The UK in Afghanistan

[Ken White]

...as if the hostilities were temporary and that we should maintain the career planning and the flow of such courses. Looking back it is easy to see the folly of it all.

There's the rub. People. Particularly Politician people...

That leads to this:

...good for the career but not a war that needs to be taken by the scruff of the neck and dealt with. (I understand and identify with this approach because we experienced similar.)

Which most of us also experienced.

Not the career of individuals nearly so much as it is protecting the institution. That and the unwillingness of politicians to got to all out war. Understandable but frustrating.

..while it is possibly good for the British Army to 'exercise' their Brigade HQs under operational conditions its not good for the NATO war effort in Afghanistan.

True but it is, long term, good for the Army -- and it is very good, long and short term, for the Politicians who do not have to contend with irate voters whose husbands, wives ,daughters and sons have to do those extended deployments.

(How the the US do this in Vietnam and what were the lessons learned?)

Mostly on a voluntary basis, the tour was a year but one could extend that for 'X' days or months. A few people were involuntarily retained. IIRC, the J2, the senior Intelligence director stayed for over three years. Not totally sure of all lessons learned. Anecdotally, that burnout was a major problem and that some people 'married the job' and were unable to shed a lot of baggage from it -- assignment dependent of course. The guy who ran an Officers Club for four years merely got rich, not traumatized.

Maybe three years is all you need out of an individual. And those who want to stay on for longer may not want to return to a peacetime army when its all over anyway. In a lot of ways the career guys are really not suited for this type of utilisation anyways.

Agree. That's part of the rub in democratic societies, difficult to balance politically acceptable, affordable and effective...

(where sports took precedent over valuable field training).

That too. The democratic society syndrome, I mean. The Mothers and other Voters of America are happier when their kids are playing war on the pitch rather than actually engaging in what they're paid to do...

I suggest that the key is continuity. In that the turnover of staff within units should be restricted to a churn of 10-15% tops. Continuity can be achieved through a greater commitment to that specific war and the same troops used on a semi-permanent basis. Impossible if great numbers required.

All true. I'm not sure how the senior Staff and Commander long tour effort is being managed in Afghanistan. IIRC, there was talk of about 400 key people who would rotate in and out of the same job on a 'for the duration' basis.

So yes the Brits were tasked with securing that part of Helmand and disrupting the opium cycle and they have failed spectacularly on both counts. Will the Marines do better? Can't do worse.

Unfortunately, they were given a virtually impossible task and inadequate resources with which to perform that task. It was and is a task that in many respects was not truly a British national interest (nor a US one but that's another thread...). The Marines may do 'better' -- a very relative term -- but that'll be as much due to better resourcing as anything. Then again, they may nor do as well. We'll see.

Penalty of living in an inefficient, chaotic democratic society where domestic politics mean more than the war at hand and the Politicians absolutely do NOT want Armed Forces that are too effective...

Still, all things considered, I wouldn't change that. The good outweighs the bad -- even for those that get to go do the bad stuff and have fun while eating poorly and living rough.

[JMA]

There are active discussions ongoing within the UK military about how to gain more continuity in COIN campaigns.

The Brits arrived in 2006 and 4 years on its as the man said..."slow learners"

In N Ireland some units stayed for 2 years on 'residential' tours while others rotated in and out on 6 month 'emergency' tours. HQ, support and specialist staff generally did 2 year tours. In Afghanistan the number of 12 month posts in critical areas (G2, Info Ops, CIMIC) has increased and the UK mil has got much better at conducting a campaign as opposed to a series of ad hoc brigade initiatives

Its a case of too little too late. And it can't all be blamed on the politicians. I suggest that the centuries of inbreeding in the officer class are coming home to roost.

The UK mil has also recognised that there is still an element of 'being on operations' as opposed to 'being at war' mindset, exemplified at it most stark raving mad by the army being on a 'war footing' for everything except career management, with the inevitable consequences that this entails. This is work in progress and the Chief of the General Staff (General Richards) is actively driving this.

War footing? Look you can't be taking this whole thing seriously if you do a 6 month tour followed 18 months of guarding palaces and other unproductive pursuits. Now unless the Brits intend to do a "Basra" on the US again in the case of Afghanistan then they better settle down and get stuck in to where ever the US deploys them in Afghanistan.

It is understood that the Brits can't bring their troops home from Europe as they have no place to house them. Soinstead of letting them waste their time hanging out in Germany let them do time in Helman.

[William F. Owen]

The Brits arrived in 2006 and 4 years on its as the man said..."slow learners"

So tell me your impression of the first 4 years of Northern Ireland or Malaya? What constitutes fast and in what area?

And it can't all be blamed on the politicians. I suggest that the centuries of inbreeding in the officer class are coming home to roost.

Well if you believe entirely mythical stereotypes, I can't help you.

War footing? Look you can't be taking this whole thing seriously if you do a 6 month tour followed 18 months of guarding palaces and other unproductive pursuits.

Who guarding what?

It is understood that the Brits can't bring their troops home from Europe as they have no place to house them. Soinstead of letting them waste their time hanging out in Germany let them do time in Helman.

Sorry JMA, but you are clearly and profoundly ignorant of the issues.
Yes, the UK does have some major problems in Afghanistan. Not denying it, but they are a world away from the observations you make.

Unless you can contribute some constructive, I strongly suggest that you get up to speed on what the actual issues are - and then comment if you can help.

[Red Rat]

Its a case of too little too late. And it can't all be blamed on the politicians. I suggest that the centuries of inbreeding in the officer class are coming home to roost.

In order to change one has to understand the environment one is operating in, and the constraints one is operating under, all of which takes time. Furthermore in order to change one has to be resourced. I contend that we have adapted quickly in Afghanistan, but we continue to be hampered by a lack of resources and admittedly a degree of institutional inertia. We have undoubtedly made mistakes and need to review the nature and value of military advice to politicians but while that (IMHO) is a systemic and possibly cultural failing within the armed forces officer corps, it certainly is nothing to do with outmoded thoughts on the composition of the officer class.

War footing? Look you can't be taking this whole thing seriously if you do a 6 month tour followed 18 months of guarding palaces and other unproductive pursuits.

6 months on tour, 6 months recuperation (including essential individual career courses), 6 months sub-unit to unit training and then 6 months pre-deployment training before deploying... Units in ceremonial roles commit sub-units to operations, mostly as Battle Casualty Replacements.

Now unless the Brits intend to do a "Basra" on the US again in the case of Afghanistan then they better settle down and get stuck in to where ever the US deploys them in Afghanistan.

The story of Basra is a sorry story, but not necessarily as sorry as people make it out to be. Under resourcing, lack of strategic clarity and miscommunication between the US and the UK all played their part.
Unlike Iraq where there was not strategic political/military coordinating mechanism which lead to all sorts of confusion and misunderstanding within the respective US and UK chains of command the ISAF operation in AFG is run under NATO auspices and I think we are doing slightly better.

It is understood that the Brits can't bring their troops home from Europe as they have no place to house them. Soinstead of letting them waste their time hanging out in Germany let them do time in Helman.

Troops based in Germany are heavily committed to Afghanistan with sub-units, units and formations all deploying.

[JMA]

In order to change one has to understand the environment one is operating in, and the constraints one is operating under, all of which takes time. Furthermore in order to change one has to be resourced. I contend that we have adapted quickly in Afghanistan, but we continue to be hampered by a lack of resources and admittedly a degree of institutional inertia. We have undoubtedly made mistakes and need to review the nature and value of military advice to politicians but while that (IMHO) is a systemic and possibly cultural failing within the armed forces officer corps, it certainly is nothing to do with outmoded thoughts on the composition of the officer class.

I have found in life that the more people have to explain something and the more they have to demystify something the more there is something really indefensible behind it all.

I was taught that anyone can make a mistake but when one fails to learn from a mistake and goes on to repeat it then quite frankly there is no hope.

The UK is set for a repeat in Helmand. No excuse the second time around.

6 months on tour, 6 months recuperation (including essential individual career courses), 6 months sub-unit to unit training and then 6 months pre-deployment training before deploying... Units in ceremonial roles commit sub-units to operations, mostly as Battle Casualty Replacements.

Interesting. Seems the Afghanistan 'tour' is just another item in the two year cycle. Does anyone think that those on the previous 'tour' are still current in operational terms? Out of interest how many units have had a second 'tour' to Afghanistan and what percentage of the men were also on that second tour?

I can think of a simple way to ensure operational continuity but it would never happen in the Brit army.

In Rhodesia the units that had the most difficulty in adapting were those with the most tradition (being the RAR and the SAS). There was too much "thats not our role" and "that's not the way we did it in Malaya"... as I have stated before, like trying to turn a supertanker in high seas. This is why the Selous Scouts was formed (to cut through all the crap) and the RLI was such a young regiment they were unencumbered by the baggage of tradition.

All this is why an Independent Briage HQ needs to be formed and permanently based in Afghanistan. And the battalions that fall under that brigade are either raised specially for that purpose or required to comply tightly with operational continuity requirements.

These battle casualty replacements, are they for other units?

The story of Basra is a sorry story, but not necessarily as sorry as people make it out to be. Under resourcing, lack of strategic clarity and miscommunication between the US and the UK all played their part.
Unlike Iraq where there was not strategic political/military coordinating mechanism which lead to all sorts of confusion and misunderstanding within the respective US and UK chains of command the ISAF operation in AFG is run under NATO auspices and I think we are doing slightly better.

Basra was more than a sorry story it was in the eyes of the non-British world seen as a defeat at the hands of the Shia militia.

Quote:
"Yesterday, a member of the Iraqi government appeared to concede that the British troops had pulled back after suffering defeat to the Shia militias. "For me, I think the British couldn't do the job as they liked to do it, so for that reason they pulled out. They didn't control the situation, they couldn't improve the situation," the Human Rights minister, Wijdan Mikha'il Salim, told journalists in London. Pressed on whether the British had been defeated, she replied: "It's a hard question," before nodding." http://tinyurl.com/2wvuylr

As I said before the British rank and file do not deserve this humiliation through the hands of their politicians and senior officers. Just as they do not deserve whats coming to them in Helmand when they 'withdraw' and are replaced by the US Marine corps.

Troops based in Germany are heavily committed to Afghanistan with sub-units, units and formations all deploying.

Its all about what constitutes the term "heavily committed" in your and/or the Brit terms. Six months on and 18 months "off" is quite frankly laughable.

[JMA]

Sorry JMA, but you are clearly and profoundly ignorant of the issues.
Yes, the UK does have some major problems in Afghanistan. Not denying it, but they are a world away from the observations you make.

Unless you can contribute some constructive, I strongly suggest that you get up to speed on what the actual issues are - and then comment if you can help.

William I thought we had agreed to walk away from this one?

[William F. Owen]

William I thought we had agreed to walk away from this one?

Not that I remember. I stated that I was not going to keep explaining the basics of patrol doctrine to you, because it clearly served no purpose.

You have since suggested (-with no hint of humour) that UK's problems are associated with ceremonial duties and in breeding amongst serving officers. Both are ill-founded and utterly incorrect - as Red Rat points out.

SWJ's reputation is derived from the high level of informed discussion, which is how I find myself here - and nowhere else - thus my response.

[davidbfpo]

The operating environment cited by Red Rat is not just in Afghanistan or over the border in the FATA; there is the home front too - which for a variety of reasons has only recently been given attention. Months ago IIRC Gordon Brown said we were on a 'war' footing and homecoming public parades became a regular fixture.

At home over 75% of the UK public - according to polling data - is not convinced of the rational given for our involvement and want the troops out. None of the main political parties support this, each no doubt for their own reasons.

When the re-deployment from Helmand Province was mooted a few months ago, IIRC there were 'presentational difficulties' and I am not convinced the UK public will think any better of the war if and when we redeploy.

Yes, sitting in my "armchair" faraway I know a tiny fraction of what is going on in Helmand. That caveat aside it is quite clear from the open source reporting that I see something is profoundly wrong. Sometimes referred to as "mowing the lawn", IIRC a phrase coined (no pun intended) by a young officer (Mark Evison in May '09) who died after a few days at a FOB. These points I have often made in previous posts and I vividly recall one post that IEDs were being laid outside a FOB 100m away (it would take time to re-locate the post).

Yes, Kings of War have an excellent PPT on the campaign (which was mentioned in the last week). Where is the equivalent of MG Flynn's report in the public domain?

That UK soldiers died to ensure the last Afghan elections were "free & fair" is a national disgrace, in what was clearly neither free nor fair; yes, Karzai and the Afghans have made their choices, that does not mean we have to die for them.

Add in heroin production, of which a good portion ends up in the UK, simply causes dismay when I talk to friends about Afghanistan. This I know has been "aired" in other threads; I simply cannot see why we do not purchase 'X' % of the crop and destroy it in situ and supply alternative crops.

[Steve Blair]

You bring up some very good points, actually. Your armchair may be far away, but as you're one of the ones who's footing the bill for all this, your comments are as valid as any (and more than some when taken in their proper context). There is an unfortunate tendency to belittle those who are not in uniform, but it's also easy to forget that it's the folks in armchairs who foot the bills and try to keep things running.

That said, the government side (in and out of uniform) does have an obligation to clearly communicate as much as possible what's going on. When they fail (as in Vietnam) the folks in armchairs get restless and start complaining about footing the bill for things. When communication is lacking or questionable, the natives get restless. And that can have major and unintended consequences.

[baboon6]

Interesting. Seems the Afghanistan 'tour' is just another item in the two year cycle. Does anyone think that those on the previous 'tour' are still current in operational terms? Out of interest how many units have had a second 'tour' to Afghanistan and what percentage of the men were also on that second tour?

I can think of a simple way to ensure operational continuity but it would never happen in the Brit army.

In Rhodesia the units that had the most difficulty in adapting were those with the most tradition (being the RAR and the SAS). There was too much "thats not our role" and "that's not the way we did it in Malaya"... as I have stated before, like trying to turn a supertanker in high seas. This is why the Selous Scouts was formed (to cut through all the crap) and the RLI was such a young regiment they were unencumbered by the baggage of tradition.

All this is why an Independent Brigade HQ needs to be formed and permanently based in Afghanistan. And the battalions that fall under that brigade are either raised specially for that purpose or required to comply tightly with operational continuity requirements.

These battle casualty replacements, are they for other units?

Its all about what constitutes the term "heavily committed" in your and/or the Brit terms. Six months on and 18 months "off" is quite frankly laughable.

1. Many units have done two tours in Helmand, several have now done three. From what I have read the percentage of personnel remaining from previous tours varies from 40-60%.

2. The Rhodesian forces didn't get everything right, and were also guilty of some complacency. As you of course know COMOPS (Combined Operations Headquarters) was only formed in 1977 and even then it didn't always do the job it was supposed to. The formation of the Selous Scouts was indeed innovative but the subsequent rivalry between them and the SAS was apparently sometimes quite idiotic. When a Special Forces HQ was finally established to control the two units, improve sharing of intelligence, and prevent overlapping of resonsibilities it was hived off to command the Security Force Auxiliaries. Ron Reid-Daly had some interesting things to say about the way things developed:

It was indefensibly ridiculous for General Walls or his Staff to concern themselves with which village in the bush, a three-man stick
from the Special Air Service, or the Selous Scouts should be deployed, and who should release the helicopters to support them. This was, and should have stayed the sole responsibility of the Army and Air Force Commanders and their Staffs, whose plans would have been the logical follow-on from the strategical guide lines put out by COMOPS. The immediate result of COMOPS taking overall physical, as well as the detailed day to day control of the Army's running of the war, was that the Army Commander, General Hickman, lost his rightful operational command. ... The only command left to him was purely an administrative one. ... His staff at Army Headquarters, particularly the G-Staff, were allowed nothing further to do with his planning of the war and were only able to concern themselves with new organisations, amendments to staff tables and training matters.

(Quoted in Jakkie Cilliers' book Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia, p.74)

3. Re BCRs I know during Herrick 10 (summer 2009) when there were rather heavy casualties, a whole coy (can't remember from which unit) was sent out and its members were generally integrated into units as complete sections when possible, with the remaining members of understrength sections/platoons going to others within their own units. However it seems more normal for units to get BCRs as individuals, some almost straight from phase 2 training.

4. The US Army does indeed do 12-month tours, which are arguably more effective than 6 month ones but their breaks between tours are generally (not always) longer too. USMC usually units do 7-month tours. So I don't see your point.

[William F. Owen]

I have found in life that the more people have to explain something and the more they have to demystify something the more there is something really indefensible behind it all.

I would very much concur with that. Thus I would suggest the Red Rat has very clearly explained the problem.
If not, allow me to add:

a.) The UK mission to Afghanistan was ill conceived, badly planned and hugely under re-sourced, while we were still committed to Iraq in numbers that made success (in Iraq) impossible.

b.) Given that we have no clear Strategy in Afghanistan, certain aspects about the conduct of operations is open to question.

c.) So yes, given a coherent and achievable strategy, based on the use of armed force, we can progress a sensible discussion - in the absence of that it serves no purpose to quibble about theatre specific TTPs.

I can think of a simple way to ensure operational continuity but it would never happen in the Brit army.

Very interested in serious suggestions. Let's hear it.

All this is why an Independent Briage HQ needs to be formed and permanently based in Afghanistan.

Sorry, I just don't understand why you want an Independent Brigade HQ? So you base all the Theatre command elements back in the UK?

And the battalions that fall under that brigade are either raised specially for that purpose or required to comply tightly with operational continuity requirements.

So explain exactly how that would work?

Its all about what constitutes the term "heavily committed" in your and/or the Brit terms. Six months on and 18 months "off" is quite frankly laughable.

So you suggest?

[JMA]

The operating environment cited by Red Rat is not just in Afghanistan or over the border in the FATA; there is the home front too - which for a variety of reasons has only recently been given attention. Months ago IIRC Gordon Brown said we were on a 'war' footing and homecoming public parades became a regular fixture.

At home over 75% of the UK public - according to polling data - is not convinced of the rational given for our involvement and want the troops out. None of the main political parties support this, each no doubt for their own reasons.

When the re-deployment from Helmand Province was mooted a few months ago, IIRC there were 'presentational difficulties' and I am not convinced the UK public will think any better of the war if and when we redeploy.

Yes, sitting in my "armchair" faraway I know a tiny fraction of what is going on in Helmand. That caveat aside it is quite clear from the open source reporting that I see something is profoundly wrong. Sometimes referred to as "mowing the lawn", IIRC a phrase coined (no pun intended) by a young officer (Mark Evison in May '09) who died after a few days at a FOB. These points I have often made in previous posts and I vividly recall one post that IEDs were being laid outside a FOB 100m away (it would take time to re-locate the post).

Yes, Kings of War have an excellent PPT on the campaign (which was mentioned in the last week). Where is the equivalent of MG Flynn's report in the public domain?

That UK soldiers died to ensure the last Afghan elections were "free & fair" is a national disgrace, in what was clearly neither free nor fair; yes, Karzai and the Afghans have made their choices, that does not mean we have to die for them.

Add in heroin production, of which a good portion ends up in the UK, simply causes dismay when I talk to friends about Afghanistan. This I know has been "aired" in other threads; I simply cannot see why we do not purchase 'X' % of the crop and destroy it in situ and supply alternative crops.

What is the anticipated approach of the new government?

[William F. Owen]

That UK soldiers died to ensure the last Afghan elections were "free & fair" is a national disgrace, in what was clearly neither free nor fair; yes, Karzai and the Afghans have made their choices, that does not mean we have to die for them.

Add in heroin production, of which a good portion ends up in the UK, simply causes dismay when I talk to friends about Afghanistan. This I know has been "aired" in other threads; I simply cannot see why we do not purchase 'X' % of the crop and destroy it in situ and supply alternative crops.

Good points. Well made.

[davidbfpo]

JMA asked:

What is the anticipated approach of the new government?

IIRC both parties support our national role in Afghanistan; David Cameron has certainly visited those deployed - twice I think - and a number of MPs have too. It will be interesting if any of them get junior ministerial posts; notably Adam Holloway, see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adam_Holloway and this Iraqi report he wrote:http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.co...e-in-iraq.html

The BBC has this mainfesto summary for all the parties, note LibDems 'critically support' the mission:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/p...ur&col3=libdem

They also have this comment on coalition policy:

The British role in the war will continue, though both parties in the coalition hope that conditions will allow for the start of a British withdrawal in the not-too-distant future. If they do not, there could be tensions.

Link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/p...10/8678135.stm

My own view, from afar, is that the new government will not alter policy an iota for months, partly out of concern for the US reaction to any perceived weakness on remaining stalwart. Cuts in public spending could eventually push the issue back to the fore.

Whoops, I overlooked the newly elected MP Rory Stewart; I expect he'll be on the backbenches for awhile.

Hope that helps.

[JMA]

1. Many units have done two tours in Helmand, several have now done three. From what I have read the percentage of personnel remaining from previous tours varies from 40-60%.

Do you have a source for this? I would like to understand it more clearly.

2. The Rhodesian forces didn't get everything right, and were also guilty of some complacency. As you of course know COMOPS (Combined Operations Headquarters) was only formed in 1977 and even then it didn't always do the job it was supposed to. The formation of the Selous Scouts was indeed innovative but the subsequent rivalry between them and the SAS was apparently sometimes quite idiotic. When a Special Forces HQ was finally established to control the two units, improve sharing of intelligence, and prevent overlapping of resonsibilities it was hived off to command the Security Force Auxiliaries. Ron Reid-Daly had some interesting things to say about the way things developed:

It was indefensibly ridiculous for General
Walls or his Staff to concern themselves with
which village in the bush, a three-man stick
from the Special Air Service, or the Selous
Scouts should be deployed, and who should
release the helicopters to support them. This
was, and should have stayed the sole responsibility
of the Army and Air Force Commanders and
their Staffs, whose plans would have been the
logical follow-on from the strategical guide
lines put out by COMOPS. The immediate result
of COMOPS taking overall physical, as well as
the detailed day to day control of the Army's
running of the war, was that the Army Commander,
General Hickman, lost his rightful operational
command. ... The only command left to him was
purely an administrative one. ... His staff at
Army Headquarters, particularly the G-Staff,
were allowed nothing further to do with his
planning of the war and were only able to concern
themselves with new organisations, amendments
to staff tables and training matters.(

(Quoted in Jakkie Cilliers' book Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia, p.74)

Of course the broader Rhodesian effort had many flaws. No one (certainly not me) is contesting that. At the start of the main insurgency (end of 1972) the army was run by the "Malayan clique" comprising those who had served there during the emergency. They (like I suspect the Brits now in Afghanistan) had all the answers until a few years later they found all was not going according to script. To their credit at that point they moved swiftly to adapt... too late though.

Well in a small army there was quite honestly no requirement for another level of command. Once COMOPS had been established there was really no operational role for Army HQ. So they should have formalised that rather than dish scraps out to Gen Hickman at Army HQ.

Worthy of note is that the JOCs (Joint Operations Centres) were essentially a Bde HQ in the field were permanently manned by Brigade staff which include the other services (Air Force and Police). Worked well. Had there been more troops available to deploy it would have worked even better.

3. Re BCRs I know during Herrick 10 (summer 2009) when there were rather heavy casualties, a whole coy (can't remember from which unit) was sent out and its members were generally integrated into units as complete sections when possible, with the remaining members of understrength sections/platoons going to others within their own units. However it seems more normal for units to get BCRs as individuals, some almost straight from phase 2 training.

OK thanks I see its not hard and fast. I had thought these battalions trained their own troops so theoretically they could feed the recruits in on completion of training.

4. The US Army does indeed do 12-month tours, which are arguably more effective than 6 month ones but their breaks between tours are generally (not always) longer too. USMC usually units do 7-month tours. So I don't see your point.

We have been through this. The point is continuity. 1 year is far better than 6 months but when you have a wholesale change over in an operational environment when there is claim to establishing relationships and trust with the locals it makes no sense and sets the supposed 'hearts and minds' operations back by months.

[JMA]

Whoops, I overlooked the newly elected MP Rory Stewart; I expect he'll be on the backbenches for awhile.

About Rory Stewart... what on earth is a "gap year commission"?

[Red Rat]

I was taught that anyone can make a mistake but when one fails to learn from a mistake and goes on to repeat it then quite frankly there is no hope.

The UK is set for a repeat in Helmand. No excuse the second time around.

Basra was more than a sorry story it was in the eyes of the non-British world seen as a defeat at the hands of the Shia militia.

Iraq was a combination of vague and sometimes contradictory strategic direction, under resourcing and miscommunication. UK plc and the UK army did not do well there and mistakes were made. Some of those mistakes have also been made in Helmand. I hesitate to say repeated because that infers that the Iraq mistakes had been recognised when the Helmand mistakes were made - and they had not. A report has been written on the Iraq mescapade and will no doubt be discussed in these forums when it is published in October As for defeat at the hands of the JAM... I disagree in part. The hard military fact is that the UK fought the JAM to a draw over the period 2006-2007. We did not have the strength to dominate Basra, the JAM did not have the strength to defeat us, it was stalemate. We had decapitated their C2 and severely attrited their main cadres but we lost the battle of perceptions internally (Basra) and externally (middle east and ROW). What followed, the accommodation, extraction and then Op Charge of the Knights is a story which will be told later on this year, at which point we can discuss anew. The story of the UK mescapade in Basra, especially 2006-09 reminds me in part of the story of the Tet Offensive.

Interesting. Seems the Afghanistan 'tour' is just another item in the two year cycle. Does anyone think that those on the previous 'tour' are still current in operational terms? Out of interest how many units have had a second 'tour' to Afghanistan and what percentage of the men were also on that second tour?

With the exception of 3 brigades, all other units have completed 2 tours and are on their third. Of those three brigades one is deployed, the other two will deploy in the next 12 months and all have units and sub-units with Afghanistan experience. Many specialist units such as G2 and CIMIC are seeing a much higher op tempo.

In terms of currency no, the units will not be current per se, but they will have a degree of corporate cultural awareness about Afghanistan. In terms of changeover of personnel most units deploying ill have 40-60 percent of men with previous tour experience; this is based on the normal turnover of men in a unit.

In terms of JMA's proposals for op continuity. I too chafe at the fact that the British Army still appears to be 'business as usual with a spot of operations after tea and tiffen'. However, this (unlike Rhodesia) is for the UK a limited conflict and with limited means allocated to it; it is not a war for national survival. Also as JMA has alluded to, while the regimental system has its strengths, it also creates a large anount of institutional drag...

Another difference between Afghanistan and Rhodesia is ISAF forces are supporting an indigenous government and it is for them to put in place (if appropriate) many of the forces and structure that are alluded to. Personally I would like to see a strengthening of HQ structures in Theatre (it has happened, but not enough) and greater continuity in mentoring elements.

Its all about what constitutes the term "heavily committed" in your and/or the Brit terms. Six months on and 18 months "off" is quite frankly laughable.

It is a war of National Interest, not a war of National Survival... That said many of us do query why we could not sustain a higher operational tempo, especially as we have pared training not directly relevant to AFghanistan (ie high tempo, high intensity Major Combat Operations the so called 'conventional war') to the bone.

Miscellaneous points:

Rory Stewart: A gap year commission is a probabtionary commission given out on a very selective basis (normally up to 12 awarded in any one year) to undergraduates in their gap year. They complete 2-4 weeks training and then complete 9-12 months with the unit of their choice. They are not allowed to deploy on operations. It was designed as a recruiting tool to take high calibre individuals and give them a taste of army life at the end of which they would go to university and extol the virtues of a military life. As a bonus many often ended up joining the army.

[JMA]

Iraq was a combination of vague and sometimes contradictory strategic direction, under resourcing and miscommunication. UK plc and the UK army did not do well there and mistakes were made. Some of those mistakes have also been made in Helmand. I hesitate to say repeated because that infers that the Iraq mistakes had been recognised when the Helmand mistakes were made - and they had not. A report has been written on the Iraq mescapade and will no doubt be discussed in these forums when it is published in October As for defeat at the hands of the JAM... I disagree in part. The hard military fact is that the UK fought the JAM to a draw over the period 2006-2007. We did not have the strength to dominate Basra, the JAM did not have the strength to defeat us, it was stalemate. We had decapitated their C2 and severely attrited their main cadres but we lost the battle of perceptions internally (Basra) and externally (middle east and ROW). What followed, the accommodation, extraction and then Op Charge of the Knights is a story which will be told later on this year, at which point we can discuss anew. The story of the UK mescapade in Basra, especially 2006-09 reminds me in part of the story of the Tet Offensive.

I look forward to hearing the story (from the Brit point of view) Sadly in the meantime the PR war seems to have been lost which is tragic for the reputation of the British soldier.

Lets see how the Helmand "redeployment" pans out to see if any lessons have been learned.

Things are happening at various levels, the level you speak of and the operational level. Its maybe a lot less murky at operational level where one can look at the tactics and the minor tactics and figure out quite well what's going on.

With the exception of 3 brigades, all other units have completed 2 tours and are on their third. Of those three brigades one is deployed, the other two will deploy in the next 12 months and all have units and sub-units with Afghanistan experience. Many specialist units such as G2 and CIMIC are seeing a much higher op tempo.

It seems the Brits are working on a 1:3 rotation (6 months in and then 18 months out). I suggest that a 3:2 rotation into the same operational theater is doable for a sustained period. In Rhodesia the regulars worked 6 weeks on ops followed by 10 days R&R while the Territorials were on a 6 week in, 6 week out basis (while trying to keep the economy going) which was not sustainable. (The breakdown by weeks, as opposed to months, was possible because the war was in our backyard as opposed to over the seas and far away.)

In terms of currency no, the units will not be current per se, but they will have a degree of corporate cultural awareness about Afghanistan. In terms of changeover of personnel most units deploying ill have 40-60 percent of men with previous tour experience; this is based on the normal turnover of men in a unit.

Yes I accept that they will return with 'awareness' as opposed to 'being current'. How long these returning units require to get up to speed, I don't know. My point is that continuity in such a war is vital and achieving it is quite possible at virtually all levels.

In terms of JMA's proposals for op continuity. I too chafe at the fact that the British Army still appears to be 'business as usual with a spot of operations after tea and tiffen'. However, this (unlike Rhodesia) is for the UK a limited conflict and with limited means allocated to it; it is not a war for national survival. Also as JMA has alluded to, while the regimental system has its strengths, it also creates a large anount of institutional drag...

I would suggest that if the resources are limited that a force level able to operate adequately and effectively within that resource level be deployed to Afghanistan (no more). There is really little point in deploying under resourced units to Afghanistan as that merely leads to operational failure and troop demoralization.

"Institutional drag"... yes, good description.

Another difference between Afghanistan and Rhodesia is ISAF forces are supporting an indigenous government and it is for them to put in place (if appropriate) many of the forces and structure that are alluded to. Personally I would like to see a strengthening of HQ structures in Theatre (it has happened, but not enough) and greater continuity in mentoring elements.

It would, however, be helpful if the Brits put the most effective structure in place now to help their war effort with the intention of handing over the operational area to the locals as soon as practicable. The current system which seems pretty dodgy at best is unlikely to be maintained by the locals even if they had the resources and the logistic resupply capability. What I am essentially saying is that when you hand over the area to the locals they are going to do it their way regardless, so don't waste time with mentoring and concentrate rather on operational coordination and/or cooperation.

It is a war of National Interest, not a war of National Survival... That said many of us do query why we could not sustain a higher operational tempo, especially as we have pared training not directly relevant to AFghanistan (ie high tempo, high intensity Major Combat Operations the so called 'conventional war') to the bone.

I accept that basic premise and would suggest that instead of spreading the load to include for example mech units who are really role (and mental approach) unsuitable for the type of warfare and that the concentration be on 'light' and 'air mobile' infantry at a higher operational tempo.

I suggest that if you get involved in a conflict you need to commit with some degree of seriousness. One could give it the grand name of "the Afghanistan Taskforce" and then let the commander get the job done.

Miscellaneous points:

Rory Stewart: A gap year commission is a probabtionary commission given out on a very selective basis (normally up to 12 awarded in any one year) to undergraduates in their gap year. They complete 2-4 weeks training and then complete 9-12 months with the unit of their choice. They are not allowed to deploy on operations. It was designed as a recruiting tool to take high calibre individuals and give them a taste of army life at the end of which they would go to university and extol the virtues of a military life. As a bonus many often ended up joining the army.

OK thanks.

[JMA]

JMA asked:

IIRC both parties support our national role in Afghanistan; David Cameron has certainly visited those deployed - twice I think - and a number of MPs have too. It will be interesting if any of them get junior ministerial posts; notably Adam Holloway, see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adam_Holloway and this Iraqi report he wrote:http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.co...e-in-iraq.html

The BBC has this mainfesto summary for all the parties, note LibDems 'critically support' the mission:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/p...ur&col3=libdem

They also have this comment on coalition policy:

Link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/p...10/8678135.stm

My own view, from afar, is that the new government will not alter policy an iota for months, partly out of concern for the US reaction to any perceived weakness on remaining stalwart. Cuts in public spending could eventually push the issue back to the fore.

Whoops, I overlooked the newly elected MP Rory Stewart; I expect he'll be on the backbenches for awhile.

Hope that helps.

Obama has been meeting with Karzai, so perhaps we should wait and see what instructions are passed onto Downing Street in due course.

[baboon6]

Do you have a source for this? I would like to understand it more clearly.







OK thanks I see its not hard and fast. I had thought these battalions trained their own troops so theoretically they could feed the recruits in on completion of training.



We have been through this. The point is continuity. 1 year is far better than 6 months but when you have a wholesale change over in an operational environment when there is claim to establishing relationships and trust with the locals it makes no sense and sets the supposed 'hearts and minds' operations back by months.

1. As for what units have done tours, it is simply from going through the unit pages on the British Army website, the defence questions in Hansard, and the archives on the TF Helmand blog (brigade ORBATs are particularly useful). Quite a laborious process.

2. All phase 1 and 2 training for infantrymen is now done at the Infantry Training Centre at Catterick. Each administrative "division" of infantry has its own training coy there with its own instructors. As I wrote above some BCRs come almost straight from there or the relevant training establishment for their corps (with a short time at OPTAG*), some from a unit's own rear party, some from other units. I haven't read much about officers' deploying as BCRs but they will have of course completed Sandhurst and then (if infantry) the Platoon Commanders' Battle Course at Brecon.

*Operational Training Advisory Group- responsible for preparing units and individuals for tours. Has sections both in the UK and Helmand.