Afghanistan ROE Change

[IntelTrooper]

CERP funds again? You Spooks and your nets...

Ask me again in 25 years...

[Kiwigrunt]

I am reminded of Schmedlap’s post a little while ago on another thread where he said that they got more recognition (Iraq) from the locals once they started making more noise with increased (careful) use of HE etc. This created a perception among the locals that they were doing their jobs!

[Cavguy]

Going to play devil's advocate here -

Is it always necessary to pursue and finish the fight, usually ending w/ a bomb?

I was in a firefight once, had insurgents in a house. Wounded one of my guys. Decided to charge in after supression, got one of my guys killed and another wounded. Wound up bombing the house. Killed about half of a family next door too.

A few weeks later council member Tankersteve was in the same situation about a klick away. He surrounded the house until the insurgent gave up.

I'll pick his solution. I have seen it often where we resort to firepower when other, less lethal options, would do.

I'm not saying it's good for every case, but often our firepower has replaced the use of good tactics and innovative thinking to solve problems. As FM 3-24 says, "sometimes the best action is to do nothing". Keyword "sometimes".

Another way to think about it - should the cops level your house because criminals take refuge in it?

Just feeling contrary tonight.

[IntelTrooper]

Going to play devil's advocate here -

Is it always necessary to pursue and finish the fight, usually ending w/ a bomb?

Definitely not. And someone needs to tell some ODA teams that is the case. You're absolutely right -- just because you can, doesn't mean you should. I do have some trouble with being told that if someone pops up over the wall of a qalat and shoots an RPG at me, that I'm supposed to just shrug and leave. Maybe I'm reading the guidance wrong, but I'm fairly certain that a lot of more risk-averse commanders will understand it that way.

I was in a firefight once, had insurgents in a house. Wounded one of my guys. Decided to charge in after supression, got one of my guys killed and another wounded. Wound up bombing the house. Killed about half of a family next door too.

A few weeks later council member Tankersteve was in the same situation about a klick away. He surrounded the house until the insurgent gave up.

Thanks for sharing that. A lot to think about, for sure.

[William F. Owen]

One of the doctrinal corner stones of Irregular threats is to, physically, conceptually and morally restrict the Regular Armies use of force. We all know this.

If you think killing civilians is wrong, as an absolute statement, then I can see some are backing themselves into a corner where things are going to get unravelled pretty quickly.
No one should intend to kill civilians, but rewarding the use of human shields may well come home to rest in ways those advocating it, cannot yet see.

[Cavguy]

Definitely not. And someone needs to tell some ODA teams that is the case. You're absolutely right -- just because you can, doesn't mean you should. I do have some trouble with being told that if someone pops up over the wall of a qalat and shoots an RPG at me, that I'm supposed to just shrug and leave. Maybe I'm reading the guidance wrong, but I'm fairly certain that a lot of more risk-averse commanders will understand it that way.

I think we generally tend to over-interpret guidance in the US Army, people take all orders to extremes not intended.

I think you are reading it a little wrong, and yes, 10pct will always read it wrong. I think the good general is trying not to use the hammer on all problems that kinda look like nails, and place the thought that occasionally there are other options.

A story was related to me from A-Stan that kind of illustrates his point. A unit chased insurgents into a village and engaged in a sustained firefight. Instead of assaulting the village, the commander emplaced LP/OPs in overwatch, and withdrew his forces, with a QRF in hiding. That night when the insurgents tried to sneak out of the village they were ambushed and killed. All done without bombing a village that hands the enemy an IO tool. Won't work in every situation (damn METT-TC again), but the commander wisely determined an alternate, less violent way to resolve the problem.

I think that's what he's getting at. It's up to GEN McCrystal to clarify his intent to the lowest level. I am positive he is not intending to take away a soldiers' right to self defense.

Thanks for sharing that. A lot to think about, for sure.

Experience is something you get after you need it.

[Tom Odom]

Going to play devil's advocate here -

Is it always necessary to pursue and finish the fight, usually ending w/ a bomb?

I was in a firefight once, had insurgents in a house. Wounded one of my guys. Decided to charge in after supression, got one of my guys killed and another wounded. Wound up bombing the house. Killed about half of a family next door too.

A few weeks later council member Tankersteve was in the same situation about a klick away. He surrounded the house until the insurgent gave up.

I'll pick his solution. I have seen it often where we resort to firepower when other, less lethal options, would do.

I'm not saying it's good for every case, but often our firepower has replaced the use of good tactics and innovative thinking to solve problems. As FM 3-24 says, "sometimes the best action is to do nothing". Keyword "sometimes".

Another way to think about it - should the cops level your house because criminals take refuge in it?

Just feeling contrary tonight.

I am with you Devil

Tony doing something about fires taken from a village does not mean you need to bomb the village or ignore it.

Ken, I will disagree with you on this one. This has been overdue and we have been dancing with the effects for several years now.

Blackjack putting it in terms of running away from the fight is throwing an emotional issue in on top of an already complicated tactical fight. That you cannot prove they are civilians does not make them targets.

Wilf, again I will finish my disagreement here with the simple statement that civilians in a counterinsurgency fight are friendly meaning that civilian casualties are friendly casualties.

Tom

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, again I will finish my disagreement here with the simple statement that civilians in a counterinsurgency fight are friendly meaning that civilian casualties are friendly casualties.

Like I said, you should not intentionally kill civilians. I absolutely agree with the theory, but who is a civilian? War and conflict is not the realm of absolute truths or absolute solutions.

Soldiers causing friendly fire casualties are subject to Military justice. Will that happen in A'Stan and Iraq, when civilians die?

[Tom Odom]

Soldiers causing friendly fire casualties are subject to Military justice. Will that happen in A'Stan and Iraq, when civilians die?

Yes depending on circumstances as in ROE and that is nothing new.

[Cavguy]

Yes depending on circumstances as in ROE and that is nothing new.

Right.

In Iraq 2007 (and I am sure in A-Stan and Iraq 2009), questionable deaths of civilians or potential law of armed conflict violations required a 15-6 investigation (commander's inquiry). Usually these inquiries existed to clear any questions of wrongdoing, rather than to prosecute soldiers. Rarely has anyone been brought to trial or reprimanded. However, the process does serve as a "check" on tendencies to be less than discriminating.

That said, I was in a unit where one of our company commanders received a bad conduct discharge for a LOAC violation in 2004.

[William F. Owen]

Yes depending on circumstances as in ROE and that is nothing new.

I understand ROE and consider them vital instruments, sensibly applied. ROE have to exist in terms of specific guidance. That means you must be able prosecute folks who violate that guidance. Violation of ROE in Northern Ireland, meant murder investigations and UK soldiers being convicted, and placed in prison.

I don't see the same process as being applicable in the circumstances currently prevailing on A'Stan or Iraq, but I may be wrong. Time will tell.

Would violation of ROE be deemed a war crime? Should it be investigated by the UN?

[jcustis]

No one should intend to kill civilians, but rewarding the use of human shields may well come home to rest in ways those advocating it, cannot yet see.

That's a very difficult problem set Wilf, and so I wonder...how would you deal with a human shield situation? Are you thinking along the lines that the Gen's apparent policy rewards those who would use human shields? If so, just how do you see it rewarding them?

Let's just say for the sake of argument that you made contact with X insurgent force, which fled into a compound/village that you knew had unarmed civilians inside (and they had not previously demonstrated sympathy towards insurgents).

I know this is a simplistic view to certainly a difficult issue that is indeed METT-TS&L...and C, and P dependent, but what would you do? Do you have issue with the policy as it seems to be portrayed here, or is it an issue with a policy of measured restraint when civilians are involved and could factor into collateral damage? I ask because I do not want to presume to know, and your responses are unclear in that regard.

I agree with other posters that risk-averse commanders could employ this intent the wrong way. At the same time, perhaps more careful deliberation of the problem set is due in many circumstance we face over there. I dunno, but I'll be finding out in my very next deploy.

[Anthony Hoh]

Tony doing something about fires taken from a village does not mean you need to bomb the village or ignore it.

Tom

You know me, I am not an advocate of bombing what I can shoot. Of course there is merit in waiting things out, or an even handed approach. But the way this ROE change reads (from the little we know of it) when unsure of who else may be injured...flee. IMO that is too far.

You do not need to have a masters in Arab culture to see the implications of this. If you think the Taliban are having a I/O field day now, wait until we pull pitch whenever the shooting starts during unplanned meeting engagements.

I am not gonna break out my been there got the T-shirt drawer with you. Because quite frankly I'd lose. But let me give you another counter point to consider from an Advisors perspective.

Story Time...
No S there I was my teams 2 UAH's, and the host MiTT 2 MRAP's, all PPE'd up getting ready to roll out of the gate with our Infantry Kandak to clear the Khwost Gardez pass. MEDEVAC aircraft were in black due to weather we did not roll but the ANA did, without heavily armored vehicles, body armor, fires, etc it hurt our credibility for the rest of the operation, we came out a day later. Sometimes our default to force protection and casualty aversion hurt our overall relationships.

I don’t feel this ROE change will do a whole lot in the credibility/ go protect the populace department, it has the potential to stifle the limited support we get from the populace now for when we do take action. In the micro scale I respect that one Kandak Commanders relationship with his US advisor does not really have strategic impact, but I think we can both agree that these relationship’s are important. There is a reason the ANA want US advisors and not (with all do respect to the foreign memebers of SWJ) French, German, etc… we are not (currently) harangued by our legislature/ civilian leadership with these ridiculous war time caveats. Could the Allies cross the Rhine and take Berlin under these conditions? ( I know you are gonna crucify me for that last sentence but I had to put it in there.)

Tony

[Tom Odom]

No S there I was my teams 2 UAH's, and the host MiTT 2 MRAP's, all PPE'd up getting ready to roll out of the gate with our Infantry Kandak to clear the Khwost Gardez pass. MEDEVAC aircraft were in black due to weather we did not roll but the ANA did, without heavily armored vehicles, body armor, fires, etc it hurt our credibility for the rest of the operation, we came out a day later. Sometimes our default to force protection and casualty aversion hurt our overall relationships.

No doubt it did, But the story is oranges (force protection) to apples (use of fires). In fact the change in ROE is in many ways an acceptance of greater risk.

Again I don't think the ROE change is a change to "flee" or retreat or hide or any other judgement-laden term. It is a change to think hard and adjust accordingly. I also don't see where it will call for withdrawal in unplanned meeting engagements.

When you can show me the Rhine River in Afghanistan I'll tell you whether we can take Berlin.

Best
Tom

[Cavguy]

Rather than speculate about "running away" and what the new ISAF CG might have said, let's look at what he actually said.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/wo...trikes.html?hp

“Air power contains the seeds of our own destruction if we do not use it responsibly,” General McChrystal told a group of his senior officers during a video conference last week. “We can lose this fight.”

“When we shoot into a compound, that should only be for the protection of our forces,” he said. “I want everyone to understand that.”

...

Under the rules that General McChrystal outlined, those strikes would almost certainly be prohibited. They would be prohibited, the general said, even if it meant letting some Taliban get away.

Referring to airstrikes, General McChrystal said, “If it is just to defeat the enemy, then we are not going to do it, even if it means we are going to step away from that firefight and fight another time.”

Or from his confirmation testimony:

http://washingtonindependent.com/453...fghanistan-war

he repeatedly emphasized how his approach in Afghanistan would be guided by “classic counterinsurgency” precepts, such as protecting the population from insurgent assaults, rather than focusing primarily on killing and capturing insurgents. A “military-centric” strategy would not succeed, he told senators, and pledged to review “all” standard practices and rules of engagement to minimize civilian casualties, which have outraged Afghans and jeopardized the United States’ relationship with the Karzai government. Losing the support of the Afghan population would be “strategically decisive,” McChrystal said, meaning the war would be lost, and said he believed that adverse perceptions of the U.S. caused by civilian casualties is “one of the most dangerous enemies we face” in Afghanistan. Success will ultimately be measured by “the number of Afghans shielded from violence.”

Seems to me he's trying to fight on our terms, not the enemy's, and stop playing into their hands with tactical victories but losses in the bigger fight.

[slapout9]

Going to play devil's advocate here -

Is it always necessary to pursue and finish the fight, usually ending w/ a bomb?

I was in a firefight once, had insurgents in a house. Wounded one of my guys. Decided to charge in after supression, got one of my guys killed and another wounded. Wound up bombing the house. Killed about half of a family next door too.

A few weeks later council member Tankersteve was in the same situation about a klick away. He surrounded the house until the insurgent gave up.

I'll pick his solution. I have seen it often where we resort to firepower when other, less lethal options, would do.

I'm not saying it's good for every case, but often our firepower has replaced the use of good tactics and innovative thinking to solve problems. As FM 3-24 says, "sometimes the best action is to do nothing". Keyword "sometimes".

Another way to think about it - should the cops level your house because criminals take refuge in it?

Just feeling contrary tonight.

Like I keep saying the most important TTP's for COIN are how LE handles situations.

Good Example from above. 1st your surround them and tell them to surrender just like TV, then gas them LE can do this but LOAC forbids this....dum.... change the law,then flashbang dynamic entry as a last resort. And you always have the option of a Tactical withdrawal. Often with better Intelligence about how to do something at another time and place for a better result.

But our Forces are not trained that way or equipped that way or have enough manpower to do this if they were trained and equipped to do this.

Good LE organizations are trained to be assertive NOT aggressive and they are trained to DE-escalate not Escalate. Soldiers are not generally trained that way.

We need a 5 pound grenade that can be dropped from 30,000 feet and hit just where we want it to.

[J Wolfsberger]

Along the lines Tom Odom and Cavguy have been following. The "terrain" of interest, where we win or lose, is the civilian population. The tactic of choice for AQ and the Taliban in this conflict is terror.

Does AQ/Taliban care whether they kill civilians or get us to do it for them? In fact, given the choice, wouldn't they deliberately structure the situation to force us to kill civilians?

[slapout9]

Sting Ball Grenades......ever try any of these?

http://192.139.188.71/index.asp?id1=125

[Blackjack]

Sting Ball Grenades......ever try any of these?

http://192.139.188.71/index.asp?id1=125

40mm Stingball

These could work too. You know, I come from an extremely agressive military culture that is not risk adverse. Even I can see the benefits of these LE tools applied to military operations.

LE does not by any means have all the answers, but they sure have the market cornered in LTL products and their application. Also, these sting balls would probably leave some serious welts. It could be a good way to identify suspected Taliban later on, and aprehend them. The exploding dye packs of the battlefield if you will.

[jcustis]

Sting Ball Grenades......ever try any of these?

http://192.139.188.71/index.asp?id1=125

Haha..they hurt...a lot .