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Thread: Paper: Rethinking Role of Religious Conflict in Doctrine

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  1. #1
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    Default Basic primer & basic capabilities

    Agree with this:

    from STP
    Personally, I wish folks in the field had a basic primer in the practical and administrative aspects of political organization and operation (at the internal and sub-national levels, not foreign policy/nation state stuff) It would make life easier.
    re: local governance (which covers a lot of bases) in villages and districts and their interface with provinces.

    But, more so than the primer (which could be compiled from numerous "lessons learned"), is developing the basic capabilities (organized people, whether military, civilian or mixed) who will use the primer.

    For example, looking at MG Flynn "guidance" on intelligence, I saw many items that would be useful to me if I were advising on a local (village or district) level re: local governance, civil and criminal justice systems, etc. E.g. (p.7):

    ... census data and patrol debriefs; minutes from shuras with local farmers and tribal leaders; after-action reports from civil affairs officers and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs); polling data and atmospherics reports from psychological operations and female engagement teams; and translated summaries of radio broadcasts that influence local farmers, not to mention the field observations of Afghan soldiers, United Nations officials, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
    Even Legrange could get into the act.

    I suppose many of the same items would be useful to a combat commander in the same environment. Our military effort (in some places) reaches down to the district and village levels, in sufficient force projection to make a difference. E.g. (p.13, 14):

    The tide began to turn in Nawa on July 2, when 800 Marines descended in helicopters and began sweeping across the district on foot, establishing nearly two dozen patrol bases in villages and cornfields along the way. Five months later and with few shots fired by Marines after their initial operation, the situation in Nawa is radically different. Insurgents find it substantially more difficult to operate without being ostracized or reported by farmers; government officials meet regularly with citizens to address their grievances, removing this powerful instrument of local control from the Taliban’s arsenal; the district center has transformed from a ghost town into a bustling bazaar; and IED incidents are down 90 percent.
    ....
    To be sure, various chips had to fall the right way in order for our forces to enable this positive turn of events. Nawa was lucky to have a charismatic governor and a modern battalion commander who, together, ran their joint effort like a political campaign as much as a military operation. The robust presence of security personnel (there was one Marine or Afghan soldier or policeman for every 50 citizens) was also vital. [6]

    [6] 6 following report: Seth G. Jones, Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, and K. Jack Riley, Establishing Law and Order after Conflict (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2005).
    Note also the force ratio 1:50. The 2005 Rand monograph is interesting (Astan is one of the countries considered); but have we gotten any better than we were then with respect to the political effort being made at the local (district and village level). At that level, the military (as part of the military effort) is an intelligence consumer. Where is the equivalent consumer organization, at that level, to implement the political effort ?

    The political effort would include religious considerations where they are material; but also goes beyond that into my "law" areas, STP's mapping and records area, and "Commandant" () Surferbeetle's development area. I see a "whole of government" approach at national and provincial levels (less so there); but don't see it at the lower levels.

    Regards

    Mike

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    Default Re: Sistani

    An interesting note from McCreary's Nightwatch (01/11/2010):

    Iraq-Saudi Arabia: For the record. Iraqi President Talabani has asked Saudi King Abdullah to intervene in stopping Saudi criticisms of Iraq's Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Mehr News Agency reported 11 January. In a letter to King Abdullah, Taliban(i) wrote that insults to al-Sistani cause "division and quarrels that spark the flames in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and other countries.

    To recap the action, a Kurd – Talabani – made an argument to a Sunni Arab King to protect Arab Shiites. That’ll work, right."

    Politics, religion? Go figure.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 01-14-2010 at 04:39 PM. Reason: Add quote marks

  3. #3
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Default

    I recently was engaged by man who "has several Ph.D.s" in Theology" who was intrigued by a paper of mine (Published here on SWJ) on the role of ideology in insurgency. He was fascinated by the paper but was adament that I had made the issue far too secular due to my background and approach to the problem.

    "Are you sure that it is not you making the issue far too religious based on your background and experience" I countered?

    At this point he called, and apparently it was table stakes and I didn't have adequate sheepskin to cover the bet so he felt he won that hand...

    It was a good coversation though. What I told him in essence is that religion and culture are absolutely critical to ones understanding of the environment in which insurgency occurs, and it is these environmental factors that make every insurgency unique. That the goal of my work was to delve past these environmentals and attempt to get to the pure essence of insurgency at a fundamental level; and that to my thinking at that level ideology is simply a tool requried of every insurgency, and selected for its utility in rallying the populace to the cause, while at the same time taking positions that the sitting government was either unable or unwilling to adopt. But that a wise insurgent would discard any ideology that either failed to rally the populace or that was compormised by the counterinsurgent; and pick a new one to continue on to his political ends. That religion was used so often simply because it works.

    It also works for expanding colonialism around the globe (be it christian or Muslim, or whatever); and for conventional warfare as well. The ultimate multi-tool.
    Last edited by Bob's World; 01-14-2010 at 09:40 AM.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Default

    Bob's World, Marx kinda thought the same way as you. Find a contradiction between the classes and exploit it (propaganda) until you create an armed conflict.

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    Council Member M-A Lagrange's Avatar
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    Steve

    I have mouths to feed is a pretty standard human motivator even if some of the nuances change.
    I'll say it's a full universalism in the Levis Strauss sense of the term. We all live on that.
    My point was rather than religion will give you a color but environment will be a strong determinant in the way you build a society. At little as Montesquieu (If I do not mistake) definition of environment influence on society. Or object anthropology in some extend. Those people are managing risks and environmental insecurity. Sometime my field approach is closer to US anthropology than French one.

    Mike,

    An extreme example would be an all-encompassing dictatorship which ignores all external constraints - a North Korea on steroids - where one man calls all of the shots in all three rings >>> a single ring. Again, that construct would be theoretical, not real.
    As usual you dragging us back to reallity. In some extend, Mugabe is close to North Korea on Steroids. What we witness is the capacity of a man to virtually control everything and when it's not working (Like the ZAPU or MDC) just manage to get them included in his machine.
    Zim has changed but when I was there, military, judiciary, political powers were all in his hands openly or through underground grovernment. He even tried (and almost succeded) to get his hands on economy. Bob (Mugabe) had almost the capacity to terrorise anyone, even the vice president and the head of security departments.
    But he was no religious. Or, as some may say , he was religious has he is a hardcore communist.

    In the process of Nation Building as we do implement it, I see more and more room for a single ring society controled by a party and not a man.

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    Default Northern Iraq

    For all the talk about religion and tribes, I know they were underlying factors---as were clans, families--- but if you looked at a lot of what the Kurds, for example, were focused on, it was almost purely political/administrative in nature---shifting political and voter balance one nahia at a time.

    That conveys a very sophisticated and highly directed administrative and political understanding.

    What were the reactionaries doing? Mostly focused on disruption of economic and infrastructure systems.

    Was their affiliation and focus religious in nature? No. It was administrative/political.

    By contrast, I am trying to follow the events in the many Afghanistans to understand the nature and purpose of the different actors.

    At the risk of over simplification:

    At present, the national government seems to be focused on controlling the structure and direction of international aid flows, and does so with support/cooperation of drug manufacturing/distribution systems; which have grown to become some of the largest in the world. I'm not reading a lot of religious zeal behind that.

    A lot of knowledgeable people have described the various opponents as (1) competing sets of organized opposition whose internal differences are not marked by religion; (2.) an overall diminished focus on harsh religion (Sharia) to the extent that it reduced public support; and (3.) an overall and very sharply focused administrative/political purpose, including the targeting of elections, the appointment of shadow governments, and the "exercise" of power in areas like RoL, security assurance, and economic activity flows.

    OK, Mullah Omar has, behind all this, a religious intent, but the focus, ways and means, all seem overwhelmingly driven by administrative/political purpose.

    If I was just a dumb political strategist, I would think about what I can control, and what isn't worth the effort right now.

    Leaving the central government and its drug systems aside for a moment, can I, through intimidation and asymetrical efforts, gain credible administrative/political control in other areas?

    If I launch a "nationwide campaign," say through shadow government, can i define the scope of my support in different areas, and, from that, develop the next plan for, say, a spring push to consolidate gains?

    If I avoid the central cities, but establish sufficient functional control of regions, corridors, etc..., do I have everything I need at this stage, to lay the foundation for the next?

    Maybe also, through skillful negotiation and profitable business arrangements, I can prosperously co-op the drug folks, and/or partner with them so we can all work together (even if my religious convictions abhor drugs)?

    One of my big assets, unlike my opponents, is that I can pop-up at will (since I am not burdened by their administrative/political/security baggage, and, I have no regard for the "democratic" effort to win their hearts and minds. If my stick is big enough (civilian deaths), they will side with me out of fear vs. free choice (Who cares?).

    Besides, I am a stateless person anyway, as my Pashtun lands (the real Afghanistan) were long ago, and arbitrarily carved up by the big powers who play the big game over our heads (Who cares about their versions of nations and power structures anyway?).

    Moreover, the arbitrary national lines are a substantial asset to my operational strengths as my associations, allegiances and lines of operation are beyond them, while they pose major constraints on my opponents.

    Despite my religious opposition to these technically sophisticated and amoral foreigners, I will also use technology where ever I can if it works for me. Streaming video, pop music, Drone feeds, GoogleEarth, etc...

    But, because I am much more like one of the people, it is very easy to use their backwardness and distrust of foreigners and new things as a wedge between us. I'll even pull out the Quran card if I have to, and blame the peoples' deaths on the inevitable and holy struggle against the infidel foreigners. (It seems to work well).

    XXXX

    Again, a great generalization that could be 180 degrees different in any particular place, but, like Iraq, I see a great deal of administrative/political purpose, and not a lot of religion going on.

    Now, if I was serious about undermining that, I would not have religious intents, just a huge respect for the role of religion in those people's lives, and try to fit my efforts into their frameworks and narratives.

    But my focus would be the same as theirs--administrative/political/economic. And max out the use of technology and education.

    Two bits on religion in this conflict.

  7. #7
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    Default Perhaps,

    MA:

    this:

    from MA
    In the process of Nation Building as we do implement it, I see more and more room for a single ring society controled by a party and not a man.
    but, even in SovCom and ChiCom governance, you can distinguish between the Dip/Pol, Law and Op rings. Though the Politburo, legal system and military were all supposed to be based on Communist party principles, each had their own take on how those principles should be applied in their particular arena.

    No doubt Communist principles shaped all three rings; but again those principles had to yield to reality. For example, in law, two areas were never resolved during the SovCom era: (1) International law is primarily based on nation-state interaction; whereas Marxist-Leninist theory calls for the "withering away" of the State; and (2) Russian legal history (actual) proved that the development of property law and contract law arose from individual transactions; whereas Marxist-Leninist historical theory called for a "primitive communism" in both property and contracts.

    The Putin-Ivanov duo (both lawyers) dumped Marxist-Leninist theory in both of these areas, but not in others - their own synthesis, so to speak.

    I certainly do agree that autocracy (whether by one person or one party) remains with us; particularly in unstable societies, because it is the quickest short-term way to get things done - and also satisfies the egos and greed of the one person or members of the one party.

    An interesting fact is that a strong autocracy (with an effective state security service) is as (or slightly more) strong against insurgencies than a strong democracy. The strong autocracy can be established with a generation; a strong democracy takes generations. Since we like to see our desires implemented within our own lifetimes (not too many real futruists out there), you can see why "nation-builders" tend to autocracy.

    COL Jones:

    It is much easier for autocratic "nation-builders" to use religion (or other strong ideologies) in furthering their goals. As Bob says:

    from BW
    That the goal of my work was to delve past these environmentals and attempt to get to the pure essence of insurgency at a fundamental level; and that to my thinking at that level ideology is simply a tool requried of every insurgency, and selected for its utility in rallying the populace to the cause, while at the same time taking positions that the sitting government was either unable or unwilling to adopt. But that a wise insurgent would discard any ideology that either failed to rally the populace or that was compormised by the counterinsurgent; and pick a new one to continue on to his political ends.
    I would call this "manipulation of the slogan" (rather than "manipulation of the ideology") because often the proponent of the slogan has either no real ideology; or, more important, a different underlying ideology than the slogan that is used and discarded.

    E.g., Mao and the ChiComs used many slogans (in their "from the people, back to the people" agitprop campaigns). But, their brand of Marxist-Leninist ideology did not change. Dave Galula goes into this briefly in his section on "Manipulation of the Cause" (Mao is the example). John McCuen goes into more detail in many places.

    I conclude, Marse Robert, that you and I use different terminology for many of the same things - which is why you drive me up a wall.

    Regards

    Mike

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    The Putin-Ivanov duo (both lawyers) dumped Marxist-Leninist theory in both of these areas, but not in others - their own synthesis, so to speak.
    Yep, this where I believe people are starting to get the idea of Corporate Communism. It can be powerful stuff to.....Tali-Bankster Board of Directors with Nazi CEO's

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