces committed against settlers in the Mohawk Valley; in Canada, he was remembered for his efforts to regain land for the Mohawk people.

Brant acted as a tireless negotiator for the Six Nations to control their land without crown oversight or control. He used British fears of his dealings with the Americans and the French to extract concessions. His conflicts with British administrators in Canada regarding tribal land claims were exacerbated by his relations with the American leaders.

Brant was a war chief, and not a hereditary Mohawk sachem. His decisions could and were sometimes overruled by the sachems and clan matrons. However, his natural ability, his early education, and the connections he was able to form made him one of the great leaders of his people and of his time. The situation of the Six Nations on the Grand River was better than that of the Iroquois who remained in New York. His lifelong mission was to help the Indian to survive the transition from one culture to another, transcending the political, social and economic challenges of one the most volatile, dynamic periods of American history. He put his loyalty to the Six Nations before loyalty to the British. His life cannot be summed up in terms of success or failure, although he had known both. More than anything, Brant's life was marked by frustration and struggle.

His attempt to create pan-tribal unity proved unsuccessful, though his efforts would be taken up a generation later by the Shawnee leader Tecumseh.

[Ken White]

than is contained in the quotes or the Wiki articles. I'm also aware of the the fact that Washington elected to fight the British on their own terms and thus Von Steuben was beneficial -- and that Thayendanega was an Indian and they had difficulties with group discipline (but not, more importantly, with self discipline once they were pointed in the right direction). He sided with the British but that was as much due to American intransigence as his earlier relationships.

In any event, that allegory was not really aimed at the persons but at the fact that we adopted European models for many things we do and those were possibly not the best approach for a very independent people.

Way off thread here, to get back on, one could make the case that Indian Strategy was not good, as they sort of lost -- but when one considers the time period involved and the raw numbers on both sides, they really did quite well. My reason for mentioning the Von Steuben / Thayendanega contrast was to make the VonS / CvC link and the point that a lot of German ideas permeated the early US and not all were beneficial. OTOH, Thayendanega was as American as one could possibly be, he took care of his people and he was a smart and principled guy. I believe a happy medium between those two poles -- Europe / Indian -- would have better served us. However, we didn't go that route...

We for years have adopted European strategic concepts and patterns as well as a Eurocentric strategy and I agree with Bob's World that these patterns have not done us any favors.

And JMM has a good dissection of one reason this is possibly so.