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Thread: Afghanistan ROE Change

  1. #21
    Council Member Blackjack's Avatar
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    Default Its' find, fix, finish. Not find, fix, flee

    "But if there is a compound they're taking fire from and they can remove themselves from the area safely, without any undue danger to the forces, then that's the option they should take," Smith said. "Because in these compounds we know there are often civilians kept captive by the Taliban."
    For those who have expressed concern over the issue of being all to quick to call in airtrikes for everything, we are in 100% agreement. The idea of containment of an enemy may work at times, situation will dictate. We had CAS on mission at times, but the FAMAS works just as well for what the Legion does. Now maybe the intent was to keep every commander from calling in a JDAM strikes and hellfires every time a mortar tube goes off, but if so that should be covered in a seperate CAS ROE.

    If you can run away from the fight go ahead and do it? Gentlemen, none of us wish to harm any non-combatants, but the top down order to flee from the fight because there may be civilians in the compound, and they may be hostages of the insurgents is not a good plan. Loitering around waiting for them to come out and surrendur may not be all that bright either, you would risk your men to any rienforcements jihad joe could call up. One thign we must ask ourselves here in regards to civilian casualties is this. Were they really civilians, how do we know? If they were hostages and we cannot engage these compounds how can we reasonbly expect to clear, hold, or build anything? Do we really think that the civillian that got held hostage for three days and was tormented by the Taliban will somehow respect us more because we ran away and left him to the mercy of such men?

    ISAF will likely come out of such situations looking like base cowards to the locals in many of these situations. They may see it as westerners making excuses for ISAF forces not to fight the Taliban. Putting myself in the enemy mindset for a moment; I can see already hear the jokes in the villages about Americans putting both SAPI plates in the backs of their IBAs in my mind. I know if I were a Mujahideen Commander I would order video cameras to be present for any long term occupation of civil compounds. That way I could get video of the kuffr running away and turn it into some good propaganda. I could also remind the locals of how when the Mujahideen came, the Americans and ISAF crusaders ran away.

    Find, fix and finish is the simple and effective answer here. Not find, fix and flee. Having said that mouthful above I will say that I have a great deal of respect for the General, and I know I am being unfair to him by bieng so critical when I do not have the burdens of command placed on me any longer. I also know that regardless of the outcome, he has the best intentions in mind here.
    Last edited by Blackjack; 06-23-2009 at 05:19 AM. Reason: Had to add an enemy mindset para.
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  2. #22
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    One of the doctrinal corner stones of Irregular threats is to, physically, conceptually and morally restrict the Regular Armies use of force. We all know this.

    If you think killing civilians is wrong, as an absolute statement, then I can see some are backing themselves into a corner where things are going to get unravelled pretty quickly.
    No one should intend to kill civilians, but rewarding the use of human shields may well come home to rest in ways those advocating it, cannot yet see.
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  3. #23
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    Going to play devil's advocate here -

    Is it always necessary to pursue and finish the fight, usually ending w/ a bomb?

    I was in a firefight once, had insurgents in a house. Wounded one of my guys. Decided to charge in after supression, got one of my guys killed and another wounded. Wound up bombing the house. Killed about half of a family next door too.

    A few weeks later council member Tankersteve was in the same situation about a klick away. He surrounded the house until the insurgent gave up.

    I'll pick his solution. I have seen it often where we resort to firepower when other, less lethal options, would do.

    I'm not saying it's good for every case, but often our firepower has replaced the use of good tactics and innovative thinking to solve problems. As FM 3-24 says, "sometimes the best action is to do nothing". Keyword "sometimes".

    Another way to think about it - should the cops level your house because criminals take refuge in it?

    Just feeling contrary tonight.
    I am with you Devil

    Tony doing something about fires taken from a village does not mean you need to bomb the village or ignore it.

    Ken, I will disagree with you on this one. This has been overdue and we have been dancing with the effects for several years now.

    Blackjack putting it in terms of running away from the fight is throwing an emotional issue in on top of an already complicated tactical fight. That you cannot prove they are civilians does not make them targets.

    Wilf, again I will finish my disagreement here with the simple statement that civilians in a counterinsurgency fight are friendly meaning that civilian casualties are friendly casualties.

    Tom

  4. #24
    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by IntelTrooper View Post
    Definitely not. And someone needs to tell some ODA teams that is the case. You're absolutely right -- just because you can, doesn't mean you should. I do have some trouble with being told that if someone pops up over the wall of a qalat and shoots an RPG at me, that I'm supposed to just shrug and leave. Maybe I'm reading the guidance wrong, but I'm fairly certain that a lot of more risk-averse commanders will understand it that way.
    I think we generally tend to over-interpret guidance in the US Army, people take all orders to extremes not intended.

    I think you are reading it a little wrong, and yes, 10pct will always read it wrong. I think the good general is trying not to use the hammer on all problems that kinda look like nails, and place the thought that occasionally there are other options.

    A story was related to me from A-Stan that kind of illustrates his point. A unit chased insurgents into a village and engaged in a sustained firefight. Instead of assaulting the village, the commander emplaced LP/OPs in overwatch, and withdrew his forces, with a QRF in hiding. That night when the insurgents tried to sneak out of the village they were ambushed and killed. All done without bombing a village that hands the enemy an IO tool. Won't work in every situation (damn METT-TC again), but the commander wisely determined an alternate, less violent way to resolve the problem.

    I think that's what he's getting at. It's up to GEN McCrystal to clarify his intent to the lowest level. I am positive he is not intending to take away a soldiers' right to self defense.

    Thanks for sharing that. A lot to think about, for sure.
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  5. #25
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom View Post
    Wilf, again I will finish my disagreement here with the simple statement that civilians in a counterinsurgency fight are friendly meaning that civilian casualties are friendly casualties.
    Like I said, you should not intentionally kill civilians. I absolutely agree with the theory, but who is a civilian? War and conflict is not the realm of absolute truths or absolute solutions.

    Soldiers causing friendly fire casualties are subject to Military justice. Will that happen in A'Stan and Iraq, when civilians die?
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  6. #26
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Soldiers causing friendly fire casualties are subject to Military justice. Will that happen in A'Stan and Iraq, when civilians die?
    Yes depending on circumstances as in ROE and that is nothing new.

  7. #27
    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom View Post
    Yes depending on circumstances as in ROE and that is nothing new.
    Right.

    In Iraq 2007 (and I am sure in A-Stan and Iraq 2009), questionable deaths of civilians or potential law of armed conflict violations required a 15-6 investigation (commander's inquiry). Usually these inquiries existed to clear any questions of wrongdoing, rather than to prosecute soldiers. Rarely has anyone been brought to trial or reprimanded. However, the process does serve as a "check" on tendencies to be less than discriminating.

    That said, I was in a unit where one of our company commanders received a bad conduct discharge for a LOAC violation in 2004.
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  8. #28
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom View Post
    Yes depending on circumstances as in ROE and that is nothing new.
    I understand ROE and consider them vital instruments, sensibly applied. ROE have to exist in terms of specific guidance. That means you must be able prosecute folks who violate that guidance. Violation of ROE in Northern Ireland, meant murder investigations and UK soldiers being convicted, and placed in prison.

    I don't see the same process as being applicable in the circumstances currently prevailing on A'Stan or Iraq, but I may be wrong. Time will tell.

    Would violation of ROE be deemed a war crime? Should it be investigated by the UN?
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  9. #29
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    No one should intend to kill civilians, but rewarding the use of human shields may well come home to rest in ways those advocating it, cannot yet see.
    That's a very difficult problem set Wilf, and so I wonder...how would you deal with a human shield situation? Are you thinking along the lines that the Gen's apparent policy rewards those who would use human shields? If so, just how do you see it rewarding them?

    Let's just say for the sake of argument that you made contact with X insurgent force, which fled into a compound/village that you knew had unarmed civilians inside (and they had not previously demonstrated sympathy towards insurgents).

    I know this is a simplistic view to certainly a difficult issue that is indeed METT-TS&L...and C, and P dependent, but what would you do? Do you have issue with the policy as it seems to be portrayed here, or is it an issue with a policy of measured restraint when civilians are involved and could factor into collateral damage? I ask because I do not want to presume to know, and your responses are unclear in that regard.

    I agree with other posters that risk-averse commanders could employ this intent the wrong way. At the same time, perhaps more careful deliberation of the problem set is due in many circumstance we face over there. I dunno, but I'll be finding out in my very next deploy.
    Last edited by jcustis; 06-24-2009 at 03:01 AM.

  10. #30
    Council Member Blackjack's Avatar
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    Blackjack putting it in terms of running away from the fight is throwing an emotional issue in on top of an already complicated tactical fight. That you cannot prove they are civilians does not make them targets.
    I agree with you on the fact that just because they cannot be proven as civilians means they are targets part Tom. If commanders become too CoA and risk adverse it has the very real potential to become find, fix, flee. Absolutely nothing emotional about that. Just another possibility.

    A story was related to me from A-Stan that kind of illustrates his point. A unit chased insurgents into a village and engaged in a sustained firefight. Instead of assaulting the village, the commander emplaced LP/OPs in overwatch, and withdrew his forces, with a QRF in hiding. That night when the insurgents tried to sneak out of the village they were ambushed and killed. All done without bombing a village that hands the enemy an IO tool. Won't work in every situation (damn METT-TC again), but the commander wisely determined an alternate, less violent way to resolve the problem.
    That is a really great point Cavguy. Patiance, cunning, and flexibility and while it will not work in every situation, it shows people another way of getitng the same task accomplished. What I am concerned about is turning compounds into hostage negotiation sites, or setting up a patrol for an ambush as they try to wait out the insurgents who are callign in their buddies. As you said, damned METT-TC.

    I also wished to point out that I am in agreement with you fully in regards to air power, and its uses and abuses in sector.
    See things through the eyes of your enemy and you can defeat him.

  11. #31
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    Default Little guardian lawyer angels ...

    Well, we went pretty quick from a change in the ROEs to prosecuting officers for war crimes - ready, shoot, aim.

    Suppose every soldier had a little guardian lawyer angel (let's call him JMM), who will whisper the best legal advice (angel JMM doesn't whisper military advice). Angel JMM might whisper something like this. Niel Smith and Tom Odom, two officers that JMM happens to highly respect, accept the new ROEs; and believe that, if civilians (defined as friendlies) are killed, you my soldier ward could (not necessarily will) be prosecuted for war crimes. So, I'm telling you, scoot & don't shoot. You won't be prosecuted, none of your men will be killed (at least not here), and no civilians will be killed (at least by you).

    QED (any lawyer angel who advised otherwise should be given a spaded tail & exiled).

    Here is another legal opinion on the same topic. Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF, Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts (2001; he rose in the world since):

    (p.5)
    As Reisman and Antoniou indicate, the mere perception of LOAC violations can significantly impact operations. The Gulf War provides two examples of situations where LOAC was not violated yet the perception that it may have been had clear military consequences. The first concerned the attack on the Al Firdos bunker in Baghdad that was believed by the allies to be a command and control node. Some experts concluded that the post-attack pictures of the bodies of family members of high Iraqi officials (who evidently used the bunker as a bomb shelter) being excavated from the wreckage achieved politically what the Iraqi air defenses could not do militarily: rendering downtown Baghdad immune from attack.[22]

    Worried coalition leaders put the city virtually off-limits to avoid a repetition of like scenes reaching their peoples. Similarly, fears about the impact on coalition constituencies of the images of hundreds of burnt out vehicles along the so-called “Highway of Death” following an air attack on retreating Iraqi forces was a significant factor in the early termination of hostilities.[23] That result left the Republican Guard intact to slaughter Kurds and to help keep Saddam Hussein in power to this day.

    22 See Michael Gordon and Bernard E, Trainor, The Generals’ War (1995), at 324-326.

    23 Id., at 476-477. See also Colin Powell, My American Journey (Random House, 1995), at 520 (“The television coverage… was starting to make it look as if we were engaged in slaughter for slaughter’s sake.”).
    This is a short 27 page article, worth reading in full by everyone.

    End legal advice by little guardian lawyer angel.

    No smiles or other icons - this is a difficult topic (as another officer I respect just posted - hi, jcustis).
    Last edited by jmm99; 06-23-2009 at 07:24 AM.

  12. #32
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    That's a very difficult set Wilf, and so I wonder...how would you deal with a human shield situation? Are you thinking along the lines that the Gen's apparent policy rewards those who would use human shields? If so, just how do you see it rewarding them?
    I'm referring to general circumstances and not specific ones. It's not my place to critique the General from afar, however it is legitimate and necessary to consider the implication of the problem as he allegedly sees it.

    I see the issue as being one of commitment to the mission. If insurgents feel that they gain from operating within an environment where the presence of civilians protects them, then you are being suppressed, not them. 99% of civilians live in structures of some kind. That reality needs to be applied to operations.

    Let's just say for the sake of argument that you made contact with X insurgent force, which fled into a compound/village that you knew had unarmed civilians inside (and they had not previously demonstrated sympathy towards insurgents).
    No brainier. Surround the compound, and wait it out. Send word into the compound and be prepared to clear each space or dwelling with the appropriate amount of force required to ensure the bad guys get killed or captured, but no civilians are harmed - regardless if they supported the insurgents or not - which is another can of worms.

    If I had been GOC A'Stan there would have been a blanket ban on using aircraft or artillery to engage anyone in any structure, for the last 5 years - unless there was a severe risk to the unit concerned. That rule would have been reviewed on a weekly basis. I'd also have different ROE for different areas. - BUT ROE works both ways. Wait for the day that when the Post or the Times runs a story about the 7 soldiers who died obeying ROE, to the letter, and got over run and killed. ROE are political, not ethical. Not killing civilians is only relevant in how it applies to the political part of the conflict, and I specifically include their politics as well as ours.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  13. #33
    Council Member Blackjack's Avatar
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    A side topic here, but it has to do with the situation. What about flashbangs? LEOs use them to clear rooms in buildings so what can't the army? I know they would not be so great in an open courtyard, etc. In certian situations where waiting them out may not be a wise option flashbangs followed by a close assault could be used.
    See things through the eyes of your enemy and you can defeat him.

  14. #34
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Blackjack View Post
    A side topic here, but it has to do with the situation. What about flashbangs? LEOs use them to clear rooms in buildings so what can't the army?
    I'm pretty sure that the UK is currently using something along those lines, but I'm not entirely sure. Having seen the NICO types, used in training, and on demonstrations by Police Firearms teams, I was not that impressed. More obviously I would be advocating the use of CS gas, or something similar, but it's use is banned by NATO, as a chemical weapon.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  15. #35
    Council Member Anthony Hoh's Avatar
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    Default Sometimes and always

    Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom View Post

    Tony doing something about fires taken from a village does not mean you need to bomb the village or ignore it.

    Tom
    You know me, I am not an advocate of bombing what I can shoot. Of course there is merit in waiting things out, or an even handed approach. But the way this ROE change reads (from the little we know of it) when unsure of who else may be injured...flee. IMO that is too far.

    You do not need to have a masters in Arab culture to see the implications of this. If you think the Taliban are having a I/O field day now, wait until we pull pitch whenever the shooting starts during unplanned meeting engagements.

    I am not gonna break out my been there got the T-shirt drawer with you. Because quite frankly I'd lose. But let me give you another counter point to consider from an Advisors perspective.

    Story Time...
    No S there I was my teams 2 UAH's, and the host MiTT 2 MRAP's, all PPE'd up getting ready to roll out of the gate with our Infantry Kandak to clear the Khwost Gardez pass. MEDEVAC aircraft were in black due to weather we did not roll but the ANA did, without heavily armored vehicles, body armor, fires, etc it hurt our credibility for the rest of the operation, we came out a day later. Sometimes our default to force protection and casualty aversion hurt our overall relationships.

    I don’t feel this ROE change will do a whole lot in the credibility/ go protect the populace department, it has the potential to stifle the limited support we get from the populace now for when we do take action. In the micro scale I respect that one Kandak Commanders relationship with his US advisor does not really have strategic impact, but I think we can both agree that these relationship’s are important. There is a reason the ANA want US advisors and not (with all do respect to the foreign memebers of SWJ) French, German, etc… we are not (currently) harangued by our legislature/ civilian leadership with these ridiculous war time caveats. Could the Allies cross the Rhine and take Berlin under these conditions? ( I know you are gonna crucify me for that last sentence but I had to put it in there.)

    Tony

  16. #36
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    No S there I was my teams 2 UAH's, and the host MiTT 2 MRAP's, all PPE'd up getting ready to roll out of the gate with our Infantry Kandak to clear the Khwost Gardez pass. MEDEVAC aircraft were in black due to weather we did not roll but the ANA did, without heavily armored vehicles, body armor, fires, etc it hurt our credibility for the rest of the operation, we came out a day later. Sometimes our default to force protection and casualty aversion hurt our overall relationships.
    No doubt it did, But the story is oranges (force protection) to apples (use of fires). In fact the change in ROE is in many ways an acceptance of greater risk.

    Again I don't think the ROE change is a change to "flee" or retreat or hide or any other judgement-laden term. It is a change to think hard and adjust accordingly. I also don't see where it will call for withdrawal in unplanned meeting engagements.

    When you can show me the Rhine River in Afghanistan I'll tell you whether we can take Berlin.

    Best
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  17. #37
    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Rather than speculate about "running away" and what the new ISAF CG might have said, let's look at what he actually said.

    http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/wo...trikes.html?hp

    Quote Originally Posted by General McChrystal
    “Air power contains the seeds of our own destruction if we do not use it responsibly,” General McChrystal told a group of his senior officers during a video conference last week. “We can lose this fight.”

    “When we shoot into a compound, that should only be for the protection of our forces,” he said. “I want everyone to understand that.”

    ...

    Under the rules that General McChrystal outlined, those strikes would almost certainly be prohibited. They would be prohibited, the general said, even if it meant letting some Taliban get away.

    Referring to airstrikes, General McChrystal said, “If it is just to defeat the enemy, then we are not going to do it, even if it means we are going to step away from that firefight and fight another time.”
    Or from his confirmation testimony:

    http://washingtonindependent.com/453...fghanistan-war

    he repeatedly emphasized how his approach in Afghanistan would be guided by “classic counterinsurgency” precepts, such as protecting the population from insurgent assaults, rather than focusing primarily on killing and capturing insurgents. A “military-centric” strategy would not succeed, he told senators, and pledged to review “all” standard practices and rules of engagement to minimize civilian casualties, which have outraged Afghans and jeopardized the United States’ relationship with the Karzai government. Losing the support of the Afghan population would be “strategically decisive,” McChrystal said, meaning the war would be lost, and said he believed that adverse perceptions of the U.S. caused by civilian casualties is “one of the most dangerous enemies we face” in Afghanistan. Success will ultimately be measured by “the number of Afghans shielded from violence.”
    Seems to me he's trying to fight on our terms, not the enemy's, and stop playing into their hands with tactical victories but losses in the bigger fight.
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    Thanks for being contrarian Cavguy and for the additional info.

    It sounds like he thinks we have been too enemy-centric and aggressive in going after the enemy in Afghanistan without paying enough attention to the wider effects of our actions. It sounds a lot more reasonable than it did to me at first. I guess my only question is, who is the decider? Who will have the authority to determine a strike is necessary to protect our force?

  19. #39
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    Going to play devil's advocate here -

    Is it always necessary to pursue and finish the fight, usually ending w/ a bomb?

    I was in a firefight once, had insurgents in a house. Wounded one of my guys. Decided to charge in after supression, got one of my guys killed and another wounded. Wound up bombing the house. Killed about half of a family next door too.

    A few weeks later council member Tankersteve was in the same situation about a klick away. He surrounded the house until the insurgent gave up.

    I'll pick his solution. I have seen it often where we resort to firepower when other, less lethal options, would do.

    I'm not saying it's good for every case, but often our firepower has replaced the use of good tactics and innovative thinking to solve problems. As FM 3-24 says, "sometimes the best action is to do nothing". Keyword "sometimes".

    Another way to think about it - should the cops level your house because criminals take refuge in it?

    Just feeling contrary tonight.

    Like I keep saying the most important TTP's for COIN are how LE handles situations.

    Good Example from above. 1st your surround them and tell them to surrender just like TV, then gas them LE can do this but LOAC forbids this....dum.... change the law,then flashbang dynamic entry as a last resort. And you always have the option of a Tactical withdrawal. Often with better Intelligence about how to do something at another time and place for a better result.

    But our Forces are not trained that way or equipped that way or have enough manpower to do this if they were trained and equipped to do this.

    Good LE organizations are trained to be assertive NOT aggressive and they are trained to DE-escalate not Escalate. Soldiers are not generally trained that way.

    We need a 5 pound grenade that can be dropped from 30,000 feet and hit just where we want it to.

  20. #40
    Council Member J Wolfsberger's Avatar
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    Default I have aquestion.

    Along the lines Tom Odom and Cavguy have been following. The "terrain" of interest, where we win or lose, is the civilian population. The tactic of choice for AQ and the Taliban in this conflict is terror.

    Does AQ/Taliban care whether they kill civilians or get us to do it for them? In fact, given the choice, wouldn't they deliberately structure the situation to force us to kill civilians?
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