Do Senior Professional Military Education Schools Produce Strategists?

[Surferbeetle]

...Thayendanegea or Joseph Brant was new to me and so I chased and shared a link. The Van Steuben link on the other hand brought back some memories for me...

There was a summer day at Ft Knox which I spent in the commissary parking lot while Drill Sgt O taught me and many others the 'spirit of the bayonet'. I don't remember any German or French being used but I did indeed learn some new, interesting, and choice ways to use the English language from him

As an aside, mapping the North American Indian tribes looks pretty interesting. I haven't thought about this side of things since I did a report on the Pacific Northwest Tribes a long long time ago...

[William F. Owen]

If I am correct in this line of thought, following CvC's view of the people and government is based on his false premises as to the character of them - and will often yield lousy results, since one will be looking in the wrong place for rationality re: the national interest. Populace-centric formation of strategy ?

Be a bit careful of jumping to that conclusion. CvC was pretty sceptical of democracy and/or republics, as he saw them work in practice. Best to look back at Thucydides as a strong influence on Clausewitz, were the forces that drive nations or peoples to war, were Fear, Honour, and/or Interest.

CvC was describing the process as an observer. He saw no evidence that people, governments or armies were guided by rational thought - which is why he did not have much time for democracy!

He also had a number of trinities, and they were all context specific. Passion, reason and chance, for example are those he uses to describe the social nature of war.

I would submit that US Foreign Policy post -911 shows CvCs observation, as being correct.

[Ken White]

I would submit that US Foreign Policy post -911 shows CvCs observation, as being correct.

even a scintilla of rational thought to same before 911 -- a highly suspect proposition...

CvC was right, democracies aren't rational -- but Winston was also correct, "“It has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried.”"

Really, though, that lack of rationality bit is somewhat suspect; I think Democracies are as if not more rational than other forms of government (lacking a particularly wise benevolent ruler) but they do not react as rapidly as do other governmental types and that time lag can give the impression of dithering when it is actually simply time consumed to reach consensus. Regardless, CvC was correct on trinities -- and they are inherently unstable.

And I think JMM is on to something...

[jmm99]

not the Bermuda Triangle (which captured my initial try at this post when at home - and sent it into the ether); but this one:

from Wilf
He also had a number of trinities, and they were all context specific. Passion, reason and chance, for example are those he uses to describe the social nature of war.

which is exactly the "remarkable trinity" quoted in MCDP 1-1 Strategy, and in any number of US doctrinal publications on strategy.

In that "remarkable trinity", the characteristics (using your terms) are primarily associated as follows: "passion" (people), "reason" (government) and "chance" (armies). Or, in CvC's own terms (Howard & Paret translation, which I quoted in my prior post and here numbered for absolute clarity):

... composed [1] of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; [2] of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and [3] of [war’s] element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.

The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government.

I suggest the foregoing rather clearly establishes that reason ("rational thought" in your words; "rationality" in mine) was associated by CvC with governments - in his theoretical construct, reason cannot be associated with the people who are moved by "blind natural force" - "primordial violence, hatred, and enmity". Nor can "reason" be relied on in the case of commanders and armies because of the element of chance (query: why chaos and complexity theory would not be applicable to peoples and governments as well, but that is a subject matter for another thread).

No doubt that CvC's view of governments was informed by the European governments in place when he wrote (a product of Metternich and Vienna, so quite conservative in tidy boxes) - and those which had shaped Europe since Westphalia. In that construct, the Sovereign was co-terminous with Sovereignty - then, in a very real sense, the ruler was the state. Not that many years before, Louis XIV had stated exactly that.

The salient point of all that is that the government (the ruler and his cabinet) was necessarily composed of statesmen because their objectives and courses of action were the state's objectives and courses of action. The government was the state and defined the national interests. A very simple construct, justified by the realities ca. 1831 Europe.

CvC was also informed (perhaps a better word is "uninformed") as you say:

CvC was pretty sceptical of democracy and/or republics, as he saw them work in practice. Best to look back at Thucydides as a strong influence on Clausewitz, were the forces that drive nations or peoples to war, were Fear, Honour, and/or Interest.

as to which, the first point is simply that the Athenian and Spartan systems of governance were not informative when it came to the system of Jeffersonian-Jacksonian Democratic-Republicanism then developing in the US; or to the parliamentary system of democracy developed in the UK after George III lost his grip. The Greek systems are even less informative when it comes to the evolved systems of governance in either the US or UK. In short, CvC was no SME when it came to the interplay between the people, government and the military in modern democracies like the US and UK.

The second point deals with the Thucydidean construct of "fear, honour and/or interest" as factors leading to wars. In CvC's time, whose "fear, honour and/or interests" were critical to the decisions to make war ? The only answer is the ""fears, honour and/or interests" of the statesmen, since they (not the people) decided on the national interests that include those factors.

Now, use of the term "statesmen" has everything to do with those folks being the "deciders" when it came to what they believed was in the national interest. It has nothing to do with whether those statesmen (by the Grace of God, etc.) were competent or not in making those decisions. Since CvC had the decisions of Louis XIV, XV and XVI in front of him, we can fairly infer that he did not believe that all statesmen and their governments were competent.

Moving this up to the present, and back to my initial point, is that there have been substantive changes in US politics since the era of Jeffersonian-Jacksonian Democratic-Republicanism (which CvC would have viewed with some distain is a good probability). Crudely stated, we are much more likely to find politicians, rather than statesmen, making national policy decisions.

To introduce some rigor in my terms, by "politicians" I mean persons who practice "politics", the art of getting elected to and remaining in office - often by log rolling legislation and policies which enhance the latter objective. While this has always been true to some extent in US politics, the present practicalities of the election cycles and fund-raising efforts require politicians to be just that - leaving little room for consideration (much less implementation) of the national interests. The vastly quickened media cycle has also added up to politicians being more and more politicians.

Even beyond that, we have seen more and more "professional politicians" in office. That is, the guy or gal who perhaps went to law school (let's say with very high grades, etc.), but then got into politics at the grassroots (say, in community organizing) or by marrying into the governor's mansion. Those folks are indeed SMEs in politics - that is a serious comment; they are good at it and know their profession as well as any professional. But, that does not make them "statespersons".

They, at the highest level, do end up with that mission - to be statespersons faithfully representing the national interests (the "peoples' business" as they are so fond of saying) - until the next election cycle, etc. Perhaps, I am naive, but I believe that Pres. Bush then, and Pres. Obama now, felt and feel that they represented and represent the national interests - as they saw and see them. That situation is, however, qualitatively different from the situation that CvC wrote about.

My suggestion is that the People, collectively and over a longer timeframe, are more likely to get the national interests right, than transitory politicians.

Entirely too long, and somewhat political; but the subject matter of the discussion seemed to require some political sidebars.

---------------------------
Wilf, this ...

I would submit that US Foreign Policy post -911 shows CvCs observation, as being correct.

looks like an argument heading in a brief. Please feel free to complete the brief; but tell me what CvC observation you are suggesting (he must have made 100s or 1000s of observations); and the facts tying that observation into post-9/11 US foreign policy.

Cheers

Mike

[William F. Owen]

JMM

My reading of CvC is that Passion is associated with the people, because people as a collective are not rational. Rule of the mob? Governments are driven Reason, because they have to put forth policy. Policy should be rational? Chance is the concern of armies because war is inherently unpredictable. Now these are not direct relationships, they are merely cited as dominant influences. I see them as largely correct and useful. The greater the passion of the people, the more the influence on reason. The better the chance, the greater influence on passion, and reason. - so after 911, invading A'Stan was not a great leap. We Want to do it + We Can do it, = We Should do it. - Passion + Chance = Reason.

With democracy you see the passion of the people driving the election politicians and thus passion driving policy. Hitler and Hamas both got elected! You also have the interplay of "Chance" since if the odds look good, the army is tempted to believe they can get what the "elected official" wants.

Yes the Governments of today are not the Government of 1831, but their primary purpose is still the defence of the nation. They still comprise the trinity of People, Leadership and Army(armed force). The FARC, Hezbollah and Hamas also conform to that model.

No CvC was not an SME on 21st Century US Politics, but nor was he on Marxism or National Socialism, yet his observations remain true in the prism of totalitarian states or even theocracies.

My suggestion is that the People, collectively and over a longer timeframe, are more likely to get the national interests right, than transitory politicians.

OK. So where is the evidence? I don't think CvC ever suggested that passion might not, in the long term, create a reasonable outcome. Most peoples passion is for a safe nation, but bear in mind that a lot of terrorist organisation and insurgencies are born of someone's passion.

[jmm99]

from Wilf
My reading of CvC is that Passion is associated with the people, because people as a collective are not rational. Rule of the mob? ... Now these are not direct relationships, they are merely cited as dominant influences. I see them as largely correct and useful.

you are, in classical US political terms, a Hamiltonian[*]. It is very much a matter of perception - and a product of one's entire life experience. So, I end up a Jeffersonian-Jacksonian. You don't see it that way.

Evidence of the people collectively acting over time ? As one example, I'd look to the Civil Rights story from Reconstruction to the present, where the pendulum swung back and forth until something of a consensus was reached by a majority of the people.

All this having been said, you haven't addressed the key issue of transitory politicians setting national policy. If CvC addressed that issue in one of his "observations", please supply the quote - thereby giving me a chance to recant and renounce heresy.

-------------------------
[*] Watch out for Aaron Burrs. Now there was a rabble rousing politician who tried to lead a charge. Good pistol shot, though.

[William F. Owen]

All this having been said, you haven't addressed the key issue of transitory politicians setting national policy. If CvC addressed that issue in one of his "observations", please supply the quote - thereby giving me a chance to recant and renounce heresy.

I haven't addressed it because I think CvC does in pretty well on Page 89 of the Princeton, Howard and Paret edition.

Do Politicians set policy? Are they effected by the passion of the people? Do peoples passions effect the setting of policy? CvC indicates all these to be true.

Page 89: These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship among them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.

I can't see how this is out of step with modern polotics.

[slapout9]

The Moral Linkage! is what is missing. Before you can develop any worthwhile Strategy you have to answer the question......Is this the right thing to do?The whole history of our country can be analyzed in that way. When we were morally right we did very well, when we weren't we generally got into trouble. That is why we have such a total lack of direction in this country today and it may be our final undoing, we don't agree on what the right thing to do is anymore so we fall into the trap of prgmatism.....we tend to do things just because they are possible and that is dangerous.

[William F. Owen]

The Moral Linkage! is what is missing. Before you can develop any worthwhile Strategy you have to answer the question......Is this the right thing to do?The whole history of our country can be analyzed in that way. When we were morally right we did very well, when we weren't we generally got into trouble.

Errr... I think the Native Americans and Texan Mexicans might take a slightly different view on that, as may the people of South Korea, the Lebanon and Somalia. Who says when you are morally right? I suggest its a political perspective.

[Ken White]

many times in our history when we we did what was morally right. OTOH, there are few cases of totally amoral conduct including those Wilf mentioned.

The few times we did what was morally right, we generally screwed it up. Viet Nam was an example. We signed a treaty to assist. Morally correct, I think. We then urged and paid the Viet Namese to ask us to assist. Morally wrong, I think. We then proceeded to assist. Morally questionable. We screwed it up -- morality not relevant.

Same with WW II. We were on the side of 'right.' We did what was needed to win regardless of human cost (ours or others). We cheated, lied, stole and bullied other nations to get into the war that may not have ever significantly affected us. What of all that was 'right' and what was 'wrong?'

There's a lot of gray out there...

That said, we and the British have generally acted in our own interests as have all nations. Across the board, both of us have done more good than harm on a practical (pragmatic) and realistic basis. I think the 'moral' aspect in the conduct of nations is sort of a misnomer. Nations are not people; they may have some social characteristics and national trends in the psyche arena but they aren't people.

It has been said that morals are what others think you should be doing -- but they may not necessarily feel constrained to act the same way. Lot of truth in that.

[William F. Owen]

many times in our history when we we did what was morally right. OTOH, there are few cases of totally amoral conduct including those Wilf mentioned.

...and would not wish to imply that cases I cited were immoral. I think we share the same concern. I really worry when people talk about ethics and foreign policy in the same breath. I am not a relentless cynic, or wedded to Realpolitik, or the thoughts of Brother Nicolo, but I do see international politics as more competitive than co-operative, so I am a bit iffy when it comes to moral approaches.

[George L. Singleton]

Overall I find William F. Owen's comments best synthesize the practical and textbook facts and history of "strategy."

National strategy or goal setting by the President as supported by the NSC is good on paper, but the interpersonal direct influence of the SECDEF and SECSTATE have disproportionate implications. I used to say the same about the Director of the CIA but not too sure about that these days.

As from slamming Senator McCain over a beer discussion I find that tasteless and rude and totally unnecessary, perhaps pandering to political correctness with another as our now new President.

We all owe our allegiance to whoever our President is and if we differ with him or her (future tense thinking) we work our disagreements through our Congressmen and Senators and at the next Presidential election.

My two cents.

[slapout9]

Wilf,Ken as Gomer Pyle would say Thank Ya,Thank Ya,Thank Ya for proving my points! I have to go do stuff but I will respond later and perhaps I can splain stuff mo better better

[Surferbeetle]

...with the understanding that Asia is not my area of expertise, but an interesting place nonetheless.

From David Rothkopf's blog on the FP Website:

Then you arrive at Singapore's Changi Airport and you are powerfully reminded that the excellence of the airline is not a fluke. This is the best airport in the world, spacious, efficient, and attractive. As such, it is the perfect preparation for Singapore itself, almost certainly the best run political entity on the planet. Admittedly, the country, led from the start by the man who is now known as its Minister Mentor Lee Kwan Yew, has practiced what I would characterize as constrained form of democracy but few places have ever so compellingly made the case that what is trade away in terms of the occasional citation for spitting gum on the sidewalk is more than made up for in a society that is prosperous (Asia's second richest), innovative, and safe.

It is a government that has led the way by behaving in many ways like a corporation, taking ideas like competitiveness and strategic planning seriously. (At dinner tonight with a senior business executive who is one of the country's great entrepreneurial success stories, she said, "In the beginning, in Singapore, the state was the entrepreneur." And that was said with a genuine appreciation for all the state achieved in that role.) Even in the midst of a global recession it has been seen as not just responsive, but creatively responsive, promoting retraining of workers and focus on new growth industries.

Part of the credit must go to its unique system of senior government official compensation. Ministers are paid via a formula: two thirds of the average of the eight highest salaries in six key professions (lawyer, accountant, banker, multinational executive, local manufacturer, and engineer). As a result in recent years the president and the prime minister have made in excess of $2 million a year in salary and other ministers in excess of $1 million. The result is that many of the best minds will be found in the government, zero corruption and terrific results. Want an example of the innovation? The president, prime minister, and ministers took an almost one-fifth pay cut this year because of the recession. What? Accountability among public officials? Real incentives? Imagine the loud "gak" you would get out of the U.S. government as they choked on those ideas.

[slapout9]

Errr... I think the Native Americans and Texan Mexicans might take a slightly different view on that, as may the people of South Korea, the Lebanon and Somalia. Who says when you are morally right? I suggest its a political perspective.

I will start with the easy ones.
Tex Mex, your are right that is why we are still fighting them and they are winning.

Somalia,Lebanon, we should not have gone so we left good moral recovery.

Indians, we started off wrong in some cases but not all, but again good moral recovery at least in the South Indian tribes have exclusive rights to gambling,tobacco,alcohol in some places and have become political and economic powerhouses.

South Korea, I would leave it is their fight now.

[slapout9]

The few times we did what was morally right, we generally screwed it up. Viet Nam was an example. We signed a treaty to assist. Morally correct, I think. We then urged and paid the Viet Namese to ask us to assist. Morally wrong, I think. We then proceeded to assist. Morally questionable. We screwed it up -- morality not relevant.

That is exactly my point exactly Ken ! We started out morally correct then screwed it up when we we tried to manipulate it or become immoral so morality is the binding glue for good or bad! The Moral..... is as you have said we need to be darn sure about our interest before we go sticking our noses into other people's business.

[jmm99]

that is p.89 of Howard & Paret, as appears in full in my post #37, and which I will repeat here (keeping my numbering to designate the three points of the trinity; and keeping your emphasis and mine as well; and including CvC's fourth paragraph):

... composed [1] of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; [2] of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and [3] of [war’s] element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.

The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government.

These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship among them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.

Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.

-------------------
Again, I have to make it very clear that the situation I am addressing is the interface between the people, the government and the military in setting national policy, and its impact on national strategy and military strategy (as those terms are defined in joint doctrine), as that interface exists in the US in the first decade of the 21st century.

I am not making or trying to make some generalized argument that applies to the US in other time periods, or to other nations in the same or other time periods. In short, I'm not addressing the application of CvC to Hitler or Hamas, WWII or Vietnam, Native Americans or Texan Mexicans, or the peoples of South Korea, the Lebanon and Somalia.

Scope: US, 1st decade of 21st century - its interface of people, government and military.

---------------------------
What CvC wrote is clear enough. As to the main tendency of the people: "[1] of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force;" As to the main tendency of the government: "[3] of [war’s] element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone."

My modest suggestion is that the primary characteristics, that CvC applied to the people and government ca. 1831 (a view strongly held by Metternich in Europe and less strongly by Hamilton in the US), are not the primary characteristics of situation I address - US, 1st decade of 21st century - its interface of people, government and military.

Further, I suggest that to take CvC's early 19th century charactistics for the people and government ("tendencies", as he called them, "like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject") and apply them to the 21st century US situation, would be serious error - and without rigor.

In fact, I would suggest that to do so would to violate CvC's statement that "to fix an arbitrary relationship among them" would render that argument "totally useless" (from 3rd CvC paragraph quoted above).

My second modest suggestion is that CvC's early 19th century analysis of the people and government did not (and could not - since CvC did not claim a magic crystal ball) take into account what I call the transitory politicians of the 21st century US situation. Again, to attempt to define them (the transitory politicians) in terms of the 19th and 18th century statesmen would also be an "arbitrary fixation" - and also "totally useless".

So, my two modest suggestions are not contrary to CvC's warning against "arbitrary fixations" - in fact, they heed that warning.

The following is an important concept; that is, the "tendencies" are "... yet variable in their relationship to one another" (as Ken said, "they are inherently unstable"); and that (4th para. above):

Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.

It is impossible to develop a theory and maintain the balance if one gets the composition of the magnets wrong; and attempts to define them for what they are not.

end part 1

[Ken White]

That is exactly my point exactly Ken ! We started out morally correct then screwed it up when we we tried to manipulate it or become immoral so morality is the binding glue for good or bad! The Moral..... is as you have said we need to be darn sure about our interest before we go sticking our noses into other people's business.

For Viet Nam, Eisenhower signing that treaty may have been 'morally correct' but it was strategically stupid. While I agree about being sure of our interests, sometimes the 'other people' are totally ancillary to our business. That was the case here.

In the event on VN, Kennedy decided to cater to domestic politics and engage in a little foreign adventure. I'm not making any moral judgment on that nor am I at all sure there is one to be made. One can make a political judgment about it -- I think it was wrong and self serving -- but I'm not sure where it lies in the moral compass bit.

You can ding Johnson for moral turpitude in his bid to expand it and the way he went about it but essentially morally neutral or ambivalent moves by Eisenhower and Kennedy put him in a position to do that. The one could not, would not, have happened without the others.

What happened after he got stupid was not a moral thing; the real screw ups were operationally and tactically by the US Army -- no moral dimension ascribed to that either; it was just a screw up. Nothing more (Mostly the fault of poor training -- now there's a moral failure... )

Back to our interests -- Who determines what our interests are? Therein lies the problem. For every US military adventure, there were people who legitimately believed it was the right thing to do. There were also people who said it was morally wrong. That's been true from the early Indian troubles on the frontier before we were even a nation through the Whiskey Rebellion up to Afghanistan today. In hindsight, there were at least questionable aspects about every one of our military efforts in a 'moral' dimension. EVERY one...

My belief is that all war is immoral and stupid -- but some are necessary. So are some military adventures. Iraq or something like it was necessary IMO. Thus I think it was the right thing to do (again, done poorly by the US Army and yet again due to poor training...) without ascribing any morality to it though some have said it was okay morally. Others strongly disagree with that, saying it was not the right thing to do and some saying it was immoral. Who's right? Depends on one's viewpoint, I believe.

I'm not sure you can properly apply moral judgment to the conduct of a nation if for no other reason than that there will always be people who disagree on moral grounds with any action -- or on failures to take action.

[jmm99]

Did CvC have something to say about this, beyond the direct quotation of his "remarkable trinity" ? Indeed, he did.

The following quotes are from J.J. Graham translation, published in London in 1873, from Book 8, Chapter III, subpart B. "Of the Magnitude of the Object of the War, and the Efforts to be Made", which is here - so everyone can quickly find them online and see the context. These quotes are running from start to finish (no cherry picking), starting 6th paragraph from the bottom:

------------------------

The first quote sets the context, where the French Revolution and Napoleon were much on CvC's mind - and where he eschewed prediction of the future:

Thus, therefore, the element of war, freed from all conventional restrictions, broke loose, with all its natural force. The cause was the participation of the people in this great affair of State, and this participation arose partly from the effects of the French Revolution on the internal affairs of countries, partly from the threatening attitude of the French towards all nations.

Now, whether this will be the case always in future, whether all wars hereafter in Europe will be carried on with the whole power of the States, and, consequently, will only take place on account of great interests closely affecting the people, or whether a separation of the interests of the Government from those of the people will gradually again arise, would be a difficult point to settle; and, least of all, shall we take upon us to settle it. But every one will agree with us, that bounds, which to a certain extent existed only in an unconsciousness of what is possible, when once thrown down, are not easily built up again; and that, at least, whenever great interests are in dispute, mutual hostility will discharge itself in the same manner as it has done in our times.

This brings in the concept that "great interests closely affecting the people" will result in a different manner of how "mutual hostility will discharge itself".

----------------------------

The next step in CvC's analyis (of his summary historical sections that precede this part) was to introduce the doctrine that each period has "its own peculiar forms of war", "its own theory of war" and must be judged in terms of the "peculiarities of the time"....

We here bring our historical survey to a close, for it was not our design to give at a gallop some of the principles on which war has been carried on in each age, but only to show how each period has had its own peculiar forms of war, its own restrictive conditions, and its own prejudices. Each period would, therefore, also keep its own theory of war, even if every where, in early times, as well as in later, the task had been undertaken of working out a theory on philosophical principles. The events in each age must, therefore, be judged of in connection with the peculiarities of the time, and only he who, less through an anxious study of minute details than through an accurate glance at the whole, can transfer himself into each particular age, is fit to understand and appreciate its generals.

But this conduct of war, conditioned by the peculiar relations of States, and of the military force employed, must still always contain in itself something more general, or rather something quite general, with which, above everything, theory is concerned.

but that the "conduct of war" has, in each era, some things which are quite general and which imply a more general theory of the conduct of war.

-------------------------------
The last step in CvC's analysis was recognition that all future wars will not be of a "grand character" - and that "external influences" and "manifold diversity of causes" alter the nature of the particular war. While not expressly mentioning the "people" and "government" legs of the trinity, context suggests that they are the source of the "external influences" and "manifold diversity of causes":

The latest period of past time, in which war reached its absolute strength, contains most of what is of general application and necessary. But it is just as improbable that wars henceforth will all have this grand character as that the wide barriers which have been opened to them will ever be completely closed again. Therefore, by a theory which only dwells upon this absolute war, all cases in which external influences alter the nature of war would be excluded or condemned as false. This cannot be the object of theory, which ought to be the science of war, not under ideal but under real circumstances. Theory, therefore, whilst casting a searching, discriminating and classifying glance at objects, should always have in view the manifold diversity of causes from which war may proceed, and should, therefore, so trace out its great features as to leave room for what is required by the exigencies of time and the moment.

Accordingly, we must add that the object which every one who undertakes war proposes to himself, and the means which he calls forth, are determined entirely according to the particular details of his position; and on that very account they will also bear in themselves the character of the time and of the general relations; lastly, that they are always subject to the general conclusions to be deduced from the nature of war.

So, analysis in this strategic context must be situation dependent, though always subject to the "general conclusions" to be deduced from the nature of war as it has been conducted.

[slapout9]

You can ding Johnson for moral turpitude in his bid to expand it and the way he went about it but essentially morally neutral or ambivalent moves by Eisenhower and Kennedy put him in a position to do that. The one could not, would not, have happened without the others.

That is my point or rather the point, do see how what you call moral ambivalence got us into trouble and then it just went down hill from there. National Strategy has to start with what is right for the Country.

As to our interest. nations are people and some type of representation either elected or what ever..... but it is the human leadership of the country that is responsible. In our country their powers are defined in the Constitution as in how we deal with Treaties and Declarations of War and real live human beings are supposed to be held responsible for that.