(p.5)
As Reisman and Antoniou indicate,
the mere perception of LOAC violations can significantly impact operations. The Gulf War provides two examples of situations where LOAC was not violated yet the perception that it may have been had clear military consequences. The first concerned the attack on the Al Firdos bunker in Baghdad that was believed by the allies to be a command and control node. Some experts concluded that the post-attack pictures of the bodies of family members of high Iraqi officials (who evidently used the bunker as a bomb shelter) being excavated from the wreckage achieved politically what the Iraqi air defenses could not do militarily: rendering downtown Baghdad immune from attack.[22]
Worried coalition leaders put the city virtually off-limits to avoid a repetition of like scenes reaching their peoples. Similarly, fears about the impact on coalition constituencies of the images of hundreds of burnt out vehicles along the so-called “Highway of Death” following an air attack on retreating Iraqi forces was a significant factor in the early termination of hostilities.[23] That result left the Republican Guard intact to slaughter Kurds and to help keep Saddam Hussein in power to this day.
22 See Michael Gordon and Bernard E, Trainor, The Generals’ War (1995), at 324-326.
23 Id., at 476-477. See also Colin Powell, My American Journey (Random House, 1995), at 520 (“The television coverage… was starting to make it look as if we were engaged in slaughter for slaughter’s sake.”).
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