Observing Iran (catch all historical thread)

[SWJED]

Yea, that's the ticket... 5 November AP:

Iran, whose president has described the Holocaust as a "myth," said Tuesday it will hold a conference to discuss the evidence of the World War II genocide.

The two-day conference scheduled for next week was initiated by hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Deputy Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mohammadi said.

"The president simply asked whether an event called the Holocaust has actually taken place ... No rational response was ever given to Ahmadinejad's questions," Mohammadi said, explaining the reason for the conference....

[Merv Benson]

Anyone who says they have not seen a rational response considering the question of whether the holocaust took place has to be engaged in conscience avoidance of the facts and history. If that is so, what value is their word on any agreement?

[selil]

I was having lunch the other day with an Iranian (where I work that is pretty much a given), and he said something that was interesting. When I asked how he would describe his nationalism he said "Persian". Talk about a different take on the entire cultural war. Whereas I had though of Iran being a cohesive nation state of Islamic fundamentalism here was somebody basically shattering that misconception. He put it into perspective of the religious fundamentalists in the United States taking over the government by force and forcing their agenda.

[JP0302]

Iran, whose president has described the Holocaust as a "myth," said Tuesday it will hold a conference to discuss the evidence of the World War II genocide.

Call me paranoid, but if you consider the following.
1) Above statement
2) Just a few days ago, he also said that soon israel would dissapear (or something along thoselines)
3) Repeated comments on the destruction of israel, palestine getting "all" their territories back (read israel).

Is it not reasonable to conclude that if they do not "find" any evidence, that they (Iran) will may take actions to recover those territories? Why else hold a conference, if not to take action on the findings.

[UCrawford]

Selil,

Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" had some interesting points about how many of the problems we have in dealing with Islamic cultures comes from their adherence to religious, cultural and tribal identities over national boundaries. We think of Iranians, Iraqis, Afghanis...they think of Shi'a, Sunni, Pashtuns, Tajiks, Persians, al-Sauds, Wahhabists, Hashemites, etc. It's just such a fragmented system that they follow that I wonder how anyone could have believed that Western democratization would be able to take hold as Bush was proposing.

Of course, the confusion is somewhat understandable since in the case of many of those countries (Afghanistan to name a prominent example) the people of the region weren't the ones who drew up national boundaries...Western nations were (as with the Durand Line, which the Pashtuns largely don't recognize). That's not really anyone's fault today, and certainly not Bush's of course, but it's something we should be aware of when engaging in that region with an eye towards reform.

[selil]

Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" had some interesting points about how many of the problems we have in dealing with Islamic cultures comes from their adherence to religious, cultural and tribal identities over national boundaries.

If we can realize these issues, discuss them, and even come up with plans to operationalize them why can't it be enacted as foreign policy?

I know it sounds like sour grapes it just seems so trivial as a problem. Then I start thinking about. Unsolvable problems or unresolved imbalances are the preludes to war which is the instrument of nature balancing mans inadequacies.

[UCrawford]

I don't think it's impossible to come to consensus in the Middle East, but I do think it's highly improbable.

It seems like one of the things Huntington was trying to illustrate was that it's not just a matter of opposing interests between us and them, it's a matter of diametrically opposed perspectives. We see things in terms of how it affects our nation and us as Americans and we negotiate with the leaders of other countries based on that. The Muslims see things in terms of how it affects their tribe, or their religious sect, or their immediate community, not a national identity. Huntington's point seemed to be that the nation-state in Islamic society isn't the ultimate authority for negotiation because the people don't recognize the authority of national identity as we do. Unless that changes, like in the case of Turkey, then the strongmen and the dictators in the Middle East may be the best bet for us. They aren't representing the interests of their people, and it creates its own problems, but at least they are a cohesive body to negotiate with and they can usually get their people to adhere to agreements with us (although, of course, not always).

[tolsen]

I was having lunch the other day with an Iranian (where I work that is pretty much a given), and he said something that was interesting. When I asked how he would describe his nationalism he said "Persian". Talk about a different take on the entire cultural war. Whereas I had though of Iran being a cohesive nation state of Islamic fundamentalism here was somebody basically shattering that misconception. He put it into perspective of the religious fundamentalists in the United States taking over the government by force and forcing their agenda.

This is also true of two people I know. They refuse to call themselves 'Iranian' - its always 'Persian'. Of course, both of them are children of those who fled the Mullahs. Im not sure how it is in Iran proper.

[Ken White]

Cyrus are alive and well.

You'll also find that calling them 'Arab' is a grave insult. That favor is returned. All why I pay little attention to "Iran is the big winner in this" rhetoric. Everyone from Juan Cole upward saying that is ignoring 5,000 years of history. The folks who live there will cooperate when it suits but they aren't climbing in bed together...

[Rank amateur]

All why I pay little attention to "Iran is the big winner in this" rhetoric. Everyone from Juan Cole upward saying that is ignoring 5,000 years of history. The folks who live there will cooperate when it suits but they aren't climbing in bed together...

Well, if the Iraqis cooperate more with Iran now than they did before, then Iran is the short term winner. If you think very long term, wars don't matter. (How would the world be any different if Brutus had defeated Anthony?)

[Ken White]

10 characters...

[Van]

Rank Amateur

If you think very long term, wars don't matter.

Perhaps you wish to reconsider this opinion? Especially in this thread?

Consider the long term consequences had the Spartans and the rest of the Greeks not held at the Hot Gates as long as they did, or had they failed a year later at Platea. What we think of as Greek Democracy would never have happened, the Rennaissance would have been very different, etc. Military conflict buys time for diplomatic solutions, but in history we have a number of examples of leaders who see military force as their primary instrument of national power (Hitler, Milosevic, Saddam Hussein, for example). Wars matter, but require context to make sense.

[Rex Brynen]

This is also true of two people I know. They refuse to call themselves 'Iranian' - its always 'Persian'. Of course, both of them are children of those who fled the Mullahs. Im not sure how it is in Iran proper.

It is worth remembering that ethnic Persians form only a bare majority of Iranians. According to the CIA World Factbook, the numbers break down as:

Persian 51%, Azeri 24%, Gilaki and Mazandarani 8%, Kurd 7%, Arab 3%, Lur 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmen 2%, other 1%

There have been periodic signs and episodes of ethnopolitical dissatisfaction among the Azeri, Arab, and Kurdish minorities in particular, although personally I think they are very, very from being regime-threatening.

[UrsaMaior]

According to a hungarian Iran expert the division lines are not between different ethnic groups only (although it is interresting to note, that more azeris live in Iran than they do in the independent Azerbaijan), but also between nomads and peasants as well. BUT because of the relative well being (in material sense and human right wise -although the latter has declined under Ahmedinejad-) basically no significant minority is playing on ganing independence. According to the same person when asked they first say they are iraniians, second their religion and their ethnic belonging is only in the last place.

If there will be any regime change it will be most likely caused by the economic instability (high unemployment especially among the youth who were born after 1979 -it is not to be neglected since they represent 50% of the countries population-). Problem from a western point of view is that even the most radical iranian reformers (living in the country) think in a theocracy. That means they will cling to their nuclear programme, unless they are given security guarantees by the US directly. While I understand the outrage of some on their position (ie dictating conditions), either talks based on the above or a war with unforeseenable consequences.

[Jedburgh]

CEIP, 11 Mar 08: Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran's Most Powerful Leader

....Since Khomeini’s death, Iran watchers have turned their attention to various individuals, groups, and trends in trying to determine the country’s future trajectory: From 1989 to 1997 the individual focus was on President Rafsanjani, the group focus was Islamic technocrats, and the theme was post Iran–Iraq war reconstruction. From1997 to 2005 the individual focus was on reformist PresidentMohammed Khatami, the group focus was the studentmovement, and the theme was democracy and civil society. From 2005 to present, the individual focus has been on hardline President Ahmadinejad, the group focus has been on the Revolutionary Guards, and the theme a return to revolutionary radicalism.

Yet if there has been one anchor throughout these periods and today, it is Khamenei. Both his domestic vision for Iran (more Islamic than republican) and his foreign policy views (neither confrontation nor accommodation) have prevailed. He has resisted Rafsanjani’s desire to reach amodus vivendi withWashington, Khatami’s aspiration for amore democratic state, and Ahmadinejad’s penchant for outright confrontation. Though known as a great balancer, he has consistently favored conservatives over reformists.

Like Khomeini’s, Khamenei’s writings and speeches present arguably the most accurate reflection of Iranian domestic and foreign policy aims and actions. They depict a resolute Leader with a remarkably consistent and coherent—though highly cynical and conspiratorial—world view. Whether his audience is Iranian students or foreign dignitaries, or the topic of his speech is foreign policy or agriculture, he rarely misses an opportunity to invoke the professed virtues of the 1979 revolution—justice, independence, self-sufficiency, and Islam—and to express his deep disdain for Israel (“the Zionist entity”) and opposition to the ambitions of the United States (“global arrogance”).

Based on this premise—that Khamenei means what he says and his words broadly reflect the Islamic Republic’s policies—this study is a portrait of Ayatollah Khamenei in his own words, based on a careful reading of three decades of speeches and writings. To devise a more effective approach toward Iran, a better understanding of Khamenei is essential.....

Complete 42 page paper at the link.

[tequila]

Interesting article about increased diplomacy with Iran.

[SWJED]

6 July Wall Street Journal commentary - Iran's Proxy War by Sen. Joseph Lieberman.

Earlier this week, the U.S. military made public new and disturbing information about the proxy war that Iran is waging against American soldiers and our allies in Iraq.

According to Brig. Gen. Kevin Bergner, the U.S. military spokesman in Baghdad, the Iranian government has been using the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah to train and organize Iraqi extremists, who are responsible in turn for the murder of American service members.

Gen. Bergner also revealed that the Quds Force--a special unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps whose mission is to finance, arm and equip foreign Islamist terrorist movements--has taken groups of up to 60 Iraqi insurgents at a time and brought them to three camps near Tehran, where they have received instruction in the use of mortars, rockets, improvised explosive devices and other deadly tools of guerrilla warfare that they use against our troops. Iran has also funded its Iraqi proxies generously, to the tune of $3 million a month.

Based on the interrogation of captured extremist leaders--including a 24-year veteran of Hezbollah, apparently dispatched to Iraq by his patrons in Tehran--Gen. Bergner also reported on Monday that the U.S. military has concluded that "the senior leadership" in Iran is aware of these terrorist activities. He said it is "hard to imagine" Ayatollah Ali Khamenei--Iran's supreme leader--does not know of them...

[Jedburgh]

The Economist, 19 Jul 07: Iran: The Revolution Strikes Back

....Iran is a young country: two out of three people are below the age of 30. On the streets of affluent north Tehran, young people dress in the latest fashions—even if the jeans-clad women are obliged by law to wear the Islamic headscarf (the hijab). The audience at prayers, however, is older: shabbily dressed men well into their 40s, regime stalwarts who have trekked uphill from the poor southern suburbs.

Which is the true Iran—the consumer-oriented young, bored by the slogans of a long-ago revolution and impatient to move on? Or the regime faithful chorusing the familiar slogans at Friday prayers?

It is tantalisingly hard to know. With 71m people and a multitude of languages and ethnicities, Iran is a difficult place to read. Although it has elements of democracy, including an elected president and parliament, the state is not ultimately controlled by elected institutions. And even the elected bit of the system is a backstage game of personalities and factions, not a transparent process rooted in political parties. Press freedom is limited, almost no serious independent opinion polling is allowed, and many official economic statistics appear simply to be made up. All this makes the regime's inner workings elusive. Outsiders can only follow the trend and make a guess.

[Jedburgh]

Conference report from the 21 Mar 07 RAND conference in DC on Coping with Iran: Confrontation, Containment, or Engagement?

Discussions throughout the one-day conference broached a number of key issues, including internal leadership and societal dynamics within Iran, Iran’s relationship with other regional actors, the implications of a nuclear-armed Iran or a military strike against Iran, and the various policy options available to address key issues such as Iran’s nuclear capabilities, instability in Iraq, and terrorism. Many participants argued at the conference that some degree of both containment and engagement was the best policy approach toward Iran and that a use-of-force option was neither imminent nor desirable. There was a general sense that UN sanctions and economic pressure was working in isolating Iran (even if some desired that it work faster). Furthermore, Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns emphasized that the United States is willing to be patient to allow economic and diplomatic efforts to work and stated that there are no imminent deadlines that would cause the U.S. government to pursue a drastic course in its approach toward Iran.

To follow are several other key themes that emerged from the discussions:

- U.S.-Iranian cooperation is possible, especially on Iraq.

- Iran may be interested in working with the United States and the international community to find a solution to the nuclear issue.

- The UN sanction process and international economic pressure are working.

- Preemption is not imminent.

- Focus is on regime behavior, not regime change.

- A nuclear-armed Iran can be expected to be more dangerous and aggressive than a non—nuclear-armed Iran.

- Engagement and containment options were ultimately preferred to confrontation.

[Ken White]

ago, my belief is that the bullets you list are sensible and those things are achievable. We probably ought to go that route.

Lacking backhoes in large numbers, the Iraniha, like many nations, use a three man shovel with an extremely long handle and two ropes attached for deep holes. Unlike most of those nations, in Iran they use six people per shovel. Three dig and three kibitz for a few minutes, then the second three push the first three out of the way with much shouting and take over the shovel. Rotations invariably also involve trading of handle versus rope men. These rotations within rotations get repeated until it's time for tea, a multiple times per day event...

Iranian stores carry merchandise with no price tags. Haggling is the national pastime.

Point of all that is that usually its hard to tell who's actually in charge and any bilateral dealings had better be led by someone from the US with a whole lot of ME time -- and patience.

Neither attribute seems too common in the US today, Mota assa fahnay...