"The status quo is not sustainable. All of DoD needs to be placed in a large bag and thoroughly shaken. Bureaucracy and micromanagement kill."
-- Ken White
"With a plan this complex, nothing can go wrong." -- Schmedlap
"We are unlikely to usefully replicate the insights those unencumbered by a military staff college education might actually have." -- William F. Owen
CERP funds again? You Spooks and your nets...
From my very first operational experience the one consistent theme for our ROE is the inherent right to self defense. That ROE fundamental even applies in peacetime operations. If the reporting is accurate on this, then this ROE change fundamentally alters that and takes away the inherent right of self defense in combat situations that are relatively common in Afghanistan.
The second issue I have with this is that an ROE change is a needlessly draconian, top-down solution to the problem. Why can't the commanding General provide detailed Commander's intent and guidance that subordinates can apply as the situation dictates? Changing the ROE seems to me to show a lack of confidence in the ability of subordinate Commanders to properly follow and interpret the Commander's intent.
That's exactly what it is. The obvious problem is that with the "commanders discretion" guidance we are still making a royal mess of things. Not saying it's the best solution, but may be necessary to get the commander's intent across.
I'm not comfortable with it easier, but much of what I hear/read is that we (ISAF) are very quick to call an airstrike to resolve what could be taken care of by other, less destructive, means that don't hand an IO victory to the enemy.
"The status quo is not sustainable. All of DoD needs to be placed in a large bag and thoroughly shaken. Bureaucracy and micromanagement kill."
-- Ken White
"With a plan this complex, nothing can go wrong." -- Schmedlap
"We are unlikely to usefully replicate the insights those unencumbered by a military staff college education might actually have." -- William F. Owen
I am reminded of Schmedlap’s post a little while ago on another thread where he said that they got more recognition (Iraq) from the locals once they started making more noise with increased (careful) use of HE etc. This created a perception among the locals that they were doing their jobs!
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
Going to play devil's advocate here -
Is it always necessary to pursue and finish the fight, usually ending w/ a bomb?
I was in a firefight once, had insurgents in a house. Wounded one of my guys. Decided to charge in after supression, got one of my guys killed and another wounded. Wound up bombing the house. Killed about half of a family next door too.
A few weeks later council member Tankersteve was in the same situation about a klick away. He surrounded the house until the insurgent gave up.
I'll pick his solution. I have seen it often where we resort to firepower when other, less lethal options, would do.
I'm not saying it's good for every case, but often our firepower has replaced the use of good tactics and innovative thinking to solve problems. As FM 3-24 says, "sometimes the best action is to do nothing". Keyword "sometimes".
Another way to think about it - should the cops level your house because criminals take refuge in it?
Just feeling contrary tonight.
Definitely not. And someone needs to tell some ODA teams that is the case. You're absolutely right -- just because you can, doesn't mean you should. I do have some trouble with being told that if someone pops up over the wall of a qalat and shoots an RPG at me, that I'm supposed to just shrug and leave. Maybe I'm reading the guidance wrong, but I'm fairly certain that a lot of more risk-averse commanders will understand it that way.
Thanks for sharing that. A lot to think about, for sure.I was in a firefight once, had insurgents in a house. Wounded one of my guys. Decided to charge in after supression, got one of my guys killed and another wounded. Wound up bombing the house. Killed about half of a family next door too.
A few weeks later council member Tankersteve was in the same situation about a klick away. He surrounded the house until the insurgent gave up.
"The status quo is not sustainable. All of DoD needs to be placed in a large bag and thoroughly shaken. Bureaucracy and micromanagement kill."
-- Ken White
"With a plan this complex, nothing can go wrong." -- Schmedlap
"We are unlikely to usefully replicate the insights those unencumbered by a military staff college education might actually have." -- William F. Owen
One of the doctrinal corner stones of Irregular threats is to, physically, conceptually and morally restrict the Regular Armies use of force. We all know this.
If you think killing civilians is wrong, as an absolute statement, then I can see some are backing themselves into a corner where things are going to get unravelled pretty quickly.
No one should intend to kill civilians, but rewarding the use of human shields may well come home to rest in ways those advocating it, cannot yet see.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I think we generally tend to over-interpret guidance in the US Army, people take all orders to extremes not intended.
I think you are reading it a little wrong, and yes, 10pct will always read it wrong. I think the good general is trying not to use the hammer on all problems that kinda look like nails, and place the thought that occasionally there are other options.
A story was related to me from A-Stan that kind of illustrates his point. A unit chased insurgents into a village and engaged in a sustained firefight. Instead of assaulting the village, the commander emplaced LP/OPs in overwatch, and withdrew his forces, with a QRF in hiding. That night when the insurgents tried to sneak out of the village they were ambushed and killed. All done without bombing a village that hands the enemy an IO tool. Won't work in every situation (damn METT-TC again), but the commander wisely determined an alternate, less violent way to resolve the problem.
I think that's what he's getting at. It's up to GEN McCrystal to clarify his intent to the lowest level. I am positive he is not intending to take away a soldiers' right to self defense.
Experience is something you get after you need it.Thanks for sharing that. A lot to think about, for sure.
I am with you Devil
Tony doing something about fires taken from a village does not mean you need to bomb the village or ignore it.
Ken, I will disagree with you on this one. This has been overdue and we have been dancing with the effects for several years now.
Blackjack putting it in terms of running away from the fight is throwing an emotional issue in on top of an already complicated tactical fight. That you cannot prove they are civilians does not make them targets.
Wilf, again I will finish my disagreement here with the simple statement that civilians in a counterinsurgency fight are friendly meaning that civilian casualties are friendly casualties.
Tom
Like I said, you should not intentionally kill civilians. I absolutely agree with the theory, but who is a civilian? War and conflict is not the realm of absolute truths or absolute solutions.
Soldiers causing friendly fire casualties are subject to Military justice. Will that happen in A'Stan and Iraq, when civilians die?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
You know me, I am not an advocate of bombing what I can shoot. Of course there is merit in waiting things out, or an even handed approach. But the way this ROE change reads (from the little we know of it) when unsure of who else may be injured...flee. IMO that is too far.
You do not need to have a masters in Arab culture to see the implications of this. If you think the Taliban are having a I/O field day now, wait until we pull pitch whenever the shooting starts during unplanned meeting engagements.
I am not gonna break out my been there got the T-shirt drawer with you. Because quite frankly I'd lose. But let me give you another counter point to consider from an Advisors perspective.
Story Time...
No S there I was my teams 2 UAH's, and the host MiTT 2 MRAP's, all PPE'd up getting ready to roll out of the gate with our Infantry Kandak to clear the Khwost Gardez pass. MEDEVAC aircraft were in black due to weather we did not roll but the ANA did, without heavily armored vehicles, body armor, fires, etc it hurt our credibility for the rest of the operation, we came out a day later. Sometimes our default to force protection and casualty aversion hurt our overall relationships.
I don’t feel this ROE change will do a whole lot in the credibility/ go protect the populace department, it has the potential to stifle the limited support we get from the populace now for when we do take action. In the micro scale I respect that one Kandak Commanders relationship with his US advisor does not really have strategic impact, but I think we can both agree that these relationship’s are important. There is a reason the ANA want US advisors and not (with all do respect to the foreign memebers of SWJ) French, German, etc… we are not (currently) harangued by our legislature/ civilian leadership with these ridiculous war time caveats. Could the Allies cross the Rhine and take Berlin under these conditions? ( I know you are gonna crucify me for that last sentence but I had to put it in there.)
Tony
Like I keep saying the most important TTP's for COIN are how LE handles situations.
Good Example from above. 1st your surround them and tell them to surrender just like TV, then gas them LE can do this but LOAC forbids this....dum.... change the law,then flashbang dynamic entry as a last resort. And you always have the option of a Tactical withdrawal. Often with better Intelligence about how to do something at another time and place for a better result.
But our Forces are not trained that way or equipped that way or have enough manpower to do this if they were trained and equipped to do this.
Good LE organizations are trained to be assertive NOT aggressive and they are trained to DE-escalate not Escalate. Soldiers are not generally trained that way.
We need a 5 pound grenade that can be dropped from 30,000 feet and hit just where we want it to.
Along the lines Tom Odom and Cavguy have been following. The "terrain" of interest, where we win or lose, is the civilian population. The tactic of choice for AQ and the Taliban in this conflict is terror.
Does AQ/Taliban care whether they kill civilians or get us to do it for them? In fact, given the choice, wouldn't they deliberately structure the situation to force us to kill civilians?
John Wolfsberger, Jr.
An unruffled person with some useful skills.
Cavguy, I think we share the same ideas on the use of airpower, or more appropriatly not using it. I recall sitting in Corsica and hearing abut the PPCLI getting lit up by two F-16s while on a training range and it made my stomach turn. The same can be said for everytime I hear the words 'airstrike' 'Afghanistan' and 'civilian casualties'. The use of airpower as it has been used in Afghanistan should come to a swift end. Air power should be treated like the W-88 warhead of COIN. Use only as an absolute last resort because the fallout is usually never worth the effects on target.
See things through the eyes of your enemy and you can defeat him.
Has anybody made a GPS guided 120mm mortar shell yet? That would be about the same and you could mount it on almost anything.
Echo what Slap says, just keep pumping gas in there and wait. Is there any way to get around prohibitions on that? If local police were present could they do it?
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
that would require this open-source ROE (positing that the article is accurate ?) - and I am stumped.
Possibly it is an application of Additional Protocals I and II (the best and highest use of Lawfare against the US, so far), which in general shift the burden of civilian protection from the defending force to the attacking force - even though the defending force is hiding amidst the civilians.[*]
On the other hand, it could be a pure and simple political move - or some misguided view of COIN. If fully implemented, this rule would logically result in giving up built-up areas.
But, the article says:
So, we remove troops from the boondocks (where they can shoot) to built-up areas (where they can't) ? None of this hangs together.Smith said McChrystal will address in the coming months how U.S. and NATO forces are deployed around the country, and forces could be withdrawn from remote regions in order to concentrate troops around population centers.
The Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict, which announced support for the rule, has a Wiki and official webpage. See its "change the rules" page.
Placing the burden on the warring parties is cute - where the AQ-Taliban are not complying with the laws of war as they now exist. So, the burden (as with AP I & II) will only fall on those nations who will follow the rules (no matter how stupid they be).
Looks like a lawfare example to this old buzzard. Maybe some of you younger, more sophisticated folks can talk me down.
---------------------------
[*] AP I & II are not accepted by the US (or by either Astan or Pstan, for that matter). They are accepted by most NATO countries.
Could be conjecture; could be a ploy, could be a misstatement of intent (accidental or deliberate). We'll have to wait and see...
Every new Boss is good for three or four wild rumors.
...the WSJ reports U.S. Revisits Afghan Battle Rules by Yochi J. Dreazan
WASHINGTON -- The new U.S. commander in Afghanistan is finalizing a far-reaching change in tactics that will generally require U.S. troops taking fire in populated areas to break contact rather than risk civilian casualties, military officials said.
Exceptions will be made when the lives of U.S. and allied personnel are in danger.The rules make clear exceptions for situations where the lives of U.S., North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Afghan personnel are in danger, U.S. officials said. The guidelines allow U.S. personnel to call in airstrikes or use powerful weaponry if they fear being overrun, can't leave the area safely, or need to evacuate wounded colleagues.For much, but not all of what we are called upon to do, I am with Cavguy...Gen. McChrystal, who arrived in Afghanistan last week, is "trying to make it as clear as possible that risking civilian lives for the sole goal of killing the enemy is not acceptable," said his spokesman, Rear Adm. Gregory Smith.
I have looked for civilian casualties & property damages on the heals of operations with my CA-bubba team. I have also done the life/limb/eyesight coordination/escort for those caught in the middle. My take is that its our guys first & always, certainly, but we also need to play smart when we can. Why add avoidable friction to our operations when many times its a variable that's under our control?
War is messy and alot of #### happens...we all know & accept the risks so try not to beat yourself up...we can't go back and fix things but inshallah we can go forward and apply what we have learned. 1LT Joshua Hurley, RIP.
Last edited by Surferbeetle; 06-23-2009 at 04:50 AM.
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