The UK in Afghanistan

[JMA]

Infanteer posed a simple question. What do YOU see as the issues, JMA, and what would YOU do to fix them? No one's looking for the Brits to admit anything. It's your identification of the issues and your proposed solutions that he's interested in.

For some reason the situation in Helmand was allowed to get out of control.

Did the Brits ever go to their dear uncle Sam and say we are over stretched, under resourced, and out of our depth so please help (like was needed at Musa Qala?)

There is a need to hold the vital ground in Helmand which I understand to be what is called the Lashkar Gar triangle. If they have enough resources to do this then its fine and they should remain in Helmand under command of the incoming USMC formation. If not they should quietly be shifted to an area where they can manage with the resources they have at their disposal.

What is certain is that the USMC commander should not allow the Brits to experiment tactically given their poor track record in Iraq and so far in Afghanistan.

Anthony King highlights the weaknesses brought about by the respective regimental cultures whereby the Paras behave like paras, the marines behave like marines and mech behave like mech. This is why I advocate that the majority of the training be carried out in theatre rather than by the battalions themselves in Kenya and on mud island.

Further to this of course would be the establishment of permanent Brigade HQ where continuity of command, strategy and the rest can be assured. Then one would rotate the battalions one at a time rather than en mass. All things which maintain continuity at a level way better than now but still not as good as if volunteer Afghan battalions were raised for the duration (as discussed earlier).

Troops would then be taught languages, about the different cultures and the religion and through more time in theatre gain a real working knowledge of the terrain and climate and importantly the enemy. These are all necessary given the slow roll out of Afghan forces (especially in Helmand comprising Pashtuns)

In the process the IED threat would be addressed further. Not only in terms of detection but also avoidance.

OK, so one for you Steve. Why have the US been so patient with the lack of performance of the Brits in Helmand? Because they want the hitherto arrogant Brits to be humbled in the process or that they really until now have had no troops to take over Helmand themselves?

[JMA]

Sorry it is off topic, but on the subject of tour lengths, my personal belief is that Afghanistan is built for year long tours - everything revolves around the fighting season. Come in during the fall, get the tail end of the action, spend the winter figuring the country out and sorting yourself out, get a solid plan set in the spring and weather the May-September fighting season with your operational concept intact. Pass it off to the next group in September.

Would I want to do a year-long tour? Not particularly, but it would probably make better sense from an operational point of view.

Of course, for the US Army this isn't an issue.

Ideally then all change overs should take place in September, yes? Is that possible? Who does the planning for the fighting season? Do the fighting soldiers have to survive the Afghan winter in order to prepare for the 'fighting season'?

[JMA]

As I said, "platoon houses" or, more simply, dispersing your forces has its advantages and disadvantages. As others have pointed out, there was significant reasons why this was done in 2006. The point is, I've seen the concept fail and I've seen it succeed. The fact that it didn't work in Helmand in 2006 doesn't mean the concept itself is flawed. I can say this with some authority as I lived in one for months and had some success.

For the purpose of this thread the concept failed in Helmand under the Brits. That's all that matters.

[JMA]

Indirectly, the President of Afghanistan , since he didn't want those district centres to fall to the Taliban. With TF Helmand only initially having five infantry coys, there wasn't much choice really.

Why am I hearing nothing about the US here? Did the Brits ever go to the US and ask for assistance saying that what was being demanded of them was beyond their capabilities and that such a deployment was against their better judgement? My person gut feel is that the Brits tried to go it alone.

Now if the Brit military commanders had gone back to No 10 and said they would be unable to carry out what was being requested/demanded by the Afghan president and governor it would have been up to the Brit politicians to take up the matter with their Afghan counterparts, yes?

So yes there was a choice but none of the Brits had the bottle to stand up and state clearly that what was being asked of them was beyond their ability given the resources available.

Answered above by RedRat:
6 months: post-tour leave and individual training courses
6 months: general unit and sub-unit training; may include an exercise in Canada or Kenya, and for a few coys a deployment to the Falkland Islands
6 months: mission specific training

That's a bit to general really. It also indicates just how underutilised the Brit forces really are. What do the US forces do between tours?

[JMA]

I read it only superficially, but it seems as if the real topic is slow learning and arrogance - cultural defects, not tactical details.

(snip)

Maybe such cultural traits are much more interesting in regard to the Helmand/Basrah performances than what exactly they did when where and how badly it failed.

Anthony Kings work is well worth the read and saving for future reference.

[Infanteer]

For some reason the situation in Helmand was allowed to get out of control.

2006 happened because 2 battalions (1 UK, 1 Canadian) transitioned down to Helmand and Kandahar provinces and ran smack into a concerted effort by the Quetta Shura Taliban to retake the south. Call it a meeting engagement. The Brits dispersed while the Canadians abandoned a plan to penny-packet forces and roamed around at the company/battlegroup level. Although I'd argue that neither had much long-term effect (the enemy would adapt and come back) the Canadians did seem better off with a mechanized battlegroup that came to Helmand to support the Paras.

Anthony King highlights the weaknesses brought about by the respective regimental cultures whereby the Paras behave like paras, the marines behave like marines and mech behave like mech. This is why I advocate that the majority of the training be carried out in theatre rather than by the battalions themselves in Kenya and on mud island.

Further to this of course would be the establishment of permanent Brigade HQ where continuity of command, strategy and the rest can be assured. Then one would rotate the battalions one at a time rather than en mass. All things which maintain continuity at a level way better than now but still not as good as if volunteer Afghan battalions were raised for the duration (as discussed earlier).

Troops would then be taught languages, about the different cultures and the religion and through more time in theatre gain a real working knowledge of the terrain and climate and importantly the enemy. These are all necessary given the slow roll out of Afghan forces (especially in Helmand comprising Pashtuns)

In the process the IED threat would be addressed further. Not only in terms of detection but also avoidance.

Okay - so now I'm tracking. Regimental culture, lack of persistant command and control, poor training during work-up, little cultural awareness and a lack of ability to confront the IED threat.

At least you've stated why you believe the mission has been a gongshow, now would anyone who's been to Helmand care to comment?

Ideally then all change overs should take place in September, yes? Is that possible? Who does the planning for the fighting season? Do the fighting soldiers have to survive the Afghan winter in order to prepare for the 'fighting season'?

September would be ideal, in my view. Things die down after the summer heat - at least in Southern Afghanistan. I have no idea how things work in the east as it is a different climate and a different foe.

As for surviving the Afghan winter - whom are you referring to? The insurgent fighter either goes back to his farm or takes a trip to Pakistan.

For the purpose of this thread the concept failed in Helmand under the Brits. That's all that matters.

Roger, tracking. I'm just trying to point out that adopting such a strategy does not necessarily imply failure. Don't throw the baby out with the bathwater (not implying you were, more of a general statement).

[Fuchs]

As for surviving the Afghan winter - whom are you referring to? The insurgent fighter either goes back to his farm or takes a trip to Pakistan.

Strange.
I was under the impression that the shadow governors of the Taleban had a core of loyal fighters in every season in order to deal with political opposition - and as bodyguards.
The mere jihadists may go home, of course.

[Steve Blair]

Anthony King highlights the weaknesses brought about by the respective regimental cultures whereby the Paras behave like paras, the marines behave like marines and mech behave like mech. This is why I advocate that the majority of the training be carried out in theatre rather than by the battalions themselves in Kenya and on mud island.

/snip for quote/

OK, so one for you Steve. Why have the US been so patient with the lack of performance of the Brits in Helmand? Because they want the hitherto arrogant Brits to be humbled in the process or that they really until now have had no troops to take over Helmand themselves?

Actually, you'll see those same "cultural differences" without a regimental system. Nothing especially new there. We see it in the US military as well, although it can be focused on branch or division instead of a single regiment. And wouldn't creating a special "colonial brigade" (which is what others could call a unit specifically raised and trained for Afghanistan) simply create another unit that was doing things "its way"?

I frankly don't think that it's a matter of US "patience" or lack thereof. I suspect a lack of troops was at least part of the reason, but I don't pretend to be in on higher policy decisions (and don't wish the partial lobotomy that seems to be required to be in on such decisions).

[Infanteer]

I was under the impression that the shadow governors of the Taleban had a core of loyal fighters in every season in order to deal with political opposition - and as bodyguards.
The mere jihadists may go home, of course.

Yes - there are areas of the country where a persistant presence is maintained - that's what I meant when I said they go home - the guys just quit fighting at the end of the summer for various reasons. Just because they are there doesn't mean they are going to fight you when you come; while waving at you and telling you there are no insurgents, they are probably trying to figure out what exfil route you're using so they can get an IED on it.

The Afghan insurgent usually only fights when he springs his trap or when he is surprised and cornered.

As an aside, you can see why population control (and biometrics, its new tool) is so useful in small wars.

[Ken White]

We haven't even started yet. You can always withdraw if you are tired and bored.

Imperial 'we' again?

Bored. Tedium does that...

[GI Zhou]

Why do I feel that there is some trolling going on. Correct me if I am wrong by all means.

[Ken White]

'til they burst. Messy but fun.

[William F. Owen]

Further to this of course would be the establishment of permanent Brigade HQ where continuity of command, strategy and the rest can be assured.

Sorry, but why a permanent formation level of command for a theatre? Explain.

In the process the IED threat would be addressed further. Not only in terms of detection but also avoidance.

How is this not the same thing? - to anybody with any IED awareness training.

[Chris jM]

It's also been my observation that most -- certainly too many -- people expect an Army to do what it's told. It will. however, it will only do that as well as it knows how. That interchange on capabilities ...is necessary but rarely occurs forthrightly on the part of either the force or the politicians.

That, I can grok. Thanks Ken and Fuchs for the clarification.

[Red Rat]

For some reason the situation in Helmand was allowed to get out of control.

Did the Brits ever go to their dear uncle Sam and say we are over stretched, under resourced, and out of our depth so please help (like was needed at Musa Qala?)

At the time of the initial ISAF engagement in Helmand Afghanistan was clearly an economy of force operation for both the US and UK, with the main effort being Iraq. It is only as the situation in Iraq began to stabilise that more attention was paid to Afghanistan. Even if the Brits had gone to the US with requests for more - the cupboards were pretty bare.
I would be surprised if the US Joint Chiefs were not aware of how over stretched and under resourced we were at the time.
In terms of 'out of our depth' I am not sure if I agree with that; 'woefully unprepared' I would agree with. It would be interesting to see the results of the IPB conducted for the British insertion into Helmand....

There is a need to hold the vital ground in Helmand which I understand to be what is called the Lashkar Gar triangle. If they have enough resources to do this then its fine and they should remain in Helmand under command of the incoming USMC formation. If not they should quietly be shifted to an area where they can manage with the resources they have at their disposal.

I quite agree and this does make sense from a tactical point of view. However this may cause a collapse of the UK strategic centre of gravity (the support of the UK domestic population) and as such is an issue that needs to be considered at all levels from tactical through to strategic. Helmand and the Helmand place names are now well known to the British public, a move away might be perceived as a retreat and would certainly raise questions about government competence to date. A new government may wish to take the risk, but it is significant. Coalition ops are messy!

What is certain is that the USMC commander should not allow the Brits to experiment tactically given their poor track record in Iraq and so far in Afghanistan.

I am not sure what you mean by this. The UK are following the agreed ISAF CONOPS as laid down by McCrystal. I see more signs of tactical experimentation by US units then British, especially in the US use of money and their willing to engage (politically) with parties on the ground.

Anthony King highlights the weaknesses brought about by the respective regimental cultures whereby the Paras behave like paras, the marines behave like marines and mech behave like mech. This is why I advocate that the majority of the training be carried out in theatre rather than by the battalions themselves in Kenya and on mud island.

I have not read the King report, however I would say that training troops in theatre to the degree which you are intimating is likely to fall foul of UK Health and Safety Legislation (which stipulates that troops should be equipped and trained prior to deployment to Theatre). The repatriation of UK dead from theatre (instead of burying in situ) and subsequent coroner's inquests have had some unforseen consequences; not least an unparralled (and IMHO uninformed) scrutiny by coroner's inquests resulting in adverse publicity and very very scared politicians.

Further to this of course would be the establishment of permanent Brigade HQ where continuity of command, strategy and the rest can be assured. Then one would rotate the battalions one at a time rather than en mass. All things which maintain continuity at a level way better than now but still not as good as if volunteer Afghan battalions were raised for the duration (as discussed earlier).

Well we have volunteer Afghan battalions already in the shape of 205 Corps ANA I would rather see a more permanent presence at Regional Command (Division) level.

In the process the IED threat would be addressed further. Not only in terms of detection but also avoidance.

Our drills are equipment are pretty slick at this. The issue is that where we hear IED but the reality on the groud is that they are operating in medium to high intensity intelligent minefields. No one solution fits and a holistic approach is required. We have to detect and attack the device (tick very good here); attack the network (tick very good here), dominate the ground (tick not so good here, need more ISTAR and more boots on the ground) and encompassing all is bringing the locals on side so that they do not allow by commission or omission IEDs to be placed (tick pretty good programme in place here!)

OK, so one for you Steve. Why have the US been so patient with the lack of performance of the Brits in Helmand? Because they want the hitherto arrogant Brits to be humbled in the process or that they really until now have had no troops to take over Helmand themselves?

The feedback I have is that the US are pretty happy with our performance. They know we did not do so well in part in Iraq, but that was then; we have learnt lessons, changed TTPs and moved on. In Afghanistan particularly in how we are linking Mil and non-mil within a coherent strategy (the top Brit man in Helmand is a civilian) we are setting the way.

[JMA]

2006 happened because 2 battalions (1 UK, 1 Canadian) transitioned down to Helmand and Kandahar provinces and ran smack into a concerted effort by the Quetta Shura Taliban to retake the south. Call it a meeting engagement. The Brits dispersed while the Canadians abandoned a plan to penny-packet forces and roamed around at the company/battlegroup level. Although I'd argue that neither had much long-term effect (the enemy would adapt and come back) the Canadians did seem better off with a mechanized battlegroup that came to Helmand to support the Paras.

One appreciates that back in 2006 it was a difficult time in Helmand. Sympathy aside though it was clear that the action taken by the Brits was poorly judged (I'm trying to be nice about this). The Commando unit who replaced 3 Para used mobile operations groups (MOGs) to carry out raids... that failed as well. Slow learners.

Okay - so now I'm tracking. Regimental culture, lack of persistant command and control, poor training during work-up, little cultural awareness and a lack of ability to confront the IED threat.

That and more. This is a long thread. But don't expect any Brits or Brit apologists to accept any or all of that. And for the record it is not just me saying this it turns out that there is a growing body of opinion in total agreement with all that and more. The Brits got a wake up call and instead of taking note just rolled over and went back to sleep.

At least you've stated why you believe the mission has been a gongshow, now would anyone who's been to Helmand care to comment?

I have got a fair amount of "you are wrong", "you don't know what you are talking about", "you don't understand the context"... but no one has been able to refute anything I have said other than with "that is not what the people I talk to say".

September would be ideal, in my view. Things die down after the summer heat - at least in Southern Afghanistan. I have no idea how things work in the east as it is a different climate and a different foe.

As for surviving the Afghan winter - whom are you referring to? The insurgent fighter either goes back to his farm or takes a trip to Pakistan.

Having touched snow twice in my life I would also take off in winter. But surely there are opportunities for troops trained in art of winter warfare?

Roger, tracking. I'm just trying to point out that adopting such a strategy does not necessarily imply failure. Don't throw the baby out with the bathwater (not implying you were, more of a general statement).

If you apply a strategy in the wrong place and at the wrong time it and not the strategy is the failure. There is probably a time and place for everything, even negotiating a withdrawal (which has been done twice recently).

[JMA]

The Afghan insurgent usually only fights when he springs his trap or when he is surprised and cornered.

This is of interest as I have it similar.

Working on COIN encounter action drills (you have them like this?) - situation A, B, C - initiative with insurgents, simultaneous sighting, initiative with you.

Why is it that there are so view 'Situation C' contacts do you think?

As an aside, you can see why population control (and biometrics, its new tool) is so useful in small wars.

Absolutely ideal. Carry a SAGEM or other fingerprint reader connect via GSM and the world is your oyster. Register everyone onto the database (with photos) and take it from there...

[JMA]

Actually, you'll see those same "cultural differences" without a regimental system. Nothing especially new there. We see it in the US military as well, although it can be focused on branch or division instead of a single regiment. And wouldn't creating a special "colonial brigade" (which is what others could call a unit specifically raised and trained for Afghanistan) simply create another unit that was doing things "its way"?

Not "its way", the way suited to the particular evolving war in Afghanistan. There are many ways of skinning the cat and one could phase in Afghans (in the case of Helmand, Pashtuns) and have a clear succession plan.

Which ever way the benefits of continuity, retained local knowledge, retained combat experience etc etc far outweigh the amateurish 6 months/18 months cycle currently in use.

I frankly don't think that it's a matter of US "patience" or lack thereof. I suspect a lack of troops was at least part of the reason, but I don't pretend to be in on higher policy decisions (and don't wish the partial lobotomy that seems to be required to be in on such decisions).

Did you answer the question?

[JMA]

Sorry, but why a permanent formation level of command for a theatre? Explain.

I missed the please there somewhere?

I'm talking about Helmand. What the Brits would need a theatre HQ for I wouldn't know. Maybe a few staff officers to be attached to the applicable US HQ.

For permanent read the benefit of continuity etc etc.

How is this not the same thing? - to anybody with any IED awareness training.

OK I'll type slowly.

If you have to drive or walk somewhere you do the barma thing, otherwise if you don't drive or walk you have avoided the risk.

Seven of of the last ten fatalities through IEDs... still see no problem?

[9351]

Hello from newcomer.
Having just returned from Helmand after a 7 month tour, i noticed in one of the above posts about winter training etc. Having done a couple tours over there, and the 1st seeing actual snow, this year it was quite a mild winter.
The mention of 12 month tour durations, i do support, although not exactly happy about it. Its true that a 6monthly cycle does not allow Units in-theatre the time to get the feel of the ground.