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Thread: The UK in Afghanistan

  1. #601
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Red Rat View Post
    In the good old days there would be robust questioning in the Houses of Parliament over the conduct of campaigns, the consequences perhaps of having parliamentarians with military experience.
    Concur, and those with military experience appear to be unable to apply it usefully. In terms of British MPs some of the stupidest comments have come from former soldiers.
    Now robust questioning appears to be seen as disloyal to the soldiers on the frontline and there is a misperception that the military is infallible and therefore unquestionable. Actually most of what we do is common sense and should be open to greater scrutiny. I like the US system of congressional hearings for military appointments.
    I agree in terms of intent, but if you want to see the complete inability of a member of the public to approach this matter objectively, go and read "Defence of the Realm." - a blog loathed by every serving soldier I have spoken to about it, because it lacks knowledge of the issues, and takes a bizarre absolutist approach to military problems, impossible to apply in reality. The site has an agenda and is pumping hard.
    We have made some shocking mistakes in Afghanistan, at every level (Strategic, (IMHO especially resourcing and aims), operational and tactical).
    Some have been resolved, some have not. Some have figured on these boards, many have not !
    Concur 100%, but most people have no clue as to the what the mistakes are or look like. Because most lack military experience that can be usefully applied, they focus on "kit" and completely miss the flow down of other cause that impact in the issues that are actually far more important.

    I sat in an Officers mess earlier this year and talked to 3 Captains and a Major, who had served in Theatre and almost all the issues they complained about had got no public airing or discussion (even on his board). They were not worried generally about the "equipment". The were worried about Command, Resources and the conduct of operations.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    I agree in terms of intent, but if you want to see the complete inability of a member of the public to approach this matter objectively, go and read "Defence of the Realm." - a blog loathed by every serving soldier I have spoken to about it, because it lacks knowledge of the issues, and takes a bizarre absolutist approach to military problems, impossible to apply in reality. The site has an agenda and is pumping hard.
    I know it well. It is definitely not what I would call constructive criticism

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    I sat in an Officers mess earlier this year and talked to 3 Captains and a Major, who had served in Theatre and almost all the issues they complained about had got no public airing or discussion (even on his board). They were not worried generally about the "equipment". The were worried about Command, Resources and the conduct of operations.
    Command - Our limited means to command effectively in a dispersed battlefield (bandwidth the geeks cry!) and probably elements of our command ethos at certain levels.

    Resources - partly too few, but also the mistakes we make with managing and looking after the kit we have. Our vehicle fleet reminds me of the Wehrmacht circa 1943. It is not a fleet but a prolific confusion of oddities, none of which are available for routine training in the UK. Logistics and equipment support are not dirty words either. (Neither is bandwidth )

    Conduct of Operations - Why have we done what we have done, the way we have done it? I think this latter has improved hugely in the last 9 months.

    Morale of the story? You can have the best COIN doctrine in the world and the most swept up culturally aware warriors that exist, able to rain down death and destruction in 3 local languages and say sorry afterwards. But if you cannot come up with a decent plan, implement it effectively and maintain your combat power while doing so you are still going to get egg on your face! It's all about the basics
    RR

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Thumbs up Words to live by...

    Quote Originally Posted by Red Rat View Post
    ...But if you cannot come up with a decent plan, implement it effectively and maintain your combat power while doing so you are still going to get egg on your face! It's all about the basics
    My emphasis. Because that really sums it up. We are overly concerned with displaying (word of choice) our sophistication and erudition thus we have lost sight of that inviolable truth.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    My emphasis. Because that really sums it up. We are overly concerned with displaying (word of choice) our sophistication and erudition thus we have lost sight of that inviolable truth.
    I agree wholeheartedly.

    My question is if the use of new technology keeps being added onto the training requirement how come basic training is not being extended? Or (horror of horrors) are some of the basics being dropped to allow this additional technical training to be completed within the same time frame?

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    Council Member Red Rat's Avatar
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    Default There has been little impact on training for 2 reasons

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    I agree wholeheartedly.

    My question is if the use of new technology keeps being added onto the training requirement how come basic training is not being extended? Or (horror of horrors) are some of the basics being dropped to allow this additional technical training to be completed within the same time frame?
    Because most of the kit is only available for operational deployment and not for generic training (including basic training). Basic training now incorporates some of the basic TTPs such as 5 and 20 metre checks and forensic awareness, but little else (we have no money to buy all the kit we want!)

    Of course even if the kit was available, the TTPs evolve (in accordance with the threat) so quickly that it is hard to identify 'constants' that can be taught as part of basic and generic training as opposed to the specifics to a given time and place. What we do not want to do is teach someone a drill that they may have to 'unlearn' prior to deployment.
    Last edited by Red Rat; 07-14-2010 at 10:27 AM. Reason: add title
    RR

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Red Rat View Post
    Because most of the kit is only available for operational deployment and not for generic training (including basic training). Basic training now incorporates some of the basic TTPs such as 5 and 20 metre checks and forensic awareness, but little else (we have no money to buy all the kit we want!)
    ...and actually nothing new. Even when I did my Basic at the Regimental Depot (long time ago!) in 1980, we had lots of NI stuff thrown in like, VCPs, and there was a whole lot really only relevant to Malaya and Borneo still hanging on.
    IMO, there is actually a lot about so-called "basic training" that really needs updating, because....
    What we do not want to do is teach someone a drill that they may have to 'unlearn' prior to deployment.
    ....and that is exactly the problem.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Default Two different viewpoints

    The UK news in recent days has focussed on the death of three soldiers serving with an ANA unit, two British officers and a Ghurka. The attacker, a Hazara sergeant, escaped and is allegedly with the local Taliban.

    No Narrative in Helmand Campaign: linkhttp://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/07/no-...mand-campaign/

    From an untested blogsite, but from the KoW website: Should Britain withdraw from Afghanistan? Link:http://thinkstrat.wordpress.com/2010...m-afghanistan/ This appears to come from an outsider who has an affinity to the Conservative Party.
    davidbfpo

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    Default Notes from AfPak past...

    In a book written by someone called Winston Churchill and narrates the British Empire's travails on what is now the AfPak border against Pathan tribesmen. HTT types could only envy his penetrating cultural analysis. Politicos would profit well from reading it too...

    The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episdoe of Frontier War

    Over all is a bright blue sky and powerful sun. Such is the scenery of the theatre of war. The inhabitants of these wild but wealthy valleys are of many tribes, but are similar in character and condition. The abundant crops which a warm sun and copious rain raise from a fertile soil, support a numerous population in a state of warlike leisure. Except at the times of sowing and of harvest, a continual state of feud and strife prevails throughout the land. Tribe wars with tribe. The people of one valley fight with those of the next. And to the quarrels of communities are added the combats of individuals. Khan assails khan, each supported by his retainers. Every tribesman has a blood feud with his neighbour. Every man's hand is against the other, and all against the stranger. Nor are these struggles conducted with the weapons which usually belong to the races of such development. To the ferocity of the Zulu are added the craft of the Redskin and the marksmanship of the Boer. The world is presented with that grim spectacle, "the strength of civilisation without its mercy ". At a thousand yards the traveller falls wounded by the well-aimed bullet of a breech-loading rifle. His assailant, approaching, hacks him to death with the ferocity of a South-Sea Islander. Here the weapons of the nineteenth century, are in the hands of the savages, of the stone age.

    Every influence, every motive, that provokes the spirit of murder among men, impels these mountaineers to deeds of treachery and violence. The strong aboriginal propensity to kill, inherent in all Human beings, has in these valleys, been preserved in unexampled strength and vigour. That religion, which above all others was founded and propagated by the sword—the tenets and principles of which are instinct with incentives to slaughter and which in three continents has produced fighting breeds of men—stimulates a wild and merciless fanaticism. The love of plunder, always a characteristic of hill tribes, is fostered by the spectacle of that opulence and luxury which, to their eyes, the cities and the plains of the south display. A code of honour not less punctilious than that of old Spain, is supported by vendettas as implacable as those of Corsica. In such a state of society, all property is held directly by main force. Every man is a soldier. Either he is the retainer of some khan—the man-at-arms of some feudal baron as it were—or he is a unit in the armed force of his village—the burgher of mediaeval history.

    In such surrounding we may without difficulty trace the rise and fall of an ambitious Pathan. At first he toils with zeal and thrift as an agriculturist, on that plot of ground which his family have held since they expelled some former possessor. He accumulates in secret a sum of money. With this he buys a rifle from some daring thief, who has risked his life to snatch it from a frontier guard-house. He becomes a man to be feared. Then he builds a lower to his house and overawes those around him in the village. Gradually they submit to his authority. He might now rule the village; but he aspires still higher. He persuades or compels his neighbours to join with him, in an attack on the castle of a local khan. The attack succeeds. The khan flies or is killed, the castle captured. The retainers make terms with the conqueror. The land tenure is feudal. In return for their acres they follow their new chief to war. Were he to treat them worse than other khans treated their servants, they would sell their strong arms elsewhere. He treats them well. Others resort to him. He buys more rifles. He conquers two or three neighbouring khans. He has now become a power. Many, perhaps all, states have been founded in this way, and it is by such steps that civilisation painfully stumbles through her earlier stages. But in these villages the warlike nature of the people and their hatred of control, arrest the further progress of development. We have watched a man, able, thrifty, brave, fighting his way to power, absorbing, amalgamating, laying the foundations of a more complex and interdependent stateof society. He has so far succeeded. But his success is now his ruin. A combination is formed against him. The surrounding chiefs and their adherents are assisted by the village populations.
    The ambitious Pathan, oppressed by numbers, is destroyed. The victors quarrel over the spoil, and the story closes, as it began, in bloodshed and strife. The conditions of existence that have been thus indicated have naturally led to the dwelling-places of these tribes being fortified. If they are in the valley they are protected by towers and walls loopholed for musketry. If in the hollows of the hills they are strong by their natural position. In either case they are guarded by a hardy and martial people, well armed, brave, and trained by constant war.

    This state of continual tumult has produced a habit of mind which recks little of injuries, holds life cheap and embarks on war with careless levity. The tribesmen of the Afghan border, afford the spectacle of a people, who fight without passion, and kill one another, without loss of temper. Such a disposition, combined with an absolute lack of reverence for all forms of law, and authority, and a complete assurance of equality, is the cause of their frequent quarrels, with the British power. A trifle rouses their animosity. (pp.4-7)

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Concur, and those with military experience appear to be unable to apply it usefully. In terms of British MPs some of the stupidest comments have come from former soldiers.

    Concur 100%, but most people have no clue as to the what the mistakes are or look like. Because most lack military experience that can be usefully applied, they focus on "kit" and completely miss the flow down of other cause that impact in the issues that are actually far more important.

    I sat in an Officers mess earlier this year and talked to 3 Captains and a Major, who had served in Theatre and almost all the issues they complained about had got no public airing or discussion (even on his board). They were not worried generally about the "equipment". The were worried about Command, Resources and the conduct of operations.
    Perhaps the principal reason for these failures to understand is the rapidity of change in military thinking. Many former soldiers assume things are as they were in their day and simply do not get the changes, particularly in counterinsurgency.

    I note that several media outlets in the U.S.A. have made some effort to explain current American COIN doctrine however the equivalent does not appear to me to have happened in the UK. Whether this can be ascribed to a lack of interest or desire by British media or to a failure of government/MOD/Military institutions is a matter for debate.

    Without public understanding what we are trying to do and how and why we are trying to it the disconnect between the public and the military will not be closed.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Rodin View Post
    Perhaps the principal reason for these failures to understand is the rapidity of change in military thinking. Many former soldiers assume things are as they were in their day and simply do not get the changes, particularly in counterinsurgency.
    OK, but none of that is true. Military thinking is not changing rapidly, because warfare only changes very slowly.
    Most of the former soldiers who actually study warfare are seeing nothing new and that includes the mythology of "counterinsurgency." British Officers have been writing books about it for 100 years.
    Without public understanding what we are trying to do and how and why we are trying to it the disconnect between the public and the military will not be closed.
    Yes the UK public are very poorly informed about war and warfare. No way around that. They are poorly informed about engineering and medicine as well.
    We should be able to educate junior and senior officers a lot better than we currently do.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default Exclusive: Official - Troops out of Afghanistan by 2014

    An 'exclusive' and appears to apply to all ISAF nations. Yes, it could be spin:
    A communiqué containing a blueprint for British troops to pull out from Afghanistan in four years' time has been leaked ahead of a major international conference this week.
    Link:http://www.independent.co.uk/news/wo...4-2029419.html

    Accompanying article by Patrick Cockburn:
    The greatest difficulty facing the US and Britain in Afghanistan is not that the Taliban is very strong, but that the Afghan government is very weak. This does not seem to be changing, and it is this that creates difficulties in making concrete plans and dates for an American and British withdrawal.
    Link:http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion...t-2029420.html

    Still four years away and will the Afghan government be any better then?
    davidbfpo

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    Theo Farrell, Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand, 2006-2009...

    In the 1980s, the British Army came to appreciate the need to get serious about doctrine, and so from the 1990s on, the British became significant producers of military doctrine.65 However, the view within the British Army going into Helmand was that it lacked an up-to-date COIN doctrine. Thus, 52 Brigade looked for doctrine to inform its training and preparations, it drew on the new U.S. Army/U.S. Marine Corps doctrine on COIN, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, which was issued to all commanders in the brigade. Indeed, 52 Brigade’s CONOPS, “Clear, Hold, Build,” was taken directly from FM 3-24.66 Actually, the British Army did have a COIN doctrine, produced in 1995, that was fit for purpose: and indeed, this doctrine informed FM 3-24. However, Countering Insurgent Operations (1995) was not mass produced and promulgated, because the British Army’s main focus in the mid 1990s was on peace operations, and so was little known about a decade later.67 In other words, poor organisational memory prevented the British Army from recovering core competencies. At the same time, as the case of 52 Brigade illustrates, it gave impetus to the search for new ideas.(p.19)

    The puzzle remains, however. Since poor organisational memory, decentralisation, and personnel change were present from the beginning of the campaign, why did it take 18 months for the British military to shift from exploiting core competencies to exploring a new approach?(p.20)


    52 Brigade did benefit from certain contextual factors that facilitated the shift to a “softer” way of war, namely, new Taliban tactics, increased ANA capabilities, and increased resources. In 2006-2007, Taliban forces suffered considerable attrition in heavy fighting with ISAF in Helmand. British Defence Intelligence puts the number of Taliban dead in the thousands (though some British commanders have expressed doubts at such high figures). Accordingly, since early 2008, the Taliban have been less inclined to launch major assaults on district centres and ISAF bases. Thus, when U.S. Marines launched an offensive against the Taliban strongholds in Garmsir district in 2008, the Taliban main force retreated rather than put up a fight. Equally, when 16 Brigade launched an air assault on Taliban villages south of Musa Qaleh, they found that the Taliban had fled.71 In Kajaki, an Afghan interpreter hired by the British to listen to Taliban communications in 2008 “described almost comical attempts by different commanders to shirk combat and foist the responsibility on other commanders.” Essentially the Taliban learned the cost of engaging in direct attacks on ISAF forces.(p.21)


    The final missing piece of the jigsaw is the character of 52 brigade and its commander. As a long-standing regular brigade (formed in 1899), 12 Mechanised Brigade had an extensive and well developed and exercised repertoire of conventional combat competencies, where were employed in the 1991 Gulf War and in Iraq in 2004. In contrast, 52 Infantry Brigade was formed for WWI and disband afterwards, then reformed for WWII and again disbanded afterwards. In the 1960s, it reformed but only as a reserve brigade. In 2002 it took command of regular army units but as a Type B brigade, i.e., a non-deployable regional brigade. In February 2006, it was turned into a Type A deployable brigade. In late 2006, Brigadier Mackay was notified that his brigade was to be deployed to Helmand within a year. 52 Brigade staff then underwent a massive expansion; the brigade HQ increased from 15 to eventually 175 staff. Incoming staff officers brought a wealth of experience with them. But the key point is that this was a newly formed Type A brigade, and hence one that was less committed to an established repertoire of core competences and one more open to new alternatives introduced by Brigadier Mackay. Moreover, Brigadier Mackay was less conventionally-minded that his predecessors in Helmand. Prior to taking over in Afghanistan, he had led missions to reform the Iraqi police force (2004) and the Lebanese Army (2006). On his return from Helmand, Brigadier Mackay was to work in the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre promoting the influence-orientated approach to operations.(p.24)

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    Default UK troops launch Operation Tor Shezada

    From the BBC:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10807606

    A battle group trying to clear another Taliban-held town in the "green zone" and note the map provided. Oddly the name given to this is Tor Shezada or Black Prince and a contact remarked:
    Why chose this name? They already see outsiders as Black Princes why reaffirm their concerns?
    The BBC "man in the street" quote in a nearby town was he preferred the Taliban to rule.
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    Quote Originally Posted by davidbfpo View Post
    From the BBC:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10807606

    A battle group trying to clear another Taliban-held town in the "green zone" and note the map provided. Oddly the name given to this is Tor Shezada or Black Prince and a contact remarked:

    The BBC "man in the street" quote in a nearby town was he preferred the Taliban to rule.
    This BBC article is interesting. It explains why the locals support the Taliban as follows:

    But the combination of a corrupt and brutal police force and an abusive local government, together with an aggressive poppy eradication programme, turned it into a virulent insurgent stronghold.
    and on the dynamics of support:

    It is true that intimidation is the weapon of choice when it comes to coercing the local population, but there is also genuine support for insurgents who are largely drawn from the area.
    The circus that is the ISAF campaign is built around propping up an illegitimate and corrupt regime, tacit acceptance of heroin production and the insane belief that by handing out sweets to kids and building the odd piece of infrastructure the locals are going to start to turn their kith and kin (who have taken up arms) over to 20 something kids out of London or Manchester who are swinging through Afghanistan on a quick 6 month tour. If this not insanity please tell me what is.

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    Default UK military speak on historical Afg ops

    Two recent IISS (London) presentations I missed until today:

    On Friday 21 May 2010 Air Commodore Stuart Atha MA BSc DSO RAF, Head, Joint Capability, Ministry of Defence spoke on 'Operations in Afghanistan: the contribution of UK air power'..was until recently the UK Air Component Commander in Afghanistan. He analysed the contribution of Fast Air and ISTAR platforms, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and the support provided to ground troops from the air.
    Link:http://www.iiss.org/programmes/afgha...-uk-air-power/

    Alas in each the slides used are not included; both talks last just over an hour.

    On Friday 18 June 2010 Brigadier James M Cowan OBE, Commander, 11 Light Brigade spoke on “Operations in Helmand: a Brigade Commander’s perspective”.

    11 Lt Bde were deployed to Afghanistan as Task Force Helmand from October 2009 until they handed over to 4 Mech Bde in early April 2010. Brigadier Cowan discussed his Brigade’s operations and responsibilities in Helmand, including the challenges that were presented during the planning and execution of Operation Moshtarak.
    Link:http://www.iiss.org/programmes/afgha...s-perspective/
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 08-01-2010 at 08:40 PM. Reason: Update on time of talk
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    Default UK training in Kenya

    Two weeks this short article 'Friendly Fire' by Aidan Hartley appeared in The Spectator, on Anglo-Kenyan training in Laikipia and IIRC both JMA and Red Rat have sparred on why we this pre-Helmand deployment for the UK:
    Kenya has become the British Army’s most important overseas infantry training spot. Each year, 10,000 British and Kenyan troops exercise together in our home area of the Laikipia plateau. The aridity, high altitude and rugged terrain resemble Helmand.
    Link:http://www.spectator.co.uk/columnist...dly-fire.thtml
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    Quote Originally Posted by davidbfpo View Post
    Two recent IISS (London) presentations I missed until today:

    Link:http://www.iiss.org/programmes/afgha...-uk-air-power/

    Alas in each the slides used are not included; both talks last just over an hour.

    Link:http://www.iiss.org/programmes/afgha...s-perspective/
    Interesting but nothing really of note. If you listen (and its worth a listen) to these two you get the impression that the war is all but wrapped up.

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    Quote Originally Posted by davidbfpo View Post
    Two weeks this short article 'Friendly Fire' by Aidan Hartley appeared in The Spectator, on Anglo-Kenyan training in Laikipia and IIRC both JMA and Red Rat have sparred on why we this pre-Helmand deployment for the UK:

    Link:http://www.spectator.co.uk/columnist...dly-fire.thtml
    Quote:
    Apparently, there’s nowhere in the Tropics as perfect for infantry manoeuvres.

    and

    Kenya benefits greatly from the Army, which pours £17 million a year into the country.
    The first is questionable and the question needs to be asked as to why the Brit army needs to train their infantry in the African tropics? I would suggest that the £17 million a year be moved to the foreign aid budget and they stop using the defence budget as a source of dispensing foreign aid.

    It is just another month away from home and family prior to the tour of Afghanistan. Who did the cost/benefit exercise on this one?

    I have commented on what I believe to be the how to get the best out of Kenya as a training area. Pretending it is Afghanistan is certainly not one of them.

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    Default A pause to remember VJ Day

    Let us remember the words of John Maxwell Edmonds (1875 -1958) today:
    When you go home, tell them of us and say, for their tomorrow, we gave our today.
    PM David Cameron prior to the service at the Cenotaph said:

    We must never forget the sacrifices made and the dedication showed by those who served our country in the Second World War. They fought and suffered around the world in ferocious conditions. They witnessed incomprehensible horrors. They lost their lives -- and many were imprisoned. And they did all this for us -- to protect the freedoms we all enjoy today.

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    Default Should British soldiers be dying for the rights of Afghan women? No.

    This article could fit in an Afghan thread and those on why are we there, but is placed here and clearly the question applies not just to the UK.

    Opens with the sub-headline:
    Should British soldiers be dying for the rights of Afghan women? No.
    It ends:
    Social change will come eventually to Afghanistan, but it must come from within, and at its own pace. Our soldiers shouldn't die for it.
    Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...tan-women-west
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