The UK in Afghanistan

[Tukhachevskii]

Doug Beattie MC, An Ordinary Soldier
The author seems to have spent his entire time in Afghanistan in a kind of moral purgatory and he is often second guessing himself throughout the work. Whether that is for civilian consumption or whether he was genuinely stricken with ethical vertigo the work is valuable in its depiction of “the face of battle” (to borrow a phrase from the title of John Keegan’s book). It is very definitely narrator’s perspective to which we are treated in all its moral confusion. Yet, Beattie is no Erich Maria Remarque. He has a job to do and does it...with aplomb. That job was to take Garmsir “the gateway to Helmand” with the 1st Battalion Royal Irish Regiment and elements of the ANA and ANP many of whom were of questionable ability and/or loyalty. Ironically, Beattie was initially penned for desk job as intelligence liaison officer to the Canadian contingent. When he arrived at KAF (Kandahar Airfield), in the best traditions of British ad hocary and gentlemanly amateurism...

...no one knew anything about Doug Beattie [...] I was given a choice. Either act as an operations watch keeper, another desk role also at KAF, or go down to Lashkar Gah to work at the embryonic Provincial Security and Co-ordination Centre (PSCC)(p.75)

He chose the latter and would subsequently be involved in one ambush after another as part of his job working with the ANA/P formulating a common security plan and supporting UK forces with fighting detachments of Afghans co-ordinated by OMLT (Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams). Beattie then continues to explain the difficulties of leading and co-ordinating OMLTs and their Afghan charges and is, if anything, an excellent examination of the clash of cultures- professional vs “yokel” / occidental rationalism vs oriental rationalism- that NATO and Afghan soldiers must contend with. There’s also the cultural intelligence that he needs in order to operate effectively in a world of deeply held religious beliefs intermingled with “chai boys” belonging to village elders, local notables or tribal chiefs...

...there to be ordered about by the men and, when required, to provide sexual pleasure [...] The boy was fresh-faced and clean shaven. He looked timid. At some stage, as he aged, his sexual attractiveness would wane and he would be replaced by someone else, someone younger. For him the abuse would be over. Instead it was likely he would himself become a fully fledged member of the police and probably turn into an abuser too.(p.137)

Add to this the outright collusion and collaboration of certain ANP units with the Taliban (p.233) and the distrust between the ANA and ANP and you have an unenviable and heady mix. Though overly sentimental for my taste definitely an interesting, and with regards to the ANA and ANP a revealing, read.

[After a brief encounter with the Taliban, Beattie asks ANA Col. Gulzar]...what would happen to the bodies of the dead. “We will give them back to the village elders and they will return them to the Talib for burial”. There was a sense of honour between the two sides I did not expect. Perhaps it came about because there wasn’t actually much that differentiated them. Afghans take a pragmatic approach to fighting. Their loyalty can be bought, people often choosing sides on the basis of who they believe will win[.](p.109)

[Tukhachevskii]

Jake Scott, Blood Clot: In Combat with the Patrols Platoon, 3 Para, Afghanistan, 2006
In polar opposition to Beattie is the “raw” account of Jake Scott whose forthright and honest style comes as a cool breeze. At times reminiscent of the early Ernst Jünger Scott’s prose is jagged edged and searing, he pulls no punches which, for a Para, is to be expected. A member of 3 Para’s patrols (reconnaissance) platoon of WMIKs (7) and Pinzgauers (2) he is mostly fond of the former vehicles recounting that ...

I remember talking to a Canadian officer on this while harboured up amongst their convoy for a night in the desert, he too thought we were mad. But as I explained to him and many others who question this, our Land Rovers could get in and out of most areas without being spotted unlike the big US LAVs that were seen miles off. We were small and relatively quiet, light and fast; it provided better cross-country capability and the reason why we would stay off the main routes where others would fall foul and pay the price with roadside bombs. We had better arcs of fire and a 360 view while moving. We could lie low in wadi beds and in mountain gullies. We also had the option of debussing very quickly if need be.(p.34-5)

The Patrols would do very much of this in their tour in Helmand province although they would also operate on foot during air assaults. He also excels at elucidating the unheralded and often inexplicable aspects of small unit cohesion, camaraderie and brotherhood- the banter, the jibing, driving off whilst the youngest soldier attempts a No.2 behind your WMIK, regimental and professional pride and espirit d’corps- that often determine whether or not men will fight. He’s also not afraid to criticise...

After the big kick-off about the .50 Cal weapons not firing correctly in Now Zad, little had been done. [...] The Canadians and Estonians were selling the British army .50 Cal ammunition. It was ridiculous that this couldn’t be solved ourselves and we had to sponge off other countries, as whoever had ordered the ammo had, in my opinion, gone for some cheap #### and the low grade of ammo was causing problems[...] What had happened in Now Zad, Sangin, Kajaki and now Musa Qaleh had made the top brass realise that this was no ordinary Iraq, KJosovo or Northern Ireland tour. I also began seeing more kit and equipment coming through the stores, TI was the big thing, TI sights for personal weapons and the .50 Cals were like rocking horse #### yet here they were (one TI per .50 Cal and one Viper TI per team). The new body armour and swing arms for the WMIK along with run-flat tyres we also accommodated. Also more ammo was coming in and we could eventually operate with our ‘full scales’ ammunition [..] About time; but again too little too late in my eyes.(p.135)

Like Beattie, Scott also reveals the complexities/pitfalls of CIMIC when he narrates that the Governor of Helmand, Engineer Daoud was pushing for more assistance from UK forces...

One of his former commanders had been attacked and his bodyguards and family members killed. Not only that but one of the local police chiefs was under threat from the local people for raping a young girl. “Let him have it”, we yelled out on hearing the news. I definitely didn’t want to be associated with saving or protecting a rapist and paedophile, I thought we were here to protect the people of Afghanistan and rid them from the Taliban and terror. If they thought we were protecting people like this it would turn everyone against us.(p121-2)

Scott vivdly describes the intensity of small unit engagements putting the reader into the heat of battle often in circumstances at once surreal and deadly...

’Stand down lads, its just women and children’, the boss said.
‘Stand down lads just a group pof tarts having a mothers meeting’, I joked.
‘Well is there any chance of getting some scoff?’, Tommo said.
‘Yeah I’m Hank Marvin’, Lee butted in. [...] As the sun began to sink some of women walked past some of the outer positions, no more than 50m away, dressed in their female dish-dash clothing with their faces covered. The Yanks moved a Humvee up onto the high ground alongside our blokes. Chris W., a fuill screw, was the commander up there.
‘Hey what you doing’ he said to one of the Yanks now standing sky lining himself with a tab in his mouth. ‘You’re in plain view, pull your vehicle back’.
‘We are fine mate’, the Yank replied.
OK, suit yourself’, Chris finished. Minutes later as the US soldier sat at the front wheel of his Humvee a massive explosion erupted. The US Humvee exploded into flames, it took a direct hit with an RPG and then everything went noisy around them. Heavy 7.62mm weapons started firing from the location from where the Afghan women had disappeared. Pete McKinley, a tom in A Company, ran forward under fire and dragged the injured Yank back and started first aid while rounds were smacking into the ground in front of him[...] The so-called women had really been Taliban dressed to disguise themselves to get as close as possible to some of the lads and the US troops and set up a firing post right in front of their position.(p.84,85)

[Tukhachevskii]

Col. Richard Kemp & Chris Hughes, Attack State Red
The book follows the exploits of the 1st Battalion The Royal Anglian Regiment Battle Group (also attached were an Estonian Armoured Infantry Company and a Danish Reconnaissance Company) during their six month tour in Helmand province’s Sangin Valley in spring 2007. The authors brilliantly capture the minutiae of small unit combat without ever losing sight of the bigger picture; strategy, operations and tactics are all covered and one would hope that the book is re-read over again for the many valuable “lessons learned” it offers.


Unlike an Ordinary Soldier and Blood Clot (see above) Attack State Red is very much a unit social history. No one man takes precedence or centre stage. Indeed the entire Royal Anglian battle group is portrayed in all its variety, colour and spirit. Like Private John Thrumble and his GPMG “Mary” tragically killed in a friendly fire incident involving a US F-15 (p. 358); Maj. Mick Aston who had formerly flown Kiowa reconnaissance helicopters in the Australian Army before being moved to the Australian Signals Corps and then turning up in ol’ Blighty (p.46); the deeply religious Fijian Jopp “Bomber” B. Matai, platoon machine gunner, who refused to continue killing Taliban because “I have killed to many today. I cannot do it” (p.303); &, Battalion sniper LCpl. Oliver “Teddy” S. Ruecker, an American, whose father – a recipient of the Bronze Star- had been a master sergeant in US Air Force Special operations (p.59). From Private to Colonel every man receives his fair dues. The book, like much of the work to come out of Afghanistan in a revelation. Having read he negative press that Mastiff’s have gotten over the past few years, for instance, I was surprised to read about their highly effective usage in Afghanistan with one particular raid operation effectively gutting its opponents (pp.332-338). Also interesting is the thriving scrap metal market driven by enterprising Afghans who scour the battlefield for empty shell cases and ammo boxes (p.147).


Also interesting was the role of non-Taliban adversaries such as Shir Agha, a Sangin crime lord whose saw his black market profits plunge after UK forces restored order, whose men had duped a twelve-year old boy into pushing a cart laden with explosives against men of B Company (p.253). All of this would be useful to the battle group Intelligence officers who compiled the evidence which would be presented with other information to a shura in Sangin...

The elders had often been briefed on the various reconstruction projects, but most hadn’t seen them. And they were frequently told by Taliban propaganda machinery that no progress was being made and the British were doing nothing to help them. In a town without newspapers, and such low literacy levels, the people understandably didn’t know what to believe. [Lt. Col. Stuart W.]Carver had managed to get a projector into Sangin.[...]His words were accompanied by PowerPoint picture thrown up on the wall behind him, showing the Jusulay irrigation project, electricity pylons being repaired and work on schools. The audience was enthralled. Most hadn’t seen any of this before, and few had ever seen projected images of any kind. As Carver went through the presentation the excitement grew, especially when the pictures showed people and places they recognised. Then Carver flashed up ma photograph showing the devastation in the market place a few days earlier. “And this is what the Taliban are doing [actually Shir Agha’s in co-operation with the Taliban]. They are attacking you. They don’t want you to have a market. [IMO its interesting how creating “market towns” has been a part of UK COIN culture historically, a la Ireland under Cromwell] Ghey don’t want you to have the prosperity the market brings you. They want to destroy your market”. He threw up more gruesome photographs, of the wrecked phone card cart, the destroyed police vehicle, of wounded and panicking locals, and finally, the remains of the dead twelve year old boy. “You have seen everything that we are doing. It is all taking you forward, to greater security and prosperity. But this is where the Taliban want to take you. They want to take you back. Back to the time before May when there was no market. They have even stooped to using a child to destroy your future”.[...] The elders were shocked. They were muttering and tutting loudly and shaking their heads vigorously at visual evidence of what the Taliban had done.(p.267)

I’ll quote some more from the deeds of these heroes rather than try to summarise.....


Privates Parker and Thrumble’s debrief their CO Lt. Seal-Coon...

“...I figured out it [enemy small arms fire] must have come from high up and there were no compounds or anything that it could’ve been fired from. I looked across and I wondered about the trees. I thought they couldn’t be up the trees – bit too risky for them. But i had a good look and couldn’t see anything so I told Thrumbles to put a burst through the trees”. Next to Parker, Thrumble started laughing, “[...] Mary and me fired a couple of bursts of twenty, and bodies just started falling out everywhere’. “[...]Don’t exaggerate to the platoon commander”, said Parker. “But two bodies fell out of the trees. It was like some sick comedy show or
something”.(p.140)

A vicious firefight in Operation Ghartse Ghar...

Private Thompson looked into the eyes of a Taliban fighter with an RPG launcher on his shoulder. Private Perry, just behind him, started to swing his weapon towards the fighter. When Thompson locked eyes with the Taliban fighter everything slowed right down. Before either Thompson or Perry could react, there was a loud bang.. Thompson saw a jet of flame flash from the back of the launcher ad a cloud of blue-grey smoke, and the missile in the air, spinning straight at him. The rocket glanced off his Osprey chest plate and flung him violently into the bank, knocking the wind out of him. It exploded against the side of the ditch between him and Perry. Thompson was engulfed in the enormous blast [...] His whole body was cut up by RPG shrapnel, with fifty holes in his legs alone.[...]Beside him Perry lay bleeding and moaning, 157 separate shrapnel wounds in his arms, legs and nose. Corporal Murphy who was close by, was hurled to the ground by the blast. He felt his legs, peppered by shrapnel, compressing and burning. Private Ross Green, Murphy’s GPMG gunner, towards the rear, and an engineer behind him, were also badly wounded”.(p.243)

Maj. Mick Aston talking in an Army Air Corps WAH-64...

The JTAC said to Aston, “He repeats what he told us before, he cannot fire until he has positively identified the target”. Fuming, Aston replied, “Well I have PID’d the target. The Viking crews have PID’d the target. 7 Platoon has. How much more PIDing does he need?”. “Sir, he says he needs to PID it himself before he can engage”. “Look I used to be in a helicopter recce squadron. I know how difficult it is to identify people from the air if they are well concealed, even with the kind of kit these fellas up there have nowadays. But we’re firing at the enemy, the Apache pilot can see our tracer. The enemy’s firing back at us, the pilot can see their tracer too. What is the problem?” [...] “What is he bothered about? Is it civvies in the area? There aren’t any. But if there had been, we’d have killed them all by now with our guns”.[...]Aston was raging. He refused to believe the Apaches had to work under such a ridiculous constraint – in this situation.[...] He said, “Let’s get rid of him now. We’ll get something else on to it. Tell the pilot – repeat these words to him exactly from me – fire at the target now or get out”.[...] Aston turned to Corporal Wilsher, his mortar fire controller. “The minute the Apache clears the airspace start engaging with mortars. I want HE up and down that treeline. Can you do that, or will the mortar line commander need to [...] do some PIDing in person?” He turned back to the JTAC. “While he’s doing that, get me some proper close air support”.(p.65)

[JMA]

Col. Richard Kemp & Chris Hughes, Attack State Red

If reading books like these does not lead to red hot anger then I don't know what...

[JMA]

Patrolling in open ground.

Knowing the topography of Helmand and the UK AO patrolling in open ground is normally conducted as:

• a means to get from A to B with being channeled through vulnerable points
• providing overwatch for units operating in the green zone
• Recce/interdiction/disruption of locales of interest to us or insurgents (routes, Firing Points, RVs etc)

Ah... the DS solution

Had a good look at Sangin and other areas on Google Earth, still baffled as to what is being attempted there. When I raised the issue of air recce by mark-1 eyeball or drone I got the of course its going on but can't talk about it routine (OPSEC I suppose) If it is then surely that reduces the need for wandering around? One could deal with all this as a hypothetical of course... but there does not seem to be the interest.

FOBs/patrol houses provide a footprint through which forces can maintain overwatch on the ground, mentor ANSF and governance structures, collect intelligence et al. My FOB location was based on the requirement to colocate with my affiliated indigenous unit and protect a vital C3 node. It also then allowed me to maximise time on the ground mentoring local forces and develop local intelligence thereby leading to targeted strike operations.

Again with respect the DS solution. The main question would be of course on which ground this overwatch is being maintained? Open ground? poppy fields? mud walls? people?

Again this "time on the ground" what was being achieved? (treat these as rhetorical questions)

[JMA]

Col. Richard Kemp & Chris Hughes, Attack State Red

Unlike an Ordinary Soldier and Blood Clot (see above) Attack State Red is very much a unit social history. No one man takes precedence or centre stage.

I’ll quote some more from the deeds of these heroes rather than try to summarise.....

Privates Parker and Thrumble’s debrief their CO Lt. Seal-Coon...

A vicious firefight in Operation Ghartse Ghar...

Maj. Mick Aston talking in an Army Air Corps WAH-64...

What amazes me is that in every war the same lessons are learned over again. Gooks in trees, gooks dressed as women etc etc. Is it a problem with the training?

[JMA]

Its all starting to come out now...

Military chiefs accused of blundering into Afghanistan with ‘eyes shut’

They went into Helmand with their eyes shut and fingers crossed. That is how Major-General Andrew Mackay views Britain’s decision to send little more than 3,000 troops to southern Afghanistan four years ago.

[William F. Owen]

Is it a problem with the training?

No, it's not. It's a problem with armies in general. The issue is what the Israelis are now calling "Operational Learning." Army's retain knowledge they like and get rid of that they do not.
For example, back in my day we had to put up with all the old soldiers going on about "when I was in Borneo we did X and Y" and so we use to end setting up Jungle Patrol Harbours in woods in Germany. Not smart.
The reason for retaining some skills, while letting others go, is not one based on any rational that I can see. For an expeditionary army it is a huge challenge.

"They went into Helmand with their eyes shut and fingers crossed. That is how Major-General Andrew Mackay views Britain’s decision to send little more than 3,000 troops to southern Afghanistan four years ago."

Well it's all coming out in public. It's been hotly debated within the Army and those engaged with the issues, for the last 2-3 years.
Mackay is pumping an agenda. He is promoting "Influence Operations" as the way ahead. IMO, it is not good.

[Tukhachevskii]

What amazes me is that in every war the same lessons are learned over again. Gooks in trees, gooks dressed as women etc etc. Is it a problem with the training?

Its also about retention of experience NCOs and other personnel who tend to leave once their views/approaches/experience fall foul of the "new doctrine" machine. Having greater input from those lower down the food chain would help in retatining valubale experience and lessons/TTPs learned/learnt (never can figure that last one out).

[William F. Owen]

Its also about retention of experience NCOs and other personnel who tend to leave once their views/approaches/experience fall foul of the "new doctrine" machine. Having greater input from those lower down the food chain would help in retatining valubale experience and lessons/TTPs learned/learnt (never can figure that last one out).

If I may,
Yes retention is an issue, but being a good and experienced NCO and being able to transmit that experience in useful written or instructional form are two very separate things. - and the same is just as true for officers.
Actually knowing what matters and what does not, is not as obvious as some think.

[Ken White]

Years ago, with long serving professional Armies, the NCOs passed knowledge on to new Officers and men; easy when people srayed in the same units for many years. As increased personal mobility hit and many Armies in large wars had to use individual replacements and had really high casualties that decimated those older NCOs, that embedded training ability was lost. It was replaced by 'doctrine' and institutional training which do an acceptable but not a great job.

Add to that the problem of an expeditionary Army as Wilf points out with a need for training to prepare people for worldwide service against a variety of opponents as opposed to training a population to fight one type of enemy in one region and you have a difficult training problem

Then consider human egos and the "I'll do it my way" syndrome and the fact that each generation thinks it has received greater wisdom than its predecessors...

It's a wonder we train as well as we do.

[JMA]

Its also about retention of experience NCOs and other personnel who tend to leave once their views/approaches/experience fall foul of the "new doctrine" machine. Having greater input from those lower down the food chain would help in retatining valubale experience and lessons/TTPs learned/learnt (never can figure that last one out).

I laid my hands on a then new Brit manual, the 1974 LAND OPERATIONS Volume 5 - Operational techniques under special conditions, Part 2 - Jungle, A - All arms operations, B - Jungle skills and drills. (There were others as well)

Great value was the layout (and content although we had no jungles). I could take the layout and amend the text to suit our situation. From the Brit point of view I would have thought that such a manual if regularly updated for jungle warfare experience from elsewhere and made to include the type of tips I raised earlier would be a valuable doc should the Brits find themselves facing jungle ops again. Can't do the old "got another jungle war, lets try and find the old Malaya/Borneo vets" routine.

I understand that there are still those who drink out on their war stories of Claret Ops in Borneo and the like. War stories have their place... in a bar, but the lessons learned and skills developed need to be institutionalised in some way. Has the Brit army still got a jungle training school? Why the emphasis on training in Kenya (what expectation do they have of ops in East Africa or savanna Africa)? Have the lessons of Bosnia and NI been properly institutionlised for future generations of soldiers? Do soldiers from other armies attend these 'courses'? (do they still even run courses) Do Brits attend other army's/countries 'specialist' op area courses?

I could go on for hours on this topic but enough is enough...

[Kiwigrunt]

A short vid on latest UK goodies here. It's got a bit off all sorts so I've dropped it here, as opposed to more specific threads under trigger puller or equipment.

I'll start a new tread on the combat shotgun.

[baboon6]

I understand that there are still those who drink out on their war stories of Claret Ops in Borneo and the like. War stories have their place... in a bar, but the lessons learned and skills developed need to be institutionalised in some way. Has the Brit army still got a jungle training school? Why the emphasis on training in Kenya (what expectation do they have of ops in East Africa or savanna Africa)? Have the lessons of Bosnia and NI been properly institutionlised for future generations of soldiers? Do soldiers from other armies attend these 'courses'? (do they still even run courses) Do Brits attend other army's/countries 'specialist' op area courses?

I could go on for hours on this topic but enough is enough...

Yes, in Brunei:

http://ukinbrunei.fco.gov.uk/en/abou...runei-garrison

http://www.army.mod.uk/operations-de...ments/922.aspx

[Ken White]

Probably no to lessons due to the factors cited above and those lessons recorded will be modified beyond recognition as time passes unless the British are much smarter than we are; Yes to other Armies attending British courses; Yes to the British Army attending the courses of others. Additionally, the UK and US have robust personnel and unit exchange programs and the interchange of students and schools has been ongoing for many years..

[William F. Owen]

I laid my hands on a then new Brit manual, the 1974 LAND OPERATIONS Volume 5 - Operational techniques under special conditions, Part 2 - Jungle, A - All arms operations, B - Jungle skills and drills.

Thanks for that. If I can get a coy it may help me answer a few outstanding questions.

Have the lessons of Bosnia and NI been properly institutionlised for future generations of soldiers? Do soldiers from other armies attend these 'courses'? (do they still even run courses) Do Brits attend other army's/countries 'specialist' op area courses?

The training for NI was done as a specific package at Lydd and Hythe, as well as exercises all over the UK. It was theatre specific training.
Bosnia training was delivered by OPTAG - same basic deal.

Have the lessons been properly institutionalised? Which lessons? A lot of stuff being done in Helmand comes directly from NI experience, even though only about 2% of men have ever served in both theatres. Early days in Bosnia about 80% of men had an NI tour.

The problem with "lessons" is always context. Threat, terrain, climate, etc etc. A large part of my life is actually spent combing books, memoirs manuals and doing interviews trying to see common threads.

IMO, the UK failed to usefully capture "lessons learned" from WW2. The Falklands War was basically about learning the lessons of WW2.

[JMA]

Yes, in Brunei:

http://ukinbrunei.fco.gov.uk/en/abou...runei-garrison

http://www.army.mod.uk/operations-de...ments/922.aspx

Let us assume that there is a "fire ball" running that show who is constantly applying new weapons and technologies as they come available to the jungle situation to see where or where they may pr may not be suited... and all this together with amending and adapting tactics, techniques and procedures. And that the units most likely to be "first in" to any such future jungle war are being kept up to date and current with jungle warfare trends... after all there is a lot of time to fill in the 18 months between Afghanistan tours

[JMA]

Thanks for that. If I can get a coy it may help me answer a few outstanding questions.

I assume that there will be a newer version, 1974 was a long time ago.

The training for NI was done as a specific package at Lydd and Hythe, as well as exercises all over the UK. It was theatre specific training.
Bosnia training was delivered by OPTAG - same basic deal.

Have the lessons been properly institutionalised? Which lessons? A lot of stuff being done in Helmand comes directly from NI experience, even though only about 2% of men have ever served in both theatres. Early days in Bosnia about 80% of men had an NI tour.

The problem with "lessons" is always context. Threat, terrain, climate, etc etc. A large part of my life is actually spent combing books, memoirs manuals and doing interviews trying to see common threads.

IMO, the UK failed to usefully capture "lessons learned" from WW2. The Falklands War was basically about learning the lessons of WW2.

I guess what I trying to say is that unless there is a formal process by which say the NI experience (with all the lessons learned) is stored and maintained for the education of future generations of soldiers in a form and structured way it gets lost over time.

Its all a bit like arriving in war zone saying we come with lessons learned from Malaya when not one officer or soldier deployed served in Malaya. The mere fact that one is a Brit and maybe even from a regiment that served in Malaya does not mean that one necessarily has the faintest clue about the lessons learned in Malaya or how to approach such an insurgency unless they have been formally passed down through the years to the new generations of soldiers.

[JMA]

Probably no to lessons due to the factors cited above and those lessons recorded will be modified beyond recognition as time passes unless the British are much smarter than we are; Yes to other Armies attending British courses; Yes to the British Army attending the courses of others. Additionally, the UK and US have robust personnel and unit exchange programs and the interchange of students and schools has been ongoing for many years..

OK, so I guess for this process to be meaningful it all comes down to the scale of the exercise.

[William F. Owen]

I assume that there will be a newer version, 1974 was a long time ago.

I know. I have it and the latest one. I am trying to trace the origin of certain procedures and ideas.

I guess what I trying to say is that unless there is a formal process by which say the NI experience (with all the lessons learned) is stored and maintained for the education of future generations of soldiers in a form and structured way it gets lost over time.

Bluntly, until maybe very recently, there wasn't. The evaporation of corporate memory is a very serious problem for all armies. What does exist is a plethora of "informal processes" which mean stuff gets retained in the training, but usually with no understanding of why it is there. - thus my approach to tactical doctrine and infantry training.
However OPTAG does address most of the problems. - but it cannot prepare soldiers for theatres it has no experience of, - thus the reliance on basics and read-across. Not perfect but there is nothing else.

Its all a bit like arriving in war zone saying we come with lessons learned from Malaya when not one officer or soldier deployed served in Malaya.

True, but manuals and training used in Malaya do exist. - The CATOM. Whether anyone has ever read it or understood is another thing.