Paper: Rethinking Role of Religious Conflict in Doctrine

[Steve the Planner]

I remain in awe of Grand Ayatollah Sistani's moral conviction not to engage in politics if at all possible. Must be the hardest thing when battle rages, or threatens to rage all around.

Same with those in Iran. Sometimes you wish they would jump in, but it must be a very high and hard road.

But the same COIN criticism could be raised about politics.

Personally, I wish folks in the field had a basic primer in the practical and administrative aspects of political organization and operation (at the internal and sub-national levels, not foreign policy/nation state stuff) It would make life easier.

But how much can you pack into a Field Manual?

Steve

[M-A Lagrange]

Well, I will just go for the Jus in Bello and Jus at bellum stuff (as usual).
The legacy (judicial and/or moral) of going at war and the legality in conducting war.

Would be interresting to see the difference between Shia and Sunny and how this could affect COIN operations. I'm not convinced a classical COIN operation as the Surge would work in Iran or with Hezbollah.
Hezbollah was one of the first to do the shift in Lebanon to gain people support by providing social services. They do actually still challenge Lebanese state on that issue.

Shia seems to be more organised to take care of their people. Also, their tradition of dissimulation would make them in apparence more easy but in fact much hardcore and difficult to rally. But I might be wrong.

I finally managed to download it.

[Tukhachevskii]

I remain in awe of Grand Ayatollah Sistani's moral conviction not to engage in politics if at all possible.
Steve

This reminded me of something Carl Schmitt said in The Concept of the Political..."To define something as non-political is itself a political act"

Sistani's decision to not engage in or lend his support to the Iraqi Shia insurgency, the Mahdi army and parliament was a political decision. Let's not forget that the overt political participation in political affairs was almost purely due to the innovating ideological acrobatics of Ayatollah Khomeini. When he wrote Kashf Al-Asrar (The Revealling of Secrets) in 47(?) he was still adhering to the traditional Shia' position (for mujtahids that is) of quietism wherein the Ulema did not overtly participate in the political process instead prefering to remain aloof and influence events through the processes of "emulation" and their monopoly on Shaira' law (and the fact the Shah didn't want a head on confrontation). Those Shia that did participate in politics did so by supporting authority to preserve Shi'ism and even, on the rare occassion, threatened revolution (1906 and the Tobbacco Revolution/Constituional Revolution) but always only to protect the status of the cerlicical establishment and the role of Shi'ism and never to further a political/transformational (modernist) project (that right properly belonged only to the Hidden Imam/Imam Mahdi). It was only in the sixties with the rise of the likes of Ali Shariati (especially his Red Shism wherein he castigated collaborationist clerics as traitors to the revolutionary spirit of Ali) that Khomeini's views began to change. By Wilayat-e-Faqih (the rule of the Faqih) he abandoned the traditionalist position (of quietism) in favour of "red shi'ism" (though he himself would have deinied that given Shariati's socialism/marxism). It was Khomeini who broke with tradition and stated that the Shia' had no need to wait for the retrun of Imam Mahdi. Our view of the role claerics have in politics is coloured by the Iranian/Islamic revolution. Nonethless, for a weltanshauung/lebenswelt that defines itself as din-wa-daula (loosely translated as religion and "state"/ or more properly the spiritual and secular authority) the commentators here are correct in that segregating lived experience into phenomenoligically discreet entities is unhelpful at best (although some academics, who make their living by dividing up the world into intellectual categories would disagree).

Have to rush, need to pick up best friend's daughter from nursery...
(apologies for the grammar, slepping, syntax and)

[Tukhachevskii]

Having now caught my breath allowme to finish off my thoughts above with a caveat. As I was saying our view of clerical action in the political sphere is coloured by ther Iranian revolution. Interestingly the Khomeinite position (wilayaet-e-faqih) was rejected overwhelmingly in the important shrine cities/theologicalseminaries in Iraq. To this day Ayatollah As-Sistani is viewed with suspicion by his cousins across the border especially Ayatollah Ali Khameinei whose attempts to influence events in Iraq to Iran's favour were fillibustered by As-Sistani, especially with As-Sistani's intervention against Muqtada As-Sadr. As-Sistani is a "charismatic" threat to the Iranian "revolutionary" clerics but is adored by those who still adhere to the old queitist modus operandi (of which there are many). As-Sistani is a "charismatic" (i.e., Weber) rather than "ideological" alternative because using words like "ideology","religion",etc. separates the unity of the field of action within which the shia' and other Muslims act. As-Sistani is thus an alternative pole of authority in the widest sense rather than just in termsof narrow theology/jurisprudence (as conceieved by us Western types).

Wait, does that even make sense...?

Must go, best friends daughter has now said that she is hungry over 50 times without taking abreath...

[tequila]

Sistani's decision to not engage in or lend his support to the Iraqi Shia insurgency, the Mahdi army and parliament was a political decision.

I'll just add in that I don't think this is really accurate. Sistani was instrumental in forming the UIA in 2005 and they used his face on their posters. He not only vetoed the CPA's original plans for Iraqi elections in 2004-2005 (intended as a sort of caucus process), but outlined exactly what form legitimate elections and constitution-writing should take. He specifically did not lend any legitimating authority to the CPA in this process, instead selecting the UN as the proper overseeing authority.

Sistani has repeatedly indicated that the clerisy should take an overseeing role with regards to state affairs, and indeed this is the role he has arrogated for himself in Iraq. But he does not endorse Iranian style institutionalization of this i.e. with the office of Supreme Leader, Guardian Council, etc. But he certainly not a pure apolitical "quietist", a title that better fits the al-Khoei family. Reider Visser has this excellent paper about Sistani's views on politics.

[Steve the Planner]

I'm not sure that even a well-written 2006 paper fully encompasses the Grand Ayatollah's position, role or intent.

Defining his role in the body politic is perhaps more complex and nuanced than evaluating his role as a politician or in politics.

I don't have those answers, but, to date, as a man, an Iraqi, and a civic leader (and possibly as a religious community leader), he has stepped in where he believed necessary, but, it seems, in general, prefers not to engage directky in influencing the outcome of "Ceasar's due."

During the run-up to the 2009 Provincial elections, folks were jumping up and down to get him to break all the ties in the competing election rules. Finally, and only finally, he indirectly gave a small nod which, while others bit their nails as to the outcome, did, in fact, generally follow the direction of his reluctant nod.

That, to me, but not necessarily to his many followers, suggests a man and religious leader that did not, and still does not, wish to see Iraq's government follow an Iranian path, and with appropriate deference to the "quietist" tradition.

Without dispute, his nods have more effect than any US President has over a circumstance. But, unlike most folks who, if they have power, use it. He is fully invested in the religious and spiritual implications of his followers, not the political ones (within a reasonable range), but will, under extreme circumstances, use the temporal power scarcely.

That might not fit our objectives, but I have tremendous personal respect for the restraint he shows.

Steve

[jmm99]

I've found the following simple diagram (credit: Geoff Corn) useful:

Corn ROEs.jpg

In the Islamic take, the Dip/Pol Ring and the Law Ring will be influenced by the Koran, etc., to a greater or lesser extent.

In this particular diagram, the intersection of the three rings defines the acceptable ROEs (what is done in war). The same rings also come into play in defining the bounds of going to war in the first place.

One recognizes a bit of CvC's Triangle (Government, Military, People).

Regards

Mike