deficiencies in U.S. anti-submarine warfare capabilities
Ooooold story.

Stories about ASW deficiencies are available in abundance and it affects all classic forces.

Aerial ASW is a near-impotent museum piece from WW2 that does no more than to force the hostile subs to be cautious.

Classic surface ASW with passive sonar (towed or hull mounted doesn't matter) are in peril against old SSNs and at the same time totally useless targets in face of a modern hostile SSK.

Surface ASW is potent with low frequency active sonars, but the emitters should be detached from major surface units if not even dispersed. Survival of surface units still depends on being silent, that is "slow" unless they sail; cavitation begins with the relatively small surface ship screws already at speeds well below what classic tea clippers were able to achieve.
Most if not all "modern"(-time) navies insist on the classic impressive warship basis instead of accepting the need for many small units. It's a bit reminiscent of 10+ battleship WW2 navies being forced to build 500+ sub hunters during wartime.

SSNs are fine at defeating obsolete loud other SSNs, but fail regularly even at the detection of modern hostile SSKs.

Modern SSKs are less prone to be found by other modern SSKs, but this works both ways. They're also often too slow to intercept a 15 kts cruising convoy and certainly too slow to escort it.