U.S. Military Is Split on Insurgency Strategy

[SWJED]

13 May Los Angeles Times - U.S. Military Is Split on Insurgency Strategy by Solomon Moore and Peter Spiegel.

... The troops have set up 19 small base camps throughout the area and begun routinely patrolling insurgent hot spots north of the Euphrates River. The deployment follows a strategy favored by a new generation of counterinsurgency experts: disperse, mingle with the population and stay put.

But the shift comes as the Pentagon appears to be moving the overall U.S. military effort in the opposite direction across much of the country. Army units are being concentrated in "super bases" that line the spine of central Iraq, away from the urban centers where counterinsurgency operations take place.

The two approaches underscore an increasingly high-profile divergence — some say contradiction — on how best to use U.S. forces in Iraq, and are evidence of a growing debate in the upper ranks about the wisest course of action.

The contrast also reflects the complicated mix of military goals and concerns as U.S. troops begin their fourth summer in Iraq. Top commanders are eager to begin shrinking the U.S. footprint, an implicit step toward a gradual withdrawal of American forces. At the same time, some field commanders are determined to break an endless cycle that allows insurgents to move back into key areas as soon as U.S. forces move on. That requires large investments of manpower...

[Merv Benson]

This paragraph is in the same story:

But current and former military leaders said it was misleading to attribute the push solely to politics. Central Command officers, including Army Gen. John P. Abizaid, the Centcom commander, have argued that the large presence fosters a "dependency syndrome" within the Iraqi military, which continues to rely on Americans to do the heavy lifting.

...

As I point out in my blog:

This is the nut of the debate over troop levels and explains for better than Cobra II why Abizaid went with the lower troop levels. His approach will work if the Iraqis take up the slack. The approach of the Marines at Qaim is the approach that defeats insurgencies. You have to have the force to space ratio sufficient to stop the enemy from being able to move. The enemy is defeated when he cannot easily move from a sanctuary to an area of operation. Contesting every town denies the sanctuary and cuts off routes of movement. An enemy using a raiding strategy is always most vulnerable while moving. Troops in a big base do little to stop that movement. Until the Iraqis can get out there and do the patroling the Marines and other troops have to do the job.

[DDilegge]

I don't believe comparing the Cobra II criticism of OIF I troop levels with our current COIN operations is fair. After major combat operations were declared over in May 2003 there was no insurgency of note to fight nor was there an Iraqi army or other security services to enforce law and order.

What we had was a huge vacuum (what some call the “Golden Hour”) that needed to be filled by troops providing security and protection of essential services. More U.S. and other coalition forces could have very well provided the same and smoothed the way to a more sane transition of power back to the Iraqis. Of course there were other factors, such as the failure of the CPA to aid the military in bringing “all instruments of national power” to the table and our infatuation with technological solutions and getting it over quickly and getting home soonest.

Whenever there is a vacuum in a society’s power structure someone will fill the void. We did not and are still paying for it.

[Jedburgh]

I don't believe comparing the Cobra II criticism of OIF I troop levels with our current COIN operations is fair. After major combat operations were declared over in May 2003 there was no insurgency of note to fight nor was there an Iraqi army or other security services to enforce law and order.

What we had was a huge vacuum (what some call the “Golden Hour”) that needed to be filled by troops providing security and protection of essential services. More U.S. and other coalition forces could have very well provided the same and smoothed the way to a more sane transition of power back to the Iraqis. Of course there were other factors, such as the failure of the CPA to aid the military in bringing “all instruments of national power” to the table and our infatuation with technological solutions and getting it over quickly and getting home soonest.

Whenever there is a vacuum in a society’s power structure someone will fill the void. We did not and are still paying for it.

Glad you jumped in and made the point. That we were completely unable to exploit that "Golden Hour" in the aftermath of the fall of Saddam led directly to the problems that we face today. The failure to take into account post-combat ops when setting initial troop levels was inexcusable ignorance which was exacerbated by the failure to effectively plan for post-combat ops, period.

As someone who had spent years in Iraq during the '90s with Provide Comfort I & II as well as jaunting about with UNSCOM, the degree of ignorance displayed by senior decision makers in those early days was hard for me to understand - I was just an old MI NCO, and certainly was not the only person who knew better. On the ground in '03, observing first-hand the spiraling descent into chaos that was a direct result of the failure to plan left me with a great deal of bitterness.

[Merv Benson]

Let me be clear. I think it was a mistake not to have enough troops to have an effective force to space ratio to deal with what became the insurgency. My point is and has been that the Centcom commander favored a small foot print that forced the Iraqis to take responsibility. US forces paid a price for this strategy, before the Iraqi forces came on line, by having to buy the same real estate more than once, because they did not have enough troops to take and hold certain areas. My point about [I]Cobra II[I] is that the commander of Centcom has consistently said he did not want additional troops. He was responsible for that decision. He had reasons for that decision beyond the wishes of the Secretary of Defense. The position quoted above is consistent with his earlier statements on force levels. His position is not wholly without merit, but we have had to pay a price for those merits. I would add that he should have done a better job of explaining his rationale for his strategy instead of letting the political leaders take the heat for backing his strategy, because political support for the war has also paid a price.