Paper: Rethinking Role of Religious Conflict in Doctrine

[M-A Lagrange]

Schmedlap,

There are no "religious wars" or "information wars" or "wars of attrition" or "proxy wars." Replace the word "war" in each one with "campaign."

you took my academic words to turn them in technical/practical words. If I can say so.
For me, religion will influence the context in term of how far and how easily you will penetrate in the opponant society/structure/network...

It will also give you a global idea of the direction to take for your cimic/psyop operations. But not much more.
The tribes I am dealing with are catholic but their culture is as far from mine than those of the afghan or somali could be. It's even amazing to see how close in fact some catholic/animist tribes are "culturaly" close to Muslim tribes in East Africa. All pastoralist have the same approach: my cows, my grazzing land and my water. My clan against the world.
After it's just a complexe political game on the one who will get the biggest part of the cake.

Mike,

I'll go with your diagram but I wonder how far it applies. With Shia, no doubt, the separation between administration and religion is there. With extremist... I somethimes really wonder. What would be the demarcation line between politic and law if it's the same religious leader who defines both?

Anyways, in operational terms, it always comes back to the fact that we need to find something that applies to it to re-establish dialog links with something that looks like us. It seems easier.

PS: yes I came back from my excursion in the bush. Was good by the way.

Personally, I wish folks in the field had a basic primer in the practical and administrative aspects of political organization and operation (at the internal and sub-national levels, not foreign policy/nation state stuff) It would make life easier.

Steve,

I agree just with you. I think that Kilcullen pointed it in a past article in SWJ: we always try to find a "new elite" to replace the one we want to go. In nation building, it's too often not functioning as we place guys who basically do not have the same understanding than us of what "being in power means". But this is rarely due to religious believes and even less to religious cultural background. My experience tells me it is rather pretty much closer to economical greed.

[Steve the Planner]

MA:

"All pastoralist have the same approach: my cows, my grazzing land and my water. My clan against the world.
After it's just a complexe political game on the one who will get the biggest part of the cake. "

I keep trying to avoid falling down the economic/geographic determinism well, but, sometimes, a lot of this can be made too complex. I have mouths to feed is a pretty standard human motivator even if some of the nuances change.

My Paris socialite friend always says it is about money or SEX, and even that gets overlooked sometimes.

Steve

[jmm99]

the Dip/Pol Ring and the Law Ring could become one in the extremist case:

from MA
I'll go with your diagram but I wonder how far it applies. With Shia, no doubt, the separation between administration and religion is there. With extremist... I somethimes really wonder. What would be the demarcation line between politic and law if it's the same religious leader who defines both?

But, some measure of secular input will enter the picture because of the external constraints - e.g., relations with the rest of the World.

An extreme example would be an all-encompassing dictatorship which ignores all external constraints - a North Korea on steroids - where one man calls all of the shots in all three rings >>> a single ring. Again, that construct would be theoretical, not real.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

Agree with this:

from STP
Personally, I wish folks in the field had a basic primer in the practical and administrative aspects of political organization and operation (at the internal and sub-national levels, not foreign policy/nation state stuff) It would make life easier.

re: local governance (which covers a lot of bases) in villages and districts and their interface with provinces.

But, more so than the primer (which could be compiled from numerous "lessons learned"), is developing the basic capabilities (organized people, whether military, civilian or mixed) who will use the primer.

For example, looking at MG Flynn "guidance" on intelligence, I saw many items that would be useful to me if I were advising on a local (village or district) level re: local governance, civil and criminal justice systems, etc. E.g. (p.7):

... census data and patrol debriefs; minutes from shuras with local farmers and tribal leaders; after-action reports from civil affairs officers and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs); polling data and atmospherics reports from psychological operations and female engagement teams; and translated summaries of radio broadcasts that influence local farmers, not to mention the field observations of Afghan soldiers, United Nations officials, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Even Legrange could get into the act.

I suppose many of the same items would be useful to a combat commander in the same environment. Our military effort (in some places) reaches down to the district and village levels, in sufficient force projection to make a difference. E.g. (p.13, 14):

The tide began to turn in Nawa on July 2, when 800 Marines descended in helicopters and began sweeping across the district on foot, establishing nearly two dozen patrol bases in villages and cornfields along the way. Five months later and with few shots fired by Marines after their initial operation, the situation in Nawa is radically different. Insurgents find it substantially more difficult to operate without being ostracized or reported by farmers; government officials meet regularly with citizens to address their grievances, removing this powerful instrument of local control from the Taliban’s arsenal; the district center has transformed from a ghost town into a bustling bazaar; and IED incidents are down 90 percent.
....
To be sure, various chips had to fall the right way in order for our forces to enable this positive turn of events. Nawa was lucky to have a charismatic governor and a modern battalion commander who, together, ran their joint effort like a political campaign as much as a military operation. The robust presence of security personnel (there was one Marine or Afghan soldier or policeman for every 50 citizens) was also vital. [6]

[6] 6 following report: Seth G. Jones, Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, and K. Jack Riley, Establishing Law and Order after Conflict (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2005).

Note also the force ratio 1:50. The 2005 Rand monograph is interesting (Astan is one of the countries considered); but have we gotten any better than we were then with respect to the political effort being made at the local (district and village level). At that level, the military (as part of the military effort) is an intelligence consumer. Where is the equivalent consumer organization, at that level, to implement the political effort ?

The political effort would include religious considerations where they are material; but also goes beyond that into my "law" areas, STP's mapping and records area, and "Commandant" () Surferbeetle's development area. I see a "whole of government" approach at national and provincial levels (less so there); but don't see it at the lower levels.

Regards

Mike

[Steve the Planner]

An interesting note from McCreary's Nightwatch (01/11/2010):

Iraq-Saudi Arabia: For the record. Iraqi President Talabani has asked Saudi King Abdullah to intervene in stopping Saudi criticisms of Iraq's Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Mehr News Agency reported 11 January. In a letter to King Abdullah, Taliban(i) wrote that insults to al-Sistani cause "division and quarrels that spark the flames in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and other countries.

To recap the action, a Kurd – Talabani – made an argument to a Sunni Arab King to protect Arab Shiites. That’ll work, right."

Politics, religion? Go figure.

[Bob's World]

I recently was engaged by man who "has several Ph.D.s" in Theology" who was intrigued by a paper of mine (Published here on SWJ) on the role of ideology in insurgency. He was fascinated by the paper but was adament that I had made the issue far too secular due to my background and approach to the problem.

"Are you sure that it is not you making the issue far too religious based on your background and experience" I countered?

At this point he called, and apparently it was table stakes and I didn't have adequate sheepskin to cover the bet so he felt he won that hand...

It was a good coversation though. What I told him in essence is that religion and culture are absolutely critical to ones understanding of the environment in which insurgency occurs, and it is these environmental factors that make every insurgency unique. That the goal of my work was to delve past these environmentals and attempt to get to the pure essence of insurgency at a fundamental level; and that to my thinking at that level ideology is simply a tool requried of every insurgency, and selected for its utility in rallying the populace to the cause, while at the same time taking positions that the sitting government was either unable or unwilling to adopt. But that a wise insurgent would discard any ideology that either failed to rally the populace or that was compormised by the counterinsurgent; and pick a new one to continue on to his political ends. That religion was used so often simply because it works.

It also works for expanding colonialism around the globe (be it christian or Muslim, or whatever); and for conventional warfare as well. The ultimate multi-tool.

[slapout9]

Bob's World, Marx kinda thought the same way as you. Find a contradiction between the classes and exploit it (propaganda) until you create an armed conflict.