Observing Iran (catch all historical thread)

[Rex Brynen]

Dial back the rhetoric and do as little as possible. Any overt attempt to 'assist' will provide ammunition to the opposition. Being seen as supported by the US is not going to be a bonus they will need to sway their peers on their own.

I agree that overt (or covert) US support for reformers in Iran is very counterproductive--it both heightens regime paranoia and discredits those you are trying to help.

I do think its a shame that more Western scholars and others don't travel to Iran to speak and share different perspectives on the world. I found colleagues and students there diverse and eager to engage. The range of questions I received in open fora was quite remarkable (including one on the Kurdish right to self-determination in an independent state, which I certainly wouldn't have received in Syria or Turkey!)

Among students with whom I spoke, opinions were split of whether Iran was/should try to acquire nuclear weapons. On the issue of Iran developing nuclear research and technical capacities, however, there was very strong support. One university even proudly showed off their MSc programme in enrichment and fuel cycle management (suggesting that the IAEA is quite right in suggesting that particular horse has long ago bolted the stable.)

[phoenix80]

The perception that US assistance will hurt the internal oppisition is very wrong. Indeed, the Iranian regime is scared of the US and the help must be OVERT and not covert at all.

Second, Iranian regime has been murdering and supressing its opponents since day one without even an excuse to begin with. They would kill and jail any body who disagree with them publicly and challenge them that way. Mullahs don't need an excuse to mistreat the dissidents. They do it any how. Back in 1988, they killed thousands of Iranian dissidents when there was no US backed rhetoric towards the regime at all. The mullahs are more wicked than you imagine.

The notion that US govt help to overthrow the regime is bad is absolutely wrong and misleading. Indeed, the US govt must publicly denounce the mullahs and support the opposition to change the regime.

[Adam L]

The difficult part of this sort of thing is that you have to know exactly how far to go. You want to support Iranian dissident groups enough to make a difference, but little enought so that the Mullahs don't become too paranoid and start killing them off. That's the hard part. Without some sort of military (cover, untraditonal or whatever) action on the table there is not much that can be held over the Mullah's so you are forced to play this game.

The problem with this sort of situations is there are no good options, but doing nothing is in no way an option.

Adam

[Rex Brynen]

The perception that US assistance will hurt the internal oppisition is very wrong. Indeed, the Iranian regime is scared of the US and the help must be OVERT and not covert at all.

I didn't meet anyone in Iran--among regime critics--who thought this would be helpful.

I agree that the regime is paranoid about US-backed regime change efforts. Having said that, I was surprised (to say the least) at how little internal security was in place, compared to other countries in the region.

1) Students openly asked questions of me that were critical of the regime in public lectures. They did so with some caution, but it is not something I would have found in, say, Syria.

2) There were no internal movement controls on me of any sort.

3) There was very little street-level security: I saw two AKs (I was counting) and a few sidearms on police and Pasadran the entire time I was there. I see more internal security in Jordan or Egypt or Lebanon crossing the street.

4) I walked up to, around, and touched, Ahmadinejad's podium a few hours before due to speak at an event. No police, other than a few at the opposite end of the square. No sanitized area or perimeter security. Nada.

Either the regime is foolish on security issues, or (gasoline riots notwithstanding) they're really not fundamentally worried.

What I did find was enormous openess among students, academics, and even many policy-makers to new ideas and change. I think there are better ways of encouraging that then openly calling for the overthrow of the regime.

[Rob Thornton]

Phoenix80,
As an Iranian (albeit one who has moved to Canada), this is certainly an area that you as an Iranian can shed light on. I wondered if we might ask you to write up some of your thoughts about Iranian domestic politics, the forces that drive them and the different parts of the Iranian military (IRGC, Basiji, Iranian Army). It'd be very useful to get your perspective on what parts of the Iranian military are used for what and what your perception of how decisions are made. It'd also be interesting to hear how average Iranians think - about us, the West, what they value culturally, etc. Our understanding Iran and Iranians better might lead to better solutions.

While we appreciate your passion and your desire to see conditions improve in Iran, I suspect you have a great deal more to offer then limiting your commentary to character observations.

Best Regards, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

Rex,
I appreciate your sharing your recall and reflection. Having an inside look helps provide context and provides a counter-balance to the rhetoric we normally hear coming out of Tehran.

What I did find was enormous openess among students, academics, and even many policy-makers to new ideas and change.

Could you expand on that a bit?

Thanks, Rob

[Rex Brynen]

Could you expand on that a bit?

I can, although they're all semi-random observations and nothing systematic. It also comes with the important caveat that during these sorts of trips you only meet certain types: university students, professors, think-tank people, current or ex-government officials (usually of the Rafsanjani and Khatemi camps). Indeed, I was struck how striking the class divisions are in Tehran: upper and middle class (north) Tehran has little knowledge/understanding/interest in working class (south) Tehran (ie, the people who voted for Ahmadinejad).

Among the intelligensia, there was a profound sense of being misunderstood by the West, and of Iran's legitimate national security and foreign policy concerns being given short shrift by the West. This usually did not take the form of generalized anti-Americanism, but rather was blamed on the Bush Administration and (interestingly) the British, who were alleged to have some perfidious interest in blocking US-Iranian rapprochement. (I thought the latter was very odd and probably a mistaken impression when an experienced UK colleague mentioned it, but I found it too.)

This sense of a misunderstood Iran was accompanied, at times, by a slightly exaggerated view (in my own opinion) of Iran's global importance in the Grand Scheme of Things. In fairness, its a trait we Canadians share.

There was a sense that Iran and the US might have some common interests in Afghanistan and Iraq among (ex) Iranian diplomats. (I doubt this view is shared among those now in power, however.) Students generally gave the sense that they would very much welcome more positive relations with Washington.

There was a feeling that the US is bluffing on the potential use of military force on the nuclear issue among experts and (ex) officials. My view--that the US, while unlikely to use force at present, wasn't bluffing either--was met with a little shock. Most students very much gave the impression that they didn't want a confrontation, that they would support the regime making a deal on the nuclear issue--but that any military strike would cause a rally-around-the-flag effect.

Students asked me about everything--Israel/Palestine, US and Canadian policy, US politics, the Holocaust, globalization, Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, you name it.. they were both enthusiastic and well-informed, yet curiously isolated (and feeling that isolation) too. There was a lot of only slightly-veiled criticism of Ahmadinejad, and obvious embarrassment at his antics. I was often very starkly critical of regime behaviour in my public lectures--everything from Hizbullah to EFPs to IRGC and MOIS activities to Afghanistan, not to mention nukes--and this didn't seem to cause any problems with either audiences or hosts. This isn't to say there was fully open discussion--students explicitly told me they watch what they say in their classes. It was hardly totalitarian, however, and more open than Syria and much more than Saddam-era Iraq.

Academic colleagues were bright, open, extremely welcoming, and often had Western PhDs. The hospitality was remarkable, even by hospitable Middle East standards.

No one, and I mean no one, thought the regime was at risk of toppling or crumbling. There were very divergent views on Ahmadinejad's current popularity, aggravated by the fact that the intelligensia are rather disconnected from the sort of folks who comprise his clerical base.

I hadn't been there more than a couple of days when I got invited to an underground rave, complete with booze. Despite the promise of look-outs, I thought it best not to risk spending my trip as an involuntary guest of the basij or pasadran, and hence declined.

Finally, I had enormous fun with the War of 1812 every time I got a question of comment on US imperialism ("don't boast to me about confronting American imperialism until you've actually fought a war with them.") Remarks on having burnt Washington were received with amazement. Somehow I forgot to mention York, or the Battle of New Orleans

[phoenix80]

I didn't meet anyone in Iran--among regime critics--who thought this would be helpful.

I agree that the regime is paranoid about US-backed regime change efforts. Having said that, I was surprised (to say the least) at how little internal security was in place, compared to other countries in the region.

1) Students openly asked questions of me that were critical of the regime in public lectures. They did so with some caution, but it is not something I would have found in, say, Syria.

2) There were no internal movement controls on me of any sort.

3) There was very little street-level security: I saw two AKs (I was counting) and a few sidearms on police and Pasadran the entire time I was there. I see more internal security in Jordan or Egypt or Lebanon crossing the street.

4) I walked up to, around, and touched, Ahmadinejad's podium a few hours before due to speak at an event. No police, other than a few at the opposite end of the square. No sanitized area or perimeter security. Nada.

Either the regime is foolish on security issues, or (gasoline riots notwithstanding) they're really not fundamentally worried.

What I did find was enormous openess among students, academics, and even many policy-makers to new ideas and change. I think there are better ways of encouraging that then openly calling for the overthrow of the regime.

Nice to know u went to Iran.

One thing I must mention is that the regime certainly knows it is not popular and knows it has critics and also realizes that every body speaks against it BUT it won't jail/detain/take action against/ those who just speak about it in cabs and lectures and libraries and grocery stores since it cant jail all the populace. However they will take action ONLY against those who dare to challenge it out loud. They only care about the vocal critics, other than that you're left to say whatever you want. They simply dont care and know you're not a real threat but once you have a following and trying to challenge them, you'll be dealt with, no question asked.

And yes, Iran is not like Saddam's Iraq, Cuba, North Korea or even Syria. The democratic experience of the people has taught them to THINK differently and act differently. Iran is a different country altogether.

[phoenix80]

Phoenix80,
As an Iranian (albeit one who has moved to Canada), this is certainly an area that you as an Iranian can shed light on. I wondered if we might ask you to write up some of your thoughts about Iranian domestic politics, the forces that drive them and the different parts of the Iranian military (IRGC, Basiji, Iranian Army). It'd be very useful to get your perspective on what parts of the Iranian military are used for what and what your perception of how decisions are made. It'd also be interesting to hear how average Iranians think - about us, the West, what they value culturally, etc. Our understanding Iran and Iranians better might lead to better solutions.

While we appreciate your passion and your desire to see conditions improve in Iran, I suspect you have a great deal more to offer then limiting your commentary to character observations.

Best Regards, Rob

I moved to Canada almost 2 years ago and spent all my life there in Iran.

[kwtusn]

Okay, it's a long read (100 pages ), but Thomas Joscelyn presents an interesting unclas analysis of events over the past 27 years; found this on the recent 9/11 anniversary on Clairmont Institute's website. Can anyone comment on the credibility of the author or the Clairmont Inst.?
http://http://www.claremont.org/publ...pub_detail.asp

Foreword

The Claremont Institute’s National Security Studies series is devoted to the serious discussion of what will be required to defend the United States and the West. Our Declaration of Independence teaches that government is instituted among men to secure life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The Constitution’s injunction to provide for the “common defense” requires a vigorous and vigilant approach to national security. American foreign policy dedicated to the security of the interests and rights of its citizens requires not only informed and prudent statesmanship, but also a responsible citizenry that is engaged in the national discussion about friends and foes. It is in this tradition of spirited self-government that we publish these studies.

Iran has long been one of the leading state sponsors of terrorism worldwide. Iran’s ruling mullahs are extending their regional influence in the fog of the Iraq conflict. Their pursuit of nuclear weapons and a robust ballistic missile capability continues apace. Thomas Joscelyn argues that Iran is guilty of far more. An emboldened Iran has vicariously waged war against America for nearly three decades, yet America’s leaders are unwilling to admit what is plain for all to see.

Because of our reluctance to confront this terrorist state openly, we are losing ground on a vital front in our war against radical Islam. Through careful analysis of open sources, Joscelyn explains both the intelligence establishment’s misreading of history and the numerous but unfounded assumptions by today’s elite concerning Iran and its link to terrorist operations.

One of the most damaging and unwarranted assumptions made is that sectarian differences within Islam should prevent cooperation in operations against the West. A brief look at the evidence shows that Iran and others have had no trouble in putting aside differences in theology to harm their enemies, especially America. Specific links include the Iranian connection to al-Qaeda in the Sudan, a partnership brokered by Hassan al-Turabi, one-time leader of Sudan’s ruling party, the National Islamic Front. Next, there is Imad Mugniyah, Hezbollah’s master terrorist, who helped Osama bin Laden upgrade al-Qaeda’s capabilities in the early 1990s. The 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, long suspected to be the handiwork of Hezbollah under direction from Iran, may also have had a junior partner in al-Qaeda. The 9/11 Commission established that the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania were the work of Hezbollah-trained al-Qaeda operatives. There are disturbing signs that may implicate Iran in, at the very least, facilitating travel for some of the 9/11 hijackers. Finally, there is extensive evidence that Iran aided al-Qaeda’s retreat from Afghanistan in late 2001 and has allowed al-Qaeda agents to operate from Iranian soil ever since.

Recognizing this pattern is a prerequisite to restoring a sound policy towards Iran. We must be honest about Iran’s past actions over the last three decades. We must also publicly investigate Iran and Hezbollah’s possible involvement in 9/11 and other al-Qaeda attacks. Evidence not harmful to current national security assets or strategy should be declassified. We should demand that Iran turn over any al-Qaeda fighters seeking refuge on Iranian soil. Finally, we should set about the business of devising a broad and coherent strategy for confronting Iran. How we go about meeting the Iranian threat is open for debate, but we cannot hope to resolve this vital issue by continuing to pretend that Iran does not play a large role in the terrorists’ ongoing war against America.

The American regime has faced down larger and more formidable foes than Iran, Hezbollah, and al-Qaeda. But in an age of increasing technological sophistication, it is irresponsible to sit idly by while threats gather and foreign actors are allowed to carry out acts of war. The way forward requires prudence, clear strategic thinking, and statesmanship. Thomas Joscelyn’s compelling case that we must first open our eyes is a vital contribution to what we hope will be a new direction for American foreign policy.

Brian T. Kennedy
President, The Claremont Institute
September 11, 2007

[bourbon]

Can anyone comment on the credibility of the author or the Clairmont Inst.?

Thanks for the link.

The Claremont Institute is a right-of-center think tank, and is considered an intellectual bulwark in the conservative movement. Claremont's big kahuna, Professor Harry Jaffa, studied under Leo Strauss and is of the Straussian persuasion.

[phoenix80]

Michael Rubin of AEI has argued for far too long that the diplomatic engagement with Tehran is futile because the Iranian regime cannot be trusted at all.

[tequila]

U.S. Focus on Ahmadinejad Puzzles Iranians - NYTIMES, 24 Sep.

When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was first elected president, he said Iran had more important issues to worry about than how women dress. He even called for allowing women into soccer games, a revolutionary idea for revolutionary Iran.

Today, Iran is experiencing the most severe crackdown on social behavior and dress in years, and women are often barred from smoking in public, let alone attending a stadium event.

Since his inauguration two years ago, Mr. Ahmadinejad has grabbed headlines around the world, and in Iran, for outrageous statements that often have no more likelihood of being put into practice than his plan for women to attend soccer games. He has generated controversy in New York in recent days by asking to visit ground zero — a request that was denied — and his scheduled appearance at Columbia University has drawn protests.

...

Political analysts here say they are surprised at the degree to which the West focuses on their president, saying that it reflects a general misunderstanding of their system.

Unlike in the United States, in Iran the president is not the head of state nor the commander in chief. That status is held by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, whose role combines civil and religious authority. At the moment, this president’s power comes from two sources, they say: the unqualified support of the supreme leader, and the international condemnation he manages to generate when he speaks up.

“The United States pays too much attention to Ahmadinejad,” said an Iranian political scientist who spoke on the condition of anonymity for fear of reprisal. “He is not that consequential ...”

Nice summary article on Ahmadenijad's true role at home, which is as one center of power amongst many competing rings, whose main responsibilities are domestic and economic. He reminds me a bit of Khruschev banging his shoe at the U.N., while the Iranian nomenklatura looks on in embarassed bemusement. In the end he will be defeated by his inability to create real change in a calcified, kleptocratic state epitomized by Rafsanjani and his cronies, who will take him down.

[goesh]

I for one would like some commentary on those more in the know than I about the Prez/Iran why he went to Columbia to get essentially heckled and challenged. Was it to show his hardline supporters back home that he would walk into the lion's den unafraid? I assume most back home didn't get to tune in to the questions and his introduction by Columbia's President.

[Rex Brynen]

I for one would like some commentary on those more in the know than I about the Prez/Iran why he went to Columbia to get essentially heckled and challenged. Was it to show his hardline supporters back home that he would walk into the lion's den unafraid? I assume most back home didn't get to tune in to the questions and his introduction by Columbia's President.

I'm sure he thinks he came out on top.

[Rank amateur]

I for one would like some commentary on those more in the know than I about the Prez/Iran why he went to Columbia to get essentially heckled and challenged. Was it to show his hardline supporters back home that he would walk into the lion's den unafraid? I assume most back home didn't get to tune in to the questions and his introduction by Columbia's President.

He's trying to convince people - like British and French voters who may soon need to decide whether their country will participate in military action against Iran - that Bush/Israel are the radicals/warmongers. It might seem crazy to you, but given the situation in Iraq, Bush's unpopularity and the fact that many people see all religious fundamentalists as a little bit wacky, it will be somewhat successful. (I think many Europeans would say, "Let the two fundamentalist presidents have their war. We'll stay out of it.") It'd be more successful if he'd stop denying the Holocaust. Even more successful if he stopped supporting terrorists.

[JJackson]

Re Columbia debate.
As a British voter I thought he came over well – which is more than can be said for Bollinger. Bollinger’s introduction was appalling. If President Bush came to speak at a UK university and the chancellor launched into a vitriolic attack on him for launching wars of aggression, complete disregard for international norms re extraditions and Gitmo etc. - I might agree - but I would cringe with embarrassment all the same.
Back to what he said. He reiterated that they are trying to establish a nuclear program within IAEA rules and with inspection; fair enough unless anyone can prove otherwise. Re Israel he side stepped instead clarifying his preferred option, namely a Palestinian plebiscite, which – although he did not explicitly say this – would include all inhabitants of Israel, the West Bank, Gaza and (although less clear) displaced Palestinians elsewhere. The resultant state – presumably called Palestine not Israel – would be democratic and of mixed religions. Seems fair enough to me but I suspect this option would be as popular with Israelis as the end of white South Africa was with the whites. On insurgency in Iraq, another deft sidestep, this time to explain Iran is a greater victim of terrorism than the US. All in all a typical political interview with most questions dodged rather than directly answered.

[bourbon]

I for one would like some commentary on those more in the know than I about the Prez/Iran why he went to Columbia to get essentially heckled and challenged. Was it to show his hardline supporters back home that he would walk into the lion's den unafraid? I assume most back home didn't get to tune in to the questions and his introduction by Columbia's President.

Michael Hirsh, who was in Iran in the Spring, thinks it is to: A.) Divide Western powers and agencies (as RA mentioned), and B.) facing an election in 2009, shore up increasingly critical domestic-opinion by appearing "more reasonable".

The Ahmadinejad Show: What’s really driving the Iranian president’s Western charm offensive?, By Michael Hirsh. Newsweek, Sept 24, 2007

Since the spring he and his regime have been embarked on a new campaign to divide the Western powers and agencies that have been seeking to force Tehran to suspend uranium enrichment through a campaign of increasing economic pressure and sanctions. The Iranians accurately identified the weak link in this tightening chain—Mohammed ElBaradei, the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency—and they promptly went after it. Their tactic? Merry Mahmoud's barrage of Good Will. In an interview during a trip I made to Tehran in late June, I asked Iran’s chief negotiator, Ali Larijani, whether it was in fact his strategy “to win over ElBaradei and the IAEA by satisfying his concerns.” He smiled faintly and answered, “We have always supported the active role of the agency in this case … We are quite hopeful, and we always keep in touch with the agency. We have no problem with the agency. We welcome agency surveillance, and inspections, and their cameras are in place.”

So, unsurprisingly, in subsequent months Tehran opened its arms to the IAEA and agreed to a “work plan” to address ElBaradei’s questions about Iran’s past nuclear practices. The result has been diplomatic success—which in Iran’s case means further delay in the U.N. sanctions process, and therefore more time to enrich. (Right after the “work plan” was announced in August, Iran announced that it had installed 3,000 centrifuges for delivering higher levels of enriched uranium.) The Russians and Chinese, the two permanent members of the U.N. Security Council that have been most resistant to further sanctions, promptly seized on the IAEA-Iran agreement to suggest that further discussions on a third Security Council resolution should await conclusion of the “work plan.”

All of which brings us back to Mahmoud the Entertainer. The IAEA is informally a U.N. agency, and by appearing more reasonable this year during his annual visit to New York for the opening of the U.N. General Assembly, Ahmadinejad is attempting to win over more members of the IAEA board of governors at the world body. He seems just as worried about what’s happening behind his back in Tehran. As Iranian politicians begin to jockey for the next presidential election in 2009, Ahmadinejad is deeply unpopular. (Mainly over his mishandling of the domestic economy: he has strong-armed the central bank into driving down interest rates artificially, risking hyperinflation, shifted back to a command economy by slowing privatization, and misused much of the nation’s oil revenue.) Recently two leading pragmatist politicians, former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, have apparently joined forces to defeat him. And Rafsanjani, who after 9/11 issued many peace feelers to Washington and authorized deep cooperation with the Bush administration over post-Taliban Afghanistan, has gained in parliamentary power. So a savvy political strategy for Ahmadinejad—and despite what the White House says, Iran is the closest thing to a democracy in the Middle East outside Israel—is to appear just as reasonable with the West as Rafsanjani.

[goesh]

In light of Ahmadinejad's recent appearance at Columbia and his lunatic assertions, his image of the irrational/mad/loose cannon dictator has significantly grown in stature. His danger rating scale has been elevated on the scale of Public perception, i.e. he says there are no homosexuals in Iran for instance and CNN shows pictures of some swinging from cranes high in the air with gaping Iranians all around. He publically asserts Israel should be wiped from the face of the planet and the UN hounds him over compliance issues and sanctions are in affect yet on Columbia's stage, he tells us Iran doesn't want the bomb. Iranian covert aggression against our troops in Iraq is also trickling out bit by bit to the Public. It becomes less likely, again in the eyes of the Public, that such a madman can be reasoned with and as my old Granny would say, "better to sic the Raptors on him than the politicians". The court of Public opinion is starting to gain equal footing with the strategic analysis that suggests hitting Iran is not the best way to go. Regarding the issue of nuclear contamination from a preemptive strike agaisnt Iran, it is starting to boil down to the perception that either the Iranians will suffer from it or others in the world will.

I think heightened sabre rattling is needed because a massive hunk of the Iranian population was born post Ayatollah Khomeini and they don't buy into the fundamentalist facism being forced down their throats by the hardliners and their bassiji enforcers.

If Ahmadinejad can rattle the sabre, so can we.

http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satelli...cle%2FShowFull

"Ahmadinejad unveils world without Israel"

[Steve Blair]

A good Cox and Forkum about this whole thing.....