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  1. #1
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    No one should intend to kill civilians, but rewarding the use of human shields may well come home to rest in ways those advocating it, cannot yet see.
    That's a very difficult problem set Wilf, and so I wonder...how would you deal with a human shield situation? Are you thinking along the lines that the Gen's apparent policy rewards those who would use human shields? If so, just how do you see it rewarding them?

    Let's just say for the sake of argument that you made contact with X insurgent force, which fled into a compound/village that you knew had unarmed civilians inside (and they had not previously demonstrated sympathy towards insurgents).

    I know this is a simplistic view to certainly a difficult issue that is indeed METT-TS&L...and C, and P dependent, but what would you do? Do you have issue with the policy as it seems to be portrayed here, or is it an issue with a policy of measured restraint when civilians are involved and could factor into collateral damage? I ask because I do not want to presume to know, and your responses are unclear in that regard.

    I agree with other posters that risk-averse commanders could employ this intent the wrong way. At the same time, perhaps more careful deliberation of the problem set is due in many circumstance we face over there. I dunno, but I'll be finding out in my very next deploy.
    Last edited by jcustis; 06-24-2009 at 03:01 AM.

  2. #2
    Council Member Blackjack's Avatar
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    Blackjack putting it in terms of running away from the fight is throwing an emotional issue in on top of an already complicated tactical fight. That you cannot prove they are civilians does not make them targets.
    I agree with you on the fact that just because they cannot be proven as civilians means they are targets part Tom. If commanders become too CoA and risk adverse it has the very real potential to become find, fix, flee. Absolutely nothing emotional about that. Just another possibility.

    A story was related to me from A-Stan that kind of illustrates his point. A unit chased insurgents into a village and engaged in a sustained firefight. Instead of assaulting the village, the commander emplaced LP/OPs in overwatch, and withdrew his forces, with a QRF in hiding. That night when the insurgents tried to sneak out of the village they were ambushed and killed. All done without bombing a village that hands the enemy an IO tool. Won't work in every situation (damn METT-TC again), but the commander wisely determined an alternate, less violent way to resolve the problem.
    That is a really great point Cavguy. Patiance, cunning, and flexibility and while it will not work in every situation, it shows people another way of getitng the same task accomplished. What I am concerned about is turning compounds into hostage negotiation sites, or setting up a patrol for an ambush as they try to wait out the insurgents who are callign in their buddies. As you said, damned METT-TC.

    I also wished to point out that I am in agreement with you fully in regards to air power, and its uses and abuses in sector.
    See things through the eyes of your enemy and you can defeat him.

  3. #3
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    That's a very difficult set Wilf, and so I wonder...how would you deal with a human shield situation? Are you thinking along the lines that the Gen's apparent policy rewards those who would use human shields? If so, just how do you see it rewarding them?
    I'm referring to general circumstances and not specific ones. It's not my place to critique the General from afar, however it is legitimate and necessary to consider the implication of the problem as he allegedly sees it.

    I see the issue as being one of commitment to the mission. If insurgents feel that they gain from operating within an environment where the presence of civilians protects them, then you are being suppressed, not them. 99% of civilians live in structures of some kind. That reality needs to be applied to operations.

    Let's just say for the sake of argument that you made contact with X insurgent force, which fled into a compound/village that you knew had unarmed civilians inside (and they had not previously demonstrated sympathy towards insurgents).
    No brainier. Surround the compound, and wait it out. Send word into the compound and be prepared to clear each space or dwelling with the appropriate amount of force required to ensure the bad guys get killed or captured, but no civilians are harmed - regardless if they supported the insurgents or not - which is another can of worms.

    If I had been GOC A'Stan there would have been a blanket ban on using aircraft or artillery to engage anyone in any structure, for the last 5 years - unless there was a severe risk to the unit concerned. That rule would have been reviewed on a weekly basis. I'd also have different ROE for different areas. - BUT ROE works both ways. Wait for the day that when the Post or the Times runs a story about the 7 soldiers who died obeying ROE, to the letter, and got over run and killed. ROE are political, not ethical. Not killing civilians is only relevant in how it applies to the political part of the conflict, and I specifically include their politics as well as ours.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

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    Council Member Blackjack's Avatar
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    A side topic here, but it has to do with the situation. What about flashbangs? LEOs use them to clear rooms in buildings so what can't the army? I know they would not be so great in an open courtyard, etc. In certian situations where waiting them out may not be a wise option flashbangs followed by a close assault could be used.
    See things through the eyes of your enemy and you can defeat him.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Blackjack View Post
    A side topic here, but it has to do with the situation. What about flashbangs? LEOs use them to clear rooms in buildings so what can't the army?
    I'm pretty sure that the UK is currently using something along those lines, but I'm not entirely sure. Having seen the NICO types, used in training, and on demonstrations by Police Firearms teams, I was not that impressed. More obviously I would be advocating the use of CS gas, or something similar, but it's use is banned by NATO, as a chemical weapon.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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