Observing Iran (catch all historical thread)

[SWJED]

2 June Washington Times commentary - Iran Through Prism of Iraq by Michael Barone.

To learn lessons from history, including recent history, it's essential to get the history right. That's why, to understand what to do about the mullahs' regime in Iran, it's worth revisiting the debate over the intelligence in Iraq. This is especially so in view of the recent announced decision to participate in talks with Iran, provided the mullahs call a halt to the country's enrichment of uranium...

The precise facts were unknowable, and so decisions had to be made on the known facts -- all of which pointed to Saddam developing WMDs. Intelligence agencies in the past overestimated the time it would take regimes -- the Soviet Union, China, India, Iraq -- to develop nuclear weapons. Under the circumstances, it was prudent to act on the assumption WMDs would be developed sooner rather than later.

Fast forward to today, and Iran. We have every reason to believe the mullahs' regime is developing nuclear weapons. We know Britain, France and Germany in three years of talks with Iranian officials have made no progress in persuading them to stop. And we know Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has threatened to destroy Israel and to attack other countries. His letter to President Bush, taken by some as an invitation to talks, reads like a demand for capitulation to fundamentalist Islam.

What to do in these circumstances? First, assume Iran is bent on getting nuclear weapons -- and don't rely totally on estimates it won't get them for 10 years. Second, understand the case for military action is not as strong as it was in Iraq. Iran is a much larger country, and the nuclear program sites are widely dispersed and probably strongly fortified. Third, -- and most importantly -- there is every indication the Iranian people hate the mullahs' regime and like the United States.

That means direct negotiations with the Iranian government, which seem sure to be futile, could give the regime prestige and reduce the chances of its peaceful overthrow. But be clear about maintaining the military option: It seems likely air strikes could substantially delay if not destroy Iran's nuclear program. And keep stepping up direct communications with the Iranian people...

[Stu-6]

Third, -- and most importantly -- there is every indication the Iranian people hate the mullahs' regime and like the United States.

I recall hearing the something about Iraq three years ago, and it would now seem that many of them hate us too.

It is also worth noting that Hussein also thought that Iranian revolutionary was lacking in support when he started the Iran-Iraq war, after eight years his lack of foresight was painfully obvious. Are we destined to make the same mistake?

I fail to understand why it is that some people think that governments just appear for no reason. The Iranian government may not be democratic but it would not have come into being without the support of a large part of the population, likewise it could not continue without at least the acceptance of most of the people. Finally even if the population was not supportive of the current government there is no reason to think they would be more supportive of one installed by a foreign power.

[Jedburgh]

Finally even if the population was not supportive of the current government there is no reason to think they would be more supportive of one installed by a foreign power.

Spot on. The majority of the Iranian populace does not support their current regime. This opposition runs the gamut from vehement and strident, to indifference and just wanting to be left alone. However, a US intervention would be like a clumsy intervention in a domestic dispute - the hostility festering under one roof suddenly uniting in opposition to the stranger. And any US support to the opposition for which not enough care is taken to maintain its covert nature, will serve only to completely deligitimize that opposition.

[S-2]

My greatest source of frustration with the Iran issue revolves around yet another example of information operations. The vast majority of us acknowledge that Iran is pointedly seeking a nuclear weapons capacity. While transparent acquisition of weapons themselves would lend considerable prestige to Iranian ambitions for the role of pre-eminent spokes-nation of Islamic strategic aspirations, it could (and probably would)still be challenged by both Pakistan (possessors of said weapons) and Saudi Arabia (guardians of Islam's holiest sites). Thus there is, IMHO, less for Iran to gain by this approach than a more sublime and opaque pursuit of capacity.

Capacity, of course, is a cover. Assembly of these weapons is a minor extension once the knowledge base becomes technologically entrenched. Yet, as civilized governments worldwide mobilize their diplomatic efforts, this capability has taken a back seat to the actual possession of weapons. Understandable and, moreover, consistently positioned at the forefront of our discussion points as the logical endgame of this unfolding process.

Still, one will note the consistent drumbeat from Iran towards the world, but more notably to its own peoples, of their "natural right" to this capability under the NPT. While our diplomats have noted the aborgation of this "natural right" by the constant employment of duplicity and subterfuge tactics over an eighteen year period by Iran against IAEA inspections, we HAVE NOT, in my opinion, highlighted this position.

Namely, the past points clearly to the future. Iran's past activities in this regard makes IMPOSSIBLE any creditable inspections by the IAEA henceforth. Iranian ability to circumvent these inspections is a proven and exercised tactic, and will remain so.

As such, our argument must first be directed to the Iranian people. The civilized world has no desire to prevent Iran from a peaceful nuclear energy program. However inspection safeguards, as normally exercised, are no longer a valid means to affirm this goal. Iran, by its duplicity, has rendered null this "natural right" under NPT provisions. THIS point must lead any commentary by our leading diplomats, and the message must be pointed at both ours and the Iranian peoples. Over and over again. It must further be driven home repeatedly that the NPT WILL collapse should Iran continue its current path. Moreover, if that treaty holds any continuing importance to the world, including the Iranian people, it will be the Iranian theocrats who must bear the burden of its demise. The Iranian peoples must then be made aware that THEY will bear the burden of that consequence.

It is this central point that makes the Russian fuel offer still valid. It is also this point that thoroughly invalidates Iranian notions of legitimacy to their continued pursuit of nuclear capability. Finally, it is the ONLY means that I believe circumvents the Iranian gov't. ability to mobilize its population to the regime's cause. But as clear as that position seems, it appears to me that we haven't made that case to the Iranian people, nor our own. Doing so effectively will mobilize our populations, while separating the Iranian gov't. from theirs.

Instead the discussion has already moved to sanctions or air-strikes, both of which will rally the Iranian people while finding considerable resistance among the populations of all other concerned nations.

Let the mullahs wear the black hats for a change. They seem comfortable in black in any case.

[slapout9]

Good point. Our President should use FDR's fireside chat format to keep americans better informed and do his best to see that his message gets to the population of Iran.

[S-2]

Yeah. MSM won't give POTUS thirty minutes a week on T.V. Worse, we've nobody in our government with both the credibility and skill at delivering this message like FDR. Condi's the closest, and she's really not a warm and engaging speaker. Appears visibly nervous to me and has sort of a stilted, robotic, and slightly icy demeanor. Plus, we need this message to be delivered in Europe and Iran by people whom those folks implicitly trust. I've no idea who they'd be.

Maybe it is GWB adopting a TEDDY ROOSEVELT approach of speaking softly, but carrying a BIG STICK. I just don't trust that he can consistently pull it off without suffering "foot in mouth" disease at some point.

[Jones_RE]

Iraq is the source of our Iran trouble - it is this issue that has largely drained the President of the domestic support he needs to conduct foreign policy. The various scandals, infighting and fits among the Republican party haven't helped, either. Fact is, the President holds virtually supreme power over US foreign affairs and matters of state and war. Unfortunately, that power is diminished any time the President's power and prestige is diminished.

Speaking as a liberal, I don't like the idea of George W. Bush in charge of US foreign policy. I like the current situation even less: right now no one is in charge. American foreign policy at the moment is driven by inertia and blind reaction to overseas events - all our programs are either legacies or hasty expedients.

[SWJED]

Just posted at the U.S. Army's Strategic Studies Insititute - Iran, Iraq, and the United States: The New Triangle's Impact on Sectarianism and the Nuclear Threat by Dr. Sherifa D. Zuhur.

This monograph considers the issues of Iranian influence in Iraq, and its impact on continuing sectarian violence there. It also questions the claims that a Shi'a crescent of power is solidifying by examining the distinct features of Iraqi versus Iranian Shi'ism and political Islam. Iran and Iraq have historically influenced and threatened each other. Today, the situation has been further complicated by the post-2003 change in the Iraqi Shi'a community’s status, Iran's development of a nuclear program, and international efforts to contain that program. These issues are now influenced by a new pattern of Iraqi-Iranian, U.S.-Iraqi and Iranian-U.S. dynamics. This new triangle of state relations must also be considered in light of Iraq and Iran’s neighbors.