The UK in Afghanistan

[William F. Owen]

So am I too understand that the Brits have taken the cause of 80% of their casualties and analysed it inside out and have come to the conclusion that there is no solution so they carry on driving around until the hit an IED and keep sending out foot patrol until they trigger and IED. Is that what we are down to in Afghanistan?

Sorry, but the men on the ground are not stupid. I've spent several nights in last 3 months sitting in Officers Mess's in the UK talking to Infantry Captains and Majors, and they "get it." There ARE some issues, but they are nothing to do with the degree of stupidity your comment might imply.

If the come out to plant them at night... thats when you need to plan to get them. If the use cell phones to trigger them... block the cell phone frequency. etc etc.

They know this. - OPSEC is in play here and it's not all of the issue.

Numbingly stupid officers are getting soldiers killed out there. If that does not make you angry then... go ahead and shoot the messenger.

Well there is some numbing stupidity, but it's pretty high up. Part of it is the moronic flow down from "protect the population" and a lot of it flows the conditions set by resources and policies.

Yes, the UK in A'Stan needs a "back to the basics" direction and they would do that themselves if it they weren't been given a fairly stupid policy direction from on high.

[JMA]

Yes, the UK in A'Stan needs a "back to the basics" direction and they would do that themselves if it they weren't been given a fairly stupid policy direction from on high.

OK I can go with that.

It implies that these units/regiments have to some degree lost contact with the basics, yes?

Secondly exactly how would they address this and the other 'problem areas'? I remember well that we were able to very quickly identify what was wrong and where it was wrong... it took a little longer to fix it. Meaning that the vast majority know what the problem is and just sit around waiting for a unique soldier to start to kick over the traces and take the situation by the scruff of the neck. Then they all fall in behind him in lockstep saying "I told you, this is what we should have done a long time ago."

Rhodesia was easier because we had a young regiment (RLI) and a brand new one (Selous Scouts - commanded by an exceptional man) to turn the situation on its head. Reid-Daly was hated by many because he had a hot-line to the top and could cut through the bureaucracy at will. It was a standing joke that he had more to fear from a knife in the back from jealousy on our side than from the enemy.

With big established armies change is like trying to turn a super-tanker in rough seas.

The one option that should possibly be explored is to create composite units and formations manned by volunteers from all over or by sub-units being attached for a tour. This would cut through the RC (resistance to change) problem where a brigadier and his brigade come complete with all their own regimental baggage.

[William F. Owen]

It implies that these units/regiments have to some degree lost contact with the basics, yes?

Not really. Only judging on talking to the guys actually doing the operations, the basics seem good, especially at the skills and drills level. Now having said that, I have a lot of questions about the actual planning and conduct of operations.
I loathe judging from the arm-chair (beach chair in may case), but if the descriptions contained in some of the published accounts are to be believed, then their may well be problems.

Secondly exactly how would they address this and the other 'problem areas'? I remember well that we were able to very quickly identify what was wrong and where it was wrong... it took a little longer to fix it.

Welcome to the world of human beings. Why do smart men do dumb things?

It was a standing joke that he had more to fear from a knife in the back from jealousy on our side than from the enemy.

Yep. I got a sack full of extras for asking the new-RSM if he could help me sow a steel plate into the back of Mess kit, now he was in charge!!

[JMA]

You seem to wish to understand that, your prerogative. I've seen no evidence the British have come to your conclusion. As for what you'd do with a Battalion commander, since it seems everyone there has an IED problem, then you're effectively saying every Battalion commander from NATO in the country is incompetent -- that doesn't even approach, much less pass, the common sense test.

My conclusion is that as 80% of Brit casualties in Afghanistan are caused by IEDs they should be working day and NIGHT to address this treat and take the initiative away from the the TB. Then they agree that there should be less road movement they don't have enough helicopters available and of those they have 30-50% are serviceable at any one time? Maybe the drones they need for thermal surveillance are being flown from a base in Nevada or South Korea and are Bde and higher level resources which don't serve their local tactical needs at all. If the battalion Commander is a blithering idiot then how effective does one expect his unit to be?

Your words not mine. What you have not told us is what you plan to do about it to halt these pernicious practices... If, indeed...

I have no authority to do anything about the IEDs but I suggest that it is in the best interests of the Brits and indeed US forces to think out of the box on this and stop blundering into IEDs day after day, night after night.

That paragraph is mind numbingly ignorant. You really need to get on the internet, Google or Yahoo or Bing search and get a bit smarter on what is going on in Afghanistan. Not least, you'll discover that everything you suggest is being done, has been done -- and that there are a number of things you haven't even thought of.

I said etc etc. And pray do tell how the TB would know where to plant anti-personnel IEDs if every patrol is applying the basics as taught under "route selection and planning"?

OK, so how about applying this one; "If at first you don't succeed then try and try and try again." Or are you saying that the IED situation is insurmountable?

That is your assumption, it is based on ignorance and, I suspect, a degree of bias. I am not shooting a messenger, much less the messenger because your message is so flawed that is is borderline comical. If I am shooting anything, in this series of posts on several threads, it is shots across your bow to warn you that you really are missing a great deal of what is happening for some odd reason. You are coming across as not well informed, biased and on a tear about IED casualties -- which worry others much more than they do you; they after all have to write the letters to the next of kin and bear the responsibility as opposed of being able to kibitz from the sidelines. Consider also that if they were a problem as easily handled as you seem to believe they should be, they'd have been eliminated months if not years ago.

Shooting the messenger again Ken. Do try to stick to the argument.

[William F. Owen]

My conclusion is that as 80% of Brit casualties in Afghanistan are caused by IEDs they should be working day and NIGHT to address this treat and take the initiative away from the the TB. Then they agree that there should be less road movement they don't have enough helicopters available and of those they have 30-50% are serviceable at any one time?

JMA mate. How many guys are we actually talking about? 36 have died this year. My estimate has about 66% being IED casualties. In early 1980's something like 80%+ of all UK Army deaths in South Armagh were IED related - and the Inf BN in South Armagh were about as "COIN skilled" as it is possible to get. You can only mitigate risk so far.
What if 66% where Arty or Small Arms fire casualties? The idea that IED casualties are avoidable and other forms are not, makes no sense.

YES, not enough helicopters is a huge problem. The answer is money. That is simply the only constraint - which tells me the UK does not need to be in A'Stan or else they would be prepared to spend far more to there, and deploy at least 20,000 men.

[baboon6]

OK I can go with that.





The one option that should possibly be explored is to create composite units and formations manned by volunteers from all over or by sub-units being attached for a tour. This would cut through the RC (resistance to change) problem where a brigadier and his brigade come complete with all their own regimental baggage.

This already happens to a large extent. Brigades and battle groups in Afghanistan, no matter what the "name-plate", are made up of units and sub-units from all over the British Army as well as often including some individual reinforcements. For example 1 Grenadier Guards BG on its recent tour (just finished) included, besides its own three rifle coys, a coy from 1 R ANGLIAN, a coy from 2 LANCS, part of a coy from 2 YORKS acting in the OMLT role (advising an ANA Kandak) and a coy of Estonians. This besides gunners, sappers, signallers etc. 19 Light Brigade, which was the formation in Helmand in summer last year, was especially formed for that tour from units pulled from other brigades.

[William F. Owen]

For example 1 Grenadier Guards BG on its recent tour (just finished) included, besides its own three rifle coys, a coy from 1 R ANGLIAN, a coy from 2 LANCS, part of a coy from 2 YORKS acting in the OMLT role (advising an ANA Kandak)

...and has happened regularly since the 1960's thus giving the lie to the cohesion argument of the "Regimental system." Once the UK dropped conscription and allowed Regiments to recruit for themselves, a great many Infantry Battalions needed augmenting on deployment, and this was also exacerbate by bad Battalion organisation.

[baboon6]

...and has happened regularly since the 1960's thus giving the lie to the cohesion argument of the "Regimental system." Once the UK dropped conscription and allowed Regiments to recruit for themselves, a great many Infantry Battalions needed augmenting on deployment, and this was also exacerbate by bad Battalion organisation.

It happened too in WW1, Ww2 and Korea, though that was more a matter of individual reinforcements being posted in to whatever unit needed them, no matter their original capbadge, rather then formed sub-units. In this case I suspect since 1 GREN GDS deployed three rifle coy groups of their own it was more a matter of the BG needing to be quite a bit bigger than a normal light-role infantry battalion rather than the unit being substantially understrength.

This mid-tour report from 2 Coy 1 GREN GDS may be of interest to some:

http://grengds.com/uploads/files/filepath_151.pdf

[Ken White]

My conclusion...If the battalion Commander is a blithering idiot then how effective does one expect his unit to be?

That is not a conclusion, it is an assumption that they are not doing what you say they should be. I think it is a totally incorrect assumption trending to innuendo -- and your concluding sentence above is pure innuendo.

I said etc etc. And pray do tell how the TB would know where to plant anti-personnel IEDs if every patrol is applying the basics as taught under "route selection and planning"?

Because the best route selection in the world runs afoul of an entire population which either willingly or through fear informs of every movement. Not to mention that if you sit on a really high mountain, you can see for flipping miles...

Or are you saying that the IED situation is insurmountable?

Pretty much. Explosives are cheap, IEDs are easy to produce, they really cause few casualties -- as you know, 80% of a small number is an even smaller number and the other 20% show that your assertion of little US or British tactical ability is incorrect. So, yeah, it's pretty much insurmountable -- you can never eliminate the possibility. There's a reason South Africa (and, while it existed, Rhodesia) excelled at mine proofing and clearance...

Shooting the messenger again Ken. Do try to stick to the argument.

There is no argument, you're arguing with yourself. Futilely, I might add. Thus there is no message.

There is a lot of ill informed innuendo. A question is 'why is that so?'

[Kiwigrunt]

JMA mate. How many guys are we actually talking about? 36 have died this year. My estimate has about 66% being IED casualties. In early 1980's something like 80%+ of all UK Army deaths in South Armagh were IED related - and the Inf BN in South Armagh were about as "COIN skilled" as it is possible to get. You can only mitigate risk so far.
What if 66% where Arty or Small Arms fire casualties? The idea that IED casualties are avoidable and other forms are not, makes no sense.

That’s a good point. It shows the risk of using percentages as a metric. If the IED problem was to disappear the IED percentage would be 0. That would turn the KIA by ‘other stuff’ from 20% to 100% without affecting that actual number of KIA.

Baboon6, thanks for that link (post 149). Reads a bit different from many media reports.

[JMA]

That’s a good point. It shows the risk of using percentages as a metric. If the IED problem was to disappear the IED percentage would be 0. That would turn the KIA by ‘other stuff’ from 20% to 100% without affecting that actual number of KIA.

Not really.

Last year the Brits lost 108 KIA and 158 very seriously or seriously wounded/injured. So far this year (to end march) it is 33 KIA and 31 very seriously or seriously wounded/injured. So effectively last year the brits had a whole company KIA (approx) and another whole company (approx) very seriously or seriously wounded/injured. So far this year (first quarter 2010) they have a full platoon (approx) both ways.

Even though there are those who sit back and find these statistics 'acceptable' the bad news for the war effort in Afghanistan is that the political impact is mounting and that such losses are unsustainable to the british army (economically, politically and militarily).

Earlier in another post I suggested that those who find the casualty rates (especially from IEDs) acceptable should be the ones to face up to the parents and families of the killed and maimed. "Mrs Smith you must understand that your son's life was an acceptable risk, do try to understand that." the answer would be, "Where is YOUR son?" the answer then, "Oh safe and out of harms way."

We lost a Puma with all 17 on board on an operation in Mozambique back in 1979. It took until Easter last year for the crash site to be located and the process to erect a memorial to begin. See facebook group here: http://tinyurl.com/39undku We don't forget. No body forgets.

So I'm not sure whether my response to those who dismiss casualties and especially those from largely preventable causes (IEDs) with a wide sweep of the hand is one of incredulity or barely controllable anger. The same anger I feel to this day for someone in Rhodesian Air Force Headquarters who turned down the request for expenditure into research to protect our aircraft from strela (SAM-7) attack. After we had lost 4 aircrew the money was suddenly made available and we beat the strela threat. My mate did not need to die.

The bottom line is that the Brits have effectively 'lost' two full platoons in the first quarter of 2010 in Afghanistan. Whether the IED % is still 80% as of 2009 or now 66% as suggested makes for 51 as opposed to 42 directly related to IEDs and as such largely preventable makes no great difference to me quite honestly.

It is absolutely and totally unacceptable.

Baboon6, thanks for that link (post 149). Reads a bit different from many media reports.

I'll wait for Ken's comment on the 'bias' of that report.

[JMA]

JMA mate. How many guys are we actually talking about? 36 have died this year. My estimate has about 66% being IED casualties. In early 1980's something like 80%+ of all UK Army deaths in South Armagh were IED related - and the Inf BN in South Armagh were about as "COIN skilled" as it is possible to get. You can only mitigate risk so far.

Is it not obvious that being "COIN skilled" may not include being IED savvy?

[JMA]

This already happens to a large extent. Brigades and battle groups in Afghanistan, no matter what the "name-plate", are made up of units and sub-units from all over the British Army as well as often including some individual reinforcements. For example 1 Grenadier Guards BG on its recent tour (just finished) included, besides its own three rifle coys, a coy from 1 R ANGLIAN, a coy from 2 LANCS, part of a coy from 2 YORKS acting in the OMLT role (advising an ANA Kandak) and a coy of Estonians. This besides gunners, sappers, signallers etc. 19 Light Brigade, which was the formation in Helmand in summer last year, was especially formed for that tour from units pulled from other brigades.

I would actually consider setting up a series of theater specific field HQs, Bde or Bn level depending on locale. These HQ posts would be filled by head hunting. I would then call for volunteers from across the army to fill all posts in the subunits on a permanent basis. This on the basis similar to how the Chindits were raised. Tell the volunteers to leave their regimental baggage at home. Leave the guards to march around London and fill the operational area with soldiers AND Afghans who are serious about making war.

[Ken White]

I'll wait for Ken's comment on the 'bias' of that report.

I saw no bias. As I said, good article. He's got a sense of perspective. He's far less worried about IEDs than you seem to be -- and he's there...

He also utterly and completely refutes your oft stated contention that no one in Afghanistan knows what they're doing or ever gets in a fight.

[William F. Owen]

It is absolutely and totally unacceptable.

Sorry JMA, I am just not getting this. Is it you contention that all IED casualties are unacceptable or that all casualties are unacceptable?
Also I fail to see how anyone can claim "IED casualties are largely preventable."

As to the observation that the casualty rate is politically unacceptable, so what? That's your opinion and as an observation it does help progress the matter.

Is it not obvious that being "COIN skilled" may not include being IED savvy?

It may not be, but there was extensive training on how to select X-country routes to avoids IEDs and how to cross hedges to make patrols less vulnerable to IEDS.

[JMA]

I saw no bias.

Of course you saw none, Ken.

As I said, good article. He's got a sense of perspective. He's far less worried about IEDs than you seem to be -- and he's there...

They Ken, those things are written by all the officers. Then sanitized to not to give anything away and to make sure the necessary "rah, rah" stuff is included.

He also utterly and completely refutes your oft stated contention that no one in Afghanistan knows what they're doing or ever gets in a fight.

It does? LOL

Read through that all again and see which of the actions they initiated and which the TB initiated. And then help me here. How is it that enemy casualties are an estimate? And why in the same report the enemy casualties for the same contact are different?

Enquiring minds ask questions...

[Ken White]

those things are written by all the officers. Then sanitized to not to give anything away and to make sure the necessary "rah, rah" stuff is included.

Of course, been that way in all Armies for a good many years. One always has to read between the lines, so to speak (easier than trying to decipher an ignorant journalist's writing...). What's your point?

Read through that all again and see which of the actions they initiated and which the TB initiated. And then help me here. How is it that enemy casualties are an estimate? And why in the same report the enemy casualties for the same contact are different?

Enquiring minds ask questions...

I obviously cannot help though goodness knows I've tried. As have others.

Enquiring minds can ask stupid questions. Considering the Rules of Engagement in Afghanistan which have been discussed on this Board at great length and with which I do not agree -- but they aren't my call -- of course the Talibs initiate most contacts. That is not good. While totally unsound militarily, it is politically unavoidable.

The enemy casualties are almost always an estimate in all wars, only very rarely does one do a complete overrun and get all the enemy.

As for your last question, See Sylvan's comment (LINK).

[JMA]

Sorry JMA, I am just not getting this. Is it you contention that all IED casualties are unacceptable or that all casualties are unacceptable?

Neither.

Also I fail to see how anyone can claim "IED casualties are largely preventable."

In the simplest terms by not using certain roads and using only those which are protected and cleared before use. As far as the anti-personnel types go very much the same applies. Only go where the TB go.

As to the observation that the casualty rate is politically unacceptable, so what? That's your opinion and as an observation it does help progress the matter.

?... What it does advance is that public support for the war is at an all time low. That impacts on any decision to pull troops out before the mission is accomplished. Domestic pressure whether you or I like it or not is material.

The effect of IEDs in respect of casualties, killed and maimed, also has a deleterious effect on both civilian and military morale.

It may not be, but there was extensive training on how to select X-country routes to avoids IEDs and how to cross hedges to make patrols less vulnerable to IEDS.

When in doubt avoid the areas altogether as it is not like the TB and the locals will want to walk around in minefields either. I often wonder when I see foot patrols crossing open fields what exactly are they doing. Surely they don't expect the TB to be found sitting around armed in these open fields?

I understand that the doctrine says that one should dominate no-man's land with patrols but when you can dominate it by day from an OP and by night with thermal then whats the point of legging it around looking for a trip wire?

[JMA]

Of course, been that way in all Armies for a good many years. One always has to read between the lines, so to speak (easier than trying to decipher an ignorant journalist's writing...). What's your point?I obviously cannot help though goodness knows I've tried. As have others.

Good that you can read between the lines of a journalists article but sad that you can't do the same with that army piece.

Enquiring minds can ask stupid questions. Considering the Rules of Engagement in Afghanistan which have been discussed on this Board at great length and with which I do not agree -- but they aren't my call -- of course the Talibs initiate most contacts. That is not good. While totally unsound militarily, it is politically unavoidable.

Aah the ROE. A convenient scapegoat for all the problems. How is it that the ROE preclude troops on the ground from initiating contact with the TB?

The enemy casualties are almost always an estimate in all wars, only very rarely does one do a complete overrun and get all the enemy.

Why estimate? Why not just count the bodies and get an accurate number?

Or... are the infantry not closing with and killing the enemy?

Take this snip from that piece:

"During the search we were hit heavily from the south and fought a pitched battle with the Taliban over a one hundred metre field. 66mm rockets, rocket grenades and Javelin were used to good effect to destroy the enemy and aide our safe extraction back to Crossing Point 1."

Now you can really help me by explaining to me how the winner of a battle gets to need to extract itself from the battle? Sure explains how the enemy casualties are reduced to guess work though.

As for your last question, See Sylvan's comment (LINK).

That's right nobody counted the bodies because nobody got any where near where the bodies were supposed to be.

[baboon6]

I would actually consider setting up a series of theater specific field HQs, Bde or Bn level depending on locale. These HQ posts would be filled by head hunting. I would then call for volunteers from across the army to fill all posts in the subunits on a permanent basis. This on the basis similar to how the Chindits were raised. Tell the volunteers to leave their regimental baggage at home. Leave the guards to march around London and fill the operational area with soldiers AND Afghans who are serious about making war.

No it is not. Only a small percentage of the Chindits were volunteers. The majority of the men on both the 1943 and 1944 operations were members of normal British or Gurkha infantry battalions who were simply put under Wingate's command. While there was a fair amount of reorganisation regimental/battalion identities were retained.

http://www.chindits.info/Units/Units.html

Why do you need special units made up of volunteers to serve in Afghanistan? All British (and US, Canadian, Australian etc) soldiers are volunteers anyway and I'm sure the majority want to go to Afghanistan. However I don't think you're going to get too many takers for a unit that is permanently deployed. I do think certain advisors and liaison officers should be there on a long-term basis; I believe the US Army is trying to institute such a scheme.