Afghanistan ROE Change

[slapout9]

Sting Ball Grenades......ever try any of these?

http://192.139.188.71/index.asp?id1=125

[Blackjack]

Sting Ball Grenades......ever try any of these?

http://192.139.188.71/index.asp?id1=125

40mm Stingball

These could work too. You know, I come from an extremely agressive military culture that is not risk adverse. Even I can see the benefits of these LE tools applied to military operations.

LE does not by any means have all the answers, but they sure have the market cornered in LTL products and their application. Also, these sting balls would probably leave some serious welts. It could be a good way to identify suspected Taliban later on, and aprehend them. The exploding dye packs of the battlefield if you will.

[Cavguy]

I would love the ability to use non-lethal rounds.

When I was last in Iraq 2006-2007 we were prohibited from using them by the lawyers. The legal reasoning was that sometimes these rounds can kill. Therefore, you can only use them in situations where you would have justification to use lethal force. In said situation, better to use the lethal force than use a non-lethal round that accidentally kills.

I didn't agree then and don't now, but that was the reasoning. Love the lawyers.

[jmm99]

The legal advice is exactly on point given the ROEs that were in effect. The lawyer was protecting you from a possible manslaughter charge.

I'd prefer ROEs that would leave decisions like that to the field commander (you). Then I could say that your legal options are A, B and C. Which one you select is a military decision, not a legal decision.

But, as you have already said, field commanders were calling in too much heavy stuff; so, top-down ironclad rules are laid down which try to fit everything into neat little boxes.

[slapout9]

Now you guys understand why LE feels the way we do about lawyers
Soldiers should be looking at counter lawsuits because they were denied appropriate capabilities to do there job thus having to escalate to deadly force.

Dye marking has a lot of potential, there are a lot of options with stuff like that

Also I would want lots of snipers (precision guided bullets) and the surveillance ability they have.

Also need the ability to take of your uniform OFF and grow some HAIR like plain clothes officers. If you have to blend with the environment and the environment is the people......You know real camouflage.

Which you know..... we keep talking about a new kind of warfare,hybrid,4GW,etc. but nobody is looking at the RULE set we force our military to fight under that could be changed to help level the field some.

[J Wolfsberger]

... precision guided bullets...

We could do that.

What's your budget?

[carl]

Also need the ability to take of your uniform OFF and grow some HAIR like plain clothes officers. If you have to blend with the environment and the environment is the people......You know real camouflage.

That sounds like what Frank Kitson did in Kenya long ago.

[tankersteve]

your use of me as an example was a bit too kind, and apples & oranges - for one, I didn't have a guy wounded, which CAN definitely affect your decisions, and two, we really didn't have a plan to get the guy if he didn't come out soon (other than get ready to go get him, just like you).

I really think Blackjack hit the nail on the head when you look at the actual language - air power is the big stick. It discredits us with the locals to use air power because of the likely CDE and the risk-averse nature of using it in close quarters. If you risk some butts and clear it with direct fire, and civilians are wounded/killed, I think the locals will still respect what you were trying to achieve.

Perhaps the criteria for air power needs to be raised - troops in heavy contact on their own base, or an enemy isolated and trying to break contact, etc.

I know there are some who think this is too restrictive, but I think the real intent is for troops to really measure the gain (couple of knuckleheads dead, who will likely be replaced tomorrow) versus the loss (an entire village committed to supporting AQ, due to exceptional losses, especially among women/children).

Oh and Niel, I am at Leavenworth, give me a ping.

Tankersteve

[Ken White]

...It discredits us with the locals to use air power because of the likely CDE and the risk-averse nature of using it in close quarters. If you risk some butts and clear it with direct fire, and civilians are wounded/killed, I think the locals will still respect what you were trying to achieve.

Perhaps the criteria for air power needs to be raised - troops in heavy contact on their own base, or an enemy isolated and trying to break contact, etc.

Well said. Afghans understand and accept bullets; 'Be Omeidi Xodah.' Arty and Air not so much...

[IntelTrooper]

That sounds like what Frank Kitson did in Kenya long ago.

When your troops are tactically and morally disciplined, uniforms are overrated.

[jcustis]

Sting Ball Grenades......ever try any of these?

http://192.139.188.71/index.asp?id1=125

Haha..they hurt...a lot .

[jcustis]

Haha..they hurt...a lot .

so, top-down ironclad rules are laid down which try to fit everything into neat little boxes.

I don't view ROE as ironclad, nor do I view them aa restrictive. Fail to train your troops properly in their execution, and they can be. For the most part they are permissive from my experience.

I will admit that in my prearation for three deployments in support of OIF, the option of fixing, cordoning, and waiting out has NEVER been discussed, trained to, or published as a potential solution.

That commanders have employed it as a tool in the toolbox is a testament to that individual's ability to think on their feet, becauseI for sure haven't seen it ever as a bullet on a training slide. I can't speak for the JRTCs, however.

[Dayuhan]

Given the extensive and negative publicity that has been drawn by actual or alleged civilian casualties from air strikes, and given the very public nature of the announcement under discussion here, is it possible that the announcement is aimed less at altering the tactical environment on the ground than at creating or reinforcing a perception of a shift away from the use of air power in environments where civilian casualties are likely?

I have no doubt that Gen. McChrystal wants and intends to reduce collateral damage, but I'm sure he also wants everyone in the picture to be aware of this intention. When a change like this is announced in the mass media before the new rule is even released, it suggests to me that there's a strong "for popular consumption" factor in the picture.

I would certainly agree with those here who point out that if the JDAM is option A and running away is option Z, consideration needs to be given to the options in between - with full awareness that options are restricted by circumstances.

[Uboat509]

IF this is what it appears to be, then it looks to me like another case of "Some are abusing it so we will deny it to everyone." Maybe it's just me, but I hate taking proven tools out of my toolbox. This particular tool probably has been abused and greater controls over its use are probably warranted, but outright removing it doesn't seem like a good idea. CavGuy's scenario is a great one, IF you have the time and IF you have the resources and manpower and IF you can control the terrain. It is definitely a tool to keep in the box but that doesn't mean it will always be the right tool. It also doesn't mean that assaulting the building or even striking it with indirect or CAS is always the wrong answer.

Again, we don't know what the full ROE will be but Ken is right, IF we create areas where our troops are reluctant to engage the enemy for fear of creating civilian casualties then we can virtually grantee that the enemy will be there.

SFC W

[J Wolfsberger]

This morning, Fox news broadcast a piece by Steve Harrigan, on the ground in Afghanistan. The thrust of the piece, which may or may not be accurate, was that the new ROE are intended to place restrictions on the use of air support, particularly with regard to bombs in "urban" areas.

[Cavguy]

IF this is what it appears to be, then it looks to me like another case of "Some are abusing it so we will deny it to everyone." Maybe it's just me, but I hate taking proven tools out of my toolbox. This particular tool probably has been abused and greater controls over its use are probably warranted, but outright removing it doesn't seem like a good idea. CavGuy's scenario is a great one, IF you have the time and IF you have the resources and manpower and IF you can control the terrain. It is definitely a tool to keep in the box but that doesn't mean it will always be the right tool. It also doesn't mean that assaulting the building or even striking it with indirect or CAS is always the wrong answer.

My point exactly.

Look, I agree with Ken. I wish we would invest in the upfront training and guidance to ensure subordinates aren't denied tools/flexibility they need to do the job.

The unfortunate reality is that time and time again we have failed to exercise restraint.

In an odd way, this turns back to the discussion I have had with COL Gentile over "dogma" and doctrine. We seem to have a recurring pattern of commanders following "letter of the law" in risk adverse fashions rather than tailoring to each situation. Yingling has offered one reason why. I believe it goes back to the late 90s zero-defect checklist approach to training mentality. I don't believe it's the doctrine's fault, it's a sign of a massive failure in our Leader Development and Education System, and our inability to develop individual leaders and hold individuals responsible for their actions. We see every problem as a fault of the system, and issue blanket one size fits all policies as a result. It is sad.

As a final note, although this thread started with the title ROE, we are really talking RUF - Rules for use of Force, which can be more restrictive than ROE. ROE in a legal way hasn't changed, and doesn't really cover specific weapons systems. It's more general. GEN McChrystal is changing the theater guidance for RUF. There is more than a semantic difference.

"Why Johnny Can't Think for Himself" is an excellent question.

[Tom Odom]

My point exactly.

Look, I agree with Ken. I wish we would invest in the upfront training and guidance to ensure subordinates aren't denied tools/flexibility they need to do the job.

The unfortunate reality is that time and time again we have failed to exercise restraint.

In an odd way, this turns back to the discussion I have had with COL Gentile over "dogma" and doctrine. We seem to have a recurring pattern of commanders following "letter of the law" in risk adverse fashions rather than tailoring to each situation. Yingling has offered one reason why. I believe it goes back to the late 90s zero-defect checklist approach to training mentality. I don't believe it's the doctrine's fault, it's a sign of a massive failure in our Leader Development and Education System, and our inability to develop individual leaders and hold individuals responsible for their actions. We see every problem as a fault of the system, and issue blanket one size fits all policies as a result. It is sad.

As a final note, although this thread started with the title ROE, we are really talking RUF - Rules for use of Force, which can be more restrictive than ROE. ROE in a legal way hasn't changed, and doesn't really cover specific weapons systems. It's more general. GEN McChrystal is changing the theater guidance for RUF. There is more than a semantic difference.

"Why Johnny Can't Think for Himself" is an excellent question.

All good points and in many ways this change reminds me of what happend in Iraq with the change in leadership, change in doctrine, boost in forces, and strategic focus. Different AO with different issues I will readily agree. But I would also say similar in the need to make changes, not all of which can be affected by better training at the tactical level.

Best

Tom

[William F. Owen]

1. I believe it goes back to the late 90s zero-defect checklist approach to training mentality. I don't believe it's the doctrine's fault, it's a sign of a massive failure in our Leader Development and Education System, and our inability to develop individual leaders and hold individuals responsible for their actions. We see every problem as a fault of the system, and issue blanket one size fits all policies as a result. It is sad.
   
2. "Why Johnny Can't Think for Himself" is an excellent question.

I was taught about ROE going through basic training in 1980. It's a central pillar of British Army thinking (or used to be). If ROE isn't at the centre of your use of force, then there may be a problem.

[J Wolfsberger]

We seem to have a recurring pattern of commanders following "letter of the law" in risk adverse fashions rather than tailoring to each situation. Yingling has offered one reason why. I believe it goes back to the late 90s zero-defect checklist approach to training mentality. I don't believe it's the doctrine's fault, it's a sign of a massive failure in our Leader Development and Education System, and our inability to develop individual leaders and hold individuals responsible for their actions. We see every problem as a fault of the system, and issue blanket one size fits all policies as a result. It is sad.
...

"Why Johnny Can't Think for Himself" is an excellent question.

Well elaborated on by Ken and Tom. I'll add that we also induct privates into basic training after given them 12 years of experience that mistakes means you're a "failure," with an "F" on a piece of paper to prove it to the entire world. Those who go on to college get another 4 years of reinforcement to the "lesson." (I've had to go so far as telling new graduate employees that if I don't see at least one mistake a week, it will be proof they aren't doing anything.)

Here's the problem: if we want initiative and independent thinking, people must know that they won't be pilloried for getting it wrong. When that happens, you create a risk averse culture. You also start eliminating the possibility that people will learn from their mistakes and become the better for it. (I met an officer from the 11th Cav who stranded his troop on an island during maneuvers. Career over - and the Army lost an officer who for damn sure would never let his unit get trapped on the wrong terrain again.)

The flip side problem, is creating a cultural environment where mistakes are accepted as the price of initiative and independent thinking, without creating one where the duds can "fail up."

So to summarize, solving the problem seems to require creating a culture that addresses two points:

1. Tolerating mistakes as the result of initiative and independent, creative thought.
2. Weeding out the people who can't or won't learn from their mistakes, or believe that initiative and independence somehow mean out of control.

[Rank amateur]

Lots of intelligent comments. When you're being population centric, there really is no rush. The population was there in 2001. They'll be there in 2021. It really doesn't matter if the enemy occupies the village today, tomorrow or next week. It only matters whether the enemy is able to reoccupy the village after you guys have cleared it.

As an ad guy, if I were selling the new ROE to the boots on the ground I would say in this one specific situation, if it is safe to do so, treat it as a hostage situation and not a firefight. Part of the safety, of course, is making sure you're not setting yourself up to be ambushed by the hostage takers colleagues. (I don't know the buzzwords for that. "Establish, secure defensible, oversight positions?")

As to the fact this may encourage human shields. Perhaps that's a good thing. people don't like being taken hostage. They don't like their hostage takers. They like their rescuers. After the hostages are rescued, the takers almost always face justice.