The UK in Afghanistan

[JMA]

Upgraded helicopters have gone into service in Afghanistan as part of efforts to bolster the firepower available to frontline British troops.

Read more here

[JMA]

What you said was:Had you asked as politely as you did in the last sentence of Comment 399, I'd have said nothing.

As it was you unnecessarily implied willful evasion on his part and that of others. You frequently make implications of wrongdoing or malfeasance that have little basis in fact and make snide and condescending comments. When called on that you're quick enough to reply with injured innocence but without truly recanting or ceasing to use the technique. That penchant obscures your often valid observations and legitimate questions.

Seems unnecessary and counterproductive to me but certainly your prerogative so long as it stays reasonably civil.

Ken, with respect you are not reading the exchange accurately. You really need to learn to understand the Brit psyche. Although we left "the green and pleasant land" in 1793 we have kept in touch.

Now Red Rat would have read my response and gone back to his post to see what prompted me to say that. He would have seen that he had made a 'smart' insinuation about the good colonel's real reason for resigning. Did you pick up on that? Colonel not here to defend himself.

The only thing Red Rat did not do was to start his reply with the words "fair cop" but certainly he knew why he got a kick on the shin. You following this Ken?

[Ken White]

and that's why I suggested you avoid the implications and derogatory tone.

You really need to learn to understand the Brit psyche.

Actually, I do not need to do so though it might be beneficial for you to understand the American psyche.

He would have seen that he had made a 'smart' insinuation about the good colonel's real reason for resigning. Did you pick up on that? Colonel not here to defend himself.

In reverse order, he is not here and that's actually irrelevant. Yes, I picked up on that -- made sense to me. That "reason" may or may not be true -- but you did not address that, you merely made a snide implication that Red Rat and possibly others were deliberately using a ploy to avoid answering your questions.

The only thing Red Rat did not do was to start his reply with the words "fair cop" but certainly he knew why he got a kick on the shin. You following this Ken?

As I pointed out, I have no quarrel with your "kick on the shin" (though I do think it's grasping at straws...).

My issue was and is with the implication in and the overall tone of your Comment 396. Had you said what you now say or said in 399 or otherwise been civil, we wouldn't be having this interchange. I'll also note that yet again, you adroitly cover an accusation by implication with a protestation of innocence -- but this time you do not affect the innocent accused act, you instead drop a little unnecessary sarcasm on top of it. The issue isn't content, it's presentation and you aren't doing well in that regard. You following that, JMA?

[JMA]

and that's why I suggested you avoid the implications and derogatory tone.Actually, I do not need to do so though it might be beneficial for you to understand the American psyche. In reverse order, he is not here and that's actually irrelevant. Yes, I picked up on that -- made sense to me. That "reason" may or may not be true -- but you did not address that, you merely made a snide implication that Red Rat and possibly others were deliberately using a ploy to avoid answering your questions.As I pointed out, I have no quarrel with your "kick on the shin" (though I do think it's grasping at straws...).

My issue was and is with the implication in and the overall tone of your Comment 396. Had you said what you now say or said in 399 or otherwise been civil, we wouldn't be having this interchange. I'll also note that yet again, you adroitly cover an accusation by implication with a protestation of innocence -- but this time you do not affect the innocent accused act, you instead drop a little unnecessary sarcasm on top of it. The issue isn't content, it's presentation and you aren't doing well in that regard. You following that, JMA?

Loud and clear Ken

[davidbfpo]

Moderators Note

This thread appears to be tipping over the edge of debate into acrimony. A couple of days ago I said:

I ask that everyone who is contributing pause for awhile and reflect on how this debate is going. If necessary I will 'lock' the thread up for a temporary "cooling off" period.

Well now I am locking the thread for a short "cooling off" period and will re-open it on Sunday. Any new items can be saved up. Thank you.

[davidbfpo]

I have unlocked this thread and will watch it closely.

The new UK Foreign Secretary has made some comments: http://www.newyorker.com/online/blog...ghanistan.html

Another UK minister, the Defence Secretary, made a "own goal" statememt too and this was: insisted that British soldiers were not there

for the sake of the education policy in a broken 13th- century country"

From:http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2...ops-withdrawal

[Pete]

The following story on the Gurkhas from the Daily Telegraph in London emphasizes population-centric COIN rather than combat operations.

How the Gurkhas are fighting the Taliban with a smile

The Gurkhas are making a big impression on the people of Helmand province, but will that be enough? Ben Farmer reports from Afghanistan

From Ben Farmer in Afghanistan
Published: 7:00AM BST 29 May 2010

The Gurkhas have become the latest weapon in the battle for hearts and minds in Afghanistan. Recently, a gaggle of dusty boys and girls warily approached the unfamiliar figures resting in a ditch shaded by fig trees. Five minutes later they were giggling in the late afternoon sun, joking with the legendary Nepalese soldiers.

Southern Nahr-e-Seraj, in the notorious Helmand province administered by the British, was last summer the battleground of the bloody Panther’s Claw offensive. Eleven British soldiers died in fighting to secure a corridor from Helmand’s capital, Lashkar Gah, to Gereshk, its economic hub. The offensive tried to extend the writ of Hamid Karzai’s ineffective national government so it could bring health, education and justice to Helmand’s residents.

Nearly 12 months on, the Gurkhas are stationed in a small strip of fertile farmland in Nahr-e-Seraj, training the Afghan police and army, building checkpoints and guarding a new road linking the main towns. Commanders believe the soldiers are ideal for the role. A shared love of Bollywood means the Gurkhas and the Afghans can often converse in Hindi or Urdu, where British soldiers are forced to rely on a handful of interpreters. The link builds bridges and brings life-saving information.

The entire article can be read by clicking here.

[JMA]

The following story on the Gurkhas from the Daily Telegraph in London emphasizes population-centric COIN rather than combat operations.

The entire article can be read by clicking here.

Pete, I'm not sure what your point is.

It is neither a choice of one or the other it is a question of which to apply under which circumstances and in what mix. If there are guys walking around with guns or planting IEDs you kill them. That should be a non negotiable. Your strategy towards the population would require a different effort probably from people with a different skill set. If these "civilians" are the ones who lay the IEDs at night or pick up hidden weapons when it suits them then you have an added problem.

[davidbfpo]

A delayed post as I am catching up on reviewing magazines etc and placed here as it is political, although there is an active thread on the UK & Afghanistan.

Note written before the General Election:http://www.spectator.co.uk/columnist...election.thtml

Not that much has changed since the coalition took office.

[JMA]

Man, this article is wild...

Doug Beattie on Helmand

Can anyone explain what on earth he means by: "They (the US) have 20,000 soldiers in Helmand, rising to 50,000; although, to our credit, much of what they are doing is based on experience and insight gained by the British."

[davidbfpo]

JMA,

I too read The Times article and have briefly looked at the author's website learning he retired from the UK Army in protest, but as a TA reservist is going back with his old unit (RIR Royal Irish Regiment).

He explains why here: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle7095768.ece

His book's website is: http://www.dougbeattie.com/

I'd say he is well qualified to write and comment on the UK's performance, now whether the US is learning from us - that's quite different IMHO.

[JMA]

I myself have been guilty on using 'presence' as a crux for a lack of a tactical appreciation.

I accept that the label 'presence' isn't the root cause of poor patrolling. What it does do, in my opinion and in my experience, is shield incompetency and inefficiencies. Get rid of the presence label and some shortcomings would be revealed, allowing the real causes (training, proper campaign planning and the maintenance of mission command) to be properly rectified.

Chris it has been established that you can't "secure the population" by strolling through their village a couple of times a week.

In the absence of hard intel to act upon what other choice do they have but to wander around and clothe this activity in terms like "presence patrol" and claim all manner of benefits that accrue through the exercise. I feel the frustration from here.

Wonder if anyone will venture to answer the question as to how much hard intel has been received by these presence patrols which has been translated into Taliban kills? Very, very few I am starting to believe.

Sad how few people question the strategy and tactics.

From the beginning of the Brit involvement the use of patrol houses (which are now called FOBs) was an error. Not much has changed. Flogging a dead horse.

I am really saddened that so many years into this war no alternatives have been explored and adopted to secure the population. Maybe the focus is wrong. Maybe time to ask the question securing them from what?

[William F. Owen]

Wonder if anyone will venture to answer the question as to how much hard intel has been received by these presence patrols which has been translated into Taliban kills? Very, very few I am starting to believe.

Do you really think it would be answered in an open source forum?
The fact is that it is better to patrol than not to. If you want to better understand the basics behind modern patrol operations/doctrine, start a thread and those who are experienced and informed on the matter can pitch in.

Sad how few people question the strategy and tactics.

I agree. Most of us here do, and that is why we are here. I actually do it as part of my job, - BUT you have to be informed on the subject to discuss them in a useful way. Luckily for most, the cost of entry is very low.

From the beginning of the Brit involvement the use of patrol houses (which are now called FOBs) was an error. Not much has changed.

Platoon Houses are not FOBs. What is the problem with a FOB anyway?

Maybe the focus is wrong. Maybe time to ask the question securing them from what?

That is the question we have all been asking for the last 3 years. If you read some of the past threads, this should become apparent.

[JMA]

Do you really think it would be answered in an open source forum?

Yea, saved by the so-called security concerns. I really wonder if it is possible to tally up the thousands or more likely millions of wasted man hours of soldiers wandering around in Helmand.

Been watching Tim Marshall's TV reports on Sky from Afghanistan. More patrolling over open ground. What are they expecting to find?

What is the problem with a FOB anyway?

What exactly is their purpose?

[William F. Owen]

Yea, saved by the so-called security concerns.

Well they're real concerns. - and with your experience they should not need to be pointed out.

Been watching Tim Marshall's TV reports on Sky from Afghanistan.

Really. I know Tim. Used to work with him at Sky. Nice chap. Ex-RAF.

More patrolling over open ground. What are they expecting to find?

Context?

What exactly is their purpose?

A Forward Operating Base is designed to give you a reasonably robust presence in useful proximity to your AO. It is usually a Coy+ or Coy- location, but can be BG location for multiple agencies. In addition to supporting, sustaining and maintaining operations it may or may not be used as a location for EO/EW surveillance, and/or "other means." It's proximity and relevance to other locations will be based on a wide variety of criteria.

[Red Rat]

Patrolling in open ground.

Knowing the topography of Helmand and the UK AO patrolling in open ground is normally conducted as:

• a means to get from A to B with being channeled through vulnerable points
• providing overwatch for units operating in the green zone
• Recce/interdiction/disruption of locales of interest to us or insurgents (routes, Firing Points, RVs etc)

FOBs/patrol houses provide a footprint through which forces can maintain overwatch on the ground, mentor ANSF and governance structures, collect intelligence et al. My FOB location was based on the requirement to colocate with my affiliated indigenous unit and protect a vital C3 node. It also then allowed me to maximise time on the ground mentoring local forces and develop local intelligence thereby leading to targeted strike operations.

[Red Rat]

I really wonder if it is possible to tally up the thousands or more likely millions of wasted man hours of soldiers wandering around in Helmand.

I would hope this is not the case. Patrols should always be as the result of intelligence or to get intelligence or to achieve tangible operational effect such as supporting other ops.

[JMA]

Was true then, is true now.

The Afghanistan Problem
Gilles Dorronsoro
LOS ANGELES TIMES, OCTOBER 20, 2009

[davidbfpo]

Equipment issues again: the sub-headline text:

The Army’s most decorated serving soldier has condemned a four-decade old tank being used in Afghanistan as a vulnerable “problem vehicle”.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...d-soldier.html

[William F. Owen]

Two Issues arising from the two previous posts:
Secure the population.
Said it once, I'll say it again. This is a dumb idea. It makes no sense. H
CVR-T
The issues with Scimitar CVR-T have been known for 30 years. It's a piece of junk, with very poor levels of protection, and should never have replaced the FV-600 series, which were protected against mines. - at least level 2a was proven in Oman.
EG: FV-600 was deployed in Northern Ireland. CVR-T never was - as far as I know. At best CVR-T was a cheap and marginal tracked support vehicle for formation reconnaissance in Europe.