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Thread: Afghanistan ROE Change

  1. #161
    Council Member tequila's Avatar
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    Yep, we went because we were attacked. Initial plan was to go in, run off the Talibs and then leave. For various reasons, not all readily apparent, we changed the game and decided to stay. Mistake in my view but they didn't ask me. Not only did we decide to stay, we told the Afghans -- and the world -- that we would. In my view, we didn't have to stay but we said we would and so now we have to.
    This strategic argument has always intrigued me. After we toppled the Taliban and al-Qaeda and chased them into Pakistan, should we have simply pulled all troops out of Afghanistan and allowed it to collapse back into chaos? What could we have done to ensure that neither returned to power? I think the course of action from 2002-2006 showed that "paying off the warlords", everyone's favorite do-nothing technique, wasn't going to work.

  2. #162
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Better question -- which Bacevich would approve --

    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
    This strategic argument has always intrigued me. After we toppled the Taliban and al-Qaeda and chased them into Pakistan, should we have simply pulled all troops out of Afghanistan and allowed it to collapse back into chaos?
    is should we have gone into Afghanistan the way we did. Might it have been better just to reduce every AQ hangout in the country to less than rubble -- we knew where they were and pretty much who was in them. Unfortunately, despite the errors of the Carter, Reagan, Bush 41 and Clinton administrations, despite the flaws identified in Eagle Claw, we had deliberately NOT developed a strategic raid capabiltiy for several reasons. Thus, to remove the AQ elements in Afghanistan, we had to use the capability we did have and as should have been expected when cranking up systems that hadn't been used for ten years or so with the concomitant skill decay; we screwed things up a bit.
    What could we have done to ensure that neither returned to power?
    Nothing then and most likely nothing now. Afghanistan is Afghanistan. It is not going to turn into the Costa Rica of South Asia. we can leave it better than we found it but we will never stay long enough to 'fix' it. Nor should we, not our job.
    I think the course of action from 2002-2006 showed that "paying off the warlords", everyone's favorite do-nothing technique, wasn't going to work.
    True and we knew that but given the resourcing and the flawed 'strategy,' the guys on the ground had little choice. They did the best they could with what they had.

    The sensible thing would've been to severely clobber AQ in Afghanistan, bribe the Taliban to keep 'em out and not go to Iraq until we left there and were in Bush 43s second term. However, we needed to do something in the ME -- Afghanistan is not in the ME and the effect was not the same -- as all the hate and discontent came from there; Iraq was the spot; unpopular Dictator, geographically central, no major disruption of world oil supply. so the strategy was okay, the location was good -- but the timing was bad. The Army screwing the operation up didn't help. Iraq may still work out okay. We'll see in about five or ten years. Afghanistan will also probably be okay but little changed from its normative state which should be perfectly acceptable but is certainly not in accord with western values.

    The fact that it is not a western state seems to befuddle many...

    I think Bush knew that if he did not do Iraq or something like it, his successor probably would not and he thought it needed to be done. I agree with that, just wish he'd waited. Also wish the Army and Marines had done the post June 2003 stuff a little better. It would've also have helped had there been no Paul Bremer

    Don't put too much stock in Bacevich -- he's a smart guy but neither he nor I have all the answers. Nobody has 'em. Bacevich does have an agenda, though, which is fine and his right but sometimes those folks with agendas can't see the forest. Sometimes their shattered dreams from earlier wars drive their thoughts on all wars. Often wrongly...

  3. #163
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    Default Purple Kool Aid and warm chunky goats milk...

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    We're not going to change 3,000 years of Afghan history and culture. Never were going to be able to do that.
    Too true; not Costa Rica, nor "...a Scandinavian Democracy.", nor anything close to a 'western' construct.

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    If one has swallowed the Kool Aid and believes the rather foolish rhetoric that population centric stuff matters, then one could hope for that. Big fly in that pie is that we do not have enough troops, NATO, US, Afghan (Police and Army) to do that. It would take five to ten times the now available strength to do it that way and neither we, NATO or the Afghans (or anyone else) are likely to come up with gold or the people. Plus we Americans just do not do that stuff well -- impatience again, plus the tour syndrome and the domestic political turmoil every two years. Not our bag.
    So then, I agree with you on what the warm chunky goats milk of inadequate force ratios and unrealistic political schedules could to do to us

    ....and as a result I am eyeballing that damn population centric purple kool-aid...

    Realworld applications-wise, upping the total force ratios/total mass (our side + % of population) by focusing upon population issues is possible and doable. We did it in Mosul for a while and we have done it in other locations (Japan & Germany, different sized delta yes but there were/still are appreciable cultural differences). The western clock we like to time ourselves on however may be the 'special' ingredient in the purple kool aid that we have to watch for. Reading about Mr McNamara in today's WSJ was pretty sobering.

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    So we go to Plan B. Clear, then dazzle with footwork and get the crowd behind the Goal to wave their pom poms or whatever while building roads and schools and giving the max number of troublemakers an opportunity to repent and be productive Pomegranate growers. We can get there. Just makes it more difficult and more likely to provide a temporary 'OK' solution rather than a long term good one. Tough world out there, people don't play fair...
    Schools/madrassa's are specialized high end type work that require sustained cash flows and networks, instead simple gpf water & ag projects might be playing more to our strengths....ring road status...

    Steve the Planner was saying the other day the Afghanistan once exported ag products and I have read that Kabul U's ag program was supposed to have been pretty strong...where you around/aware when/if that occurred?

    Finally, I note that we have transitioned from relying on only our boxing skills and are adapting …it's slow going sometimes but somebody wise told me that the kids always come through…
    Last edited by Surferbeetle; 07-07-2009 at 07:03 AM.
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  4. #164
    Council Member tequila's Avatar
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    The sensible thing would've been to severely clobber AQ in Afghanistan, bribe the Taliban to keep 'em out and not go to Iraq until we left there and were in Bush 43s second term.
    What evidence in the history of the Taliban suggests they could simply be "bribed" to remove themselves from power?

    Afghan history is not exactly a unitary repetition of events over 3,000 years, despite what Steven Pressfield would like to think. Among other things, there was the introduction of Islam and the replacement of most of the ethnic population.

    The Taliban itself represents something new in Afghan history - a nontribal movement taking its inspiration purely from a religious and foreign base, the twin pillars of Deobandi extremist faith mixed with Pakistani backing, that managed to establish a firm central government over nearly the entire country.

  5. #165
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
    ....that managed to establish a firm central government over nearly the entire country.
    Regardless of what most Afghans wanted? If so, it makes a mockery of the POP-Coin approach.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
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  6. #166
    Council Member tequila's Avatar
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    Regardless of what most Afghans wanted? If so, it makes a mockery of the POP-Coin approach.
    Does POP-COIN require popularity? I thought it was mostly about providing a monopoly of force and then security and stability to the population when faced with an insurgent enemy. The Taliban did so in the east and the south of Afghanistan, which were rife with banditry and warlord gangs. During its drives to the west and the north, it did not face insurgents but rather armies like its own in the forces of Massoud and Hekmatyar, which it defeated in the Afghan version of conventional combat with artillery, tanks, and aircraft, not a COIN campaign.

  7. #167
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
    Does POP-COIN require popularity? I thought it was mostly about providing a monopoly of force and then security and stability to the population when faced with an insurgent enemy.
    Well my understanding of the focus on the population, as opposed to the threat is that you are seeking the popular legitimacy, as being your primary enabler to exercise the actions of the government. People talk about not "out fighting" but "out governing."

    In Sierra Leone, if you supported the Government, the insurgents just came and killed you. Same in Algeria. Same in Cambodia.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  8. #168
    Council Member tequila's Avatar
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    Well my understanding of the focus on the population, as opposed to the threat is that you are seeking the popular legitimacy, as being your primary enabler to exercise the actions of the government. People talk about not "out fighting" but "out governing."

    In Sierra Leone, if you supported the Government, the insurgents just came and killed you. Same in Algeria. Same in Cambodia.
    Isn't that where the whole "separating the population from the insurgents" and "focus on securing the population" comes in? The idea is not to go in without weapons, but rather to use those to protect the population from insurgent attacks rather than attacking the insurgents amongst the population, no?

    From my understanding, improving government services comes after the population has been separated from the insurgents, in order to remove the root causes of the insurgency and cut it off from its political base.

  9. #169
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
    Isn't that where the whole "separating the population from the insurgents" and "focus on securing the population" comes in? The idea is not to go in without weapons, but rather to use those to protect the population from insurgent attacks rather than attacking the insurgents amongst the population, no?
    If someone tells me that defending the population is best enabled by killing and capturing the enemy, I am in complete agreement, because if you don't kill them, once you leave, they come back.

    From my understanding, improving government services comes after the population has been separated from the insurgents, in order to remove the root causes of the insurgency and cut it off from its political base.
    So once the enemy are gone, you re-assert government control. Sounds good!
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  10. #170
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    Default Its an elephant...

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    If someone tells me that defending the population is best enabled by killing and capturing the enemy, I am in complete agreement, because if you don't kill them, once you leave, they come back.

    So once the enemy are gone, you re-assert government control. Sounds good!
    ...and even though we blind men are describing different parts of it I think that we are all describing the same elephant.

    My experiences, which are just a datapoint and not the end all and be all of anything, are that effective security work & population work are inexorably intertwined.

    Lets simplify and only look at water and security in a 'tactical' sense.

    Consider humoring me and sketching three lines, two will be vertical and a hands breadth apart while one will connect the two on the bottom...a flattend U if you will. The bottom axis is time (0-100% of the time available for the mission). The left axis is population needs (0-100%) and the right axis is cost (0-100% of cost/resources available for mission).

    A horizontal line from about 10% on the population needs axis over to the cost axis would define must haves: enough water and policemen or soldiers to get you through that 125F day without dying. A horizontal line from about 30% on the population needs axis would define should haves: 'enough' water to drink, clean with, grow some crops with and the security to keep you going. A horizontal line from about 40% on the population needs axis would define nice to haves: more than 'enough' water to drink, clean with, grow some crops with and the equivalent security to enjoy them with. Each day could be plotted to get a sense of whats happening.

    Get the folks in your AO spending more time on non-kinetic things so that its easier to identify and properly address the troublemakers...go Wilf go

    Thats an incomplete look of course...there needs to be some sort of local leadership structure which can sustain these tactical things. Now one heads into operational and strategic issues and of course it gets much stickier...
    Last edited by Surferbeetle; 07-07-2009 at 03:52 PM.
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  11. #171
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Surferbeetle View Post
    Get the folks in your AO spending more time on non-kinetic things so that its easier to identify and properly address the troublemakers...go Wilf go
    Under the circumstances you describe this is most probably correct.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  12. #172
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Can't rollerskate in a Buffalo Herd

    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
    What evidence in the history of the Taliban suggests they could simply be "bribed" to remove themselves from power?
    None to my knowledge -- that may be why I said bribe them to keep AQ out after we'd shaken them up a bit and destroyed every known or suspected or even slightly possible AQ hangout and cluster. That's a quite different thing.
    Afghan history is not exactly a unitary repetition of events over 3,000 years, despite what Steven Pressfield would like to think. Among other things, there was the introduction of Islam and the replacement of most of the ethnic population.
    Really? Who knew....

    Who's Steven Pressfield? Should I be concerned with what he says? If so, why?
    The Taliban itself represents something new in Afghan history - a nontribal movement taking its inspiration purely from a religious and foreign base, the twin pillars of Deobandi extremist faith mixed with Pakistani backing, that managed to establish a firm central government over nearly the entire country.
    Be careful with the non-tribal aspect, it can bite.
    ...During its drives to the west and the north, it did not face insurgents but rather armies like its own in the forces of Massoud and Hekmatyar, which it defeated in the Afghan version of conventional combat with artillery, tanks, and aircraft, not a COIN campaign.
    Not really defeated. Neither of the two were whipped -- suppressed, yes but not defeated. You are correct that it was not a COIN campaign, so few are. There may be a message in that...
    From my understanding, improving government services comes after the population has been separated from the insurgents, in order to remove the root causes of the insurgency and cut it off from its political base.
    Good idea -- lemme know when you round up enough Afghan, NATO, other coalition and US troops to do that.

    As Surferbeetle said ""Thats an incomplete look of course...there needs to be some sort of local leadership structure which can sustain these tactical things. Now one heads into operational and strategic issues and of course it gets much stickier...''" Yup. Don't we all just hate it when that happens...

  13. #173
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    Default Update

    Marine mission to protect Afghans slows progress Link

  14. #174
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post

    Who's Steven Pressfield?


    Web Site

    Writer
    To name a few...
    Gates of Fire
    The Legend of Bagger Vance
    Killing Rommel

    His Blog...It's The Tribes Stupid

  15. #175
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Went to the web site and the blog...

    Thanks for the info. Your link to the web site doesn't seem to work for some odd reason but I Googled him. Link to the Blog was good.

    Thus discovered:

    (a) He's a writer whose books I have not read but many others have. I'm happy for him.

    (b) I do not need to be concerned about what he says. Which is what I suspected all along. Nor does he need to be concerned about what I say, so we're even.

  16. #176
    Council Member Abu Suleyman's Avatar
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    Default It's been a month or two...

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    On this one:Me, too. I'll give it a month or two before it quietly disappears. Not a smart move on several levels...
    Has it quietly disappeared?
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  17. #177
    Council Member Greyhawk's Avatar
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    Default Hmmm...

    13 Aug AP story via Air Force Times:

    A new military approach in Afghanistan may mean buzzing rather than bombing the enemy, according to the general taking over the air war there.

    It’s known as irregular warfare, designed to protect local people and then enlist their help defeating Taliban insurgents, Air Force Lt. Gen. Gilmary Hostage said Thursday.

    “The first thing we do is fly over head, and the bad guys know airpower is in place and oftentimes that’s enough. That ends the fight, they vamoose,” said Hostage, who will direct the air battle over Iraq and Afghanistan. “The A-10 has a very distinct sound. The cannon on an A-10 is horrifically capable and our adversaries know it. When they hear the sound of an A-10, they scatter.”

    Sometimes they do.

  18. #178
    Former Member George L. Singleton's Avatar
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    Default A-10

    The A-10 is a very old subsonic tank killer.

    It sounds like we have nitwits making battle plans if any of these quotes and suppositions are true.

    Might as well bang bots together to drive the tiger, but the tiger is still there and will keep killing.

  19. #179
    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
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    Post Interesting analogy

    Quote Originally Posted by George L. Singleton View Post
    The A-10 is a very old subsonic tank killer.

    It sounds like we have nitwits making battle plans if any of these quotes and suppositions are true.

    Might as well bang bots together to drive the tiger, but the tiger is still there and will keep killing.
    Kinda like trucks filled with chains driving along brick roads
    Sound just like tanks
    Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours

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  20. #180
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    Default NATO (German requested) airstrike

    From the AP this morning:

    NATO airstrike in Afghanistan kills up to 90
    Afghan official says NATO airstrike on hijacked fuel tankers kills 90, including 40 civilians
    FRANK JORDANS
    AP News
    Sep 04, 2009 09:00 EST

    A U.S. jet blasted two fuel tankers hijacked by the Taliban in northern Afghanistan, setting off a huge fireball Friday that killed up to 90 people, including dozens of civilians who had rushed to the scene to collect fuel, Afghan officials said.
    .....
    In Kabul, the NATO command said a "large number of insurgents" were killed or injured in the pre-dawn attack near the village of Omar Khel in Kunduz province. In Brussels, the alliance's chief said it was possible civilians died.

    Kunduz Gov. Mohammad Omar said 90 people were killed. A senior Afghan police officer, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the information, said that included about 40 civilians who were siphoning fuel from the trucks.
    ...
    Navy Lt. Cmdr. Christine Sidenstricker, a public affairs officer, said the attack occurred after commanders in the area determined that there were no civilians there.

    In Brussels, however, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said "a number" of Taliban fighters were killed and "there is a possibility of civilian casualties as well."

    The German military, which has troops under NATO command in Kunduz, said the airstrike struck the tankers at 2:30 a.m., killing 50 insurgents, adding that "uninvolved (persons) were presumably not harmed."

    Militants seized the tankers about four miles (seven kilometers) southwest of a German base and an unmanned surveillance aircraft was dispatched to the scene, German officials said. After the images showed no sign of civilians, the Germans called for a U.S. airstrike, which occurred about 40 minutes after the tankers were seized. ....
    From this armchair, this incident confirms that UAV IDs are not infallible, and that civilian casualties come in large bunches where airstrikes are involved (the latter fact is established by the UNAMA Report).

    This incident is different from the May Farah incident; although both boil down to how much ID is required to justify an airstrike - and whether the presence of any civilians requires an abort.

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