The UK in Afghanistan

[JMA]

Hello from newcomer.
Having just returned from Helmand after a 7 month tour, i noticed in one of the above posts about winter training etc. Having done a couple tours over there, and the 1st seeing actual snow, this year it was quite a mild winter.
The mention of 12 month tour durations, i do support, although not exactly happy about it. Its true that a 6monthly cycle does not allow Units in-theatre the time to get the feel of the ground.

If it is true that the TB go into hibernation in the winter what opportunities do you see to exploit this?

And are there actually people out there who like being out in such winters?

Maybe you need to read back a bit to pick up what has been said on the length of tours issue but essentially we are talking continuity issues here.

To make the issue even more controversial I would suggest that given the saving in travel costs and the operational dividend accruing I would seriously consider a R&R system during a year tour. Where would you like to go?

[JMA]

At the time of the initial ISAF engagement in Helmand Afghanistan was clearly an economy of force operation for both the US and UK, with the main effort being Iraq. It is only as the situation in Iraq began to stabilise that more attention was paid to Afghanistan. Even if the Brits had gone to the US with requests for more - the cupboards were pretty bare.
I would be surprised if the US Joint Chiefs were not aware of how over stretched and under resourced we were at the time.
In terms of 'out of our depth' I am not sure if I agree with that; 'woefully unprepared' I would agree with. It would be interesting to see the results of the IPB conducted for the British insertion into Helmand....

Yes it is acknowledged that it was a difficult time at the start of Herrick 4 (2006) but then most wars are hectic. It is far easier if there is an admission that given the limited options available to the Brits at that time they chose the wrong one. Time to move on.

I quite agree and this does make sense from a tactical point of view. However this may cause a collapse of the UK strategic centre of gravity (the support of the UK domestic population) and as such is an issue that needs to be considered at all levels from tactical through to strategic. Helmand and the Helmand place names are now well known to the British public, a move away might be perceived as a retreat and would certainly raise questions about government competence to date. A new government may wish to take the risk, but it is significant. Coalition ops are messy!

Yes again agreed that the US needs to keep the Brits on sides politically. So once again we can anticipate a less than perfect outcome. The sad news is that only the Brits can be the losers when it doesn't work out so well.

I am not sure what you mean by this. The UK are following the agreed ISAF CONOPS as laid down by McCrystal. I see more signs of tactical experimentation by US units then British, especially in the US use of money and their willing to engage (politically) with parties on the ground.

That's why you need to read the King paper. The Brig Cmdrs seem to have had too much leaway in their choice of how to operate.

I have not read the King report, however I would say that training troops in theatre to the degree which you are intimating is likely to fall foul of UK Health and Safety Legislation (which stipulates that troops should be equipped and trained prior to deployment to Theatre). The repatriation of UK dead from theatre (instead of burying in situ) and subsequent coroner's inquests have had some unforseen consequences; not least an unparralled (and IMHO uninformed) scrutiny by coroner's inquests resulting in adverse publicity and very very scared politicians.

Do read the King paper.

OK, so there is yet another self imposed limiting factor the Brits have. Fix it.

Well we have volunteer Afghan battalions already in the shape of 205 Corps ANA I would rather see a more permanent presence at Regional Command (Division) level.

The Brits have a division in theatre?

I understand it (the raising of independent battalions especially for Afghanistan) will never happen within Herrick as the Brits are not capable of that degree of lateral thinking but do you see the potential benefits of such a system for the prosecution of the war in Afghanistan?

Our drills are equipment are pretty slick at this. The issue is that where we hear IED but the reality on the groud is that they are operating in medium to high intensity intelligent minefields. No one solution fits and a holistic approach is required. We have to detect and attack the device (tick very good here); attack the network (tick very good here), dominate the ground (tick not so good here, need more ISTAR and more boots on the ground) and encompassing all is bringing the locals on side so that they do not allow by commission or omission IEDs to be placed (tick pretty good programme in place here!)

Having reduced effective IED detonations to 25% of those laid is very good indeed. There is no doubt about it.

But there seems to be a reluctance to accept that regardless of the law of diminishing marginal returns there is still room for improvement. 7 out of the last 10 Brit fatalities were IED related. The last mile is always the hardest.

The feedback I have is that the US are pretty happy with our performance. They know we did not do so well in part in Iraq, but that was then; we have learnt lessons, changed TTPs and moved on. In Afghanistan particularly in how we are linking Mil and non-mil within a coherent strategy (the top Brit man in Helmand is a civilian) we are setting the way.

Yes officially the US must keep their Brit buddies happy especially when the other coalition forces seem ready to jump ship. I would have thought this was obvious?

[Red Rat]

That's why you need to read the King paper. The Brig Cmdrs seem to have had too much leaway in their choice of how to operate.

I quite agree that that was initially the case; a hangover from the bad old Balkans days in the 90s. We have fixed that now.

OK, so there is yet another self imposed limiting factor the Brits have. Fix it.

That is a matter of UK and European legislation, the former outside the ability of HM Forces to fix, the latter outside the ability of HM Government to fix.

The Brits have a division in theatre?

Currently HQ 6 Div is in theatre (Kandahar), plus large elements in Kabul

I understand it (the raising of independent battalions especially for Afghanistan) will never happen within Herrick as the Brits are not capable of that degree of lateral thinking but do you see the potential benefits of such a system for the prosecution of the war in Afghanistan?

It is not a matter of lateral thinking. I am not sure the benefits would outway the disadvantages. There is a broader issue of whether we want an army focused purely on Afghanistan, or an army capable of conducting operations in Afghanistan. It is a debate that is alive and well in the UK army, the same debate is ongoing in the US Army.

But there seems to be a reluctance to accept that regardless of the law of diminishing marginal returns there is still room for improvement. 7 out of the last 10 Brit fatalities were IED related. The last mile is always the hardest.

Yes I quite agree, but improvements are happening all the time. Every incident is scrutinised to see what happened and why, what lessons can be learnt, equipment improved, TTPs amended. The system is robust, quick and is better then anything I have seen since N. Ireland; N. Ireland which was a much more stable theatre of operation. The threat in Afghanistan is qualatively and quantatively a much bigger badder threat.

Yes officially the US must keep their Brit buddies happy especially when the other coalition forces seem ready to jump ship. I would have thought this was obvious?

My feedback was from off the record sources in Washington DC, having raised the issue of US perceptions of UK efforts

[William F. Owen]

I'm talking about Helmand. What the Brits would need a theatre HQ for I wouldn't know. Maybe a few staff officers to be attached to the applicable US HQ.

For permanent read the benefit of continuity etc etc.

I didn't understand why you kept going on about a permanent "Brigade HQ". Clearly you were unaware of theatre command set up. UK Operations in A'Stan require and theatre level of command. See Red Rat's patient, polite, and excellent answer.

...and that's the point. We do not want to muck about raising a couple of volunteer Battalions to go and live in Afghanistan. This is just a plain bad idea. That's what you want the Afghans to do. What the UK actually requires is some 27,000+ troops deployed. That solves most problems - and also creates a few new ones.

If you have to drive or walk somewhere you do the barma thing, otherwise if you don't drive or walk you have avoided the risk.

So if you want zero IED casualties, do nothing?

JMA - as Red Rat has explained,

Every incident is scrutinised to see what happened and why, what lessons can be learnt, equipment improved, TTPs amended. The system is robust, quick and is better then anything I have seen since N. Ireland; N. Ireland which was a much more stable theatre of operation. The threat in Afghanistan is qualatively and quantatively a much bigger badder threat.

Your perceptions of how things work in theatre are way off. I would also add that this type of rapid learning was the case in NI, especially in the mid 1980's. It's also very noticeable in the video de-debriefs from one the Rifles tours in Basra.

[baboon6]

Yes it is acknowledged that it was a difficult time at the start of Herrick 4 (2006) but then most wars are hectic. It is far easier if there is an admission that given the limited options available to the Brits at that time they chose the wrong one. Time to move on.

Probably had a lot do with the type of forces sent. The Canadian battle group was a mechanised one, the British one mainly light-role infantry.

The Brits have a division in theatre?

HQ 6 Div, mentioned by RedRat and myself previously, provides most of the HQ for ISAF's Regional Command South, based at Kandahar, with a British commander and a US deputy.

[William F. Owen]

Having not read King's work until very recently it is uncanny how close our opinions of the situation and reasons are. Do you have a comment on King's work?

Now read it. There are fair few mistakes, but then I guess it's down to which sources you have access to. ..but the conclusion:

Despite evident developments in the Helmand operation, the underlying campaign geography of dispersed operating bases remains. This operational pattern has now been institutionalized, despite the fact that dispersal encourages high levels of indecisive combat in which British troops rarely have more than very temporary superiority.

Sorry but this was blindingly obvious from the word go. This is not news. This is what I and many others have been saying for a very long time. Moreover, this being the case, the problem does not lie with all the alleged tactical short comings, but with a lack of resources.

[JMA]

Now read it. There are fair few mistakes, but then I guess it's down to which sources you have access to. ..but the conclusion:

And once again your unnamed sources are impeccable.

Sorry but this (the conclusion) was blindingly obvious from the word go. This is not news. This is what I and many others have been saying for a very long time. Moreover, this being the case, the problem does not lie with all the alleged tactical short comings, but with a lack of resources.

Was it really blindingly obvious back in 2006? To whom?

What remains clear is that it was a serious military blunder and has diminished the reputation of the Brit military even further.

If you don't have the resources you don't take on the job. Have the Brits lost the ability to say no?

[JMA]

Probably had a lot do with the type of forces sent. The Canadian battle group was a mechanised one, the British one mainly light-role infantry.

Yes this has been said by King and others. Whatever they are, mech, airborne, marine, they tend to behave true to type. Invariably predictable.

HQ 6 Div, mentioned by RedRat and myself previously, provides most of the HQ for ISAF's Regional Command South, based at Kandahar, with a British commander and a US deputy.

I asked about a division, not a Div HQ. This Div HQ thing seems to be a sop to the Brits and commands more troops from other countries than the 9,000 or so Brits in Helmand. From our earlier discussions was it not obvious that my comment on permanent HQs related to Helmand and the ridiculous notion of changing full command ever 6 months. Its almost childishly schoolboyish where everyone and their chum is being given a shot at brigade command in Afghanistan. I wonder how many lives this nonsense has cost?

[JMA]

I quite agree that that was initially the case; a hangover from the bad old Balkans days in the 90s. We have fixed that now.

Do I take that as an admission that the 2006 period at least was a classic case study in military incompetence?

That is a matter of UK and European legislation, the former outside the ability of HM Forces to fix, the latter outside the ability of HM Government to fix.

OK, I hear you and it just frankly boggles the mind.

Currently HQ 6 Div is in theatre (Kandahar), plus large elements in Kabul

I was asking about a division of troops and not a mere Div HQ.

It is not a matter of lateral thinking. I am not sure the benefits would outway the disadvantages. There is a broader issue of whether we want an army focused purely on Afghanistan, or an army capable of conducting operations in Afghanistan. It is a debate that is alive and well in the UK army, the same debate is ongoing in the US Army.

Are you going to try to get away with that answer? Maybe you will get a prompt from a moderator to explain yourself.

Its neither of the two options.

What it is is to apply a focussed effort on the Afghan war. Makes sense from the operational point of view to have specialised troops trained and experienced under the Afghan conditions as they develop rather than trot a bunch of 6 month wonders through on a leisurely 6 months on and 18 months off basis.

Yes I appreciate raising new independent battalions will upset the delicate regimental sensitivities and therefore would be undoable. None of the reasons against specialised troops seems to be relating to a negative outcome operationally (unless you can provide them). Its all about trying to turn a supertanker in high seas.

You have the the Paras for example. Leave one playing with the black army, put another on permanent Afghanistan duties and raise the extra men needed to be able to have a full battalion in theatre all the time and then the other can carry on guarding palaces, trooping the colour parades and doing adventure training in Kenya (and traning for the next Falklands). It seems like a win, win, win situation, yes?

Yes I quite agree, but improvements are happening all the time. Every incident is scrutinised to see what happened and why, what lessons can be learnt, equipment improved, TTPs amended. The system is robust, quick and is better then anything I have seen since N. Ireland; N. Ireland which was a much more stable theatre of operation. The threat in Afghanistan is qualatively and quantatively a much bigger badder threat.

NI, NI, NI... it seems that you wish outsiders to just simply take your word for it that the Brit army had a self correcting mechanism then but not before and clearly not after (Iraq and Helmand). There seems to be as much mythology about NI as there was over Malaya.

With 70-80% of the Brit fatalities through IEDs I would expect efforts to be made along the lines of what you say. However, my point has not been that no effort has been made nor that there has not been a impressive improvement but that the basic MO that vehicle movement and predictable patrolling are no more than food for IEDs.

Perhaps in a few years I will be told that it was "blindingly obvious" that routine non essential vehicle movement was ill advised and that foot patrols over open ground were indeed stupid but in the meantime I keep getting fed the line that everything is fine and dandy.

The fact remains that the use of IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan has been a brilliant development from an insurgent point of view. They have the initiative in this regard and so apparently also in terms of initiating contact at a time and place of their choosing. The military news out of Helmand is not good. Lets hope the USMC can do better.

My feedback was from off the record sources in Washington DC, having raised the issue of US perceptions of UK efforts

Yes from Washington DC they would ne desperately keen to keep the Brits on sides. A little white lie never hurt anyone, right?

[JMA]

I didn't understand why you kept going on about a permanent "Brigade HQ". Clearly you were unaware of theatre command set up. UK Operations in A'Stan require and theatre level of command. See Red Rat's patient, polite, and excellent answer.

Not sure they do. It seems the US have given the Brits command of the other coalition forces and some US forces (which and how many I do not know).

...and that's the point. We do not want to muck about raising a couple of volunteer Battalions to go and live in Afghanistan. This is just a plain bad idea. That's what you want the Afghans to do. What the UK actually requires is some 27,000+ troops deployed. That solves most problems - and also creates a few new ones.

As my Aussie mate would say:

"The UK have never been a nation renowned for following some-one else's example or unsolicited guidance in military matters. They have too much hubris, over-confidence and self-importance for that. I learnt this fast when I was ... and I'm told, things haven't changed!"

Why is it a bad idea? Is this just a knee jerk response or have you worked through the advantages/disadvantages of the various courses of action?

The Brits are never going to get 27,000+ troops into the field, so just forget about it. The best option to sort Helmand out is to let the USMC take over. If the Brits want to stay under command the USMC then that should be OK (I suppose)[/QUOTE]

So if you want zero IED casualties, do nothing?

It seems you've given up on reducing the IED casualty rate then.

My opinion has been and remains that despite impressive advances the Brits still have a long way to go.

So from that simple statement how do you arrive at that I expect zero casualties from IEDs?

JMA - as Red Rat has explained,

Your perceptions of how things work in theatre are way off. I would also add that this type of rapid learning was the case in NI, especially in the mid 1980's. It's also very noticeable in the video de-debriefs from one the Rifles tours in Basra.

I have only your word for it. Basra was another cock up so if you believe there are lessons for the world to learn from the Brit activities in Basra why not start a thread and lets see what you have to say?

And NI? A victory? A ceasefire, the terrorists now in parliament... some victory.

[Fuchs]

Its true that a 6monthly cycle does not allow Units in-theatre the time to get the feel of the ground.

Can you elaborate on this?
A competent army is expected to be able to do that in a matter of an hour or two in mobile warfare.

[JMA]

Brits to stay in Helmand but come under command the USMC.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8693359.stm

Quote:
"Transferring British forces from Helmand to Kandahar would prove more controversial - a much tougher decision than changing the line of command.

It raises the emotive question of sacrifice and cost - why would British troops hand over Helmand to the Americans when they have expended so much blood and treasure?"

[JMA]

More bad news out of Helmand

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/arti...feeds-newsxml#

Quote:
"Fierce fighting by the Taliban left 36 UK servicemen dead by the end of April compared to just 16 fatalities in the same period last year. Another four have lost their lives since.

Meanwhile, 149 UK servicemen have been injured on the battlefield since the New Year - an increase from 73 a year ago.

Of these, 40 soldiers - some in their teens - have been seriously wounded, including the loss of limbs, brain damage or being blinded and deafened, which is a rise from 24."

[Ken White]

Can you elaborate on this?
A competent army is expected to be able to do that in a matter of an hour or two in mobile warfare.

slower and has local national cultural personality quirks that must be dealt with and impose a learning curve.

That's why Armies like Mobile Warfare (or existential war in general). It is more complex in many things, engenders far higher casualty rates but it is less tedious and less dependent upon personal and societal whims in operational matters...

In FID, one will generally be fighting locals who know the terrain thoroughly and use it and who also use all the local infrastructure; it take time for outsiders to 'acclimatize' and learn the local terrain and ground rules. There will be restrictions on military action that are militarily stupid but politically necessary. Ideally, one would place units in such a job for several years at a time, the same social mores of the day that dictate that the supporting foreign Army must allow the host nation to lead and that it must know the people and the area while minimizing 'civilian' casualties dictate that shorter tours be used so the troops home life will not be wrecked.

No way to win in that situation. Modern social constraints got tossed in WW II but that tossing has not really been repeated in any of the larger wars that had estern involvement since 1945.

[William F. Owen]

Why is it a bad idea? Is this just a knee jerk response or have you worked through the advantages/disadvantages of the various courses of action?

Because it does not address any of the actual problems on the ground. - thus does not provide a solution.
You are trying to invent scenarios to feel outraged about and pump an anti-British agenda - be that "inbred officers" "guarding palaces" or "professional training types." Almost all your criticism is groundless or the product of invention.

Now let me make myself clear. There are very serious problems on the ground, but clearly you do not know what they are. A few folks here are patiently trying to tell you.

The Brits are never going to get 27,000+ troops into the field, so just forget about it.

I agree the chance is slim, but the policy in place demands those numbers and more. Drastically change the policy and the 9,000 would be sufficient.

It seems you've given up on reducing the IED casualty rate then.

Nothing to do with me. The men in theatre are the worlds most committed, skilled and dedicated IED specialists. They do not need armchair commentary from the side lines, telling them they are not doing a good enough job.

I have only your word for it. Basra was another cock up so if you believe there are lessons for the world to learn from the Brit activities in Basra why not start a thread and lets see what you have to say?

Don't take my word for it. Do some research. Talk to the units. SWJ is forum for the informed and wish to be informed community. No thread needed. The men who need to know, know.

And NI? A victory? A ceasefire, the terrorists now in parliament... some victory.

Who asked for the cease fire? Who stated that their political objectives could not be met via the armed struggle? Who convinced them of that?
The province of Ulster remains part of the United Kingdom.

[JMA]

Because it does not address any of the actual problems on the ground. - thus does not provide a solution.

Is that it? LOL

Now let me make myself clear. There are very serious problems on the ground, but clearly you do not know what they are. A few folks here are patiently trying to tell you.

Would you care to list these "actual problems" on the ground? Or would you have to decline on the grounds of national security... etc etc

I agree the chance is slim, but the policy in place demands those numbers and more. Drastically change the policy and the 9,000 would be sufficient.

Cut your coat according to the cloth. I believe that the USMC general taking over command in Helmand will task the 9,000 Brits according to their ability to complete the mission.

Nothing to do with me. The men in theatre are the worlds most committed, skilled and dedicated IED specialists. They do not need armchair commentary from the side lines, telling them they are not doing a good enough job.

Do you include the US in this group as well?

Only last week we had the widow Joanne McAleese after her husbands inquest she is quoted as saying:

""As Mac's wife it's been very hard to hear some of the evidence today. In my opinion the device that killed Mac was impossible to detect with the equipment provided to our soldiers. Many more soldiers have died since Mac's death in a very similar way. How can this be allowed to continue?"
Read article here

OK so back in August last year the UK was playing catch-up. Has that problem been fixed yet? What other new techniques or equipment have the TB started using since? Still playing catch up? Of course they are and always will be.

Are the EOD guys doing 6 months swans through Afghanistan or have the Brit military escalated the priority of this effort to permanent in country staff? Just asking.

Don't take my word for it. Do some research. Talk to the units. SWJ is forum for the informed and wish to be informed community. No thread needed. The men who need to know, know.

So if I state something I need to explain myself but if you state something it is self evident? I keep thinking of what my Aussie mate said.

You really think Basra was a successful exercise from the Brit military point of view?

Who asked for the cease fire? Who stated that their political objectives could not be met via the armed struggle? Who convinced them of that?
The province of Ulster remains part of the United Kingdom.

Oh so you 'won' that one as well...

[William F. Owen]

I
Would you care to list these "actual problems" on the ground? Or would you have to decline on the grounds of national security... etc etc

Read the posts on this forum! That's mainly what we talk about. Pop-centric verus Threat-centric?

Do you include the US in this group as well?

As I said - the men in theatre - clearly that includes US troops. I would add that the UK has had dedicated IED teams for over 30 years.

OK so back in August last year the UK was playing catch-up. Has that problem been fixed yet? What other new techniques or equipment have the TB started using since? Still playing catch up? Of course they are and always will be.

You are yet again trolling for information, you have not right to know, and should not be asking.

You really think Basra was a successful exercise from the Brit military point of view?

No. I think Basra was an absolute fiasco. Strategic dissonance of the worst order and a complete "no-winner."

Oh so you 'won' that one as well...

Is Ulster still part of the UK? Yes of no? If yes...

[Fuchs]

Let's call is a minor or limited victory; it was neither decisive nor total except in its defence of the status quo ante.

[Red Rat]

Division HQs The UK has a division HQ in place as a Regional Command HQ. But in addition to the Brigade plus (the better part of two brigades are in Theatre) there are also force troops (Engineers, EOD, G2, CIMIC, Sigs and Aviation). In total there is probably a Div minus out there. The Divisional HQ does a 12 month rotation, as do elements in Kabul. The same applies for G2 and CIMIC elements. The Diplomatic and DfID (Department for International Development) do 12-24 month tours. Campaign continuity is vested at the Regional Command level.

2006 as Military Incompetence I would probably agree there, but for differing reasons to you. I am still reading the King report, but in terms of 2006 I think that was a classic case of lack of intelligence awareness. We walked in blind

What type of Army do we want? Since the 1960s the UK army has focused on being a high-end warfighting army able to adapt to other contingencies; a generalist army. The issue is now, with the costs of defence and our small size, do we want to become a specialist niche army, perhaps specialising in some aspect of COIN? That debate is ongoing. There is a danger that if we as an army focus overly now on Afghanistan we will pre-empt the debate. Personally I think we cannot do both. I also look at our current training regime and think we are losing core warfighting skills. I also look at the experience of the IDF in 2006 in Lebanon and how they transformed themselves over 2 years, what they focused on and then their experience in 2008 in Gaza and I wonder.

Tour Intervals My personal perspective is that 6 months on and 18 off is not very relaxing! I spent the majority of my time deployed out of barracks in the intervening 18 months as a company commander - just ask my ex!

Tour Duration There is a downside to longer tour durations. US military psychiatric casualty rates are significantly higher then UK rates. Kings College London have just published a study on UK Mil Psychiatric casualties that picks up on this.

Regimental Identities I think you are overstating the impact of regimental identities. What slows this army down is not regimental identities, but arms and service (or branch) politics. Many officers and soldiers I know see significant advantages in becoming a corps of infantry, this would reflect more closely the reality of what is happening in training and on the ground. In two and a half years of company commanding my company never served with its parent battalion, but was always detached to other battlegroups.

Northern Ireland My point about NI was not that it was the panacea for all things COIN, but merely that we had a very very good system in NI for the analysis and exploitation of enemy TTPs and I think we have bettered it now. This in a theatre which is significantly more dangerous, more complex and evolves more quickly.

IEDs I think you are oversimplifying the issue of IEDs. If a patrol commander in Sangin took his patrol on a virgin patrol route he would have IEDs emplaced in front, behind and to the flanks of him as he moved. If you have not cleared and do not maintain constant eyes on a piece of ground it must be assumed to be dangerous. The use of IEDs in theatre is intelligent and highly dynamic. In terms of the McAleese enquiry, it is hard to detect IEDs with little or no metal content in an area littered with metal content. There are technical solutions but these take time. It is a bit like the old Tank v Anti-Tank issue. They develop something - we develop a countermeasure. We change TTPs they move to counter.

Finally the USMC is doing a sterling job in Helmand, but they too are hitting the same issues in Marjah as we have elsewhere. I think we continue to need better force ratios there to enable us to effectively dominate the ground. I feel that in Helmand as a whole we are inching forward.

[William F. Owen]

2006 as Military Incompetence I would probably agree there, but for differing reasons to you. I am still reading the King report, but in terms of 2006 I think that was a classic case of lack of intelligence awareness. We walked in blind

Concur. Some folks clearly failed to perform, and some dumb things got done for reasons that persist in being less than clear. As I have previously said, there are ample grounds to question some aspects of the conduct of some operations. - but that is not going to happen via un-informed speculation

What type of Army do we want? That debate is ongoing. There is a danger that if we as an army focus overly now on Afghanistan we will pre-empt the debate. Personally I think we cannot do both. I also look at our current training regime and think we are losing core warfighting skills. I also look at the experience of the IDF in 2006 in Lebanon and how they transformed themselves over 2 years, what they focused on and then their experience in 2008 in Gaza and I wonder.

I disagree that you cannot do both. I visited a Tank unit on the Golan recently and while they train flat out for combined arms regular warfare, they know they may well have to dismount and man check points and do security patrols. - and 80% of the unit is <20 years old.

Tour Intervals My personal perspective is that 6 months on and 18 off is not very relaxing! I spent the majority of my time deployed out of barracks in the intervening 18 months as a company commander - just ask my ex!

Concur. Plus as your other post points out the wear and tear on units needs to be accounted for.

IEDs

I think Red Rat has pretty much nailed it, so let us leave the discussion of IEDs at that. There is no merit teaching IED 101 to civilians with no need to know. Those that need to know, know.

Good post mate. Sorry you have to keep doing it!