If that's true, then there is no reason to say. We're only there becasue we were attacked from there, and if we're not going to be attacked form there again, we have no reason to stay.Originally Posted by Ken White
If that's true, then there is no reason to say. We're only there becasue we were attacked from there, and if we're not going to be attacked form there again, we have no reason to stay.
We could have just gotten them to talk to the interpreter, answer a few questions, and then take it from there. But as was said, the story is too fragmentary to tell if that was already done.
That's why all people coming out of a structure in a hostage rescue situation are put on their face when they come out. We should have at least controlled their movement, then brought in resources to deal with the issue.
The TTP is valid...seems like we just goofed up the application.
Last edited by jcustis; 07-07-2009 at 03:35 AM.
The fact that the teenagers don't for Afghanistan
doesn't mean the little dears don't count elsewhere. Afghanistan is not an Arab nation, nor is it Malay. The Malays and the Afghans don't do the jihadi bit, that's an Arab thing. Arabs think Afghans are barbarians and thus are little concerned with what goes on in Afghanistan and they pay little heed to what Afghans might do. Thus my comment that the jihadis won't care but the Afghans will -- and they've been sneaking around in burqas when it suits for years so we won't get much PR or sales leverage out of the action at Khan Neshin.
Yep, we went because we were attacked. Initial plan was to go in, run off the Talibs and then leave. For various reasons, not all readily apparent, we changed the game and decided to stay. Mistake in my view but they didn't ask me. Not only did we decide to stay, we told the Afghans -- and the world -- that we would. In my view, we didn't have to stay but we said we would and so now we have to.
We are not popular in the world and have not been since WW II for many reasons, mostly size, wealth and arrogance. That dislike goes up and down depending on the world situation and what we're up to. The highest the dislike factor has been in my adult lifetime is 1979-70 during Viet Nam. The second highest was in 1975 -- when we left Viet Nam in an unnecessarily embarrassed mode. There was a spike in 1991 over the Marsh Arabs and the southern Shia in Iraq whom we were seen as abandoning after promising help. Then Somalia was a big flub. Another in 1996 when we had to scramble to get Kurds out of Saddam's way. Surprisingly, one of the dislike low points was in 1986, right after we'd bombed libya in El Dorado Canyon.
Point of all that is that when we don't do what's right, we suffer in world opinion -- more so than when we do what's right and some Governments and their intelligentsia get upset. Long way of getting to the point. We can't fix Afghanistan, never were going to be able to do so. We IMO should not have told them we'd stay and get them on their feet. However, we did tell them that. So now we really need to do that because all those jihadis -- they're just waiting for the US to again turn tail. we just need to be careful what we do and where we go -- and of what we say.
We need to do what we say we will do. The cost of not doing that will be greater than the cost of doing it. We leave too soon -- as we did in 1991 -- and we'll back in ten years and, like 2001, it'll be harder next time.
Ain't a sheet, Slap. It's them
burger things...
This strategic argument has always intrigued me. After we toppled the Taliban and al-Qaeda and chased them into Pakistan, should we have simply pulled all troops out of Afghanistan and allowed it to collapse back into chaos? What could we have done to ensure that neither returned to power? I think the course of action from 2002-2006 showed that "paying off the warlords", everyone's favorite do-nothing technique, wasn't going to work.Yep, we went because we were attacked. Initial plan was to go in, run off the Talibs and then leave. For various reasons, not all readily apparent, we changed the game and decided to stay. Mistake in my view but they didn't ask me. Not only did we decide to stay, we told the Afghans -- and the world -- that we would. In my view, we didn't have to stay but we said we would and so now we have to.
Better question -- which Bacevich would approve --
is should we have gone into Afghanistan the way we did. Might it have been better just to reduce every AQ hangout in the country to less than rubble -- we knew where they were and pretty much who was in them. Unfortunately, despite the errors of the Carter, Reagan, Bush 41 and Clinton administrations, despite the flaws identified in Eagle Claw, we had deliberately NOT developed a strategic raid capabiltiy for several reasons. Thus, to remove the AQ elements in Afghanistan, we had to use the capability we did have and as should have been expected when cranking up systems that hadn't been used for ten years or so with the concomitant skill decay; we screwed things up a bit.Nothing then and most likely nothing now. Afghanistan is Afghanistan. It is not going to turn into the Costa Rica of South Asia. we can leave it better than we found it but we will never stay long enough to 'fix' it. Nor should we, not our job.What could we have done to ensure that neither returned to power?True and we knew that but given the resourcing and the flawed 'strategy,' the guys on the ground had little choice. They did the best they could with what they had.I think the course of action from 2002-2006 showed that "paying off the warlords", everyone's favorite do-nothing technique, wasn't going to work.
The sensible thing would've been to severely clobber AQ in Afghanistan, bribe the Taliban to keep 'em out and not go to Iraq until we left there and were in Bush 43s second term. However, we needed to do something in the ME -- Afghanistan is not in the ME and the effect was not the same -- as all the hate and discontent came from there; Iraq was the spot; unpopular Dictator, geographically central, no major disruption of world oil supply. so the strategy was okay, the location was good -- but the timing was bad. The Army screwing the operation up didn't help. Iraq may still work out okay. We'll see in about five or ten years. Afghanistan will also probably be okay but little changed from its normative state which should be perfectly acceptable but is certainly not in accord with western values.
The fact that it is not a western state seems to befuddle many...
I think Bush knew that if he did not do Iraq or something like it, his successor probably would not and he thought it needed to be done. I agree with that, just wish he'd waited. Also wish the Army and Marines had done the post June 2003 stuff a little better. It would've also have helped had there been no Paul Bremer
Don't put too much stock in Bacevich -- he's a smart guy but neither he nor I have all the answers. Nobody has 'em. Bacevich does have an agenda, though, which is fine and his right but sometimes those folks with agendas can't see the forest. Sometimes their shattered dreams from earlier wars drive their thoughts on all wars. Often wrongly...
Purple Kool Aid and warm chunky goats milk...
Too true; not Costa Rica, nor "...a Scandinavian Democracy.", nor anything close to a 'western' construct.
So then, I agree with you on what the warm chunky goats milk of inadequate force ratios and unrealistic political schedules could to do to us
....and as a result I am eyeballing that damn population centric purple kool-aid...
Realworld applications-wise, upping the total force ratios/total mass (our side + % of population) by focusing upon population issues is possible and doable. We did it in Mosul for a while and we have done it in other locations (Japan & Germany, different sized delta yes but there were/still are appreciable cultural differences). The western clock we like to time ourselves on however may be the 'special' ingredient in the purple kool aid that we have to watch for. Reading about Mr McNamara in today's WSJ was pretty sobering.
Schools/madrassa's are specialized high end type work that require sustained cash flows and networks, instead simple gpf water & ag projects might be playing more to our strengths....ring road status...So we go to Plan B. Clear, then dazzle with footwork and get the crowd behind the Goal to wave their pom poms or whatever while building roads and schools and giving the max number of troublemakers an opportunity to repent and be productive Pomegranate growers. We can get there. Just makes it more difficult and more likely to provide a temporary 'OK' solution rather than a long term good one. Tough world out there, people don't play fair...
Steve the Planner was saying the other day the Afghanistan once exported ag products and I have read that Kabul U's ag program was supposed to have been pretty strong...where you around/aware when/if that occurred?
Finally, I note that we have transitioned from relying on only our boxing skills and are adapting …it's slow going sometimes but somebody wise told me that the kids always come through…
Last edited by Surferbeetle; 07-07-2009 at 07:03 AM.
Sapere Aude
What evidence in the history of the Taliban suggests they could simply be "bribed" to remove themselves from power?The sensible thing would've been to severely clobber AQ in Afghanistan, bribe the Taliban to keep 'em out and not go to Iraq until we left there and were in Bush 43s second term.
Afghan history is not exactly a unitary repetition of events over 3,000 years, despite what Steven Pressfield would like to think. Among other things, there was the introduction of Islam and the replacement of most of the ethnic population.
The Taliban itself represents something new in Afghan history - a nontribal movement taking its inspiration purely from a religious and foreign base, the twin pillars of Deobandi extremist faith mixed with Pakistani backing, that managed to establish a firm central government over nearly the entire country.
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