The UK in Afghanistan

[JMA]

I am with Wilf, light role is more and more a misnomer and should mean - "can be mounted in anything"

And in the Afghanistan context given the IED situation that should probably mean not mounted in vehicles and not walking around in the ridiculous belief that by doing so they deny freedom of movement to the TB.

[Ken White]

The statement I made was: "because they are seen to be 'not cutting it'."

Combat performance is a subjective judgment in any situation short of a total defeat of the opponent at the end of a campaign or war. Those judgments made in the political corridors are suspect, those reported in the media are suspect and those on blogs and discussion board are suspect. You might get an accurate assessment from persons actually on the ground at a point in time -- but even that would be a subjective assessment prone to modification as circumstances change.

The point of all that is that rushes to judgment seem to be endemic today and my observation has been that most of them are incorrect. Still, in the link you provided, there was this:

"Carter Malkesian, an expert at the Centre of Naval Analysis, said: “Among those in the Department of Defence who are paying attention to these operations, Britain’s reputation has probably fallen. But they still recognise that the British Army, among all the allies, are those that fight the most and fight the best.”

Everyone I've talked to who's been there gives the British high marks. As with ANY armed force, anywhere in the world at any time, units will vary in capability and performance. Everyone can't be great and even the great have bad days...

Here's an example of subjective judgment:

And in the Afghanistan context given the IED situation that should probably mean not mounted in vehicles and not walking around in the ridiculous belief that by doing so they deny freedom of movement to the TB.

Given the huge distances in Afghanistan, vehicles are presumed by those there to be a necessary evil; "walking around" has been proven to deny some but certainly not all freedom of movement to the Talibs. US experience has been that units that patrol heavily initiate more contacts and deny the terrain covered to the Talibs. The problem is the number of troops available versus the geography, there simply are not enough troops to provide wider coverage.

You have frequently criticized the conduct of operations in Afghanistan and you have offered some suggestions to remediate the problem you see. My perception is that your criticisms are indicative of experience and good knowledge of minor warfighting in a selected campaign but also display an apparent ignorance of conditions in Afghanistan. An attempt to fit one war as template on another usually will fail. Regardless, many of your suggestions are good and would work -- IF they were politically viable. Most do not seem to be. Politically, it would have been better had the US not decided to stay in Afghanistan and not pulled NATO into the country. Regrettably, no one asked me before they did that so we're confronted by dealing with reality instead of 'what should be.'

Those serving there do not see those factors as ridiculous. You often make strong assertions without qualification and those lessen your credibility to many. You are of course free to do so but FWIW I suspect that the basic lack of knowledge of terrain conditions, operations there and subjectivity on this topic all demonstrated here over the past weeks will not give your views a great deal of credence.

[JMA]

The operating environment cited by Red Rat is not just in Afghanistan or over the border in the FATA; there is the home front too - which for a variety of reasons has only recently been given attention. Months ago IIRC Gordon Brown said we were on a 'war' footing and homecoming public parades became a regular fixture.

At home over 75% of the UK public - according to polling data - is not convinced of the rational given for our involvement and want the troops out. None of the main political parties support this, each no doubt for their own reasons.

When the re-deployment from Helmand Province was mooted a few months ago, IIRC there were 'presentational difficulties' and I am not convinced the UK public will think any better of the war if and when we redeploy.

Yes, sitting in my "armchair" faraway I know a tiny fraction of what is going on in Helmand. That caveat aside it is quite clear from the open source reporting that I see something is profoundly wrong. Sometimes referred to as "mowing the lawn", IIRC a phrase coined (no pun intended) by a young officer (Mark Evison in May '09) who died after a few days at a FOB. These points I have often made in previous posts and I vividly recall one post that IEDs were being laid outside a FOB 100m away (it would take time to re-locate the post).

Yes, Kings of War have an excellent PPT on the campaign (which was mentioned in the last week). Where is the equivalent of MG Flynn's report in the public domain?

That UK soldiers died to ensure the last Afghan elections were "free & fair" is a national disgrace, in what was clearly neither free nor fair; yes, Karzai and the Afghans have made their choices, that does not mean we have to die for them.

Add in heroin production, of which a good portion ends up in the UK, simply causes dismay when I talk to friends about Afghanistan. This I know has been "aired" in other threads; I simply cannot see why we do not purchase 'X' % of the crop and destroy it in situ and supply alternative crops.

Unfortunately the document “A Comprehensive Failure: British Civil-Military Strategy in Helmand Province” does not seem to be available online. Can you help?

There are other docs of value.

The failure of British political and military leadership in Iraq
By Adam Holloway MP

Cracking on in Helmand
By Stephen Grey

Why we’re getting it wrong in Afghanistan
Anthony King

and

Understanding the Helmand campaign:
British military operations in Afghanistan
Anthony King

I quite frankly can't see how the strategy in Helmand can be defended in any shape of form and would be surprised if anyone would make a serious attempt to do so.

But the Brits will not accept defeat so easily.

Its the lack of resources they will use as an excuse as to why the military performance in Helmand is a failure. When asked what resources they will reply "helicopters, manpower and IED protected vehicles."

When they are asked why they penny packeted their troops all over the show in FOBs and "platoon houses" they come with some very novel excuses. When asked why they believe that it is possible to 'hold' ground through patrol activity over large areas with woefully insufficient force levels they deny angrily that they are achieving no more than 'mowing the lawn'.

It is fortunate that the British people are becoming increasingly aware and intolerant of the abject failure of the politicians the the sycophantic general staff but they are sadly still blissfully unaware of the failures at tactical level on the ground which is probably a significant cause of the ongoing military failure.

It seems the Brit public are close to accepting that the politicians and weak kneed general staff caused the military humiliation in Iraq and are repeating the same in Afghanistan but are not yet ready to accept that their illustrious military itself is adding to that failure through tactical ineptitude.

The Brit Army's claim to COIN excellence is based on their experiences in Malaya and NI. Yet (quote from Anthony King's article) "Major Will Pike, the officer commanding A Company 3 PARA, ... ‘We seem to ignore all the lessons of the past and especially those of Templer in Malaya." So is it not bizarre to claim expertise based upon a campaign the lessons of which are being ignored? I'm trying hard to see how the NI experience can be applied to rural Afghanistan.

The common understanding is that the Brits are just "cracking on" while sadly it seems more likely that the Brits are 'muddling on' by wondering around "mowing the lawn" in the ridiculous belief that they are maintaining the initiative and dominating and holding the ground.

It is a very very sad situation.

[Fuchs]

The tactical level is being overestimated.

Problems on the tactical level are embarrassing, but rarely decisive for the strategic level - and I'm quite sure that none of the tactical disappointments are of strategic significance.

Look at Basrah; the British gave what many considered to be an unsatisfactory performance and it was irrelevant, if not advantageous. The Iraqi government took over Basrah and got stronger by doing so. The city - in its shape after a British 'failure' - was close to ideal for the strategy.
A city in perfect order wouldn't have given the central state authority such a boost of confidence and respect.
The British had too many casualties, but their effect was fine (in a strange way).

It's similar in Afghanistan. All those small tactical actions have only local and temporary relevance in my opinion. All that the foreign fighters in support of the mayor of Kabul really need to achieve is to keep the Taliban in the underground or at least their control of provinces contested until the puppet learns to fight.
It would help a hundred times more if the puppet began to equip, train, supply and fight the Afghan way (not the Western way) than if the foreign fighters won every battle and controlled every hamlet.

In the end, all those local and temporary successes and failures are unimportant because they're really the sideshow. Even an unparalleled string of local successes is not likely to defeat the TB strategically.
The key to success is a contra-TB force that is (para)militarily superior to the TB and robust enough in terms of income, morale and politics.

[JMA]

Combat performance is a subjective judgment in any situation short of a total defeat of the opponent at the end of a campaign or war. Those judgments made in the political corridors are suspect, those reported in the media are suspect and those on blogs and discussion board are suspect. You might get an accurate assessment from persons actually on the ground at a point in time -- but even that would be a subjective assessment prone to modification as circumstances change.

Yes I suppose so especially if you talk to Brits on the ground there. What are the chances that you will get a candid opinion? Look there are enough Brit soldiers and commentators who have wised up that the Helmand operation has been a shambles and are beginning to speak out. Everything there is now worse than it was before the Brits arrived... expect opium production that is. It is interesting to observe the Brit military itself to see for how long they will continue the pretense that all is indeed well. I can understand why the US needs such an ally engaged along side them in Afghanistan and also why the need to talk them up. Its not working, the Brits are self destructing.

The point of all that is that rushes to judgment seem to be endemic today and my observation has been that most of them are incorrect. Still, in the link you provided, there was this:

"Carter Malkesian, an expert at the Centre of Naval Analysis, said: “Among those in the Department of Defence who are paying attention to these operations, Britain’s reputation has probably fallen. But they still recognise that the British Army, among all the allies, are those that fight the most and fight the best.”

Allies? Like who? Its almost condescending of the US to make such a comment. Yes everyone knows that the Brits die well but that does not mean that in the case of Afghanistan (and Iraq) they have performed well militarily.

Everyone I've talked to who's been there gives the British high marks. As with ANY armed force, anywhere in the world at any time, units will vary in capability and performance. Everyone can't be great and even the great have bad days...

And I suppose from that I must assume that everyone I have spoken to or read of doesn't know what they are talking about? I agree with you if you are really saying that most all other soldiers have a great deal of sympathy for the British soldier.

Given the huge distances in Afghanistan, vehicles are presumed by those there to be a necessary evil; "walking around" has been proven to deny some but certainly not all freedom of movement to the Talibs. US experience has been that units that patrol heavily initiate more contacts and deny the terrain covered to the Talibs. The problem is the number of troops available versus the geography, there simply are not enough troops to provide wider coverage.

Vehicles themselves will always be necessary but how much of the current use of those vehicles is really necessary? I quote from Adam Holloway MP: "Lt Colonel Rupert Thorneloe, two weeks before his death from a roadside bomb: "we all know we don't have enough helicopters.....we can not not move people...this increases the IED threat and our exposure to it"." Yet here i see people saying that this is not true. More helicopters will help little etc etc. Whether some people around here like it or not Thorneloe was correct.

If you have few troops then you should get clever in the way they are used, yes? If Templer's plan in Malaya was based on concentration why are the Brits dispersing their troops in Afghanistan? Yes if you have a lot of patrol activity the chances are that there will be more chance of making contact. But as we have heard from Helmand the initiative of these contacts lies mainly with the TB. It is the TB who in the main decides when and where and under what circumstances contact will be made. If the US forces are initiating the contacts they need to tell the Brits how they are achieving that. (If they will listen)

You must make the best use of your available troops. Good and intelligent field commanders should have by now figured out how to achieve that by now. But wait... they have only a 6 month tour to figure that out. Not enough time and as Adam Holloway MP says: "... they’d spend the first 2 months learning, the second 2 months dealing with the situation, and the third 2 months working out their story of how things had got better on their watch." You see not enough time to figure it all out.

You have frequently criticized the conduct of operations in Afghanistan and you have offered some suggestions to remediate the problem you see. My perception is that your criticisms are indicative of experience and good knowledge of minor warfighting in a selected campaign but also display an apparent ignorance of conditions in Afghanistan. An attempt to fit one war as template on another usually will fail. Regardless, many of your suggestions are good and would work -- IF they were politically viable. Most do not seem to be. Politically, it would have been better had the US not decided to stay in Afghanistan and not pulled NATO into the country. Regrettably, no one asked me before they did that so we're confronted by dealing with reality instead of 'what should be.'

Yet you seem quite happy that the Brits try to force the templates of Malaya and NI into the Afghan campaign? I throw alternates up for consideration but it is the commanders on the ground who need to select the best tactics for use there. There are alternatives, that's all I am saying. Then there are things happening which through my own experience make the hair on my neck stand up. Like that US ambush (reported in a thread here somewhere) which was a shocker. Like some of the reports of Brit tactical MO. We should possibly discuss these actions as case studies but its not possible as too many people around here are too sensitive to perceived criticism of their forces. Lets accept that a lot of the operational problems are self inflicted and not caused by idiot politicians.

Those serving there do not see those factors as ridiculous. You often make strong assertions without qualification and those lessen your credibility to many. You are of course free to do so but FWIW I suspect that the basic lack of knowledge of terrain conditions, operations there and subjectivity on this topic all demonstrated here over the past weeks will not give your views a great deal of credence.

I must admit it took me awhile of walking around Mozambique to realise that the chances of a random contact were not worth the effort expended. I also understand that the Brit training doctrine (which I was also subjected to) insists that you seize the initiative. Lots of patrolling and stuff like that and if you can't generate contacts and dead gooks then you have to redefine the problem. So you say defeating the enemy on the battlefield is not important, what is more important is to merely irritate him by restricting his complete freedom of movement... slightly. You also say that the best intel comes for the locals so one has to cozy up to the locals enough for them to inform on their brothers. Then you can act on it. And don't dare question the Brits as they know it all.

"It is understood that there has been “tension and resentment” over the air of superiority adopted by British commanders such as Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, who suggested that his American counterparts needed to take lessons from Britain’s experience in Northern Ireland and Malaya." http://tinyurl.com/5frl2p

Funny how close this is to the opinion of my forthright Aussie friend who says: "The UK have never been a nation renowned for following some-one else's example or unsolicited guidance in military matters. They have too much hubris, over-confidence and self-importance for that. I learnt this fast when I was the ... and I'm told, things haven't changed!"

So the question that should be asked is whether its just in Iraq and Afghnaistan where the Brit military wheels are coming off... or is it a case of this is the first time when their efforts have come under such close scrutiny?

[JMA]

The tactical level is being overestimated.

Problems on the tactical level are embarrassing, but rarely decisive for the strategic level - and I'm quite sure that none of the tactical disappointments are of strategic significance.

Look at Basrah; the British gave what many considered to be an unsatisfactory performance and it was irrelevant, if not advantageous. The Iraqi government took over Basrah and got stronger by doing so. The city - in its shape after a British 'failure' - was close to ideal for the strategy.
A city in perfect order wouldn't have given the central state authority such a boost of confidence and respect.
The British had too many casualties, but their effect was fine (in a strange way).

That's called the law of unintended consequences.

It was the capitulation of the Brits that forced the Iraqi's to act and the US had to make sure they did not fail and while all this was happening the Brits were sitting at the airfield.

"Operation Charge of the Knights... was launched and whose purpose was to visibly and rather embarrassingly do the job that the British had walked away from. Maliki never forgave this, and exacted his revenge in 2008 when he kicked the UK out of Iraq, against Brown’s expressed wish to maintain a presence to “protect our investment”. Adam Holloway MP

So it was no thanks to the Brits.

It's similar in Afghanistan. All those small tactical actions have only local and temporary relevance in my opinion. All that the foreign fighters in support of the mayor of Kabul really need to achieve is to keep the Taliban in the underground or at least their control of provinces contested until the puppet learns to fight.
It would help a hundred times more if the puppet began to equip, train, supply and fight the Afghan way (not the Western way) than if the foreign fighters won every battle and controlled every hamlet.

In the end, all those local and temporary successes and failures are unimportant because they're really the sideshow. Even an unparalleled string of local successes is not likely to defeat the TB strategically.
The key to success is a contra-TB force that is (para)militarily superior to the TB and robust enough in terms of income, morale and politics.

Yes but this sideshow is throwing up wasted lives of Brit servicemen. One would have thought that the Brits would have got to the point tactically that the TB decide to take their forces elsewhere until the Brits go home... which may not be too long now.

[davidbfpo]

I noted earlier a story on a UK news website that the original idea of redeploying the UK force in Helmand Province had been shelved, alas distractions mounted and now the story eludes searching.

That would be a very interesting development and especially after the arrival of a new UK government.

[Infanteer]

I like to think that I am as open to our (Brit) failings as anyone else is; I certainly agree that we could and should be doing better in many areas. I am not however convinced that the asertion that the Brits are to be replaced in Helmand because they are "not cutting it" holds true. As soon as the USMC moved into Helmand it was recognised that there would come a point (due to force ratios) that it would make sense for command to cut across away from the (current) Task Force Helmand (TFH) HQ. I also suspect that there is the issue of force ratios - can Britain deploy the necessary numbers to effectively carry out the strategy envisaged in its AO? If it cannot then again it makes sense to move them out to where they can be better used (or to reduce the size of their AO to achieve the necessary force ratios).

Agreed - the same is happening with the Canadians in Kandahar. When a Division of US Forces shows up to augment the battalion we had in place, it was only natural that we should step aside on some fronts.

[Ken White]

Yes I suppose so especially if you talk to Brits on the ground there.

Haven't talked to any British folks, only to Americans and Canadians who work with the British.

I can understand why the US needs such an ally engaged along side them in Afghanistan and also why the need to talk them up. Its not working, the Brits are self destructing.

I have no need to talk anyone or anything up. Nor do I have the need to put anyone or anything down.

Yes everyone knows that the Brits die well but that does not mean that in the case of Afghanistan (and Iraq) they have performed well militarily.

Since neither you or I are there, we have to rely on what we hear from others. We seem to draw quite different conclusions from the information we have obtained.

And I suppose from that I must assume that everyone I have spoken to or read of doesn't know what they are talking about?

Based on your comments (as opposed to your suggestions most of which are valid if unlikely to be implemented) thus far in this thread, that appears to be the case.

Vehicles themselves will always be necessary but how much of the current use of those vehicles is really necessary? I quote from Adam Holloway MP...

Neither you nor I nor A. Holloway know the answer to that. My observation has been that the guys on the ground usually do the best they can with what they have. YMMV.

If Templer's plan in Malaya was based on concentration why are the Brits dispersing their troops in Afghanistan?

Perhaps because the terrain, the size of the nation, the opponents are all quite different. Astonishingly different, in fact.

...as we have heard from Helmand the initiative of these contacts lies mainly with the TB. It is the TB who in the main decides when and where and under what circumstances contact will be made.

As you seem to have have heard. My contacts and several posters here who have been or are there do not agree with your version.

But wait... they have only a 6 month tour to figure that out. Not enough time and as Adam Holloway MP says: "... they’d spend the first 2 months learning, the second 2 months dealing with the situation, and the third 2 months working out their story of how things had got better on their watch." You see not enough time to figure it all out.

I agree -- but neither you or I are going to influence HMG to change that so why rant about it.

Yet you seem quite happy that the Brits try to force the templates of Malaya and NI into the Afghan campaign?

Actually, I do not believe that nor have I said or implied that I did feel that way. I have frequently said that ALL wars are different -- Afghanistan cannot be predicated on Malaya NI -- or Rhodesia.

There are alternatives, that's all I am saying.

There are always alternatives. Regrettably, you and I have no play in which are selected.

We should possibly discuss these actions as case studies...

Not really, not here, too tedious and takes up too many pixels. That's a good idea; the internet and a discussion board is simply a bad forum for it.

...but its not possible as too many people around here are too sensitive to perceived criticism of their forces. Lets accept that a lot of the operational problems are self inflicted and not caused by idiot politicians.

Taking the last item first; agreed -- and I have seen few people here that would dispute that. Just as I've seen few people here that are too sensitive to perceived criticism. A number do not react well to ill informed criticism of obscure origin.

So you say defeating the enemy on the battlefield is not important, what is more important is to merely irritate him by restricting his complete freedom of movement... slightly. You also say that the best intel comes for the locals so one has to cozy up to the locals enough for them to inform on their brothers. Then you can act on it. And don't dare question the Brits as they know it all.

You yet again attribute thoughts and statements to me that I have not held or made. I've said nothing resembling those first three items and I question the British almost as much as I question the US Army -- which is considerably.

I believe if you'll check this thread (LINK) You'll see there's been plenty of discussion of British foibles.

"It is understood that there has been “tension and resentment” over the air of superiority adopted by British commanders such as Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, who suggested that his American counterparts needed to take lessons from Britain’s experience in Northern Ireland and Malaya."

Your reliance on dated material from the mainstream media seems to be affecting your perceptions. The Aylwin-Foster article was published in the US Army Command and General Staff College's Military Review (LINK). It was discussed here (LINK){One thread, it was discussed a bit in several others here about the same time. The Search function works if you're interested} and throughout the US Army, most agreed he had some good points but that he was being terribly British about it. Some of his suggestions were implemented

...or is it a case of this is the first time when their efforts have come under such close scrutiny?

You need to read more history. The imminent demise of the British Army has been predicted dozens of times in my memory. From Pitt's days through the 'contemptible little army' to today. Amazingly, most of the predictions seem to come or came from Opposition Politicians, are or were picked up by gullible and ignorant news media types and then by a similar public.

I suspect the British Army be around for a bit, long after you and I are gone.

[Fuchs]

That's called the law of unintended consequences.

It was the capitulation of the Brits that forced the Iraqi's to act and the US had to make sure they did not fail and while all this was happening the Brits were sitting at the airfield.

It's more than that. There's likely a big turn in the marginal rate of return for additional occupation efforts.
In other words; you won't be able to achieve much more even with great ressources once you've got to a certain level of accomplishments.

I think the optimum level of accomplishment is to keep the enemy in the underground, to force them to hide or to show themselves openly only in unimportant, remote places (and shortly).
The British seem to have achieved even less than that, but they and others were nevertheless enough of a threat to prevent the militia in power in Basrah from openly marching & capturing other places (especially Baghdad).
History tells us that this was enough.

We shouldn't ignore history or lightly declare it to have been accidental.
Iraq is a COIN example in which the puppet government halfway emancipates and grows effective enough to take over the armed security job.
THAT is the decisive move, and you don't need to achieve more than to keep things from preventing this move until the move happens. Tactical, operational and strategic victory by the foreign fighters over the insurgents is not necessary if you're working towards such a host-ination.

A low level of foreign fighter commitment in support of the puppet/host government can also make sense as a motivator for a rapid build-up of the puppet/host's security forces.


Oh, and then there's of course the history of WW2 partisans in the Balkans where Italian troops were apparently more effective in suppressing revolt than German troops for the Italians were less intent to fight.

[JMA]

I believe if you'll check this thread (LINK) You'll see there's been plenty of discussion of British foibles.

Ok, I have and I now understand the game.

It is OK to blame the politicians and call the general staff pricks but don't dare try to say that there are equally huge problems developing at tactical level in the field.

[JMA]

It's more than that. There's likely a big turn in the marginal rate of return for additional occupation efforts.
In other words; you won't be able to achieve much more even with great ressources once you've got to a certain level of accomplishments.

Yes, the law of diminishing marginal returns. Its like where the Brits find themselves now with respect to counter IED efforts.

I see that the call is continuous for more troops but I suggest that the general staff look for better and more effective use of their current level of resources. The lower level commanders should have learned to do this by now.

Surely by now there is enough experience to guide a shift in tactics? Or is the quick in-and-out 6 month 'tours' (in Afghanistan) making continuity and progressive learning impossible?

I think the optimum level of accomplishment is to keep the enemy in the underground, to force them to hide or to show themselves openly only in unimportant, remote places (and shortly).
The British seem to have achieved even less than that, but they and others were nevertheless enough of a threat to prevent the militia in power in Basrah from openly marching & capturing other places (especially Baghdad).
History tells us that this was enough.

Not the 'optimum level' I must say but for politicians and gutless generals who just want to keep a lid on it that may be acceptable. The problem is that when you don't kill enough of the enemy they tend to get more and more expert at conducting their affairs without your interference. The one day they surprise you.

"In 2007 the Commanding General in Basra was given clear direction from Downing Street to “get us out”." - Adam Holloway MP

At least the general only withdrew to the airport and did not cut and make a run for Bagdad. The only good to come out of the Brit efforts in Basra was to contribute to lessons learned.

And Britain had its "Saigon moment".

We shouldn't ignore history or lightly declare it to have been accidental.
Iraq is a COIN example in which the puppet government halfway emancipates and grows effective enough to take over the armed security job.
THAT is the decisive move, and you don't need to achieve more than to keep things from preventing this move until the move happens. Tactical, operational and strategic victory by the foreign fighters over the insurgents is not necessary if you're working towards such a host-ination.

Yes the presence of the US and the Brits and others bought the new Iraqi regime time to organise itself. And luckily by the time the Brit politicians bottle went they were ready to act (only if supported by the US military). How could the US refuse?

A low level of foreign fighter commitment in support of the puppet/host government can also make sense as a motivator for a rapid build-up of the puppet/host's security forces.


Oh, and then there's of course the history of WW2 partisans in the Balkans where Italian troops were apparently more effective in suppressing revolt than German troops for the Italians were less intent to fight.

Interesting observation. More on this please.

[JMA]

I had said: "If Templer's plan in Malaya was based on concentration why are the Brits dispersing their troops in Afghanistan?"

.Perhaps because the terrain, the size of the nation, the opponents are all quite different. Astonishingly different, in fact.

Good now we are making progress.

Yes I agree, that Afghanistan is astonishingly different to both Malaya and NI so what are these lessons from Malaya and NI that the arrogant Brig Aylwin-Foster wanted the US to learn? This especially when the Brits don't seem to be applying anything successfully in Afghanistan at both strategic and tactical levels.

As much as you may not like what Adam Holloway MP has to say he is bang on in what he said here:

There was also an aspect of pride. British officers had talked at such length about their expertise in counterinsurgency, after decades of experience in Northern Ireland and Malaya, that they could not be seen to have got it wrong. The combination of self-delusion, hubris and ignorance was behind the disastrous decisions that were taken in Basra. Military commanders could not take a long-term view as they only spent six months in the job and no significant intelligence database was built. The result was that key knowledge was lost in the biannual handover and short-termism took over.

And sadly history is repeating itself in Afghanistan. And who said the Brits learn from their mistakes?

[JMA]

The tactical level is being overestimated.

Problems on the tactical level are embarrassing, but rarely decisive for the strategic level - and I'm quite sure that none of the tactical disappointments are of strategic significance.

Sorry, I needed to address this better.

You are correct in what you say.

I was addressing the tactical level because things are also going badly wrong there. Looking at the problems which some do not want to acknowledge rather than because they are of any strategic significance.

[davidbfpo]

I noted (yesterday) a story on a UK news website that the original idea of redeploying the UK force in Helmand Province had been shelved, alas distractions mounted and now the story eludes searching.

That would be a very interesting development and especially after the arrival of a new UK government.

The report was in The Times on 13th May, citing US sources:

A US proposal for British troops to withdraw from Helmand province into neighbouring Kandahar has had to be scrapped because of fierce resistance from London.

Cites a comment by General McCrystal at a briefing:

There is no planned deployment of British Forces from Helmand to Kandahar.

Link:http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle7125881.ece

[JMA]

The report was in The Times on 13th May, citing US sources:

Cites a comment by General McCrystal at a briefing:

Link:http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle7125881.ece

I guess this is a political decision. If it had been Brown I guess the US would have just gone ahead and moved the Brits out of Helmand. But now they need to remain cozy with the new boys. Lets see how it works out on the ground.

[Ken White]

Ok, I have and I now understand the game.

your use of innuendo.

It is OK to blame the politicians and call the general staff pricks but don't dare try to say that there are equally huge problems developing at tactical level in the field.

You can infer that if you wish to do so -- and you obviously do for whatever reason -- I didn't take it that way...

To my comment "Perhaps because the terrain, the size of the nation, the opponents are all quite different. Astonishingly different, in fact," you responded:

Good now we are making progress.

Your use of the imperial we is noted but in my view, you and I are making no progress toward even understanding each other, much less in agreeing.

Yes I agree, that Afghanistan is astonishingly different to both Malaya...

If you agree, you are contradicting your own earlier statement:

I had said: "If Templer's plan in Malaya was based on concentration why are the Brits dispersing their troops in Afghanistan?"

That implies they should be doing so whereas if you knew much about the war in Afghanistan you'd realize that the differences you now acknowledge made that impossible. Such contradictions in your posts leave one to presume either you are ignorant of what is really going on in Afghanistan, you are lacking in clarity of expression, or your bias is tripping you -- any or all the foregoing. Either way, you can certainly be confusing...

...so what are these lessons from Malaya and NI that the arrogant Brig Aylwin-Foster wanted the US to learn? This especially when the Brits don't seem to be applying anything successfully in Afghanistan at both strategic and tactical levels.

That's a good example of my foregoing statement. Brigadiers are supposed to be arrogant. So what if one is...

As I earlier said, Aylwin-Foster had some good points, some not so good. We, the US, did discuss with no polemics and adopt some of his suggestions.

The British really have little to no strategic say in Afghansitan therefor one cannot say they are failing in that regard. Tactically, most of your comments express your opinion to which you are entitled even if you do often appear not fully cognizant of many details. Some of those comments I agree with, most I do not. Many seem to display some ignorance, a reliance on media and an "It's British so it must be wrong..." approach. So, again, to make such a definitive statement could possibly be seen as over reach on your part.

As much as you may not like what Adam Holloway MP has to say he is bang on.

Why do you assume I do not like what Holloway has to say? I said nothing to imply that. You continually try to attribute thoughts and statements to me, quite incorrectly and it's rather silly. You cannot possibly know my thoughts and you continually attempt to misstate my positions. Inadvertently, I'm sure. Right...

Holloway is an ex Grenadier Guardsman and SAS type. A Rupert he may be but he's no dummy. His statement you quote latterly seems quite correct to me, his earlier statement quoted by you was based on hearsay; he was not, as I simply said, there. Different statements, different reactions, I generally try to avoid one size fits all thinking. You might try that.

Apropos of my earlier comment; "Amazingly, most of the predictions seem to come or came from Opposition Politicians, are or were picked up by gullible and ignorant news media types and then by a similar public." note that Holloway is a Conservative thus at the time of both quotes was in Opposition, We'll see how his future pronouncement trend...

[JMA]

The British really have little to no strategic say in Afghansitan therefor one cannot say they are failing in that regard. Tactically, most of your comments express your opinion to which you are entitled even if you do often appear not fully cognizant of many details. Some of those comments I agree with, most I do not.

Ken, I'm sure the Brits are thrilled with your spirited defence of anything and everything relating to their performance in Helmand.

I would suggest that you attempt to balance your view by reading Anthony King's document on British operations in Helmand.

Understanding the Helmand campaign:
British military operations in Afghanistan

Post Iraq the British military reputation is in tatters and they cling only to the possibility that they remain world class at company level where increasingly the evidence is that this too may not be the case.

[William F. Owen]

Good now we are making progress.

In what sense?

This especially when the Brits don't seem to be applying anything successfully in Afghanistan at both strategic and tactical levels.

Evidence for that statement? So folks are still walking around in Red Coats in your eyes?
a.) The UK has to support US/NATO strategy.
b.) There are substantial limits as to what can be achieved at the Tactical level with only 9,000 men deployed. It simply is not enough.

And sadly history is repeating itself in Afghanistan. And who said the Brits learn from their mistakes?

Well those of thus that read history would say they do. Why are we in A'Stan is another question all together. The two are not related.

[Ken White]

Ken, I'm sure the Brits are thrilled with your spirited defence of anything and everything relating to their performance in Helmand.

Though I would point out yet again -- fourth time, I believe -- that you are trying to attribute to me things that I have not written or done. I'm not defending anything and everything -- I am saying your rather peculiar and sustained attacks on the British who happen to be in Helmand appear to be based on hearsay, lack of knowledge, old media reports and the statements of politicians. Your prerogative but it appears to me to make little sense...

I would suggest that you attempt to balance your view by reading Anthony King's document on British operations in Helmand.

I'll read it. I just skimmed it, didn't see any real surprises. The British Army is making the same mistakes the American Army is making there, so no big shock in that. That's why I haven't really 'defended' the tactical blunders, but rather have pointed out that your information appears to be less than complete and that you indulge in a lot of innuendo.

What is shocking is that you don't understand the domestic political forces that drive some of the problems -- like inadequate training and professional eduaction and the ponderousness of the huge -- too huge -- bureaucracies that are the NATO Armies (with a few exceptions).

Post Iraq the British military reputation is in tatters and they cling only to the possibility that they remain world class at company level where increasingly the evidence is that this too may not be the case.

Been my observation of a number of Armies that most aren't nearly as good as they like to think they are. I see no reason why the British -- or the US -- should be exceptions to that rule...

Though I think tatters is a bit over the top.