Energy Security

[Dayuhan]

Fleming argues that the past half-decade does not support this truism: we had sustained high prices but very little increase in the production of liquid fuels in general (and no increase whatsoever in conventional crude oil).

Where in this chart do you see "sustained high oil prices"?



I see a long period of low prices followed by a brief spike, a plunge, and another rise. Again, given the time lag between the decision to invest in increased capacity and the point where that capacity comes onstream, and given the enormous political obstacles to investment in many producing areas, I see no reason at all to interpret this appearance of inelasticity to a geologic or absolute-quantity peak... unless of course you really want to.

I do think there's a danger that all the "end of days" talk will obscure the much more immediate danger of supply constraints due to underinvestment and insecurity/instability issues.

IMO it will take 5-10 years of really sustained high prices, not an up-and-down yo-yo, to see a real impact on either production or consumption. I think the elasticity is there, it's just a very viscous elasticity. People and nations react to energy price spikes by cutting spending elsewhere. Long-term high prices will eventually alter consumption and production patterns, but it will happen over an extended time frame.

[Rick M]

Steve,
You are the person who in # 298 said that we need to look "at what came before that [2005-2010]."
You ask, "Where in this chart do you see "sustained high oil prices"?

Well I'm 60 and my eyes aren't what they used to be, but I see a vague flat-line until about 1999, then a distinct upward break-away which continues to this day.
A brief spike? That lasts from 1999 until the end of 2008... almost a decade, which I would not view as brief except in geologic terms, which does raise a point....
The plunge (which was most pronounced between Jan & May 09... 150 days out of almost 4,000 days). Those 150 days (near-vertical in your graph) made no difference to investment, which was committed long before-hand and in any case global demand was down, so there was no need for additional supply during that time-frame.
Then another rise: the fact that oil prices bounced back during troubled, recessionary times should tell us all something.

As for geological factors, unless you are aware of data which I'm not, global production of conventional crude oil has been stuck between 74-75 mbpd since late 2004. Seven years is a very long time in the oil market, especially considering the incentive of sustained high prices (apart from those 150 days in early 09).
A couple of brief dips in a dozen years is hardly a yo-yo.

By the way, I have never argued that we will hit an 'absolute geologic peak': there are many factors which could converge to cause the eventual peaking of global oil production. I would argue that it matters little which combination of factors 'causes' the peak/plateau, nor when it occurs.
I do argue that its occurrence is inevitable, and that when it occurs it could have serious implications.
Nor have I ever argued that such an event means "end of days," etc.

[Misifus]

7. Your final statement strikes me as rambling and unclear. I will be clear regarding my point about economists...

No, my statement was not rambling if the reader appreciates that economists are famously wrong on just about everything. Economists only score one scale mark lower than politicians on the bullscheisse meter.

As for others that you may cite, I don't need other "experts" to simply echo a faulty theory. In fact I can think of no other experts with more expertise than me in these matters who could provide me with any information whatsoever that oil had peaked. In general, those who cite others do so generally because they have no expertise in a given specific matter themselves. Hence they become information input/output devices of what others have said, or simply are someone who studies an issue from afar, such as war college students.

...By the way, I have never argued that we will hit an 'absolute geologic peak':

But that is what Peak Oil theory claims, hence the end of days nonsense. So now you would like to define Peak Oil as something different? Than just what is your definition? This sounds like the altering of "Global Warming" to "Climate Change" back when the evidence came out that the Earth is in fact not warming. Like I said earlier, just another manifestation of the same psychosis.

[Misifus]

...
IMO it will take 5-10 years of really sustained high prices, not an up-and-down yo-yo, to see a real impact on either production or consumption...

Even if that were to occur, it would be no indication that oil had peaked.

Back when we were paying about $2/barrel for sustained periods of time (pre-1973 embargo) people were still complaining about the price of gasoline. In those times (the '60's) we were supposed to run out of oil by 1980. We were also supposed to run out of food. The psychosis goes on.

[Dayuhan]

Even if that were to occur, it would be no indication that oil had peaked.

I didn't mean to suggest that it would mean that, only that it will take a sustained high price environment to produce significant changes in patterns of either production or consumption.

Steve,
You are the person who in # 298 said that we need to look "at what came before that [2005-2010]."
You ask, "Where in this chart do you see "sustained high oil prices"?

Well I'm 60 and my eyes aren't what they used to be, but I see a vague flat-line until about 1999, then a distinct upward break-away which continues to this day.

I think we're using different definitions of "sustained". The low-price period from 87 to 2000, that was sustained, and it had a real impact on shaping investments and attitudes. To me a "sustained perion of high prices would mean 5+ years in or above the $80-100 band, not the choppiness we've seen.

A brief spike? That lasts from 1999 until the end of 2008... almost a decade, which I would not view as brief except in geologic terms, which does raise a point....

Again, you have to look at the background. For much of that period rising prices were seen as a response to political instability in the Middle East, not to any fundamental change in the supply/demand equation. Producers will not respond to what they perceive as a transient phenomenon; you wouldn't expect them to. As I said above, it really wasn't until 2006/7 that people started looking beyond the "risk premium" explanation and seeing the impact of Asian demand. That cuts the time period down quite a bit.

The plunge (which was most pronounced between Jan & May 09... 150 days out of almost 4,000 days). Those 150 days (near-vertical in your graph) made no difference to investment, which was committed long before-hand and in any case global demand was down, so there was no need for additional supply during that time-frame.
Then another rise: the fact that oil prices bounced back during troubled, recessionary times should tell us all something.

The spike/plunge pattern is largely evidence of the extent to which the spike was driven by speculation... physical demand doesn't dive like that, speculative demand does. There are lots of factors involved in price shifts other than supply and demand... you have to factor in the impact of the declining dollar, for example.

As for geological factors, unless you are aware of data which I'm not, global production of conventional crude oil has been stuck between 74-75 mbpd since late 2004. Seven years is a very long time in the oil market, especially considering the incentive of sustained high prices (apart from those 150 days in early 09).
A couple of brief dips in a dozen years is hardly a yo-yo.

Again, the response time was significantly delayed by the extended period during which the price rise was not seen as a long term phenomenon. In practical terms that cuts the dozen years to less than 5. In oil, mining, or other capital intensive industries where a large project may take a decade to move from concept to full production and the recovery horizon may stretch to several decades, 5 years is a very very short time.

By the way, I have never argued that we will hit an 'absolute geologic peak': there are many factors which could converge to cause the eventual peaking of global oil production. I would argue that it matters little which combination of factors 'causes' the peak/plateau, nor when it occurs.
I do argue that its occurrence is inevitable, and that when it occurs it could have serious implications.

Probably true, but the absolute peak hysteria is there and serves as a distraction from more practical issues.

A geologic constraint - physically running out of oil - would be absolute. Constraints driven by politics and policy are not absolute; things can be done about them, though they often aren't.

Political and policy constraints are numerous. If you look at the top 10 countries in terms of reserves, you'll see that 6 of them - Iran, Iraq, Venezuela, Russia, Nigeria, Libya - have major political obstacles to the kind of investment that would significantly increase production. In a seventh, Canada, environmental policy is a significant political constraint.

There are real problems, but to solve problems you have to identify them, and the problem is not that the oil has run out. The problem is that politics and policy are keeping the oil in the ground. That's not altogether a bad thing, if you ask me.

[Rick M]

"As for others that you may cite, I don't need other "experts" to simply echo a faulty theory. In fact I can think of no other experts with more expertise than me in these matters...."

Misifus,
You have made some extraordinary pronouncements, and I was hoping that you could back them up.
You accuse PO analysts of being psychotic doomers, yet you are unable to provide a single name or example?

It sounds as if your mind was made up long ago, which apparently negates any need to actually examine the evidence & arguments which are advanced by PO analysts.
If you can think of no other experts with more expertise than yourself, I guess you are not about to start examining other info now.

And just to be clear on your point that “oil had peaked,” I have never claimed that oil production has peaked, nor did LTC Fleming. The IEA has stated that conventional oil peaked in 2006, and I believe that they are correct in that, but time will tell.

You deride people who cite references as “information input/output devices,” suggesting that people have nothing to learn from each other. This thread was started (and the one at Armed Forces Journal as well) to facilitate a thoughtful exchange on energy security issues. There is a great deal that we can learn from each other and from various research communities.

“Absolute geologic peak” is certainly not my primary focus, nor would I (or most PO analysts) define the issue in that way. Nor do I support the “half-way” argument (that peaking will occur when we’ve extracted about half of the oil). Furthermore, there is the matter of defining oil: do we mean conventional (the definition of which keeps changing), do we include bitumen, shale oil, oil shale/kerogen, NGLs, CTL, GTL, all-liquids including biofuels, etc.

Peak Oil refers to the point at which global oil extraction reaches its maximum, for whatever combination of factors/reasons. If we find better alternatives and we have a “demand peak” as some have argued, then PO may blow over as a non-event and people like me will have worried for nothing.
However, if production should stall while mankind is so dependent on petroleum, then we certainly could face “an unprecedented risk management problem,” as Dr. Hirsch and his team put it.

Ever heard of them, Misifus?

[Misifus]

I didn't mean to suggest that it would mean that, only that it will take a sustained high price environment to produce significant changes in patterns of either production or consumption...

You are correct. My comment was for the broader audience who might infer differently.

[Misifus]

...You have made some extraordinary pronouncements, and I was hoping that you could back them up.
You accuse PO analysts of being psychotic doomers, yet you are unable to provide a single name or example?

You didn't ask me to provide a name. However, a name is not needed. Just examing the very premise of Peak Oil is enough to categorize it as being in the same pyschobable category as Malthusian Food Shortage. Global Cooling, Silent Spring, etc.

It sounds as if your mind was made up long ago, which apparently negates any need to actually examine the evidence & arguments which are advanced by PO analysts. If you can think of no other experts with more expertise than yourself, I guess you are not about to start examining other info now.

Actually, I look at the info quite often. It continues to be nonsense.

And just to be clear on your point that “oil had peaked,” I have never claimed that oil production has peaked, nor did LTC Fleming. The IEA has stated that conventional oil peaked in 2006, and I believe that they are correct in that, but time will tell.

Actually both you and Fleming imply it pretty strongly.

You deride people who cite references as “information input/output devices,” suggesting that people have nothing to learn from each other.

Actually I don't deride the study of the issue. But to study it and then sound off like an authority on it while promoting a Chicken Little psychosis is irresponsible.

“Absolute geologic peak” is certainly not my primary focus, nor would I (or most PO analysts) define the issue in that way.

That is exactly how Peak Oil is defined. Like I said upthread, the latest tactic of the wackos is to redefine it, like redefining Global Warming to Climate Change.

PO may blow over as a non-event and people like me will have worried for nothing.

Now you are making some sense.

However, if production should stall while mankind is so dependent on petroleum, then we certainly could face “an unprecedented risk management problem,” as Dr. Hirsch and his team put it.

That's not a brilliant pronouncement. It's an obvious statement similar to "if a plane runs out of fuel at 30,000 feet, it will surely crash." Hirsch's statment is simply more of the Crash of '79 mentality. Like I said, it's a psychosis. I did refer upthread to disgruntled employees. And by the way, there are many others, who like Hirsch are also former Exxon employees and who may even be considered more qualified than Hirsch, that realize his theory is simply a psychosis.

[Rick M]

In response to the recent assertion that PO analysts suffer from psychosis, I offer the following list of sensible, well-informed PO analysts:

Dr. Albert Bartlett, emeritus professor of Physics:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Bartlett

Art Berman, with 32 years in oil & gas industry:
http://www.aspousa.org/conference/20...s.cfm?bid=1189

Jeffrey Brown, geoscientist who is probably the world’s leading authority on oil export decline:
http://aspo-usa.com/conference/2011/...s.cfm?bid=1228

Dr. Colin Campbell, with over 40 years in the oil industry.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colin_Campbell_(geologist)

Dr. Ken Deffeyes, retired petroleum geologist:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenneth_S._Deffeyes

Jeremy Gilbert, former BP Chief Petroleum Engineer:
http://www.businessinsider.com/forme...ak-oil-2010-11

Dr. James Hamilton, Professor of Economics at UCSD who has done extensive research on the economic effects of oil shocks:
http://weber.ucsd.edu/~jhamilto/

Dr. Robert Hirsch, lead author of the landmark report on PO for the US Dept. of Energy:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_L._Hirsch

Dr. M. King Hubbert, Shell geoscientist who correctly predicted the peak in US oil production:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M._King_Hubbert

Dr. David Hughes, who worked for 32 years as a geoscientist with the Geological Survey of Canada.
http://www.postcarbon.org/person/36208-david-hughes

Dr. Jean Laherrere, retired French petroleum engineer:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean_Laherrère

Chris Skrebowski: 38 years in the oil industry.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chris_Skrebowski

Tom Whipple, retired CIA analyst:
http://www.postcarbon.org/person/36222-tom-whipple

[Rick M]

I see that this was posted during the past few hours.
It includes statements from several of the individuals whom I flagged as leading PO analysts:
http://www.energybulletin.net/storie...ary-steven-chu

[Misifus]

From your latest link:

We are not running out of oil. But we appear to be running out of oil that we can afford.

Like I said upthread, whining about the price of oil (actually gasoline) has been around since Henry Ford made the automobile available to the masses. We would like our gasoline for free.

The list you provided is as regal as any list composed of Global Warming experts/wackos. Bartlett? LMAO!

Nevertheless, I do enjoy this song, and hope you do too!

http://youtu.be/lZMGTsyOAG0

[Rick M]

Steve,
Thanks for your detailed response and I apologize for the slow response.
You and I often disagree, but I always appreciate the detailed, constructive way that you present your counter-arguments.

I have no significant quarrel with most of your points, but I would add the following observations.

1. You said, “The low-price period from 87 to 2000, that was sustained, and it had a real impact on shaping investments and attitudes.”
True, but did it make any difference? Exports from the North Sea and Cantarell were booming and there was plenty of supply (hence the low prices).

2. “To me a "sustained period of high prices would mean 5+ years in or above the $80-100 band….”
I agree with the 5+ year time-frame (for the reasons which you mentioned) but I fail to see why we need $80+ prices to constitute high prices. For most of us, a mere doubling or trebling constitutes a significant increase, whether we are referring to our salaries or to our expenditures.
If this table is correct, we had a doubling in 2000 of the 98 price, then triple the 98 price by 2004 and a quadrupling by 2005, and that was just a warm-up for the following half-decade:
http://inflationdata.com/inflation/i...ices_table.asp

If you or I had salary increases on that scale, we would surely view it as highly significant.

3. “For much of that period [1999- 2008] rising prices were seen as a response to political instability in the Middle East, not to any fundamental change in the supply/demand equation.”
I would argue that the market was pinched at both ends: UK peaked in ’99, Norway in ’01, Cantarell in ’04, with Prudhoe declining throughout.
Meanwhile demand surged in Asia and MENA, etc.
I would rate those factors above geopolitics, though it is of course impossible to ‘prove’ such aspects either way.

4. As for your final points, I can only say that neither I nor any of the military analysts have engaged in “absolute peak hysteria.”
As for “physically running out of oil,” that is not the central thesis of PO concerns.
First of all, we will never run out of oil, partly because of the relatively low extraction rates and also because we will have all sorts of kerogen, etc which may be left in the ground as well.
Second, the central warning of PO is that difficulties may start not when we ‘run out’ but ironically, as we enjoy the most oil that we have ever produced.

5. I certainly agree re. political and policy constraints, but please note what I’ve said repeatedly on this website: it really does not matter what combination of factors eventually ‘causes’ the ultimate peak in global oil production (nor when).
Unless we have ‘peak demand’ first, we will indeed face “an unprecedented risk management problem.”

6. I certainly support your final point about keeping oil in the ground (if only for our great-grandkids to extract).

[Rick M]

FYI,
This open letter to Energy Secretary Chu was issued yesterday:
http://www.energybulletin.net/storie...ry-steven-chur

[Dayuhan]

1. You said, “The low-price period from 87 to 2000, that was sustained, and it had a real impact on shaping investments and attitudes.”

True, but did it make any difference? Exports from the North Sea and Cantarell were booming and there was plenty of supply (hence the low prices).

The difference would lie in the sharply diminished incentive for exploration and investment in new production capacity... even, in some cases, investment in maintenance of existing production capacity. There's also a less tangible impact on attitudes and practices. The idea that oil is fundamentally plentiful and cheap, and that price spikes are primarily driven by risk premiums, gets entrenched and does not immediately vanish.

2. “To me a "sustained period of high prices would mean 5+ years in or above the $80-100 band….”
I agree with the 5+ year time-frame (for the reasons which you mentioned) but I fail to see why we need $80+ prices to constitute high prices. For most of us, a mere doubling or trebling constitutes a significant increase, whether we are referring to our salaries or to our expenditures.

It's my less than scientific assessment of the level of sustained pain needed to drive really meaningful efforts to reduce consumption, and the level of sustained incentive required to drive meaningful investment in production and alternative fuels.

If this table is correct, we had a doubling in 2000 of the 98 price, then triple the 98 price by 2004 and a quadrupling by 2005, and that was just a warm-up for the following half-decade:
http://inflationdata.com/inflation/i...ices_table.asp

If you or I had salary increases on that scale, we would surely view it as highly significant.

Look at it from the perspective of a company or nation that produces oil. Rising prices aren't an immediate incentive to go out and toss tens of billions into producing more oil. You like high prices, and your first reaction to high prices, especially after a prolonged and miserable glut, is to leave production where it is and enjoy the good times. You're also keenly aware that the price rise might easily be a transient phenomenon driven by a bubble economy and/or trouble in the middle east, and your instinct is to keep the money in the old oak chest until you're really sure the higher prices are going to last.

3. “For much of that period [1999- 2008] rising prices were seen as a response to political instability in the Middle East, not to any fundamental change in the supply/demand equation.”
I would argue that the market was pinched at both ends: UK peaked in ’99, Norway in ’01, Cantarell in ’04, with Prudhoe declining throughout.
Meanwhile demand surged in Asia and MENA, etc.
I would rate those factors above geopolitics, though it is of course impossible to ‘prove’ such aspects either way.

Price movements that start as a response to supply and demand trends are often wildly exaggerated by speculation and hedging. Fear of potential disruption can spike prices faster and more dramatically than actual disruption, because fear is open ended and the impact of what is feared is more difficult to assess than that of an existing event. Again, you have to factor in that entrenched attitude of glut, and the deep-set assumption that if demand perked up the Gulf, which had been running well below capacity for years, could simply open the tap a little.

5. I certainly agree re. political and policy constraints, but please note what I’ve said repeatedly on this website: it really does not matter what combination of factors eventually ‘causes’ the ultimate peak in global oil production (nor when).
Unless we have ‘peak demand’ first, we will indeed face “an unprecedented risk management problem.”

I don't think a production plateau due to political and security constraints should be seen as a peak or called a peak. "Peak" implies an absolute from which all must descend. Stagnating production growth or a transient decline due to constrained investment is a reversible condition calling for a different set of policy responses.

[Rick M]

Good morning

Thanks for your responses and I have no quarrel with any of them.
You also raised several interesting points:

1. "There's also a less tangible impact on attitudes and practices. The idea that oil is fundamentally plentiful and cheap, and that price spikes are primarily driven by risk premiums, gets entrenched and does not immediately vanish."

One constructive aspect of PO concerns is that they remind us that oil, though plentiful and previously cheap, is finite. I'm presently reading the most recent paper by James Hamilton (which I hope to get time to review for Energy Bulletin) in which he states:
"... although oil is in principle an exhaustible resource, in practice the supply has always been so vast, and the date at which it will finally be exhausted has been thought to be so far into the future, that finiteness of the resource had essentially no relevance for the current price... the observed price is practically the same as the marginal extraction cost" (Hamilton, p. 4).

2. "Price movements... are often wildly exaggerated by speculation and hedging."
This is precisely the point that the Bundeswehr analysts stressed: confidence in markets, confidence in the over-all economy, confidence in financial institutions is critical to national & international stability. Financial markets are hyper-sensitive to confidence & outlooks and have the power to quickly magnify/accelerate emerging trends:
http://www.energybulletin.net/storie...point-nov-2010

3. "I don't think a production plateau due to political and security constraints should be seen as a peak or called a peak. "Peak" implies an absolute from which all must descend. Stagnating production growth or a transient decline due to constrained investment is a reversible condition calling for a different set of policy responses."

I agree with your final point, but please note what you are saying: if it's just a temporary situation due to constrained investment then it is possible to increase production. If this were to occur, then the peak would be postponed yet again.
Again, the two central points of PO are that the peak/plateau must inevitably come: inevitably because of geological limitations, but the latter only provide the inevitability: many other factors could/would determine the timing of the peak. (We can make the same argument for phosphorus, etc.)

Second, when peaking does occur (ie. as we hit max, not minimum) mankind will face some unprecedented problems. The two most likely exceptions to this (ie. avoidance of problems) would be if we have "peak demand" first (eg. we have a break-through with hydrogen) or if we go on a crash mitigation program as Hirsch and others have advocated.

A mitigation program seems to be what the US military has embarked on, with recent intensive efforts in alt-energy, conservation, islanding of bases, etc.
Again, I have yet to find a military study from any country which dismisses PO as premature alarmism (or psychosis, as some have argued).
If anyone is aware of such conclusions by an analyst from the military/security research community, please post it.

[Dayuhan]

One constructive aspect of PO concerns is that they remind us that oil, though plentiful and previously cheap, is finite...

...I agree with your final point, but please note what you are saying: if it's just a temporary situation due to constrained investment then it is possible to increase production. If this were to occur, then the peak would be postponed yet again.

Again, the two central points of PO are that the peak/plateau must inevitably come: inevitably because of geological limitations, but the latter only provide the inevitability: many other factors could/would determine the timing of the peak. (We can make the same argument for phosphorus, etc.)

To some extent true, but overplaying the "near peak" arguments and generally raising excessive alarm also raises a "boy who cried wolf" risk. There are only so many times people will listen to "this is THE peak and it's all downhill from here" before deciding that the whole thing is a load of bollocks.

I know you're not raising hysteria, but some really do. I recall all sorts of declarations that 2008 was the absolute peak, generally based on the observation that production fell despite rising prices. There were quite obvious simple reasons for that, but they were ignored, and the elasticity argument was overplayed. If that happens too many times, people stop listening even to the more reasonable end of the spectrum.

Second, when peaking does occur (ie. as we hit max, not minimum) mankind will face some unprecedented problems. The two most likely exceptions to this (ie. avoidance of problems) would be if we have "peak demand" first (eg. we have a break-through with hydrogen) or if we go on a crash mitigation program as Hirsch and others have advocated.

I don't think a hydrogen breakthrough is coming any time soon. The nature of the element is not promising: there's a lot of it and it's a great fuel, but it's all bonded to something - generally to oxygen - and those bonds take more energy to break than you get from the hydrogen.

I don't like the idea of "crash mitigation" at all. It would require granting government draconian powers, very likely dictatorial powers that would effectively mean using an "emergency" to suspend democratic process. That is a very dangerous thing.

My own feeling is that even if conventional liquid fuels hit a plateau, sustained high prices will make unconventional production more attractive and that will take up some of the slack. Sustained high prices will also slow consumption growth. Point source large users, like power generation and industrial process heating, will be shifting to natural gas, as will some parts of the transport sector (fleet vehicles, sanitation trucks, buses, etc). There may be serious work on better coal technologies, realistically a more likely candidate for a breakthrough than hydrogen.

In sum, I think we're more likely to see a large number of relatively small changes, rather than a sudden tectonic shift in energy use patterns enforced by government fiat. This I think is a good thing.

[Rick M]

re. crying wolf:
It's unfortunate that people are so unfamiliar with the more credible PO analysts. I never met MKH but have heard the presentations of and met 8 of the 12 analysts listed above (#309).
I therefore have every confidence that anyone who troubled themselves to attend an ASPO conference would come away feeling quite impressed with the intelligence, sincerity and reasonableness of the presenters.
They are not interested in predictions of timing nor crying wolf; rather, they present sourced data and trends which the rest of us (and especially our elected officials) would do well to consider.
The sector which seems most attuned to these data & trends is the military, and their concerns should lend additional credibility to this complex issue.

I do not think that they are overplaying 'near peak' arguments or raising excessive alarm. One of the more imminent aspects of PO is export decline, and the leading analyst on that aspect would be Jeffrey Brown, but he is meticulous with his data and presents it as such, without sounding alarmist.

I have also seen arguments that 2008 was the peak, which I regard as foolish. First, all-liquids is now around 89 mbpd which is an all-time high, and a few years will always be insufficient to 'prove/verify' the all-time peak.
Second, people have claimed with certainty that the USA peaked in Dec 1970, and 40 years should be long enough for people to accept that fact.
That said, there are those who believe that thanks to shale oil and oil shale, the USA may eventually surpass the 1970 peak. Personally, I do not think that this is feasible, but I would never deny that it's a possibility, however remote. (So in a sense, we can never be 100% sure.)

re. Hydrogen: I agree.

re. crash mitigation: I agree that this could/would require draconian powers, at least in some aspects. Kunstler (who I regard as being more toward the alarmist/doomer end of the scale) has repeatedly wondered whether our democratic structures/institutions/processes can withstand the pressures which such circumstances could apply, and I share his concern.
The Bundeswehr analysts came pretty close to saying the same thing, warning that public confidence could be shaken not only with regard to financial institutions & the larger economy, but shaken with regard to government itself.

re. conventional liquid fuels: you say, "if they hit a plateau." According to the IEA, they already did a half-decade ago,and I share that view, as does Hirsch and many other credible PO analysts. Seven years is a very long time to be stuck at 74-75 mbpd despite sustained high prices, which is the point that LTC Fleming was trying to reinforce. Conventional oil has been the mainstay of our supply for 150 years, and the prolonged stall in its production ought to be front-page news. But it isn't, no thanks to those who dismiss PO as alarmist doomerism (I would not put you in that category: your disagreements with PO are founded on details which I find legitimate & sensible, even though I may disagree with them, if that makes any sense...).

re. unconventional sources: true, but they have much lower net energy/EROEI. Which reminds me, I should have added Charlie Hall to that list of credible PO analysts: he has done pioneering work on net energy for many years and has mentored a new generation of sharp, insightful analysts like Dave Murphy.

re. small changes from diverse sources: I agree, as would all the ASPO folks (who do not see any magic bullet on the horizon).

[Misifus]

...Look at it from the perspective of a company or nation that produces oil. Rising prices aren't an immediate incentive to go out and toss tens of billions into producing more oil. You like high prices, and your first reaction to high prices, especially after a prolonged and miserable glut, is to leave production where it is and enjoy the good times. You're also keenly aware that the price rise might easily be a transient phenomenon driven by a bubble economy and/or trouble in the middle east, and your instinct is to keep the money in the old oak chest until you're really sure the higher prices are going to last...

Most of your viewpoints are right on target. This includes the one above - almost. No oil company (major, independent, or state-owned) really has the mentality where they will

...leave production where it is and enjoy the good times...

The companies are always under pressure to replace reserves, as the mantra is that "an oil company that does not replace reserves is an oil company that is going out of business." Nevertheless, some companies, like Pemex, are slow to replace reserves because of politics and bureaucracy, but that does not change the mantra.

Also, prospects for new drilling are always under evaluation regardless of current prices or forecasted prices.

[Rick M]

" No oil company (major, independent, or state-owned) really has the mentality where they will
Quote:
...leave production where it is and enjoy the good times..."

What about Saudi Aramco?

[Misifus]

" No oil company (major, independent, or state-owned) really has the mentality where they will
Quote:
...leave production where it is and enjoy the good times..."

What about Saudi Aramco?

What about them?