The UK in Afghanistan

[William F. Owen]

The best Counter-Insurgents are, like the Gestapo or the old-time New York Beat Cop, the guy who lived and breathed the neighborhood his whole life, went to school there, knows every kid from the playground, and every new person who comes around.

Errr.... and the Rebels often know this, and account for it. In Northern Ireland a lot of the Special Branch, RUC, and UDR were local boys. I knew a Major in the UDR who had actually been at school with one of the key players on his patch.

We had guys in Malaya who had been in the country for years at a time and spoke two native languages. Same in Kenya. etc etc etc. The British had been an integral part of Irish society for 300 years when we got kicked out.

but IMO, not the issue. The bit everyone keep missing when critiquing the UK involvement in A'Stan is they do not start with the "Policy." How many here have read the "Helmand road map?"
Point being you can only have a strategy that can be implemented in tactics.
Not much is wrong with the tactics, but Strategy makes no sense, and thus you may see Operations that do not deliver the intended out come in a sustainable way. - thus you get forced into tactical behaviours that are probably less than ideal.

The stupidity was going into Helmand in the first place, with too few troops and no intent to properly resource the strategic goal that had been set. If the policy makes no sense, nothing else will either.

[Steve the Planner]

Right.

We are really debating about the various alternatives to non-success.Would you like green or blue non-success? Hot or Cold? Wet or dry?

Note: I wanted to avoid those "loaded" terms like winning or losing, which, it seems, everyone agrees has no place in the Afghan operation? Is it an "operation" or just an "insinuation"? (Clear-Hold-Nag)

It gets more and more like an Eddie Izzard comedy routine.

[William F. Owen]

It gets more and more like an Eddie Izzard comedy routine.

He's my favourite cross dressing, heterosexual comedian!

[Steve the Planner]

I can hear him in my head explaining, as a historical review in retrospective, about the Afghan "Gesture." Maybe the Afghan "Manuever?"

[JMA]

Why tears? You have no dog in this fight. You're not engaged with the problem in any way. The British Army is not your Army. You're a spectator.
Why not stop being a tourist start telling us what all the men in theatre are doing so wrong?

Why not just answer the question?

One more time then.

"... what kind of tactical movement is being used by these patrols where they are out in the open and able to be seen from 500-700m? Not to mention fieldcraft and "selecting lines of advance" issues."

[William F. Owen]

"... what kind of tactical movement is being used by these patrols where they are out in the open and able to be seen from 500-700m? Not to mention fieldcraft and "selecting lines of advance" issues."

If you move, you risk getting spotted.
What was the mission, what was the context? Where did your distances come from?
You are not asking a question. You are making another of your baseless assertions that attempts to purvey the idea that you have something to teach the men in theatre.

[Red Rat]

This is the logical result of catching soldiers out in the open and watching them stay in the Barma lane out in the open.

It is also a logical progression to us becoming more effective in our C-IED capability. Warfare evolves on all sides. Experience shows that if you leave the Barma lane on SA contact you stand a very very high chance of running into secondary IEDs.

I say it again (with tears in my eyes) what kind of tactical movement is being used by these patrols where they are out in the open and able to be seen from 500-700m? Not to mention fieldcraft and "selecting lines of advance" issues.

As a patrol: maintain tactical balance, and all round defence/situational awareness. Do not set patterns. Avoid vulnerable points and areas and if you cannot then mitigate risk through use of ISTAR and armed overwatch. The fieldcraft principles are the same as were probably taught to you.

There is no right option, only the least bad option; especially in Sangin.

A sniper gets taken out????? I guess now the Brit snipers know that its back to basics in terms of see without being seen (an expensive lesson learned).

One sniper being taken out does not equate to a systematic failure in sniper training or TTPs. If we were losing snipers all the time or they were proving ineffective then there would be cause for concern, but neither is true. Sometimes the other side is better, sometimes it is just lucky.

[JMA]

It is also a logical progression to us becoming more effective in our C-IED capability. Warfare evolves on all sides. Experience shows that if you leave the Barma lane on SA contact you stand a very very high chance of running into secondary IEDs.

I understand and accept that. I merely state that if the troops are not setting themselves up for IEDs (which is wonderful) then the next vulnerable situation is to force them to go to ground in the open where the TB would pick them off rather than expect them to run into secondary IEDs. So I'm back to my old story... get out of the open, you won't find any Taliban there.

As a patrol: maintain tactical balance, and all round defence/situational awareness. Do not set patterns. Avoid vulnerable points and areas and if you cannot then mitigate risk through use of ISTAR and armed overwatch. The fieldcraft principles are the same as were probably taught to you.

Then there is something that has caused the troops to ignore the basics. I was taught (from Brit army pamphlet 1960, I think) to treat open ground as an obstacle. Run across it when covered or walk around it. So they tell me I would be doing a lot of walking or a lot of running and my reply is that you won't find any Taliban sitting out in the open.

There is no right option, only the least bad option; especially in Sangin.

Then its back to square one then? I suggest that the mission of each patrol is analysed as being a must do, should do or nice to do and this after taking a good long look at the benefit of having a series of static positions (Beau Geste type forts) to defend and have to patrol out of (there are just so many route variations and permutations).

One sniper being taken out does not equate to a systematic failure in sniper training or TTPs. If we were losing snipers all the time or they were proving ineffective then there would be cause for concern, but neither is true. Sometimes the other side is better, sometimes it is just lucky.

That was not my point. I suggested only that it was probably a wake-up call to all Brit snipers that they themselves have become targets, hence they have to go back to basics (and the bigfoot look, or whatever is appropriate for the area).

[JMA]

You are not asking a question. You are making another of your baseless assertions that attempts to purvey the idea that you have something to teach the men in theatre.

I have nothing to teach anyone that is not already in the basic soldiering pamphlets. The best way to solve the problem is to go back to the basics.

[William F. Owen]

Then there is something that has caused the troops to ignore the basics. I was taught (from Brit army pamphlet 1960, I think) to treat open ground as an obstacle. Run across it when covered or walk around it. So they tell me I would be doing a lot of walking or a lot of running and my reply is that you won't find any Taliban sitting out in the open.

Well this is where adhering to the so-called "basics" can let you down.
You might be forced into the open because of the IED threats in the hedges/bund-lines, and/or covered routes. Run how far? Ever tried running across a flooded field?
Sorry, but this is the standard 101 dilemma of dismounted operations. Sometimes you are forced to do the thing you shouldn't do because if you do not there is no point in being there.

Then its back to square one then? I suggest that the mission of each patrol is analysed as being a must do, should do or nice to do and this after taking a good long look at the benefit of having a series of static positions (Beau Geste type forts) to defend and have to patrol out of (there are just so many route variations and permutations).

So the patrol commander ends up telling the 1-Star he's got a sh*t plan and he's not going to do any patrols?

I have nothing to teach anyone that is not already in the basic soldiering pamphlets. The best way to solve the problem is to go back to the basics.

Basics? More often than not, the problem is the "basics." They're not as set in stone as some might think, and the "basics" are only starting point that you have to move on from.- and the a lot of UK basic soldiering pamphlets contain stuff that is far from useful.
EG: Dash-Down-Crawl-Observe-Sights-Fire, is so context specific it's mostly irrelevant.
One of the biggest problems with the British Army is the stuff contained in the Pamphlets!

[Infanteer]

The armchair quarterbacking here is phenomenal.

[Ken White]

a master of understatement...

[davidbfpo]

From the BBC News:

The soldiers of 11 Light Brigade marched through Winchester accompanied by three bands, while thousands of people lined the streets and cheered. Sixty-four soldiers from the brigade were killed in action during its six-month tour of duty...

The 12 regiments taking part are: 11 Light Brigade Headquarters Staff & 261 Signals Squadron; The Household Cavalry Regiment; 1 Royal Horse Artillery; 28 Engineer Regiment, The Royal Engineers; 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards; 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards.

Also, the 1st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment; 2nd Battalion The Yorkshire Regiment (Green Howards); 1st Battalion The Royal Welsh (The Royal Welsh Fusiliers); 3rd Battalion The Rifles; 11 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Regiment, Royal Logistic Corps; 10 Queen's Own Gurkha Logistic Regiment.

I am unsure if the twelve regiments were there in total, or elements of them to bolster formations; note six infantry battalions listed.

[William F. Owen]

Sixty-four soldiers from the brigade were killed in action during its six-month tour of duty...

Without crunching the numbers, I think that 64 KIA for, one Brigade, exceeds the losses for 3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands War. Sobering thought.
5 Brigade lost 56 at Bluff Cove

[baboon6]

From the BBC News:

I am unsure if the twelve regiments were there in total, or elements of them to bolster formations; note six infantry battalions listed.

Except for 11 EOD Regt all the battalions/regts listed were there pretty much in total although 1 R ANGLIAN was minus its HQ with the coys split up amongst other battle groups.

[JMA]

The armchair quarterbacking here is phenomenal.

You have a contribution to make?

[JMA]

Well this is where adhering to the so-called "basics" can let you down.
You might be forced into the open because of the IED threats in the hedges/bund-lines, and/or covered routes. Run how far? Ever tried running across a flooded field?
Sorry, but this is the standard 101 dilemma of dismounted operations. Sometimes you are forced to do the thing you shouldn't do because if you do not there is no point in being there.

The basics never let you down.

Dismounted operations - sounds good. They all have "close with and kill the enemy" missions or has some wandering around crept in.

Let me say it again that there is absolutely no point in patrolling over open ground unless it is treated as an obstacle. What do you expect to find in the open ground?

So the patrol commander ends up telling the 1-Star he's got a sh*t plan and he's not going to do any patrols?

How he handles it is his problem. But I feel for patrol commanders operating out of pointlessly established "Beau Geste" forts and having to conduct a heavy patrol schedule to keep the flags on the ops map moving and to fill up the daily SITREP.

Basics? More often than not, the problem is the "basics." They're not as set in stone as some might think, and the "basics" are only starting point that you have to move on from.- and the a lot of UK basic soldiering pamphlets contain stuff that is far from useful.
EG: Dash-Down-Crawl-Observe-Sights-Fire, is so context specific it's mostly irrelevant.
One of the biggest problems with the British Army is the stuff contained in the Pamphlets!

What have you decided the current basics should be replaced with?

Oh yes and tell me under which circumstances the good old "Dash-Down-Crawl-Observe-Sights-Fire" would be irrelevant?

[William F. Owen]

The basics never let you down.

Not so. Study the subject.

Dismounted operations - sounds good. They all have "close with and kill the enemy" missions or has some wandering around crept in.

Let me say it again that there is absolutely no point in patrolling over open ground unless it is treated as an obstacle. What do you expect to find in the open ground?

"Close with and kill the enemy" is one version of the "infantry mission." Dismounted operations covers the entire gamut of conducting operations on foot - eg, Reconnaissance.
You sometime have to move OVER open ground.

How he handles it is his problem. But I feel for patrol commanders operating out of pointlessly established "Beau Geste" forts and having to conduct a heavy patrol schedule to keep the flags on the ops map moving and to fill up the daily SITREP.

Well IF that was the reality, I feel for him as well. I'm in this game so as the boys suffer less.

What have you decided the current basics should be replaced with?

Which basics are you talking about? I'm a big fan of the right skills placed in the right context. Battle Drill has its place - given the right context and right application.
Given the wrong context you end up with rubbish like "Section Attacks."

Oh yes and tell me under which circumstances the good old "Dash-Down-Crawl-Observe-Sights-Fire" would be irrelevant?

As a reaction to an ambush, would be one. Operating in forest or jungle would be another. Reacting to artillery or mortar would be another.
It was taught as "reaction to effective enemy fire." - never said what fire, from where or when. - and it was never actually taught as part of the original battle drill, in 1941. IIRC DCOSF does not feature in that publication.
Reaction to all effective fire should be first to seek cover. Action after that should be context dependant.

[Infanteer]

You have a contribution to make?

I'd try, but the static is drowning things out....

[Ken White]

You have a contribution to make?

to the subject of this thread in Afghanistan. Yours?