The UK in Afghanistan

[SWCAdmin]

JMA and William F. Owen, we seem to be rapidly approaching the point where the ###-for-tat, point by point missives need to transform into an agree-to-disagree thing and you move on.

Good for you both for keeping a civil tone so far, but let's not rub this thing raw until someone loses it.

Red Rat, thanks for the last injection of substance.

[Kiwigrunt]

What type of Army do we want? Since the 1960s the UK army has focused on being a high-end warfighting army able to adapt to other contingencies; a generalist army. The issue is now, with the costs of defence and our small size, do we want to become a specialist niche army, perhaps specialising in some aspect of COIN? That debate is ongoing. There is a danger that if we as an army focus overly now on Afghanistan we will pre-empt the debate. Personally I think we cannot do both. I also look at our current training regime and think we are losing core warfighting skills. I also look at the experience of the IDF in 2006 in Lebanon and how they transformed themselves over 2 years, what they focused on and then their experience in 2008 in Gaza and I wonder.

I wouldn’t have thought the Brit army that small that you need to start considering specialising. (Where would that leave us?) There has been a lot of mention over many threads that the over-commitment in the sandbox over the last decade has blunted the more traditional capabilities. I should think that to a point that is understandable and should probably, again to a point, just be accepted, with all the risks involved. But to use that as a reason, or in fact an excuse, to specialise and drop those other capabilities seems to me a bit short sighted. Better to still have those capabilities, blunted as they may be, than to be entirely and irreversibly caught with your pants down. Because Murphy will make sure that that will happen. In fact, the initial move into Iraq was pretty conventional and heavy, no COIN at that stage.

[Red Rat]

Better to still have those capabilities, blunted as they may be, than to be entirely and irreversibly caught with your pants down. Because Murphy will make sure that that will happen. In fact, the initial move into Iraq was pretty conventional and heavy, no COIN at that stage.

I quite agree, but with defence cuts looming next year it is unlikely that we will be able to afford to keep all our current capabilities and we will almost definitely not be able to keep them at the current level we maintain.

There comes a point when rather then just salami slicing capability we take a fundamental look at what we want to achieve as a nation, what part the armed forces play in that and what capabilities we need in order to do that. That is what the defence review next year is supposed to do. Of course last time we had a defence review we came with a great concept and then failed to fund it!

I think we should be taking the advantage afforded by the defence review to have a fundamental rethink of Uk defence aims, structures and processes, something akin to the 19th century Cardwell Reforms.

[William F. Owen]

I quite agree, but with defence cuts looming next year it is unlikely that we will be able to afford to keep all our current capabilities and we will almost definitely not be able to keep them at the current level we maintain.

It might be worth asking what our current capabilities actually are. We may well have a fair few paper capabilities and assumed capabilities that may not actually be so in reality, yet absorb funding.

Until the UK faces the ugly truth that being strategically relevant means having an armed force that go anywhere on the globe and do something to anyone to help someone or with someone's help, we're just going to fall back on the 1997 merry-go-round that landed us in the current mess with fiascos like FRES, BOWMAN, Apache and Chinook.

Strategically relevant militaries are a 3-4 position selector switch, not a dial. You are either in or out. The UK has to decide if it wants strategic capability or not. It costs what it costs.

[Red Rat]

The UK has to decide if it wants strategic capability or not. It costs what it costs.

'Costs' - currently a very dirty word in government circles! I suspect that our Lords and Masters want strategic capability and relevance at constabulary costs...

[Kiwigrunt]

Why do you see Apache and Chinook as fiascos?

[Fuchs]

My guess:
Chinooks - not enough helos
Apaches - not enough crews

[William F. Owen]

'Costs' - currently a very dirty word in government circles! I suspect that our Lords and Masters want strategic capability and relevance at constabulary costs...

Don't I know it. I was recently asked my opinion by a Senior Officer who just wanted a "cost-zero" solution. Couldn't help.

....but life is hard. You have to choose between a useful Army or more hospitals and schools. We can have good social services as long as we wish to be as internationally irrelevant.

My guess:
Chinooks - not enough helos
Apaches - not enough crews

Correct. We also have too many Apaches and with the wrong engines.

[baboon6]

My guess:
Chinooks - not enough helos

Probably refers to the Chinook HC.3 fiasco.These eight aircraft optimised for Special Forces work were delivered in 2001 for a cost of GBP 270 million but have still not entered service.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle4061330.ece

Instead of just ordering the MH-47E used by US Army special ops aviation the RAF wanted their own type- which for various reasons (mainly to do with the avionics fit) was unable to be certified as airworthy. They were stored for ages while it was debated what to do. Eventually it was decided that they should be modified back to a standard similar to the rest of the RAF's fleet, Chinook HC.2. The whole programme will now cost over GBP 500 million and the first two aircraft are apparently now almost ready for service:

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles...ghanistan.html

Apaches - not enough crews

It would also have been a lot cheaper to buy Apaches direct from the US instead of building them under licence in the UK.

[JMA]

Let's call is a minor or limited victory; it was neither decisive nor total except in its defence of the status quo ante.

Yes, one needs to look at the various positions at the start of it all and then compare that to the final positions and where the movement had taken place and by whom. No surprises there.

[JMA]

My guess:
Chinooks - not enough helos
Apaches - not enough crews

Can we now all agree to add procurement incompetence to the list?

[JMA]

'Costs' - currently a very dirty word in government circles! I suspect that our Lords and Masters want strategic capability and relevance at constabulary costs...

I wouldn't have thought you would approach either the US or the UK to figure out how to do something with very little. Go find someone who did and when you do try to find someone who will listen.

[JMA]

Division HQs The UK has a division HQ in place as a Regional Command HQ. But in addition to the Brigade plus (the better part of two brigades are in Theatre) there are also force troops (Engineers, EOD, G2, CIMIC, Sigs and Aviation). In total there is probably a Div minus out there. The Divisional HQ does a 12 month rotation, as do elements in Kabul. The same applies for G2 and CIMIC elements. The Diplomatic and DfID (Department for International Development) do 12-24 month tours. Campaign continuity is vested at the Regional Command level.

Ok, thanks for confirming this. (Most available on the Brit army website)

One wonders why they justify a 12 month tour at Div HQ while at Bde they go for 6?

In the context of my discussion on the Helmand brigade deployment one must certainly question the brigade HQ rotation policy. 6 Months as opposed to 12 months as opposed to semi permanent.

Four years into the escalated Herrick all we can do is look at opportunities lost. Had the Brits taken the Afghanistan deployment seriously instead of fitting it into unit rotations and had the military general staff had the ability to do a little lateral thinking they could have (four years on) had achieved a level of operational continuity and local knowledge unsurpassed in any other previous small war. The opportunity has been lost. And now the excuse will be that there is not enough time left to carry such a plan out before the withdrawal starts.

[JMA]

2006 as Military Incompetence I would probably agree there, but for differing reasons to you. I am still reading the King report, but in terms of 2006 I think that was a classic case of lack of intelligence awareness. We walked in blind

And the difference is?

Most people walk into a war unaware of what exactly is about to happen. The problem here was that the successive British commanders once faced with the reality on the ground in Helmand made bad/poor/incompetent military decisions.
Is this a training thing or a selection/promotion thing or what?

[Red Rat]

Had the Brits taken the Afghanistan deployment seriously instead of fitting it into unit rotations

That has been recognised within the UK Army. I know there is a rationale and it will be rational - I am just not yet entirely sure what the whole rationale is!

As for Mil incompetence - the incompetence (IMHO) was to go in with such limited awareness of what we were getting in to. from the initial poor int assessment (IMHO) lead the equally poor extrapolation of what might happen.

Procurement incompetence? Undoubtedly.

As for the decisions on the ground after the initial Herrick 4 insertion I am not yet in a position to comment.

[JMA]

What type of Army do we want? Since the 1960s the UK army has focused on being a high-end warfighting army able to adapt to other contingencies; a generalist army. The issue is now, with the costs of defence and our small size, do we want to become a specialist niche army, perhaps specialising in some aspect of COIN? That debate is ongoing. There is a danger that if we as an army focus overly now on Afghanistan we will pre-empt the debate. Personally I think we cannot do both. I also look at our current training regime and think we are losing core warfighting skills. I also look at the experience of the IDF in 2006 in Lebanon and how they transformed themselves over 2 years, what they focused on and then their experience in 2008 in Gaza and I wonder.

Eight years into Afghanistan and the Brits are still trying to decide whether to take the whole thing seriously. To mask this indecision the process gets framed as a pseudo-intellectual debate as to what direction the army as a whole should move in.

Sad.

The next war will certainly be different to the current one in Afghanistan.

If the Brits had decided that they could afford to provide 7 or 8 or 9,000 troops on an ongoing basis in Afghanistan then a plan could well have been hatched to ensure that the Afghanistan troop obligation was handled competently by dedicated and committed soldiers in a manner ensuring maximum operational continuity.

The inability to attempt specialise an element of the existing regimental structure for operations in Afghanistan to do justice to the international and domestic expectation the Brit military proceeded to trot various Bde HQs and battalions through the Afghan theatre on a leisurely rotation.

The end result is that the forces so used are neither Afghanistan specialists nor at a competent level at their core role. Hence the befuddled intellectual position the Brit forces find themselves in at the moment.

You can have it both ways... all it requires is a little lateral thinking so in years to come it will be so "blindingly obvious" what the solution was that the army will be at a loss as to why they never did it that way.

[William F. Owen]

As for Mil incompetence - the incompetence (IMHO) was to go in with such limited awareness of what we were getting in to. from the initial poor int assessment (IMHO) lead the equally poor extrapolation of what might happen.

It should be remembered that the UK deployments to Afghanistan in 2001, were not to Helmand. Deploying to Helmand was largely deploying into the unknown. Actually part of the mission was to "find out."

Plain fact is, that even given that, the UK went in with far too little in terms of resources for a plan based a huge amount of uncertainty - but risk is the coin of war.

Procurement incompetence? Undoubtedly.

Concur. The procurement system is badly broken - and here a great deal of the blame does lie with some senior officers.

[Red Rat]

It should be remembered that the UK deployments to Afghanistan in 2001, were not to Helmand. Deploying to Helmand was largely deploying into the unknown. Actually part of the mission was to "find out."

I quite agree about the 2001 deployments, but there was (IMHO) a staggering lack of IPB conducted on Helmand linked with a woeful lack of joined up campaign planning by an operational (level) HQ.

[Kiwigrunt]

Sorry guys, still not entirely clear.
“Chinooks, not enough helos”, does that mean not enough Chinooks, or that the size of the Chinooks precludes a larger number of smaller frames.
I ask this because the NZRAF is about to replace some 17 (IIRC) Hueys with 8 NH90s. A far better and larger helicopter, but 8 of them can only be used in so many places. It does however keep the required crew numbers down.

[baboon6]

Sorry guys, still not entirely clear.
“Chinooks, not enough helos”, does that mean not enough Chinooks, or that the size of the Chinooks precludes a larger number of smaller frames.
I ask this because the NZRAF is about to replace some 17 (IIRC) Hueys with 8 NH90s. A far better and larger helicopter, but 8 of them can only be used in so many places. It does however keep the required crew numbers down.

Not enough Chinooks I would think. The UK has several other types of tactical transport helicopter, namely Sea King, Merlin and Puma, the first two also now deployed to Helmand (from 2007 and 2009). The Sea Kings and Pumas are rather old now and availability is low. For a lot more see here:

http://www.publications.parliament.u.../434/43402.htm