The UK in Afghanistan

[William F. Owen]

*Operational Training Advisory Group- responsible for preparing units and individuals for tours. Has sections both in the UK and Helmand.

OPTAG is a flow down from the old NITAT (Northern Ireland Training Team) and is a blindingly good idea. I know a former CO of OPTAG, and it is an impressive organisation. I know of no other similar organisation. When folk go one about operational learning or "adaptiveness" OPTAG pretty much answers 90% of the relevant questions. Not perfect, but better than anything else.

[Red Rat]

OPTAG has come on in leaps and bounds and is approaching the excellence that was NITAT. We have also developed much better structures for the rapid dissemination of lessons learnt from Theatre to the wider army, not yet perfect by any stretch but a far greater improvement on even 12 months ago.

JMA raised a point about preferring light role units for Afghanistan. Having served light role, mech and armoured (and with my last unit being armoured infantry (AI)) I noted with interest that most UK units in Afghanistan have a vehicle fleet equal to or larger then the establishment of mech or AI battalions. Being primarily light role units which have deployed so far they have not necessarily had the supporting structures or know how to maintain them effectively... Logistics is not a dirty word (however unglamorous it may be!) The current brigade deployed in theatre is a mechanized brigade and it will be interesting to see what their experience is.

[baboon6]

OPTAG is a flow down from the old NITAT (Northern Ireland Training Team) and is a blindingly good idea. I know a former CO of OPTAG, and it is an impressive organisation. I know of no other similar organisation. When folk go one about operational learning or "adaptiveness" OPTAG pretty much answers 90% of the relevant questions. Not perfect, but better than anything else.

Surely most NATO countries must have something similar? I know the US Army has the Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana which seems to fulfill in some ways the same role. As well as the National Training Center at Fort Irwin in California which used to focus on mechanised ops but now also does COIN.

Anyway more about OPTAG:

http://www.hmforces.co.uk/news/artic...age-in-norfolk

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/De...eparations.htm

http://www.g4s.uk.com/en-gb/Media%20...0of%20Defence/

[baboon6]

JMA raised a point about preferring light role units for Afghanistan. Having served light role, mech and armoured (and with my last unit being armoured infantry (AI)) I noted with interest that most UK units in Afghanistan have a vehicle fleet equal to or larger then the establishment of mech or AI battalions. Being primarily light role units which have deployed so far they have not necessarily had the supporting structures or know how to maintain them effectively... Logistics is not a dirty word (however unglamorous it may be!) The current brigade deployed in theatre is a mechanized brigade and it will be interesting to see what their experience is.

Should it make that much difference? Surely they have gone through the same basic training, career courses and pre-deployment training? Let's not also forget the small numbers of armoured infantry (a coy at a time since 2007) deployed in-role, apparently successfully.

Re 4 Mech Bde several of its constituent units for Herrick 12 are light-role: 1 RGR, 1 LANCS, 1 MERCIAN, 40 Commando RM. It is only really the Scots Guards (less one coy with Warriors) and RDG who are being deployed "out of role". QRL are the other area battle group and 1 SCOTS the OMLT battle group though of course their role and structure is very different to other BGs.

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/De...eInHelmand.htm

[William F. Owen]

Surely most NATO countries must have something similar? I know the US Army has the Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana which seems to fulfill in some ways the same role. As well as the National Training Center at Fort Irwin in California which used to focus on mechanised ops but now also does COIN.

I'm sure they do now, but I also strongly suspect that most are modelled on the NITAT, OPTAG lines.

[William F. Owen]

JMA raised a point about preferring light role units for Afghanistan. Having served light role, mech and armoured (and with my last unit being armoured infantry (AI)) I noted with interest that most UK units in Afghanistan have a vehicle fleet equal to or larger then the establishment of mech or AI battalions.

I am somewhat involved in this debate with professional audience. What now seems clear is that "Light Role" actually means "can be mounted in anything" - which is what it should mean and traditionally did.

Why people equate it with romantic notions of bouncing across the mountains with big rucksacks or even being "light" still leaves me shaking my head.

[Red Rat]

Should it make that much difference? Surely they have gone through the same basic training, career courses and pre-deployment training? Let's not also forget the small numbers of armoured infantry (a coy at a time since 2007) deployed in-role, apparently successfully.

Actually it is more the other way round. It is the 'light role' troops who are being deployed out of role in Afghanistan because they have a vehicle fleet more in keeping with a mech or armoured unit scaling. It is a bit like the issues found with Mounted Infantry (MI) in the Boer War and the Camel Corps in Kitchener's Sudan Campaign:

Looking after the equipment: The MI could ride horses, but not very well and tended to suffer a greater degree of wear and tear to both riders and mounts then a cavalry unit. They were also intially scaled for less farriers and vets and suffered from a lack of institutional experience. A light role (no vehicles less a company's worth of lift in unarmoured trucks) unit given fighting vehicles has the same issues.

Operating the equipment; MI could ride to the scene of an engagement then dismount and fight on foot. They did not operate the horse/rider as a fighting system per se. So with light role units and armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) ; it is one thing to operate the vehicle, it is another thing to gain the expertise to fight it as a system and then again a different order of magnitude to fight the AFV with dismounts as a system.

I am with Wilf, light role is more and more a misnomer and should mean - "can be mounted in anything"

[Fuchs]

OPTAG is a flow down from the old NITAT (Northern Ireland Training Team) and is a blindingly good idea. I know a former CO of OPTAG, and it is an impressive organisation. I know of no other similar organisation. When folk go one about operational learning or "adaptiveness" OPTAG pretty much answers 90% of the relevant questions. Not perfect, but better than anything else.

This sounds a bit like the AWG and also a bit like an idea of mine for fighting micromanagement.

[baboon6]

Actually it is more the other way round. It is the 'light role' troops who are being deployed out of role in Afghanistan because they have a vehicle fleet more in keeping with a mech or armoured unit scaling. It is a bit like the issues found with Mounted Infantry (MI) in the Boer War and the Camel Corps in Kitchener's Sudan Campaign:

Looking after the equipment: The MI could ride horses, but not very well and tended to suffer a greater degree of wear and tear to both riders and mounts then a cavalry unit. They were also intially scaled for less farriers and vets and suffered from a lack of institutional experience. A light role (no vehicles less a company's worth of lift in unarmoured trucks) unit given fighting vehicles has the same issues.

Operating the equipment; MI could ride to the scene of an engagement then dismount and fight on foot. They did not operate the horse/rider as a fighting system per se. So with light role units and armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) ; it is one thing to operate the vehicle, it is another thing to gain the expertise to fight it as a system and then again a different order of magnitude to fight the AFV with dismounts as a system.

I am with Wilf, light role is more and more a misnomer and should mean - "can be mounted in anything"

Yeah the sheer variety of sub-units, roles and vehicles within supposedly " infantry" battle groups is quite mind-boggling. "Mastiff Groups", operating in a recce/fire support/troop-lift role have been manned by everyone from light-role infantry to squadrons from FR and MBT regiments to pioneers. Lately it seems to be sometimes RAC vehicle crews with Inf dismounts which makes sense. Other FR squadrons have a combination of CVRT and Jackal or Mastiff and Jackal. As you point out infantry sub-units could also have depending on their role Mastiff, Ridgeback, Jackal, WMIK etc. Viking has been manned by the Royal Marines Armoured Support Coy or squadrons from MBT regiments.

[Kiwigrunt]

The concept of what used to constitute a brigade seems to be shifting quite a bit as well. Baboon6’s link (post 245) shows 8 infantry battalions, and that’s only half the brigade-group. I suspect a brigade HQ will now be something larger than what used to be a division HQ.

[baboon6]

The concept of what used to constitute a brigade seems to be shifting quite a bit as well. Baboon6’s link (post 245) shows 8 infantry battalions, and that’s only half the brigade-group. I suspect a brigade HQ will now be something larger than what used to be a division HQ.

Six infantry battalions and two armoured regts are mentioned in that line-up but at least one of each is there without its HQ and its sub-units entirely split up between other units. As far as I can tell the ORBAT of the fighting elements of TF Helmand includes six/seven "area" battle groups based in various districts, five/six predominantly or totally UK and one predominantly Danish (also includes UK troops), each including infantry supported by (mostly light) armour, gunners, sappers, signallers etc (please don't ask how a "typical" battle group is made up because there does not seem to be such a thing, they vary wildly!); the OMLT battle group, recently renamed the Brigade Advisory Group, which is split up into teams advising the various elements of the ANA's 3/215 Brigade, which are generally "partnered" with ISAF units; and such "funnies" as the Brigade Recce Force.

There is a British div HQ there which provides the majority of the HQ for Regional Command South.

[JMA]

Yeah the sheer variety of sub-units, roles and vehicles within supposedly " infantry" battle groups is quite mind-boggling. "Mastiff Groups", operating in a recce/fire support/troop-lift role have been manned by everyone from light-role infantry to squadrons from FR and MBT regiments to pioneers. Lately it seems to be sometimes RAC vehicle crews with Inf dismounts which makes sense. Other FR squadrons have a combination of CVRT and Jackal or Mastiff and Jackal. As you point out infantry sub-units could also have depending on their role Mastiff, Ridgeback, Jackal, WMIK etc. Viking has been manned by the Royal Marines Armoured Support Coy or squadrons from MBT regiments.

When I commented on the matter of 'role' I included the factor of mental approach.

Sadly the Brits are yet to figure out how best to operate in the Afghanistan theater. To inkspot or not to inkspot... that is the question. To hand out sweeties to village kids or to go after the TB and kill them... that is the next question. This makes the selection of the most suitable units for deployment in Afghanistan impossible.

For many the basic training is years behind them and yes where they did that basic training and what they have done and learned and been conditioned with since makes a material difference both in soldiering skill and mental approach and what can reasonably be expected of them on operations.

So this rotating of units through to somehow share the load makes no sense in operational terms. Now if soldiers were not being killed at the rate they are maybe it would not matter but one would have thought that given the current carnage the general staff would be taking this little war a bit more seriously?

[JMA]

OPTAG has come on in leaps and bounds and is approaching the excellence that was NITAT. We have also developed much better structures for the rapid dissemination of lessons learnt from Theatre to the wider army, not yet perfect by any stretch but a far greater improvement on even 12 months ago.

JMA raised a point about preferring light role units for Afghanistan. Having served light role, mech and armoured (and with my last unit being armoured infantry (AI)) I noted with interest that most UK units in Afghanistan have a vehicle fleet equal to or larger then the establishment of mech or AI battalions. Being primarily light role units which have deployed so far they have not necessarily had the supporting structures or know how to maintain them effectively... Logistics is not a dirty word (however unglamorous it may be!) The current brigade deployed in theatre is a mechanized brigade and it will be interesting to see what their experience is.

Of course if one were utilising a system of sequential R&R in permanently deployed units and sub-units no OPTAG would be required as the training would be internal. Specialist IED training (for example) can be done by travelling instructors at the real sharp end.

I see training as a continuous process which includes pre-op rehearsals and preparations. The mind set must change from the clear line between training and war and blur the two into one. Preparations and rehearsals for patrols, OPs, ambushes, attacks are all a form of training. If a unit moves onto a program of OPs where they have not used that tactic before then obviously the preparation and rehearsal time (for that read training) must be adequate for them to reach operational standard.

Its all in the mental approach

[Ken White]

...The mind set must change from the clear line between training and war and blur the two into one...Its all in the mental approach

totally.

Unfortunately, a large number of democratically elected politicians and quite probably the majority of the citizens in a number large, bureaucratic nations do not agree with you and I. Recall these nations are in wars of choice, not in existential conflicts. They have no compelling need to do what we and quite probably a majority of serving soldiers from those nations think would be beneficial. Ergo, the poor Armed Forces do the best they can with the hand they've been dealt.

You say the mind set must change. That's incredibly easy to say but it is most unlikely to occur, thereby it becomes a sort of fatuous statement. We can say it would be good if it changed, even say it should change -- but cannot say it "must change" without adding qualifiers such as 'or there will likely be no significant improvement in the Afghanistan operation.' The "likely" is necessary because we cannot predict flatly that improvement will not occur without the implementation of any of the suggestions. Combat is not that orderly...

Of course if one were utilising a system of sequential R&R in permanently deployed units and sub-units no OPTAG would be required as the training would be internal.

That presupposes that adequate training capability exists in the units and that the unit heirarchy is totally competent. Bad assumption for Armies from the aforesaid large bureaucratic democracies with politicians more concerned with their reelection than they are with the state of their Armed Forces -- which, once more, those pols do not want to be too effective...

It also suggests that there is political will to deploy forces for long periods in wars of choice. Our experience in the US with one rota into Iraq being extended to 15 months is that the parents and spouses get REALLY upset -- and let their elected Representatives know they are upset. With totally predictable results.

You want military effectiveness; what Soldier does not? OTOH, the Politicians are not at all concerned with that factor. You are pleading for effective military change that is politically unachievable. That is not going to change...

[JMA]

totally.

Unfortunately, a large number of democratically elected politicians and quite probably the majority of the citizens in a number large, bureaucratic nations do not agree with you and I. Recall these nations are in wars of choice, not in existential conflicts. They have no compelling need to do what we and quite probably a majority of serving soldiers from those nations think would be beneficial. Ergo, the poor Armed Forces do the best they can with the hand they've been dealt.

The difference between a war of choice and an existential conflict is a good one.

You say the mind set must change. That's incredibly easy to say but it is most unlikely to occur, thereby it becomes a sort of fatuous statement. We can say it would be good if it changed, even say it should change -- but cannot say it "must change" without adding qualifiers such as 'or there will likely be no significant improvement in the Afghanistan operation.' The "likely" is necessary because we cannot predict flatly that improvement will not occur without the implementation of any of the suggestions. Combat is not that orderly...That presupposes that adequate training capability exists in the units and that the unit heirarchy is totally competent. Bad assumption for Armies from the aforesaid large bureaucratic democracies with politicians more concerned with their reelection than they are with the state of their Armed Forces -- which, once more, those pols do not want to be too effective...

Yes a qualifier is needed there.

It also suggests that there is political will to deploy forces for long periods in wars of choice. Our experience in the US with one rota into Iraq being extended to 15 months is that the parents and spouses get REALLY upset -- and let their elected Representatives know they are upset. With totally predictable results.

The sheer number of men in the US deployments is such that much of what I suggest (about forming special units and formations) will be impractical. Maybe the Marines will handle Helmand on their own rotating their own units through. I'll be interested to see how its done.

My company had a 7% married rate but yes for the majority of the rest there was a mommy wanting her blue eyed boy to come home soon.

You want military effectiveness; what Soldier does not? OTOH, the Politicians are not at all concerned with that factor. You are pleading for effective military change that is politically unachievable. That is not going to change...

What I am essentially asking for is for the Brit army to take the war in Afghanistan seriously. There are improvements that can be made within the current mix of available resources, there are improvements to tactics which can be made without recourse to the politicians. All is not lost. And here was a chance with a new government to push a little one way and pull a little the other. The chance is probably slipping away.

[William F. Owen]

Of course if one were utilising a system of sequential R&R in permanently deployed units and sub-units no OPTAG would be required as the training would be internal. Specialist IED training (for example) can be done by travelling instructors at the real sharp end.

The whole point of OPTAG is that it contains the sharp end experts and whole units go through it together. Travelling instructors will not work, especially if visiting deployed units.

I see training as a continuous process which includes pre-op rehearsals and preparations. The mind set must change from the clear line between training and war and blur the two into one.

You hold Rehearsals to confirm orders. They are not and should not included training.
Training is learning. I do not want anyone confusing training with operations. If you say training should be rigourous, hard, and very demanding, I agree, but I see no merit in confusing the two.

What I am essentially asking for is for the Brit army to take the war in Afghanistan seriously. There are improvements that can be made within the current mix of available resources, there are improvements to tactics which can be made without recourse to the politicians.

At the unit level everyone takes the war very seriously. There are not many improvements that can be made in the mix of resources unless there is a lot more money.

If one would want to suggest tactical solutions, you would have to have a very good understanding of current practice, and be able to understand it in context. I strongly caution against the school of "Youtube Critiquing."

That said, good ideas are good ideas and no one should not be open to them.

[JMA]

The whole point of OPTAG is that it contains the sharp end experts and whole units go through it together. Travelling instructors will not work, especially if visiting deployed units.

You hold Rehearsals to confirm orders. They are not and should not included training.
Training is learning. I do not want anyone confusing training with operations. If you say training should be rigourous, hard, and very demanding, I agree, but I see no merit in confusing the two.


At the unit level everyone takes the war very seriously. There are not many improvements that can be made in the mix of resources unless there is a lot more money.

If one would want to suggest tactical solutions, you would have to have a very good understanding of current practice, and be able to understand it in context. I strongly caution against the school of "Youtube Critiquing."

That said, good ideas are good ideas and no one should not be open to them.

William, my comments were in the context of the hypothetical of troops being on permanent deployment. So not applicable to the system the Brits are using right now.

And I am not going to get into a knock down drag out with you over the semantics of 'training', 'retraining', 'rehearsals' and 'ops preparations' in the context of troops who are virtually on continuous ops. Sorry.

Tactics cannot be discussed when a knee jerk defensive reaction is the first response to any perceived criticism. The sad and simple truth is that the Brits are about to be replaced in Helmand by the USMC because they are seen to be "not cutting it". All the blame for this can not be placed at the door of the "lack of resources".

[William F. Owen]

And I am not going to get into a knock down drag out with you over the semantics of 'training', 'retraining', 'rehearsals' and 'ops preparations' in the context of troops who are virtually on continuous ops.

Words and their meaning are important. You cannot suggest solutions unless everyone has the same understanding and uses the same language.

Tactics cannot be discussed when a knee jerk defensive reaction is the first response to any perceived criticism. The sad and simple truth is that the Brits are about to be replaced in Helmand by the USMC because they are seen to be "not cutting it". All the blame for this can not be placed at the door of the "lack of resources".

I agree with all you say, but criticism has to be based on thorough and coherent understanding of the problem. Additionally resources are a huge issue and impact on everything. Unless you understand that relationship, then all else is pretty much rubbish.
Let me be clear> I think the UK is getting it wrong, but I think it is getting it wrong for very different reasons than you suggest.

[Red Rat]

The sad and simple truth is that the Brits are about to be replaced in Helmand by the USMC because they are seen to be "not cutting it".

I like to think that I am as open to our (Brit) failings as anyone else is; I certainly agree that we could and should be doing better in many areas. I am not however convinced that the asertion that the Brits are to be replaced in Helmand because they are "not cutting it" holds true. As soon as the USMC moved into Helmand it was recognised that there would come a point (due to force ratios) that it would make sense for command to cut across away from the (current) Task Force Helmand (TFH) HQ. I also suspect that there is the issue of force ratios - can Britain deploy the necessary numbers to effectively carry out the strategy envisaged in its AO? If it cannot then again it makes sense to move them out to where they can be better used (or to reduce the size of their AO to achieve the necessary force ratios).

[JMA]

I like to think that I am as open to our (Brit) failings as anyone else is; I certainly agree that we could and should be doing better in many areas. I am not however convinced that the asertion that the Brits are to be replaced in Helmand because they are "not cutting it" holds true. As soon as the USMC moved into Helmand it was recognised that there would come a point (due to force ratios) that it would make sense for command to cut across away from the (current) Task Force Helmand (TFH) HQ. I also suspect that there is the issue of force ratios - can Britain deploy the necessary numbers to effectively carry out the strategy envisaged in its AO? If it cannot then again it makes sense to move them out to where they can be better used (or to reduce the size of their AO to achieve the necessary force ratios).

The statement I made was: "because they are seen to be 'not cutting it'."

One would appreciate that the Brits would not share this view but they may well be alone in this.

The following article of Dec2008 gives good insight into the then building view from the US side: http://tinyurl.com/5frl2p